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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I set out to answer two main questions: why does circulating 
capital become fixed in Beirut’s built environment, and how does this happen? 
Through conducting interviews with real estate developers, residents, architects, 
public officials, bankers and other relevant agents, through site surveys, the 
consultation of land and commercial registry records, real estate brochures and 
other primary material, I reconstruct the material and institutional components 
that explain the urban transformation of Beirut. I argue that this transformation 
constituted a “spatial fix”, where surplus capital was switched into the built 
environment to temporarily stave off a crisis of overaccumulation, in this case 
upper middle-class to high-end real estate, following a significant increase in capital 
flows to the country in 2008. The first part of the dissertation looks at the reasons 
for this spatial fix. I argue that the influx of excess liquidity can be explained by the 
Lebanese banking system escaping the financial crisis, consequently being able to 
offer higher interest rates than banks in countries that were affected by the crisis. 
Besides being constrained by conservative lending regulations, the banks had not 
engaged in risky financial products because they found a profitable outlet in 
lending to the government, who paid high interest rates, crowding out loans to the 
private sector. The banks were able to lend such large sums because of remittances 
and transfers from Lebanon’s large expatriate population, as well as funds from the 
Gulf following the steady rise in oil prices.  
As public debt increasingly had to be rolled over, however, interest rates 
declined. When after the crisis a large amount of liquidity found its way to 
Lebanon’s banks, they found an outlet for their capital when the Central Bank 
provided incentives that encouraged mortgage lending, leading to a major boom in 
loans to the housing and construction sectors and massive profits for the banks. I 
argue that these profits should be situated within “networks of accumulation”, 
consisting of persons with overlapping interests in banking, real estate and politics, 
who direct these capital flows and influence the legal framework that decides the 
ways in which these can be used to exploit the built environment. These networks 
are not so much a result of corruption, but of the social relations of capitalism, 
where the constraints of the laws of competition incentivize agents to concentrate 
and centralize capital, resulting in a tendency to monopolize. Capitalism in Lebanon 
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was made through alliances and networks such as these, preventing the rise of a 
welfare or developmentalist state to temper these tendencies. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I set out to explore the materialization of 
the spatial fix in Beirut’s built environment, more specifically in the neighborhoods 
of Mar Mikhael, Zokak el-Blat and Corniche en-Nahr. I show how the legal 
framework in place created conditions for a large “rent gap” to occur, i.e. the 
difference between actual ground rent and potential ground rent under a plot’s 
“highest and best use.” The existence of rent controls ensured a low actual return 
from buildings where this was the main form of tenancy. The legal framework 
related to construction allowed for a much higher exploitation of a plot of land, 
especially after changes to the Building Law in 2004. This, coupled with the absence 
of any heritage protection framework, provided a significant incentive for property 
owners to sell their buildings to developers, who would demolish them, usually 
merge the plot with some neighboring plots, and construct a high rise to fully profit 
from the exploitation of the plot as allowed in the Building Law.  
The ways in which the rent gap was closed, however, varied greatly and were 
influenced by many factors, some of which have received little attention in the 
literature on gentrification (i.e. on the process whereby higher-income dwellers and 
uses displace lower-income ones). These include the presence of art-related 
activities and creative industries, the legacies of (sectarian) conflict and 
displacement, the related territorial stigma of an area, and an area’s location in 
terms of accessibility by car or proximity to upmarket shopping and entertainment 
districts. In Corniche en-Nahr, I show how the area’s industrial character was used 
to connect its redevelopment to the redevelopment of brownfields in the United 
States and Western Europe and became part of an imagined urban world of loft 
living, shared by investors who referred to their experiences as Lebanese traveling 
and living abroad, pointing to the ways in which space is always constituted by 
multiple translocal relations.  
My findings contribute to theories on the rent gap, gentrification, urban political 
economy, the production of networks of accumulation, the structure, function and 
influence of diasporas, the historical development of secondary circuits of 
accumulation and neoliberalism, postcolonial/Marxist debates, the geographies of 
the financial crisis and the financialization of housing and land. As a case from the 
“South”, they bring dimensions in that might open up relevant questions on the 
transformation of cities everywhere and the spatial fix underlying these 
transformations. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit doctoraat beantwoordt twee hoofdvragen: waarom wordt circulerend kapitaal 
gefixeerd in de gebouwde omgeving van Beiroet, en hoe gebeurt dit? Via het 
afnemen van interviews met projectontwikkelaars, bewoners, architecten, 
ambtenaren, bankiers en andere actoren, het raadplegen van kadastrale en kamer 
van koophandel-documenten, onroerend goed-brochures en ander 
bronnenmateriaal, reconstrueer ik de materiële en institutionele componenten die 
Beiroet’s stedelijke transformatie verklaren. Ik beargumenteer dat deze 
transformatie een “spatial fix” vormde, waarbij surplus kapitaal naar de gebouwde 
omgeving “geswitched” werd om tijdelijk een crisis van overaccumulatie te 
voorkomen, in dit geval naar vastgoed voor de hogere (midden)klassen, nadat 
kapitaalstromen naar Libanon significant toenamen in 2008.  Het eerste deel van het 
doctoraat onderzoekt de redenen voor deze “spatial fix”. Ik beargumenteer dat de 
instroom van surpluskapitaal verklaard kan worden doordat Libanese banken aan 
de financiële crisis ontsnapten, waardoor zij een hogere rente konden bieden dan 
banken in andere landen. Afgezien van het feit dat de banken beperkt werden door 
conservatieve regelgeving met betrekking tot lenen, hadden zij niet geïnvesteerd in 
riskante financiële producten omdat ze een winstgevende opening vonden in 
kredietverstrekking aan de regering, die hoge rentes betaalde waardoor leningen 
aan de private sector verdrongen werden. De banken konden zoveel krediet 
verstrekken vanwege de overschrijvingen van Libanon’s grote expatgemeenschap 
en fondsen uit de Golfstaten vanwege de gestage stijging van de olieprijzen. 
De toenemende herfinanciëring van de staatsschuld verlaagde de rente. Toen er 
na de crisis een grote hoeveelheid liquiditeit naar Libanon’s banken stroomde, 
vonden de banken een opening voor hun kapitaal toen de Centrale Bank 
stimulansen voor hypotheekleningen introduceerde. Dit leidde tot een grote bloei 
in dit soort leningen, en resulteerde in hoge winsten voor de banken. Ik 
beargumenteer dat dit gesitueerd moet worden in “netwerken van accumulatie”, 
die bestaan uit personen met overlappende belangen in het bankwezen, onroerend 
goed en de politiek, die deze kapitaalstromen dirigeren en het onderliggende 
wettelijk kader beïnvloeden dat bepaalt hoe deze gebruikt mogen worden om de 
gebouwde omgeving te exploiteren. Deze netwerken zijn niet zozeer het gevolg van 
corruptie, maar van de sociale relaties van het kapitalisme, waar de beperkingen 
opgelegd door concurrentiewetten agenten stimuleren om kapitaal te concentreren 
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en centraliseren, wat resulteert in monopolisering. Kapitalisme in Libanon werd 
door dit soort allianties en netwerken gemaakt, wat het ontstaan van een welvaarts- 
of ontwikkelingsstaat die dit soort tendensen kon temperen voorkwam. 
In het tweede deel van dit doctoraat onderzoek ik de realisatie van de “spatial 
fix” in Beiroet’s gebouwde omgeving, om precies te zijn in de buurten Mar Mikhael, 
Zokak el-Blat en Corniche en-Nahr. Ik laat zien hoe het bestaande wettelijk kader de 
voorwaarden voor een grote “rent gap” schiep, d.w.z. het verschil tussen de actuele 
grondrente en de potentiële grondrente onder het “hoogste en beste gebruik” van 
een plot. Sociale huur leidde tot lage inkomsten;  de bouwwet stond een veel hogere 
exploitatie van een perceel land toe, vooral nadat deze werd veranderd in 2004. Dit, 
samen met de afwezigheid van erfgoedbescherming, stimuleerde 
vastgoedeigenaren hun gebouwen te verkopen aan projectontwikkelaars, die ze 
vervolgens sloopten, het perceel samenvoegden met aangrenzende percelen, en 
hoogbouw neerzetten om volledig van de exploitatie van het land zoals toegestaan 
in de bouwwet te kunnen profiteren. 
De manieren waarop de “rent gap” werd gedicht verschilden echter in grote 
mate en werden door vele factoren beïnvloed, waarvan sommigen onderbelicht zijn 
gebleven in de literatuur over “gentrification” (d.w.z. het proces waarbij woningen 
en activiteiten voor hogere inkomens die voor lagere inkomens verdringen). Deze 
omvatten de aanwezigheid van kunstgerelateerde en creatieve industrieën, de 
erfenis van (sektarisch) conflict, het gerelateerde stigma van een buurt, en de 
locatie in termen van toegankelijkheid per auto of nabijheid van duurdere winkel- 
en entertainmentdistricten. In Corniche en-Nahr werd duidelijk hoe het industriële 
karakter van het gebied gebruikt werd om zijn herontwikkeling te verbinden aan 
die van industriegebieden in de Verenigde Staten en West-Europa, en onderdeel 
werden van een ingebeelde wereld van stedelijk “loft living”, gedeeld door 
investeerders die naar hun ervaringen verwezen als Libanezen werkend of reizend 
in het buitenland. Dit wijst op de manieren waarop een plaats altijd bestaat uit 
verschillende relaties die voorbij de plaats zelf reiken 
Mijn bevindingen dragen bij aan theorieën over de “rent gap”, “gentrification”, 
stedelijke politieke economie, de productie van netwerken van accumulatie, de 
structuur, functie en invloed van diaspora’s, de historische ontwikkeling van 
secundaire circuits van accumulatie en neoliberalisme, postkoloniale/Marxistische 
debatten, de geografieën van de financiële crisis en de financialisering van de 
huizenmarkt en grond. Als een casus uit het “Zuiden” brengen zij dimensies binnen 
die relevante vragen kunnen oproepen over de transformatie van steden overal en 
de “spatial fix” die hieraan ten grondslag ligt.   
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Introduction 
Beirut is the capital of the tiny, 10,452km2 Eastern Mediterranean country of 
Lebanon, and home to roughly half its population.1 Besides its four million 
inhabitants, who belong to eighteen different religious sects, around two million 
refugees from Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Sudan have sought shelter there, and many 
tens of thousands of people from Africa and Asia are working in low-skilled jobs and 
domestic services. This vibrant and diverse city, known during the 1960s and -70s as 
the “Switzerland of the Middle East” where the rich came to play, and during the 
1970s and -80s as the epitome of the horrors of civil war, is once again attracting 
attention. A growing amount of articles portrays Beirut as a somewhat 
extraordinary place,2 destroyed many times but, like a phoenix, rising from its ashes 
over and over again: ‘simply a city that won’t die’ (Quinn, 2014) ‘no matter how 
many attempts are made on its life’ (Abdelnour, 2009). It dazzles its visitors with its 
stylish, partying inhabitants: ‘cocktail-dress Beiruti women belly dance with their 
designer-jeans-clad partners supping cocktails’ (Levine, 2012), while reminders of 
the civil war and current sectarian tensions are found everywhere: ‘Beirut is the 
party capital of the Middle East, but even when clubbing at renowned nightspot 
BO18 reminders of a tumultuous recent past are not far away’ (Hume, 2012). ‘It’s 
often hard to tell which is a shelled building and which is a construction site’ 
(Henderson, 2012). Authors like to highlight what are perceived as its 
contradictions: ‘Groups of girls, some with headscarves, others without, some with 
crosses around their necks, others without (…) walk freely past each other’ (Nair, 
2013, p. 11). The coexistence of tremendous wealth and decadence with miserable 
poverty, of cultural and religious extremes, of a thriving nightlife and a growing 
hospitality sector with a nearby war and occasional bomb attacks have led many to 
describe the city as an exceptional space, outside the norm, defying understanding 
(see also J. Nasr & Verdeil, 2008). 
                                                       
1 There is a distinction between the area of Beirut City proper and the Greater Beirut or Beirut 
Metropolitan Area. The latter counts the suburbs as part of the city, and is the scale from which the two 
million-estimate has been derived. 
2 Articles are listed in the bibliography (Abdelnour, 2009; Al-Sayegh, 2011; Alami, 2011; Barnard, 2012; 
Bercah, 2013; Boano & Chabarek, 2013; Carmona, 2013; Cheshes, 2013; De Cauter, 2011; Feldman, 2010; 
Henderson, 2012; Hume, 2012; Hunter, 2013; Karimi, 2013; Levine, 2012; Nair, 2013; Ohrstrom, 2006; 
Owens, 2009; Quinn, 2014; Sherwood, 2012; C. Thornton, 2014; Totten, 2013). 
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Figure 1-The worlding of Beirut. 
Many of these reports are full of gross generalizations, clichés and blatant factual 
inaccuracies.3 Lebanese have repeatedly protested them in various, often hilarious 
ways.4 The “worlding”5 that these articles perform unfortunately led to a lack of 
attention in the media to other issues that are perhaps more interesting.  
                                                       
3 For example, Bercah (2013) states that ‘no evidence of infrastructural development (highways, traffic 
lights, railways, subways, buses, power grids, wi-fi, or land line networks) appears to be in the offering or 
even under the present or imminent jurisdiction of any governing body’ (this is completely untrue). 
Other errors that were easy to fact-check include information on heritage surveys, the location of 
Beirut’s former train station (Boano & Chabarek, 2013), the year of the Israeli war on Lebanon (Karimi, 
2013) and a picture of an informal settlement on the coast accompanying Henderson’s (2012) article on 
Beirut. speaks of Beirut as becoming one of the most exciting cities on earth, but his article is 
accompanied by a picture of an informal settlement on the coast. 
4 See, for example, “Derailing Beirut” by Lebanese architect Bernard Khoury, an absurd rollercoaster ride 
along the stereotypes and fantasies about Beirut (www.bernardkhoury.com/projectDetails.aspx?ID=2 
48&catid=77); the “Looks like Beirut”-certificates that Lebanese blogger Jad Aoun awards every time 
someone in the media compares an unfavorable situation to Beirut (www.jadaoun.com); and the work of 
Lebanese-Iraqi architect, blogger and satirist Karl Sharro, which often turns representations of Lebanon 
or the Middle East more generally on their heads by giving Western countries the same treatment 
(www.karlremarks.com/2014/03/unpreced ented-images-of-western-people.html). Other responses 
include “Every single article ever written about being gay in Beirut in one convenient article” 
(www.huffingtonpost.com/raja-farah/every-single-article-ever-written-about-being-gay-in-beirut-in-
one-convenient-article_b_4221387.html); “Foreign Journalists, Can You Stop The Cliché & Poorly 
Researched Articles About Lebanon?” (stateofmind13.com/2015/07/20/foreign-journalists-can-you-stop-
the-cliche-poorly-researched-articles-about-lebanon); “BREAKING NEWS – OMG: Beirut Girls Love to 
Party!” (www.zahrahankir.com/%3Fp%3D466) and  “Through western eyes , Beirut is perpetually 
partying or at war” (www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/through-western-eyes-
beirut-is-perpetually-partying-or-at-war). 
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As will become clear from this dissertation, Beirut is a very interesting city indeed, 
but this has less to do with any inherently exceptional or exotic qualities than the 
myriad and intricate factors that influence the ways in which capital is invested and 
moved around in its built environment. As I will show, while processes of capital 
motion and fixation in Beirut resemble processes elsewhere, the Lebanese case 
presents us with some dimensions that need to be taken into account in order to 
fully understand this process and that are not readily discussed in the urban studies 
literature. 
I did not arrive at these insights from the start, but these grew gradually after I set 
out to investigate Beirut’s urban transformation since the end of the Lebanese civil 
war (1975-1991), more specifically the production of real estate for the upper 
middle classes and elite from 2008 to the present. I limit myself to this category 
because the majority of new projects in Beirut are aimed at this social class.6 Indeed, 
capital investment in the built environment has increasingly been observed to 
result in the production of upper middle class to high-end real estate (Smith, 2002). 
Beirut is no different. Real estate prices in the Lebanese capital currently average 
US$3,700 to US$4,700 per m27 while the average price for an apartment was US$1 
million in 2014 (Wehbe, 2014a). 
These prices put housing within the municipal limits of the capital completely 
out of reach for all but the richest of Lebanon’s resident population and its 
expatriates. While reliable statistics are notoriously difficult to come by, some 
numbers from the limited amount of surveys available show that in 2007, fifty 
percent of households in Lebanon lived on less than US$6,500 a year, while the 
highest income group, which is just 3.31 percent of the population, earned between 
US$1,500 and US$13,000 a month (Traboulsi, 2014). It should be noted that these 
numbers exclude the incomes of the small number of people who constitute the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 The term “worlding” was originally coined by philosopher Heidegger and connotes our orientations 
towards the world that are always already ongoing and generative, unmediated by analytical distance. 
Here, I will use it in the way that postcolonial critic Spivak (1985) uses it, in an essay where she discusses 
literary works and their forms of worlding. She maintains that the literature of all European colonizing 
cultures performs a “worlding of the Third World” whereby the latter functions as a domesticated Other 
that exists to consolidate the European self. The “Third World” exists in function of the colonizer, in 
order to confirm the latter’s image of itself (i.e. the opposite of the other) and justify the domination of 
the former (for example when we look at the role of the Caribbean woman in Jane Eyre). 
6 A survey of real estate projects currently under construction in Beirut easily confirms this assertion, see 
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=476196 
7 See http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Middle-East/Lebanon, accessed April 4, 2016. 
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richest class, which run into the millions per year (Traboulsi, 2014). Moreover, 
inequality has increased during the 1990s, with upper class incomes rising by 4.8 
percent and middle and lower class incomes declining by 8.4 and 4.6 percent 
annually respectively, pushing increasing numbers of families into poverty in a 
country where the cost of living resembles that in Western Europe, at least in the 
capital8, while the minimum wage stands at US$450 a month. 
While a number of lower-income people have managed to access housing in or 
near Beirut via rent-controlled apartments (pior to 1992, cf. Marot, 2014), informal 
settlements (Fawaz, 2008, 2009a, 2009b), or with the compensation received in the 
early 1990s as part of a resettlement program for Lebanese displaced by the civil 
war and/or Israeli invasions and occupations between 1975 and 2000 (Bou Akar, 
2005), rent controls were abolished in 1992 and displacement compensations are no 
longer available to the large number of low-income people looking for housing. 
Moreover, informal settlements are becoming increasingly overcrowded. While for 
the lower-middle class segment, a large number of residential projects are currently 
being constructed in the Mount Lebanon area to the east and north of Beirut, this 
housing remains unaffordable to the majority of the population, and is only 
accessible to those who can access mortgage financing, which requires people to 
make more than two times the minimum wage. It is therefore safe to assume that 
the vast majority of the Lebanese population cannot be considered part of the upper 
middle classes and elite who this real estate is built for. Indeed, in Lebanon, the 
middle class has all but disappeared.  
As the above has made clear, social inequality manifests itself spatially via, among 
others, the production of housing. The built environment is then one prism through 
which the division between classes can be clearly seen. Its uneven development is 
moreover closely related to the rhythms of capital investment, which produce it but 
are in turn shaped by it (Smith, 1984). In this way, economic processes and social 
and spatial inequalities are indistinguishable. Moreover, as we will see, the agents 
who are directing capital towards Beirut often combine the roles of politician, real 
estate developer and banker in one and the same person. Fully understanding these 
agents then requires an analytical lens that does not operate from the assumption 
that there are clear boundaries between economic and political spheres, or that 
such spheres in themselves exist as coherent entities (T. Mitchell, 2002). A political 
                                                       
8 Mercer’s cost of living ranking, which is based on living costs for expatriates so arguably not entirely 
applicable, still shows that Beirut rose almost twenty places, from place 63 to 44, on its 2015 annual 
ranking, ahead of Paris, while Brussels ranked 102 and Amsterdam 69. 
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economy perspective, where economic dimensions are situated in a social and 
political context that cannot be separated from them (cf. Aalbers & Christophers, 
2014), is then an appropriate lens for understanding the forces that direct capital 
into Beirut’s built environment and, more broadly, the social relations of capitalism 
that these forces are a part of. 
To understand the dialectic movements of capital in the built environment, I 
relied to a large extent on the Marxist-geographical tradition of political economy, 
including Harvey’s (1985) work on the urbanization of capital and Neil Smith’s 
(1984) uneven development thesis, and the related literature on gentrification and 
the rent gap (Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2008; Smith, 1979, 1982, 1996). The main idea of 
these theories is that the urban process, and more widely the production of space, 
reflects and constitutes the relations and contradictions of the capitalist system 
(Harvey, 1978; Lefebvre, 1991; Smith, 1984); an idea that this dissertations follows in 
its two parts. The production of space is what made capitalism possible in the first 
place: in order to free up workers’ bodies for the production of commodities and 
hence surplus value, they had to be separated from their means of subsistence so 
they would be forced to sell their labor power in order to survive (Marx, 1867 
[1992]). This was done through taking their land, by introducing private property 
laws, and other means of primitive accumulation such as colonialism (Blaut, 1993). 
Subsequently, the production of space took place within the capitalist system itself, 
because ‘in order to produce surplus value it is necessary that vast quantities of 
productive capital be spatially immobilized for relatively long periods in the form of 
factories, machinery, transport routes, warehouses and a host of other facilities’ 
(Smith, 1984, p. 88). This logically happened in cities, where a concentration of labor 
power was present and distance (thus time) constraints to capital accumulation 
could be overcome. The urban environment was also used to absorb capital 
surpluses and free them up again or engage in their creative destruction in times of 
crises and overaccumulation (Harvey, 1985). With the rising deindustrialization of 
many cities around the globe, the so-called secondary circuit of capital, i.e. the built 
environment, has increasingly become the recipient of capital surplus investment 
and a means of making profit or temporarily resolving crises of overaccumulation 
(Harvey, 2010, p. 85). This directing of capital towards the secondary circuit is 
termed a “spatial fix” (Harvey, 1978). 
This dissertation investigates the temporality and specificities of that spatial fix in 
Beirut. I study the transformation of the city’s built environment from 2008 to the 
present, limiting myself to this period not only because surveying the entire 1991-
 7 
present period falls outside the research capacities of one thesis, but also because 
since 2008 the upper middle-class and high-end real estate and banking boom, 
which had been ongoing since the early 2000s, markedly intensified. The year 2008 
moreover marks the beginning of the global financial crisis and, as we will see, this 
is directly connected to the boom. At the time, I was new to Beirut, having moved 
there in 2007 to follow a master in Middle East Studies. All around me, developers 
were demolishing low-rise buildings and replacing them with glitzy high rises. 
Their activities had a far-reaching impact on the quality of life of Beirut’s 
inhabitants, ranging from the destruction of architectural landmarks to pollution 
from the construction dust and generators, the appropriation of daylight and views, 
the depletion of groundwater due to private wells and, last but not least, the 
increasing unaffordability of housing due to the rising prices of land and real estate. 
Gradually, I started asking questions about these construction projects 
mushrooming all around me. Who was investing and with what money? What kind 
of legal and institutional framework was allowing these investors to demolish the 
existing urban fabric and construct high rises in its place? Who was buying these 
properties? Why did these investors choose real estate to invest in? What would be 
the consequences for Beirut’s inhabitants?  
As we will see, the spatial fix that has transformed Beirut since 2008 was driven 
by “agents of capital” (financiers, real estate brokers, developers and policy elites, 
T. Slater, 2015), mediated by the Central Bank and a conducive legal and 
institutional framework, and situated in a political economy of public debt, diaspora 
transfers and remittances and, to a lesser extent, petrodollars. Lebanon’s banks ran 
into large amounts of excess liquidity when they escaped the financial crisis of 2008, 
through transfers by its sizeable diaspora who lived in countries whose financial 
systems were severely hit and, to a lesser extent, Gulf citizens. While ever since the 
end of the civil war in the early 1990s the banks had invested in lucrative 
government bonds, this public debt was increasingly being rolled over, decreasing 
the profits from such bonds. As a consequence, when the banks ran into large 
amounts of excess capital in 2008, they increasingly switched this into the built 
environment, either directly through setting up real estate development companies 
or indirectly by financing developers and buyers through loans and mortgages, 
facilitated by incentives legislated by the Central Bank. The agents of capital behind 
this switch form various overlapping social networks that constitute and control 
Lebanon’s political economy and manage to capture and direct excess capital 
towards the country’s banking and real estate sectors. By choosing to “study up”, I 
set out to reveal the power structures, wealth and networks of these elites (Nader, 
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1972) who have the power to shape urban landscapes by controlling the capital and 
legal and institutional framework that go into their production. I identified them 
through patterns of overlapping share ownership in real estate companies and 
banks and political positions. I argue that these networks are not so much part of a 
tradition of corruption and crony capitalism in the Middle East, but that they can be 
expected under a capitalist system and its constituent social relations, although 
their shape is indeed informed by the specificities of the Lebanese context. The 
thesis therefore aims to go beyond divisions between “crony capitalism” and 
“healthy capitalism” that are sometimes posited as divisions between the West and 
the Middle East and instead look at what the forces of the spatial fix tells us about 
the social relations of capitalism itself. The first part of the thesis is dedicated to 
investigating this spatial fix. 
The movement of capital in and out of the built environment that underlies the 
production of urban space can be explained by a spatial fix, the possibilities for 
which are in turn created by the larger relations of the capitalist system. However, 
the timing, direction, spatial outcomes, alliances and relationships between agents, 
capital and ideas underlying these movements are endlessly varied and complex to 
grasp. Besides analyzing the macro-level dynamics of the spatial fix therefore, to 
which the first part of this thesis is dedicated, I also looked at its outcomes on a 
micro-level, by studying three different neighborhoods in Beirut that experienced 
capital investment in their built environment, starting with the real estate boom in 
2008. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to a detailed study of changes in 
each of these areas, which illuminated specific dimensions of this process. While 
their susceptibility to (re)investment could be explained by the presence of a 
sufficiently large rent gap (the difference between actual and potential ground rent 
under a highest and best use, see Smith, 1979), the ways in which their built 
environment and socioeconomic composition were transformed by renewed capital 
inflows varied widely. This process of transformation through renewed investment 
in the built environment, once a rent gap is sufficiently large, is called 
gentrification. It can be instigated through “pioneers” moving into an area and 
renovating its properties, an entire area being earmarked by state authorities as in 
need of “upgrading” or “revitalization”, or through other developments. What all 
these processes of transformation have in common, is that higher-income 
residential and commercial uses and residents replace lower-income ones (Lees et 
al., 2008).  
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Gentrification has received a large amount of scholarly attention since it is 
perceived to have “gone global” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Lees, 2012; Smith, 2002). 
During my research on gentrification in Beirut, I have focused on what these 
accounts explain and what they miss, what they illuminate but also what they 
overlook. With theoretical tools built using case studies in Western Europe and the 
United States, gentrification theory and Marxist-geographical accounts of the rent 
gap and the urbanization of capital more broadly did not always account for the 
dimensions I found in Beirut. Indeed, the production of regimes of truth about cities 
located in the Global South, i.e. about what they are in planetary capitalism or 
postcolonial cores and peripheries, has come under increasing scholarly scrutiny 
(Roy, 2011a). As postcolonial urbanists have pointed out, the way in which cities of 
the South are portrayed is often symptomatic of a developmentalist bias (Robinson, 
2006), where they are seen as lacking something, behind on a linear timeline of 
development, “not yet” there, deviating from a model that is often not explicit 
(McFarlane, 2010). Postcolonial urban critics argue that these are worldviews based 
on the experience of a limited number of cities located mostly in Western Europe en 
North America, whence the building blocks of urban theory were derived. These 
worldviews ignore the experiences of cities in the Global South, either 
misrepresenting them or simply not taking them into account (Robinson, 2002), and 
may make us blind to other dynamics that could be more important to 
understanding what is happening in the cities of the South.  
Therefore, postcolonial urban theory proposes two things: first, we should 
enlarge the scope of urban studies with an increasing number of case studies from 
the Global South, and second, we should develop other ways of looking at cities that 
can make dynamics in Southern cities visible, by studying these cities on their own 
terms and consequently learning from them for the study of other cities, including 
those located in the West. As the reader will see, I have taken the first element of 
this critique to heart, while I am critical of the second. As Van Meeteren, Derudder 
and Bassens (2016) point out, the postcolonial urban critique has in some cases 
evolved into a misrepresentation of the theories it sought to criticize, a “straw man 
rhetoric” that is not taking into account the actual diversity and critical character 
of these theories. Therefore, I have not found it necessary to abandon so-called 
“Western” urban theory paradigms just because Beirut happens to be located in the 
Global South. I believe that it is possible to produce knowledge on cities that is 
aware of the risk of blind spots, developmentalist or other biases without giving up 
or “unlearning” (McFarlane, 2010) theories based on their geographical origin, as 
long as this knowledge is based on sufficient research and awareness of a case 
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study’s background and dynamics, produced with an open sense of space (by which 
I mean an openness to the multiple translocal relations and connections of which 
every place is constituted), and does not claim to represent the city as a whole. 
Placing certain cities outside of existing theory a priori reinforces the already 
existing biases towards these places as being essentially different and precludes an 
empirical investigation of the actual usefulness of a theory’s tools in understanding 
urban change and the making of cities around the globe. 
In the case of the three areas I studied in Beirut, several factors turned out to be 
important for understanding the timing of renewed capital investment and the 
varied spatial and socioeconomic transformations resulting from it, some of which 
were discussed in the Marxist-geographical literature I employed, others of which 
were not. First, legal frameworks of ineffective heritage protection and a rent 
control law in limbo coupled with high exploitation ratios affected possibilities for 
change by encouraging owners to sell to developers, pointing towards the role of 
the state in creating the conditions for rent gaps to occur (T. Slater, 2015; Smith, 
1979). Second, an area’s reputation, as either an artistic and/or industrial hub that 
is “neutral” in sectarian terms, or a poor area with squatters controlled by political 
parties, influenced investors’ decisions. This pointed towards the role that their 
legacies of war, conflict and population displacement played in their trajectories of 
urban change and more generally the role of territorial stigmatization (T. Slater, 
2016) as either a justification tool for interventions to “upgrade” an area or a 
barrier to gentrification. Areas with similar rent gaps can hereby gentrify in 
different ways and areas where the rent gap is even larger can be bypassed for the 
time being. Third, areas’ locations, relative to highways or main cultural and 
commercial hubs, turned out to be important in a city with a dysfunctional public 
transportation system. This also harks back to the first point, because highways 
provide bypasses for residents who wish to cross the city while avoiding particular 
stigmatized neighborhoods. Fourth, Lebanon’s huge expatriate population played 
an important role as buyers and investors, influencing the way in which areas are 
marketed through a coming together of actors, ideas and capital that reached 
beyond the immediate boundaries of the city. These factors combined with the 
creative, contingent and speculative practices of developers and strongly 
influenced how, why and when investors chose to come to the areas and what kinds 
of projects they built.  
The two parts of the thesis then combine detailed studies of processes of urban 
change on the ground with wider political economy issues that constitute the 
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capitalist system, connecting the circulation of capital in the built environment via 
its diaspora to capitalist dynamics of overaccumulation in Europe and the Gulf, 
Lebanon’s position in the global economy, the role of banking systems and trends of 
financialization, Issues of urban change are therefore always connected to 
dynamics, actors and ideas that reach beyond the immediate geographical limits of 
the changing area itself (Massey, 2005). Ultimately, these processes result in 
winners and losers, where those with more means and power in the capitalist 
system are able to dispossess and displace those with less means and power.  
This work was guided by two main research questions that follow the set-up of the 
thesis and in turn lead to many sub-questions: 
1. Why did circulating capital become spatially fixed in Beirut’s built environment? 
a. Where did this capital come from? Who did it belong to?  
b. Why was it directed towards Beirut’s built environment at this time? 
Why was there a large amount of surplus capital that needed to be 
“fixed” after 2008? What was the role of the global financial crisis herein? 
c. How was this capital directed towards Beirut’s built environment? Which 
channels were available? Which legal and institutional frameworks 
created the possibilities for this spatial fix to occur? What was the role of 
state and financial intermediaries in this process? And the Lebanese 
diaspora?  
d. Who profited from this set-up? Which alliances and networks between 
concrete agents owning and directing capital can be discerned?  What do 
these tell us about the social relations of capitalism in Lebanon and in 
general? 
2. How did circulating capital become fixed in Beirut’s built environment?  
a. What were the rhythms and geographies of its movement? How and why 
did some areas see investment while others did not? At which point and 
why did an area become susceptible to reinvestment?  
b. What was the influence of the legal framework related to construction 
and zoning on the rhythms and geographies of capital investment in 
Beirut’s built environment? And the role of public authorities? 
c. How were real estate projects made attractive for buyers? What did 
investors need to do in order to create a sought-after area?  
d. Who was investing in these projects, as buyers and/or developers? 
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e. For all of the above sub-questions: Were there any dimensions to this 
process in Beirut that theories on urban change and gentrification did 
not sufficiently take into account?  
Throughout the thesis, a third research question is answered: 
3. What were the effects of this spatial fix on Beirut’s urban landscape and its 
residents? 
These research questions will be answered through the following set-up. First, in 
Chapter 1, I present the theoretical background that has come to inform the way I 
analyzed and interpreted my findings. I outline how the urbanization of capital and 
its movements in the built environment have been theorized, including the crucial 
role of the state in creating the conditions for profitable investment in the built 
environment and the credit system as a “nerve center” mediating capital flows. I 
show that during the current neoliberal era, capital switching into the built 
environment has become a strategy of economic growth: a neoliberal spatial fix. 
The way in which the production of urban space has been theorized has come under 
scrutiny from the emerging literature on postcolonial urbanism, that criticized 
some of these theories for being too focused on Western experiences, ignoring cities 
of the South or blindly applying concepts without taking into account dynamics 
that can offer a better theorization of that city’s dynamics. I follow the postcolonial 
critics’ call for a more cosmopolitan selection of case studies and attention to 
dimensions relevant for understanding urban change that are not readily discussed 
in the literature, but caution against “throwing away the baby with the bathwater” 
i.e. discarding theories just because they originated in Western contexts, which is a 
position some, but not all, postcolonial critics seem to defend. The third and final 
section of the first chapter outlines my methodological approach, discussing the 
case study method and triangulation strategy, reflecting on my positionality as a 
Western researcher and more personal aspects that have influenced the research 
process in various ways. I then discuss the actual methods and sources I used and 
which issues I encountered while trying to obtain these data.  
After this theoretical and methodological introduction, Part 1 of the thesis looks at 
the reasons for the spatial fix. Chapter 2 provides a background of Lebanon’s 
political economy, in order to situate and understand the findings of the thesis in 
their context. I explain the historical primacy of Beirut and its real estate sector as 
destinations for investment by referring to the city’s past as a semi-colonial center 
of trade and Lebanon’s laissez-faire ideology that ruled its political economy from 
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Independence in 1943. Beirut became a regional financial center that successfully 
attracted large amounts of oil capital to be recycled via its banking sector, to the 
detriment of the development of the rest of the country and its industrial and 
agricultural sectors. Many people were forced to migrate, either to Beirut or abroad, 
in search of employment. During the civil war (1975-1991), the diaspora swelled, 
especially in the Gulf region, and their large volume of remittances, together with 
the rise of Lebanese banks and large-scale government borrowing, set the stage for 
the current political-economic set-up. The section on the postwar period then 
discusses how Lebanon’s public debt rose exponentially following a reconstruction 
model premised on borrowing from domestic banks, and how the country’s elite, 
consisting of warlords and returned diaspora Lebanese, participated in the 
expropriation and redevelopment of Downtown Beirut, and enlarged the 
possibilities of exploitation of the built environment for profit corresponding to a 
neoliberal model. 
Chapter  3 then focuses on the post-2008 period and explains the timing of 
capital availability and the ways in which it was channeled into the built 
environment via, among others, several legal changes. I discuss the regulations and 
conservative banking policies that led to the Lebanese banks escaping the financial 
crisis in 2008. Following the subsequent influx of deposits, and the decreasing 
attraction of government paper, a spatial fix was achieved by switching this surplus 
capital into the built environment via several incentives provided by the Central 
Bank, including the provision of subsidized interest rates for mortgage lending and 
other changes. The Lebanese diaspora played an important role in this process as 
investors in the banking and real estate sectors. 
The spatial fix and accompanying mortgage industry resulted in massive profits. 
Chapter  4 looks more closely at who benefited from these profitable investment 
opportunities by discussing the overlapping interests between bankers, real estate 
developers and politicians. I show that the existing settlement serves several 
“networks of accumulation” that enrich themselves at the expense of the Lebanese 
population at large. I reconstruct some of these networks using shareholder 
records, interviews and existing literature, and argue that the way in which these 
networks dispossess the Lebanese population is not a consequence of corruption as 
such, but fits well into the way in which the social relations of capitalism, including 
competition, lead to monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies that are not unique 
to Lebanon, although its existing tradition of very little state interference in the 
population’s welfare has made the resulting socioeconomic inequalities especially 
glaring.  
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Part 2 looks at how the spatial fix actually materialized by discussing several case 
studies. Chapter  5 discusses and compares two case studies of gentrification in 
Beirut, namely the areas of Mar Mikhael and Zokak el-Blat. Both were susceptible to 
reinvestment due to a large rent gap, in which the recently changed construction 
and zoning law played a role, but also rent controls and the framework surrounding 
heritage preservation. While the conditions creating a rent gap were equal, other 
characteristics of the areas ensured that they gentrified in differing ways. In Mar 
Mikhael, the area’s perceived authenticity and image as a creative and nightlife hub, 
together with the area’s reputation as a diverse, non-sectarian space, had a large 
impact on its desirability as an investment destination and on the ways in which its 
transformation materialized, with a large role for commercial spaces on the ground 
floors of old buildings. Zokak el-Blat was mainly considered attractive because of its 
location next to redeveloped Downtown Beirut and other shopping districts as well 
as large traffic arteries, but the presence of displaced squatters as well as low-
income dwellers protected by political parties deterred investment in its inner 
areas, prevented the valorization of old buildings as commercial spaces and led to a 
concentration of new projects on its edges, skipping most of the center. The cases 
demonstrate the importance of taking into account the role of the state in creating 
conditions that allow for a rent gap to occur and to be exploited, as well as the 
importance of differences between areas that subsequently decide if and how 
gentrification occurs.  
Chapter  6 employs the case study of the construction of an entirely new quarter 
in the Corniche en-Nahr area, located at Beirut’s eastern edge. I point towards the 
interconnectedness and multiple translocal relations that came together in the 
initiative to create “Soho Beirut”, a cluster of residential real estate projects. I show 
how the idea of “Soho” and its related loft living-style has found “friction” within 
that particular area of Beirut, whose rent gap allowed for this profitable 
reinvestment to occur. Developers used the area’s industrial character and the 
presence of several art-related institutions to construct the Soho-image. However, 
the area’s reputation and dark history needed to be carefully glossed over. 
Developers achieved this by repeatedly referring to Corniche en-Nahr as a tabula 
rasa, a “virgin” frontier onto which they had a freedom to inscribe their projects not 
found elsewhere in densely built-up Beirut. The successful conjuring of this new 
landscape of urban living, and all the successful marketing creativity this entailed 
on the side of the developers and architects, are part of the way in which a sound 
capital investment in an area where the rent gap had become sufficiently large was 
connected to the redevelopment of brownfields in the United States and Western 
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Europe and became part of an imagined urban world of loft living, shared by 
investors who referred to their experiences as Lebanese traveling and living abroad. 
Finally, Chapter 7 forms the conclusion, where I summarize my findings, outline 
their contribution to urban theory and reflect on the larger questions and future 
avenues of research that they point to. What we learn from Beirut is the importance 
of looking beyond North America and Western Europe when trying to understand 
the consequences of the financial crisis and the functioning of the capitalist 
economy as a whole. It teaches us to look at the impact a large, highly educated 
diaspora and surplus Gulf capital can have on a country’s banking and real estate 
sectors, and how a differing political-economic context, with no history of a welfare 
or developmentalist state model, has been restructured during the neoliberal era. It 
also teaches us about the many specific dimensions that come into play when areas 
are gentrifying as a result of renewed capital investment, such as the role of 
conflict, a rent control and heritage protection framework in limbo, and a state and 
legal framework that allow almost unlimited exploitation. Notwithstanding these 
specificities, it is pointless to reify differences between Northern and Southern 
cities because the circulation of capital is a universal process. This process takes 
place in endlessly intricate, varied and complex ways that open up many fascinating 
research questions for cities all around the globe, that can help us understand the 
connections between the context of changing global financial and economic 
dynamics, between burgeoning cities and networks of profit and ultimately, and 
this is why this research is important, between these dynamics and the increasingly 
glaring socioeconomic inequality. 
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 1  The urbanization of capital under 
conditions of globalized capitalism 
Capital represents itself in the form of a physical 
landscape created in its own image (Harvey, 1978, p. 
124) 
The opening quote of this chapter poetically captures the process that I research in 
this dissertation: the fixing of capital in the built environment of Beirut. Capital is 
not a thing; it is value in motion, a process of circulation (Marx, 1867). This value 
can be fixed in the built environment. Within the capitalist system, one of the 
functions of fixing capital in the built environment is to avert a crisis of 
overaccumulation, which occurs when there are not enough productive investment 
opportunities for the amount of capital that circulates. Surplus value can be 
spatially “fixed”, but this spatial fix comes with its own contradictions that 
eventually lead to the devaluation of the remaining surplus value invested in the 
built environment. As a result of its inherent contradictions, capitalism goes 
through frequent periods of crisis. The most recent crisis of capitalism has resulted 
in a “neoliberal” spatial fix where states not only made the built environment more 
responsive and flexible to the needs of capital, but started to depend on it for its 
income (Weber, 2002) and in some cases act as entrepreneurial market agents for its 
production (Harvey, 1989; Smith, 2002). This has consequences for how capital 
investment in the built environment is mediated, with states stepping in to provide 
incentives to investors in sectors such as real estate, finance and tourism. Of course 
the way in and extent to which this happens varies greatly from place to place as 
cities across the world have vastly different traditions of government, political-
economic possibilities and positionalities in the world economy. Some scholars even 
argue that theories of neoliberal urbanism and Marxist-geographical explanations 
of the urbanization of capital more broadly are too Eurocentric to be useful for 
cities in other parts of the world. I discuss these criticisms in the second part of the 
chapter, where I also show how the emerging “school” of postcolonial urbanism has 
sought to redress these perceived Western biases. While the postcolonial critique 
has brought to light real problems and is therefore certainly justified in many 
respects, I identify some of its potential traps that I seek to avoid throughout the 
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dissertation, including a tendency to essentialize and reify places and concepts. In 
the third and final part of this chapter, I reflect on my methods, discussing my 
position as a Western researcher in a Southern city, the way in which I collected 
data and dealt with the often-encountered lack of reliability and accessibility. 
Together, the different parts of this chapter will inform the reader of the 
theoretical and methodological building blocks that came to guide my dissertation 
project as it progressed. They embody the ambition to do justice to the geography 
of contemporary capitalism in Beirut. 
1 .1  The urbanization of  capital  and the spatial  f ix 
Cities are crucial to capitalism. According to Harvey (1985), without urban 
environments and their assets for the accumulation of capital and labor power 
surpluses, capitalism would not have come into existence.9 Once it was established, 
capitalism created surpluses within the circulation of capital itself, and needed the 
built environment as a form of “fixed capital”10 or “consumption fund”11 (and most 
often both at the same time). Smith (1982, p. 147) distinguishes between fixed 
capital invested in the direct production process or capital invested to provide the 
means of reproduction -housing, schools- or the means of circulation –banks, 
offices, retail. The built environment is then a physical landscape consisting of 
immobilized capital for production, circulation, exchange and consumption: the 
secondary circuit of capital (the primary circuit being the production of goods and 
services) (Harvey, 1985). This circuit can also provide a temporary spatial fix to 
overaccumulation: a consequence of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist 
system. The spatial fix consists of switching surplus capital that cannot be 
profitably reinvested in the primary circuit, i.e. overaccumulated capital, into the 
                                                       
9 One should note that urban environments are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the genesis 
of capitalism. Other factors, such as colonialism and other forms of primitive accumulation, have been 
crucial as well (Blaut, 1993; Marx, 1867 [1992]). 
10 Fixed capital is capital that is used as an aid to the production process, enclosed within it or a physical 
framework for production (the built environment for production such as a factory hall) (Harvey, 1978).  
11 The consumption fund consists of commodities that are an aid to the consumption process, either 
enclosed within it or as a physical framework (the built environment for consumption, such as housing) 
(Harvey, 1978). 
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secondary circuit of the built environment where the profit rate is comparatively 
higher.12 An example of such a spatial fix was the massive suburbanization of the 
United States, carried out as a strategy to create growth, where the automobile, 
consumer durables, military industries and state subsidies played a crucial role 
(Harvey, 1978). Other spatial fixes exist as well, including geographical switching 
(moving capital to other markets in different regions). Massive capital investment 
in the built environment often precedes capitalist crises, as their trigger, not their 
cause (which is overaccumulation). Christophers (2011) has found evidence of 
massive capital switching into the built environment preceding the 2008 financial 
crisis in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Western-Europe and North-America, 
pointing towards the probability that overaccumulation became problematic prior 
to the devaluation that occurred during the crisis. Therefore, the spatial fix is only 
temporary. Moreover, the built environment, whether used as a spatial fix or as an 
aid to the production or consumption process, provides capitalists with its own 
contradiction and at some point becomes an obstacle to further accumulation 
(Harvey, 1978; Smith, 1984). The multiple meanings of the term “fix” thereby come 
to light: first, it refers to the immobilization of capital in the built environment; 
second, it denotes the temporary solution to the problem of overaccumulation 
(Harvey, 2001, p. 24); third, it indicates the new contradiction that is created. 
1 .1.1  The contradiction inherent in the built  environment 
The built environment presents capitalists with a central contradiction: capital 
invested in it (whether as aide to the production or consumption process or a 
spatial fix) needs to be recouped by keeping the physical use value fully employed 
                                                       
12 A high profit rate is sought because the capitalist system is inherently and forcibly competitive. Each 
individual capitalist seeks to extract surplus value at a higher rate than others in order to make a profit 
(Smith, 1979) by ‘adopting a superior production technique to the social average’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 104) 
when increasing the exploitation of labor (e.g. lowering wages, extending hours…) is no longer an option. 
If they do not, another capitalist will take their market share with cheaper goods (because of improved 
production techniques) and drive them out of or acquire their business. However, the way in which each 
individual capitalist acts is contrary to the interests of the capitalist class as a whole. The rate of profit 
falls as more machinery (capital) is used for production relative to labor power, from which surplus value 
is extracted. The concentration and centralization of capital help counteract the falling rate of profit, but 
also leads to overaccumulation. Overaccumulation means that ‘too much capital is produced in aggregate 
relative to the opportunities to employ that capital’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 106). Consequently, if 
overaccumulation is not fixed temporarily by capital switching (into the built environment for example), 
fixed capital is devalued after which accumulation can start anew because the rate of profit has risen 
once again. World War II is an extreme example of massive devaluation of capital, after which room for 
fresh accumulation opened up. 
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over its lifetime (what Harvey, 1978, p. 123 calls its “amortization time”). The 
invested capital returns its value as the investor receives returns on the investment 
by keeping the physical structure in use (Smith, 1982). But this use value cannot 
easily be altered, so the “productivity” of the building13 freezes at a certain level, as 
new and more productive fixed capital comes into being before the amortization of 
the old (and a similar structure can be built with less capital as the productivity of 
labor advances). The exchange value tied up in the building devalues while it also 
presents a barrier to further accumulation, as the capital “trapped” in the building 
completes its economic lifetime. When they run out of other profitable sectors with 
shorter turnover times to invest in, capitalists are forced by the laws of competition 
to destroy what is left of the capital in the built environment in order to invest it in 
more advanced production methods, so as not to fall behind their competitors 
(Smith, 1979). As a result of this contradiction, capitalists have to walk a thin line, a 
‘knife-edge path between preserving the exchange values of past capital 
investments in the built environment and destroying the value of these 
investments in order to open up fresh room for accumulation’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 
124). The built landscape we see is thus a reflection of capitalism’s past, created to 
overcome spatial or temporal limits and functioning as an aide to the production or 
consumption process, but at the same time presenting barriers to further 
accumulation. This means that capital creates geographies, and these geographies 
change over time, following the cycle of capital accumulation as well as the 
investment, amortization and devaluation of capital in the built environment. 
Indeed, Harvey (1978) discusses a cyclical model of this dynamic that corresponds to 
building cycles every fifteen to twenty-five years (“Kuznets cycles”). These cyclical 
movements are highly uneven at the urban scale, however. 
1 .1.2  The see-sawing movement of capital  and the rent-
gap 
The late geographer Neil Smith, Harvey’s former student, has specified how the 
logic of investment, amortization and devaluation operates at the urban scale (all 
the while cautioning that scales themselves are produced by capitalism as absolute 
                                                       
13 Harvey (1978) uses the term productivity rather than profitability as a more suitable term to describe 
investment returns in the secondary circuit. A productive investment is one ‘which directly or indirectly 
expands the basis for the production of surplus value’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 110), and investments in the 
secondary circuit have the potential of doing just this. 
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spaces of production and should therefore not be reified, see Smith, 1984, p. 147). 
The urban scale is where capital is most mobile (as compared to the national or 
global scale where moving capital encounters regulatory and spatial limitations) 
and hence where it has a chance to stay ahead of the falling rate of profit by “see-
sawing” from one devalued area to the next. This see-sawing movement creates the 
urban landscapes we see. It is driven by the contradiction explained above: capital 
has to be immobilized as fixed capital where it can produce the highest rate of 
profit (and fixed capital is increasingly crucial because of technological innovations 
that are needed to stay ahead of competitors), but capital also needs to be circulated 
as value because it has to be able to move around geographically to where the profit 
rate is highest (differentiation).  
Circulation then becomes a means of geographical differentiation. This 
differentiation of urban space is mediated by ground rent, which turns the use 
value of land (which does not require upkeep) into exchange value recouped as 
ground rent by the owner (with or without improvements such as buildings on it) 
(Smith, 1979): again this is a form of equalization, but this itself leads to 
differentiation within urban space. The unevenness of development is therefore 
determined most by ‘the equalization and differentiation of ground rent levels 
between different places in the metropolitan region’ (Smith, 1982, p. 145) and these 
ground rent levels are determined by other forces such as class and race:  
Ground rent is a claim made by landowners on users of their land; it 
represents a reduction from the surplus value created over and above cost- 
price by producers on the site. Capitalized ground rent is the actual quantity of 
ground rent that is appropriated by the landowner, given the present land use. In 
the case of rental housing where the landlord produces a service on land he 
or she owns, the production and ownership functions are combined and 
ground rent becomes even more of an intangible category though 
nevertheless a real presence; the landlord’s capitalized ground rent returns 
mainly in the form of house rent paid by the tenants. In the case of owner 
occupancy, ground rent is capitalized when the building is sold and therefore 
appears as part of the sale price. (...) Under its present land use, a site or 
neighborhood is able to capitalize a certain quantity of ground rent. For 
reasons of location, usually, such an area may be able to capitalize higher 
quantities of ground rent under a different land use. Potential ground rent is the 
amount that could be capitalized under the land’s “highest and best use.” This 
concept is particularly important in explaining gentrification (N. Smith, 1979, 
p. 543, my emphasis). 
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At any point in time, therefore, there may exist a difference between capitalized 
and potential ground rent. The “highest and best use” changes over time, due to 
new production techniques and urban growth that leads to changes in the 
building’s surroundings, increasing the potential value of its ground rent and 
discouraging the owner from investing in its maintenance, lowering actual ground 
rent further (Clark, 1995). The difference between actual and potential ground rent 
leads to Smith’s famous rent-gap thesis, where at a certain point ‘the devaluation of 
capital depresses the ground rent level sufficiently that the ‘rent gap’ between 
actual capitalized ground rent and the potential ground rent (given a ‘higher’ use) 
becomes sufficiently large that redevelopment and gentrification become possible’ 
(Smith, 1984, p. 150). Exactly when and where the rent gap becomes sufficiently 
large depends on which geographical pattern was created in the previous economic 
boom (in the United States, this pattern consisted of suburban development and 
inner-city underdevelopment, see Smith, 1982). 
Urban development is therefore always uneven, at any time reflecting this logic 
of investment and disinvestment: ‘capital attempts to see-saw from a developed to 
an underdeveloped area, then at a later point back to the first area which is by now 
underdeveloped, and so forth’ (Smith, 1984, p. 149). If capital manages to ‘jump’ 
these landscapes effectively, it can stay ahead of the falling rate of profit. During 
this process, we see some areas receiving renewed investment, which leads to far-
reaching changes in their built environment, socioeconomic and demographic 
structures as higher income commercial and residential uses replace lower income 
ones. This process has been termed “gentrification” (Glass, 1964; Smith, 1979), and 
forms the focus of the second part of this dissertation. 
Of course, capital is not an agent in itself, but a process of value in motion. The 
ways in which this process plays out in urban environments are highly constrained 
by the legal and institutional framework in place that determines how intensively 
land can be exploited and to what extent landlords can increase rents or evict 
tenants. Moreover, the differences in actual and potential ground rent that create 
rent gaps are actively produced. Agents such as landlords and financial institutions 
make investment and disinvestment decisions based on possibilities and constraints 
determined by the social relations and power struggles (Clark, 1995) that constitute 
society and shape public policy. These have a huge impact on how exactly the see-
sawing movement of capital is allowed to play out in a certain urban space. I discuss 
their role in the next section. 
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1.1.3  Agents of capital ,  the state and the social  relations 
of capitalism 
Individual capitalists usually do not invest in the built environment without further 
support. They would find it difficult to engage in capital switching into the built 
environment because of the amount of capital needed, the long turnover time of the 
investment, the difficulty of pricing and the fact that a large part of the built 
environment is open to collective use by other capitalists, who would profit from it 
without having had to invest (Harvey, 1978, p. 107). Therefore, investment in the 
built environment usually requires special incentives and conditions that can be 
provided by financial intermediaries and/or a state willing to finance and guarantee 
these kinds of investments in several direct and indirect ways. Without these 
incentives and conditions, profitable investment of capital in the built environment 
could not happen. 
The state has an active role in creating conditions in which profitability can 
occur (López-Morales, 2015; T. Slater, 2015; Smith, 1979; Zukin, 1982). Through its 
capacity to determine and change the legal framework related to property rights, 
zoning, plot merging and division, exploitation factors, rent controls, heritage 
protection, mortgages, and banking, it creates conditions that contribute to the 
opening and closing of rent gaps. Changes in these frameworks can have far-
reaching effects. López-Morales (2011) has shown for example that owner-occupiers 
in Santiago de Chile received a low ground rent when their properties were bought 
by developers, but that these same developers then waited until the state changed 
the regulatory conditions to allow for more intensive investment. The role of the 
state in creating conditions for profitable investment in the built environment is 
then crucial. Depending on the political system in place at the time, state regulation 
can steer capital into certain sectors and influence to which extent it freely see-
saws across space. 
Financial institutions play another important role. Investment in the built 
environment requires mobile money capital, which needs to be invested before 
actual production and consumption take place. The credit and money supply system 
create this “fictional capital” (Harvey, 1978) and is therefore often relied on by 
property developers and buyers who do not have sufficient cash to acquire a plot of 
land or a property. It thereby plays an important role in (dis)investment patterns in 
the built environment, because only those companies and individuals who are 
deemed creditworthy will get a loan. Also, entire areas can be excluded from loans, 
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as financial institutions engage in “redlining” certain districts where the actual 
ground rent is low, leading to further disinvestment (Smith, 1979).  
Recently, the financial sector has come to dominate the production of urban 
space more intensively, as the global economy has become increasingly 
financialized. In a financialized economy, profit is made through financial channels 
instead of through trade and commodity production (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005). 
“Fictitious capital”, consisting of claims to property and finance that cannot be 
realized over time, such as interests, dividends and claims to future yields of 
production (Hudson, 2010), increasingly replaces “real” capital based on the 
production of surplus value. The process of financialization, ‘the increasing 
dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at 
various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms 
(including financial institutions), states and households’ (Aalbers, 2016a), has also 
increasingly commodified urban space as a financial asset. This became visible in 
the expansion of (secondary) mortgage markets that connected property markets to 
the vicissitudes of financial markets (Aalbers, 2008; Christophers, 2011; Gotham, 
2009), and the various structured products based on fictitious claims that ultimately 
led to the financial crisis of 2008 in the West. 
Finally, “agents of capital” such as real estate brokers and property developers 
also produce the conditions under which rent gaps and, more broadly, capital 
switching into the built environment can occur. They play important roles in 
deciding which areas will become disinvested and reinvested, for example through  
“blockbusting”, whereby they acquire properties at a cheap price by playing on 
xenophobic sentiments, and then sell them to a minority group desperate to access 
housing, prompting other owners with xenophobic sentiments to move out as well; 
or by speculating on future increasing ground rent levels, thereby raising actual 
levels (Clark, 1995; T. Slater, 2015; Smith, 1979). 
State agents, financial institutions and agents of capital come together to 
determine the intensity with which capital is invested in the built environment and 
the conditions under which profitable investment is possible. They produce and 
exploit rent gaps. Financial and state institutions that control the flow of capital 
into the built environment can be seen as ‘the nerve center governing and mediating 
the relations between the primary and secondary circuits of capital’ (Harvey, 1978, 
p. 107). The logic of capital is not abstract; there are agents producing the rent gap. 
These agents are often connected in networks with overlapping interests. Far from 
a sign of corruption or crony capitalism, often associated with the Middle East 
(Leenders, 2012) to be replaced with capitalism’s “healthy” version of free 
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competition, I would argue that these patterns follow from the laws of competition 
that encourage the concentration of capital. The role of the state and financial 
institutions herein has become increasingly important during the current 
neoliberal era, as the capitalist system has become more unstable (Harvey, 1985). 
1 .1.4  The neoliberal  spatial  f ix 
While the role of the state in creating conditions for profitability has always been 
crucial, in the neoliberal era, there is increasing state intervention in processes of 
gentrification (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Policies that were previously designed to 
keep the excesses of land and real estate ground rent extraction and speculation in 
check have changed in the favor of investors (Lees et al., 2008). This is not only 
because developers are venturing into areas where they cannot bear the risk alone, 
but mostly because a shift has occurred whereby in the West as well as the Global 
South, states have moved away from a focus on regulating the excesses of 
capitalism and redistributing profits across a national territory, pulling out from 
affordable housing schemes and local government subsidies (Hackworth & Smith, 
2001). These policy responses followed a global economic crisis and the increasing 
globalization of capital that began in the 1970s. It led to the adoption of a so-called 
neoliberal model of governance in large parts of the world.  
The neoliberal model replaced earlier economic development policies that 
sought to balance production and consumption while achieving economic growth, 
avoiding overaccumulation. In most of the West, post World-War II policies 
followed a Keynesian logic, focusing on economic growth and redistribution across 
an assumed homogeneous territory: the nation-state (Brenner, 2004; Harvey, 2005). 
Across this territory, the maintenance of effective demand was central, because the 
collective ability to consume more commodities would assist economic growth, 
which was based on industrial production. This ability was protected via a social 
minimum in terms of housing, health care and employment, the maintenance of 
spending power and security of employment. These government expenditures were 
seen to create a so-called ‘multiplier effect’, i.e. generate economic value greater 
than the original investment as long as capital circulated and people saved part of 
their income (Hackworth, 2007). Private sector economic activities were regulated 
by public policy responses, such as a central bank and fiscal measures, to maintain 
competition and prevent monopolies. Domestic industrial production was protected 
from foreign competition via import tariffs. State measures directed investment in 
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the built environment towards public goods such as transportation, social housing 
and other infrastructure, and firms were paying for ‘externalities’, i.e. costs of 
production not featured in the commodity price such as pollution, via taxation. In 
the Global South, 14 the colonized part of which generally gained independence after 
World War II, national development models often consisted of import substitution 
by subsidizing domestic industries and applying high tariffs on imported goods in 
an attempt to emancipate national economies from foreign imports, a model often 
termed developmentalism (Park, 2013). In order to finance these programs, many 
governments resorted to borrowing large amounts of foreign currency from 
Western banks, which were awash with cash from the oil-producing countries and 
looking to recycle these deposits as loans. 
In the 1970s, a number of political events, combined with structural economic-
conjunctural issues, led to a global economic recession that set off far-reaching 
political-economic reforms across the globe. Increasing inflation and economic 
stagnation (so-called “stagflation”), the abolition of the gold standard after the 
failure of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, the resulting explosion of global 
capital flows and the increase in oil prices (Harvey, 2005) led to a severe recession in 
the West. Responses to this crisis consisted of chaotic policy experiments out of 
which a new orthodoxy emerged that has been termed “the Washington 
Consensus” (Harvey, 2005). This model pointed towards Keynesian economic 
models in the West as being partly to blame for the crisis: too much state 
intervention would presumably hamper the free functioning of markets and 
competition that could create new growth. However, the threat of a socialist 
alternative that was gaining strength at the time was perhaps just as convincing for 
political and economic elites eager to avoid this (Harvey, 2005).  
In the Global South, many countries increasingly failed to meet their debt 
payments due to increasing interest rates and the deterioration of the US dollar 
                                                       
14 The distinction between “the West” and “most of the world” has been framed as Global North versus 
Global South, West versus East or the First versus the Third World. Clarke (2012) explains that the term 
“Global South” originates in the Brandt Report of 1980 that used indicators of development to make a 
geographical distinction between North and South. While he maintains that some of these indicators are 
problematic because they are based on a very Western idea of what a good life is, and because North and 
South are plural themselves, he argues that the terms Global South and Global North are still preferable 
over First, Second and Third World or developing versus underdeveloped, because they do not imply 
hierarchy but geography, and are used by policymakers in both regions. McFarlane (2010, p. 728) argues 
moreover that simply discarding these terms does not undo their ongoing performative effects and in 
fact deprives us of the means of pointing out Western biases. Throughout this dissertation therefore, I 
will use the term “Global South”, “the South” or “Southern cities” to refer to places that are located 
outside of the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia/New Zealand; and the “Global North”, 
“North” or “the West” to refer to the latter locations. 
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exchange rate (in which loans were made). When governments were no longer able 
to service their debts, a crisis ensued in the 1980s. Institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) stepped in with 
emergency loans in response to the debt crisis, often partnering with authoritarian 
governments to carry out structural adjustment programs (SAPs) where Southern 
countries were to dismantle their developmentalist policies, including capitalist 
import-replacement industrialization, and Soviet-inspired state-centered command 
economies. These models were deemed responsible for creating inefficient 
industries and artificially blocking the entrance of cheaper goods from other 
countries and hence competitors, thus stagnating development (Connell & Dados, 
2014). Free market capitalism was facilitated and public spending cuts enforced as a 
condition for help with repaying the debts (Harvey, 2005). 
Hence, the economic crises of the 1970s set off far-reaching regulatory and 
institutional changes aimed at dismantling state regulation of economies, shifting 
from a focus on market failures to a focus on government failures (Hackworth, 
2007). This system of free market rule -and policies implemented to ensure this rule 
is generally characterized as neoliberalism. Harvey (2005, p. 2) defines neoliberalism 
as ‘in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade.’ The neoliberal ideology (which, it should be emphasized, is 
contradictory with its practices) maintains that open, competitive, and unregulated 
markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal 
mechanism for economic development because competition supposedly increases 
effectiveness (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a). Where economies were heavily 
regulated, neoliberalism entailed loosening controls on capital mobility, workers’ 
exploitation and commodification (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b; Gane, 2013; Harvey, 
2005, 2007; Jessop, 2002; Larner, 2000) and a delegation of social services to market 
actors, making individual subjects responsible for their own well-being (or lack 
thereof) (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a; Dikeç, 2006).  
While a roll-back of the state took place in the public welfare sector in some 
countries, state intervention to protect the neoliberal institutional framework of 
free trade was strong and happened in several ways, dependent on the inherited 
traditions of governance in a given country (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a, 2002b; 
Dikeç, 2006; Peck & Tickell, 2002). In all cases, there was ‘an active construction-and 
not only laissez-faire- of the conditions in which such a political rationality 
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[neoliberalism] can be disseminated, including markets, but also various 
institutional structures and practices that privilege competition, efficiency and 
economic success’ (Dikeç, 2006, p. 64). Indeed, to characterize neoliberalism as 
deregulation is highly misleading as it is characterized by high levels of regulation 
(Aalbers, 2016b). A new politico-institutional infrastructure was rolled out (Brenner, 
Peck, & Theodore, 2010a; Peck & Tickell, 2002), empowering supranational and 
regional decision-making bodies that shared their powers with private actors 
(Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2001) and hence increased the influence of the 
latter on public policy and planning in contexts where these domains were 
previously dominated by the state (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b; Hackworth, 2007; 
Harvey, 1989; Ladeur, 2004; Larner, 2000; Weber, 2002).  
The increasing globalization of the economy, which was spurred on by trade 
liberalization, revolutions in telecommunications, the deregulation of cross-border 
financial flows and the expansion of international production chains that have 
made transnational capital investment and flow the standard, has been co-
constitutive of neoliberalization processes (Cerny, 2014). Under globalization, 
finance, insurance and real estate (often abbreviated as “FIRE”) became the sectors 
that were expected to create economic growth in many places across the globe 
(Dikeç, 2006; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Weber, 2002). 
Capital investment was often directed away from the declining industries (who 
were increasingly moving production to a select number of low-wage countries in 
the Global South) towards these rent-extracting FIRE-sectors via incentives 
provided by the state and financial intermediaries.  
With the political decision to let go of the previous Keynesian or developmentalism-
oriented fixes discussed above, that were based on the idea of developing a territory 
on the nation-scale through industrialization and redistribution, and the focus on 
investment in the sectors of finance, insurance and real estate, cities and the built 
environment were increasingly seen as a means of making profit and achieving 
national growth and not as mere capital sinks or aids to the production process. In 
this way, attracting surplus value to urban space became part of a ‘neoliberal spatial 
fix’ (Hackworth, 2007, p. 79). Uneven development within and between cities was 
accelerated through competition for increasingly global capital flows (Brenner, 
2004) and real estate investment became a vehicle of economic development, ‘the 
leading edge of neoliberal urbanization at the local scale’ (Hackworth, 2007, p. 77). 
Many city administrators, losing government subsidies or other forms of income 
during the crises and restructuring of the 1970s, turned to “urban 
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entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989; Jessop & Sum, 2000), often policed into such 
action by finance capital via bond-rating agencies or the IMF and WB (Hackworth, 
2007). Strategies included investing in tourist and cultural attractions, urban 
flagship projects, business facilities, attracting command and control functions in 
high finance and government and/or attracting redistribution from higher levels of 
government. Authorities often provided public subsidies, in the form of offering 
public land, tax breaks or infrastructure to investors, who also benefited from 
selective deregulation and regulatory undercutting (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a; see 
also Hackworth, 2007; Jessop, 2002; Jones & Ward, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Sassen, 
1991; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). Cities experienced widespread 
gentrification (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5), a process whereby lower-
income uses of space (in housing or retail) were replaced by higher income uses, 
displacing and excluding lower-income city residents, either directly because their 
house or shop was appropriated for a higher income use, or indirectly because they 
could not afford to live or shop where they used to.  
More recently, many cities have sought to attract “creative entrepreneurs”, 
members of the “creative class” that are seen as a source of economic growth 
(Florida, 2005). This class includes people working in “creative industries” such as 
advertising, graphic design, music and the arts. By encouraging the development of 
“hip”, gay-friendly areas, cycling infrastructure and a lively arts scene, 
interventions that supposedly make this class “tick” (Peck, 2005), a city can become 
a creative hub generating economic growth (although the empirical foundations for 
this claim continue to be questioned by critical geographers).  
In short, the neoliberal era has intensified the exploitation of the built environment 
with state support. The ways in which this happens are of course strongly 
dependent on the local context and national tradition of public governance 
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002a; Dikeç, 2006; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989, 2005; 
Jessop, 2002; Ladeur, 2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Weber, 
2002). Indeed, the extension of market rule is ‘constitutively uneven, spatially 
heterogeneous and temporally discontinuous’ (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010b, p. 
188). It systematically produces differentiation. Therefore, it is appropriate to speak 
of processes of neoliberalization that are always mutating (Brenner et al., 2010b; 
Peck & Tickell, 2002), interacting with ‘inherited institutional frameworks, policy 
regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a, 
p. 349), producing new forms of differentiation and not convergence (Brenner et al., 
2010a, 2010b). There is nowhere a complete transition to a purely neoliberal regime, 
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but everywhere it is a searching process full of contradictions (Brenner & Theodore, 
2002a; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Uneven development and ad hoc experimentation are 
therefore not necessarily signs of the limits of neoliberalism, nor are incomplete, 
stalled, discontinuous or differentiated projects of market rule (Brenner et al., 
2010a).  
In the context of the Arab world,15 neoliberal reforms were implemented in all 
countries (Guazzone & Pioppi, 2009). Many Arab models of government were based 
on developmentalism, with various forms of welfare guarantees, for example 
through public sector employment, and economic protectionism. Neoliberalization 
processes entailed the roll-back of existing welfare and redistribution policies and 
the increasing repression of the poor, for example in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt 
(Bogaert, 2011c; T. Mitchell, 1999; Parker & Debruyne, 2011; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). 
Meanwhile, foreign capital was attracted through economic reforms such as the 
lifting of restrictions on capital mobility. These reforms happened in complex and 
contradictory ways, but they all facilitated and subsidized a domestic and 
international elite of investors while leaving public services and industry to the 
mercy of the market (T. Mitchell, 1999; Parker, 2009; Summer, 2005). As we will see 
in the next chapter, Lebanon has a somewhat different historical trajectory from 
other countries in the Arab world, as it never followed developmentalist models of 
government. While several institutional and legal reforms were passed that 
facilitated market investors, these were enacted in an inherited tradition of 
governance where the state already did not play a large role in welfare provision 
and had always facilitated these investors, and focused on providing the capital, 
Beirut, with infrastructure and resources, instead of assuming a nationwide scale of 
development and redistribution.  
So far, I have discussed how capital creates urban geographies and how the roles of 
the state and agents of capital are crucial herein. I also showed that during the 
neoliberal era, the state allows for a more intensive exploitation of the built 
environment as a vehicle of profit, with an increasing role for fictional capital. 
                                                       
15 Denoting the area that is understood to refer to “the Middle East”, the “Arab World” or “the Middle 
East and North Africa” (MENA) region is never devoid of colonial legacies. As Alsayyad and Roy (2004, p. 
2) have said: Middle of what and East of where? Generally, the Middle East is understood to comprise 
Turkey and Iran as well (i.e. non-Arabic speaking countries) but exclude the North African Arabic-
speaking countries except Egypt (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East, accessed November 13, 2015), 
whereas “the Arab world” would refer to all the Arabic-speaking countries of the Arab League 
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_world, accessed November 13, 2015) and MENA usually combines those two 
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MENA, accessed November 13, 2015). Throughout this dissertation, when I refer 
to the region using one of these terms, I will generally follow these definitions. 
 30 
However, the universal applicability of these theories has come under scrutiny from 
postcolonial critics: scholars who point to the fact that most of these theories and 
models have been produced by Western scholars in Western contexts. Their 
“Eurocentrism” and “provincial” origins (Chakrabarty, 2000) would make these 
theories less useful for understanding contexts in the Global South. The 
postcolonial urbanism literature, which focuses specifically on the theorization of 
contemporary urban developments in the Global South, has burgeoned over the 
past few years. In the next section, I will discuss the main criticisms that 
postcolonial urbanism has leveled at Western theory making and look specifically at 
what these scholars have proposed regarding the theorization of developments in 
cities of the Global South. 
1 .2  Accounting for difference:  the postcolonial  
critique on urban theory 
One aspect of power is the capacity to impose and 
maintain a particular structuring of some domain 
or other - a particular way of dividing it into parts, 
of keeping the parts demarcated from each other, 
and a particular ordering of those parts in terms of 
hierarchical relations of domination and 
subordination (Fairclough, 1989, p. 13). 
Postcolonial theory consists of a vast body of work that originated in literature 
studies (e.g. Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988, 1985) but spread to other disciplines such as 
history (Chakrabarty, 2000), sociology (Connell, 2007) and more recently urban 
studies. It criticizes what it calls the universalist/Eurocentric and 
developmentalist/historicist tendencies of Western theory making about and/or 
representation of the Global South that find their roots in colonialism (Connell, 
2007; King, 2000). These include the propensity to universalize theories, concepts 
and values that originated in the Global North and assume that these are valid 
across the world, and “stagist thinking”, i.e. imagining that civilizations go through 
several stages in their development, the last of which is the stage that the Western 
world is at now. Both approaches to understanding, evaluating and governing the 
world should be understood in the context of the large imperial-colonial expansion 
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of the nineteenth century, when the industrial revolution, nation-state building and 
scientific breakthroughs led to a desire to dominate, map, categorize and explain 
the world. Other cultures conquered during colonial expeditions were perceived as 
living in earlier stages of history, as particularistic (Tsing, 2005), and the task of 
Western civilization with its universal reason was to guide these people to the next 
stage. In this way, the actual practices of imperialism and colonialism were 
displaced from knowledge and replaced by a science of difference (Connell, 2007, p. 
16). 
The legacies of this “science of difference” are alive in the social sciences and 
humanities today, as several scholars have pointed out. Of course one of the most 
classic studies is Said’s Orientalism (1978, p. 3), where he showed that Western 
scholarship about “the East” (the Middle East and North Africa as well as Asia) was 
inextricably tied to imperial domination and politics and less to a commitment to 
true understanding: ‘Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about 
it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in 
short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient.’ Other classic work includes Spivak’s (1988, p. 271) (1988, 
p. 271) Can the subaltern speak?, where she argues that ‘Western intellectual 
production is, in many ways, complicit with Western international economic 
interests.’ More recently, Chakrabarty (2000, pp. 6, 12), in Provincializing Europe, 
accused Marxist and liberal ‘intellectuals of the West’ of historicism: ‘the idea that 
to understand anything it has to be seen both as a unity and in its historical 
development’, i.e. at a certain stage towards progress. He names the thesis of 
uneven development as an example (2000, p. 239; 261 note 37), where according to 
him certain elements in other cultures are argued to be are anachronistic and 
evidence of the incompleteness of capitalist transformation. In this way, other 
explanations are overlooked and coevalness is denied. Instead, he urges scholars to 
recognize the parochial origins of so-called universal concepts. In Southern Theory, 
Connell (2007) claims that theories from the Global North are assumed to be 
universally valid while those emanating from the South are seen as particular. Both 
point out that universal knowledge claims are often made from a position of 
privilege reflecting earlier colonial domination.  
Hence, the postcolonial critique has pointed towards the pervasiveness of power 
in the academy and its role shaping the production of knowledge in the interests of 
hegemony. Because Beirut and Lebanon are located outside the West and have been 
shaped to a large extent by colonial forces (as I will explain in the next chapter), it is 
 32 
important to reflect on the potential pitfalls of using theories that originate mostly 
in the West to explain my findings. More specifically, since the focus of my research 
has been urban, I will zoom in on how theory making on cities of the Global South 
has recently come under scrutiny in a diverse collection of scholarship that is often 
referred to as “postcolonial urbanism.” 
1.2.1  Postcolonial  urbanism  
Recently, the postcolonial critique has been expanded to scholarship on cities in the 
Global South. While scholars have critically examined Western theory production 
on urban space in the South earlier on (Abu-Lughod, 1975; D. Slater, 1992), it was 
not until the publication of Robinson’s Ordinary Cities (2006) that a discernable 
literature called “postcolonial urbanism” or “postcolonial urban studies” has 
emerged. This literature criticized urban theory for overlooking the realities of 
most of the urban world and generalizing or universalizing concepts whose origins 
are in fact parochial or “provincial” (Fortuna, 2012; King, 2000; McFarlane, 2008; 
Robinson, 2002, 2005, 2006). Urban theory has been informed by ‘a relatively small 
group of highly visible theorists [who] tend, perfectly reasonably, to write about 
their own backyards’ (Parnell & Robinson, 2012, p. 595), prioritizing ideas relevant 
to cities forged by the industrial revolution. Indeed, sometimes an urban theorist 
such as Harvey (1982, p. xii) can be caught writing as if the Western experience 
represents a universal experience: ‘In a world in which large cities have lost many 
of their traditional manufacturing functions but in which the imperialism of 
shifting tastes and fashions appears ever more important, it may well be that this 
traditional role of large cities can become part of a vital strategy for urban survival.’ 
This applies only to cities where a traditional manufacturing base was present; 
many large cities in the world have a different traditional base (such as Beirut) or 
are becoming manufacturing centers right now.  
As a potential consequence of this tendency to universalize, explanations based 
on the experience of a few cities travel and are applied to Southern cities without 
attention to their specific contexts and parochial origins (Roy, 2011a). Claims 
produced by Western theory ‘slip from the experience of a clutch of Western cities 
to claims about the city more generally’ (McFarlane, 2010, p. 729) that are then 
taught in universities across the world. Southern cities are merely sources of 
empirical data to confirm the theory, and not sources of theory-making themselves 
(Connell, 2007; Fortuna, 2012; Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Roy, 2011c); or they are 
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seen through a developmentalist and stagist lens, as sites lagging behind and 
needing intervention to fix problems such as poverty, pollution, megacities, slums, 
weak states, the absence of public infrastructure, environmental degradation, 
lawlessness and disease (Robinson & Parnell, 2011; Robinson, 2002, 2006; Roy, 2011a, 
2011b; Simone, 2010). Western cities are seen as the cradle of modernity, where an 
urban life full of innovation and culture is possible; Southern cities have problems 
that should be dealt with via policy interventions aimed at fixing them. This leaves 
understandings of other aspects of city life to rest with experiences in a select 
group of mostly western cities, instead of most of the world (Chatterjee, quoted in 
Robinson and Parnell, 2011). All cities occupy the same historical time (Robinson, 
2006, p. 39) and are coeval (see also Massey, 2005), but on the time ladder of 
development, the modern here and now of Western cities is pitted against the 
traditional there and then of cities of the South (Robinson, 2006, p. 7). Hence, cities 
of the South are viewed ‘through the trope of copy/unique’ (McFarlane, 2008, p. 
344): either as failed versions of Western cities or as being too different to be seen as 
a city as such. 
Postcolonial urban scholars argue that in order to do justice to Southern cities’ 
experiences, we need to expose the structures of power that shape the production 
and circulation of knowledge and expand the geographical scope from which case 
studies that inform urban theory are derived, beyond the ‘usual suspects’ 
(McFarlane, 2010, p. 728) to “most of the world” (Grant & Nijman, 2002; McFarlane, 
2008; Rao, 2006; Robinson & Parnell, 2011; Roy, 2009b, 2011c; Simone, 2010). This will 
allow processes that are critical to urban life in many places around the world, such 
as the increasingly important role of informal practices (Rao, 2006; Roy, 2009b, 
2011b; Watson, 2009), to be solid building blocks of urban theory (Simone, 2010) 
instead of being dismissed as peripheral or developmental issues. For example, the 
world cities literature is said to focus on a very small segment of the urban 
economy, ignoring other (economic) processes (King, 2000; McFarlane, 2008; 
Robinson, 2006) , and also disregarding most cities in the South, as they fall “off the 
map” (Robinson, 2002). Focusing on high finance or poor infrastructure risks 
missing out on the ‘economic activities, popular culture, innovations in urban 
governance and the creative production of various forms of urbanism’ in these 
places (Robinson, 2006, p. 123) and on features that are part of globalization as well 
but that have been overlooked (Fortuna, 2012; King, 2000; Simone, 2010). These 
flaws have potentially damaging outcomes as policy makers, influenced by for 
example the world city paradigm, try to improve their ranking on the world city list 
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at the expense of the actual needs of their constituencies (King, 2000; Robinson, 
2005) (for a response to these critiques, see van Meeteren et al., 2016). In order to 
avoid overlooking crucial dimensions therefore, all cities should in the first place be 
looked at as ordinary (Robinson, 2006). ‘What lags behind is attention paid to the 
continued small and medium-level developments of residential and commercial 
districts that have occupied specific territories within cities for a long time’ 
(Simone, 2010, p. 48).  
Findings from cities in the South can then also be used to “ask questions back” to 
the North, i.e. they can lead to research questions for cities in the North that would 
not otherwise have surfaced (Fortuna, 2012; Simone, 2010; D. Slater, 1992) or offer 
expertise on phenomena that are increasingly occurring in the Global North as well 
(Yiftachel, 2009, p. 96). One strand of the postcolonial urban critique proposes to 
make urban studies more inclusive and just to Southern cities by explicitly, instead 
of implicitly, comparing cities, paying attention to policy mobilities, networks and 
relationships (Jacobs, 2012; McFarlane, 2010, 2011; Robinson, 2006, 2011a, 2011b). 
Scholars from Western cities can learn about their own objects of study by thinking 
along with scholars from other cities, by tracking experiences across poorer and 
wealthier contexts. ‘[C]ities that have been kept apart by urban theory need to be 
brought within the same field of critical inquiry’ (Robinson, 2006, p. 5). Indeed, this 
dissertation explicitly aims to bring Beirut into the same field of critical inquiry as 
London and New York and contribute to urban theory making by highlighting 
dimensions that remain understudied. My field of inquiry is however solidly 
grounded in Marxist-geographical theory. 
The postcolonial urban critique forces us to take seriously the experiences of 
Southern cities as places occupying the same historical time as Western cities 
(Massey, 2005; Robinson, 2006) and as places full of potential for theory making. 
They can no longer be treated only as places that lag behind, in need of 
developmental fixes. I wholeheartedly agree with this call because, as we have seen 
in the introduction, Beirut is too often described in just such terms, as an 
exceptional city, full of problems and abnormalities, and not as a place that could 
inform urban theory or produce more general knowledge about how cities work. 
However, the extent to which “Western” theory has failed Southern cities is subject 
to disagreement among urban scholars. 
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1.2.2  Throwing away the baby with the bathwater? A note 
of caution 
Rather than consistently reifying the distinctive 
otherness of cities beyond ‘the West’, we can de-
provincialize them by identifying how multiple 
connections with other places help construct ideas 
of place’ (Edensor & Jayne, 2012, p. 8). 
The call for more research from Southern cities to inform urban theory has not 
gone unheeded and in recent years, the number of case studies on cities of the 
Global South that engage with “Western” urban theory has rapidly increased 
(edited volumes include Edensor & Jayne, 2012; Gugler, 2004; Lees, Shin, & López-
Morales, 2015). A growing body of literature is also responding to the call to learn 
from Southern cities’ experiences, investigating informal practices in cities of the 
West, such as street vending in New York City (Devlin, 2011), or showing how 
imagined places of postcoloniality and aberrance have always been present within 
Europe as well (Dines, 2012, 2013). 
There is however a tendency in some postcolonial urban scholarship to 
emphasize the “unlearning” of dominant conceptual frameworks (Clarke, 2012; 
McFarlane, 2010) in order to allow ourselves ‘to gain knowledge of others who 
occupy spaces most closed to our privileged view’ (McFarlane, 2010, p. 736). I find 
this a problematic approach because it assumes a priori that existing theory is not 
capable of representing the experiences of Southern cities properly (see also López-
Morales, 2015). This case is often made using essentialist or simplified 
representations of these “Western” theories and the Southern cities alike. For 
example, Ong (2011a, p. 2) snubs at ‘magisterial views of how cities, their functions, 
and publics will change according to some master law of European experience. 
Today, Asian cities are fertile sites, not for following an established pathway or 
master blueprint, but for a plethora of situated experiments that reinvent what 
urban norms count as “global”’ (Ong, 2011b, p. 2). She states that the universal 
principles of globalization, namely capitalism and postcolonialism, ‘are each 
associated with a unified set of economic effects or political outcomes for shaping 
global spaces’ which cause analysts to ‘lose sight of complex urban situations as 
particular engagements with the global. We should account for the complexity of 
these engagements rather than subject them to economistic or political 
reductionism’ (idem). She hereby reduces complex theories on global cities and 
urban neoliberalism to blueprints with a unified set of economic effects or political 
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outcomes. Similarly, Parnell and Robinson (2012, p. 600) conclude that theories that 
work well for the West, including gentrification and neoliberalism, might be less 
important or insufficient to explain Southern contexts because these are 
characterized by other dynamics that are more important: ‘Our suggestion is that, 
despite its widespread use and excellent contribution to understanding 
contemporary urban processes, existing theories and critiques of urban 
neoliberalism are ill-equipped for the task of illuminating the conditions of poorer 
cities, especially those that have weak (local) states or those where the link between 
urban political elites and capitalist elites are not formalized in the conventional 
(democratic) electoral and quasi-corporatist politics of the local state.’  
As long as it remains an empirical question whether a theory is valid, I am not sure 
it is so easy to overlook these other dynamics. Theorists such as Harvey (1985) and 
Smith (1984) have, I believe convincingly, shown that capital produces difference, is 
uneven, unstable and contradictory. Capitalism does not preclude diversity; capital 
does not only strive to homogenize but actually uses difference to its own 
advantage. Cultures and political systems might vary greatly between the Global 
South and the Global North, but these differences are not necessarily an 
impediment to capital. Indeed, the Global South has been a crucial component to 
the formation of capitalism: colonies were crucial to capitalist expansion 
(Rheinhardt, 2011). Unlike Chakrabarty (2000) therefore, I do not see the uneven 
development thesis as a product of historicist thinking that predicts how and when 
capitalism will unfold over the globe, but as something that explains the movement 
of capital in any context where capitalism has become the main mode of 
production, regardless of whether this is located in the North or the South. The 
geographies emanating from these dynamics are by no means always predictable. 
The examples above however reduce a complex theory that, as we have seen above, 
painstakingly pays attention to variegation, unevenness, complexity and informal 
alliances (Brenner et al., 2010b; Jones & Ward, 2002; Swyngedouw et al., 2002) to a 
simplified version of itself, and in the process perhaps inadvertently portray 
Southern cities as spaces that are so different that they are in need of their own 
theories. 
As Burawoy (2015) argues, and as I tend to agree with him, when writing about 
the Global North or Global South, we encounter the issue of hegemony and not 
essential difference. It is not possible to on the one hand argue that Southern cities 
should be brought into the same field of inquiry as Northern ones (a proposition I 
fully agree with), and at the same time argue that they should have their own 
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theories and concepts (which some, but certainly not all, postcolonial urban 
scholars do, as I showed above). Difference-finding and deconstruction risk 
forgetting about urban-theoretical renewal and reconstruction (Peck, 2015). As I 
will show in this dissertation, the urbanization of capital in Beirut is characterized 
by some dimensions that are not readily discussed in existing urban theory, such as 
the legacy of civil conflict and a banking system shielded from global capitalist 
dynamics, but an openness to the complexity and diversity of this urban experience 
has only contributed to a better understanding of how capital shaped Beirut’s built 
environment, extending the theory instead of discarding it. Focusing on the 
questions that both theoretical frameworks allowed me to ask, instead of focusing 
merely on their answers (Lund, 2014), which are of course applicable or not in a 
different context, provides an escape from having to choose between the two as if it 
is a competition. Western-based theory, that claims to understand globalization, 
could and should benefit from theory formation based on cases from the Global 
South, but we should not throw away the baby with the bathwater. 
Of course, conceptual traveling, when an idea is applied to a new case, or 
conceptual “stretching”, when a concept does not fit the new cases, have their 
limits. However, these should not be imposed too early on, either by abandoning 
the concept for explaining the case or by inappropriately modifying it (Collier & 
Mahon Jr., 1993). Moreover, a theory such as gentrification has a long history of 
incorporating new cases and consequently being “stretched”, as its definition 
evolved from the upgrading of terrace houses in London by middle class owners to 
include large-scale state-led urban renewal projects (Lees et al., 2008). As long as 
misplaced universalism, developmentalism and categorization are avoided, and we 
do not ‘read gentrification in the Global South as simply the recreation of the 
periphery (the urban South) in the image of the supposed centre (London or New 
York)’ (Lees, 2012, p. 158) but instead discern a clear similar process (in this case, of 
renewed capital investment, the creation of a rent gap, the replacement of lower-
income with higher-income uses), gentrification remains a useful concept, as I will 
demonstrate in this work too.  
One way in which I applied receptivity to the complexity of a case was by keeping in 
mind that places are always constituted of several connections that extend beyond 
the place itself (Massey, 2005). Looking at how cities are always already connected 
to other places can prevent the reification of a supposed distinctive otherness of 
non-Western cities (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, p. 351). All cities are shaped by 
connections and travels that reach far beyond their location proper: ‘social 
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relations (trading connections, the unequal links of colonialism, thoughts of home), 
which are not only internal to that locale but which link them to elsewhere. Their 
local ‘uniqueness’ is always already a product of wider contacts; the local is always 
already a product in part of ‘global’ forces, where global in this contexts refers not 
necessarily to the planetary scale, but to the geographical beyond, the world 
beyond the place itself’ (Massey, 1995, p. 183). Capital, ideas and actors do not 
circulate freely and detached, out there in some unspecified, global third space (K. 
Mitchell, 1997), but always come from and have to find friction within specific 
places (Tsing, 2005). And these places and contexts have themselves been shaped 
through connections to other places, interaction with people and practices from 
elsewhere (Robinson, 2006, p. 101). Any distinctions Western and Southern cities as 
being fundamentally different can be critically scrutinized by looking at the 
relationships that shape these places beyond their location. In this dissertation, I 
will show how the urbanization of capital in Beirut is shaped by just such translocal 
connections and relationships, taking into account specificities, complexities and 
agency. What are these translocal interconnections producing? How do they 
mediate the capital flows into Beirut’s built environment? What are the material 
and institutional components that actually construct sites? I will shed some light on 
exactly these questions. 
To sum up the chapter so far, I have discussed two main theoretical frameworks in 
which I seek to situate my findings: first, the Marxist-geographical theories on the 
urbanization of capital, showing how capitalism shapes the built environment 
according to a certain rhythm of accumulation and crisis and mediated by state and 
financial institutions, who play an important role in creating the conditions for 
capital movements and their geographies. In cities, the see-sawing movement of 
capital creates a pattern of investment and disinvestment that explains why one 
area is developing and another one is not. I have also explained how the current 
neoliberalism spatial fix consisted of altering legal and institutional frameworks to 
facilitate capital investment in the built environment as part of a wider process of 
prioritizing the logic of the market as an organizing principle of society. Second, I 
outlined the postcolonial critique, which pointed to the parochial origins of many 
urban theories and the role of power in academic knowledge production, rooted in 
the “science of difference” of the colonial past. As a result, the experiences of cities 
of the South have often been ignored in theory-making, and instead these places 
have been viewed through a developmentalist lens as having problems needing 
intervention or lagging behind on a timeline of development towards convergence 
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with the West. As a result, urban theories are presented as universally applicable 
while they are in fact not always valid and have the potential to mute other 
explanations that might be more valid for a Southern city. Postcolonial urban 
theorists have therefore called for an urban studies where every city is viewed as 
ordinary, away from a focus on developmental issues only, and allowing every city’s 
experience to inform urban theory making.  
I then discussed how Marxist geographers and postcolonial urban scholars are 
not necessarily operating from mutually exclusive frameworks, where the former 
would miss certain dimensions that are salient to Southern cities. Paying careful 
attention to context-specific dimensions does not preclude a focus on capitalist 
urbanization, but to the contrary will improve research findings, as long as 
researchers agree on which common processes they are looking at. The next section 
will discuss how I actually went about my research: which methods I employed, how 
I collected my data, and which obstacles I encountered during this process.  
1 .3  Reflections on a methodology 
A still often-heard prerogative for anyone doing research is that they have to be 
“objective” i.e. ensuring that their findings are not influenced by their “subjective” 
opinions, blind spots and biases. Knowledge should not be influenced by the people 
who make it and their partialities and self-interests, but represent the world as it 
really is (Porter, 1995). As is recognized by everyone except the staunchest 
defenders of objectivity in science, attempting to reconstruct reality “as it really is” 
and thereby stepping outside of one’s own frame of reference and preferences and 
opinions (or even Heideggerian being-in-the-world that is always already 
accompanied by a “mood” of understanding the world before we even attempt to 
analyze it) is a rather impossible endeavor. Instead, it is more useful to be open 
about one’s presuppositions, definition of concepts and frameworks of reference 
from the beginning, as these inevitably dictate where one starts to look and what 
kinds of questions one will ask (Beauregard, 2012; Lund, 2014). At the same time, 
recognizing this subjectivity can then clarify how it influences the questions asked, 
and if this is combined with an open mind towards data or findings that contradict 
or change initial presuppositions or hypotheses, a researcher has the best chance at 
appreciating a phenomenon in its full complexity. 
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My own trajectory during this dissertation should be proof that not attempting to 
hide the baggage, questions and hypotheses with which one arrives “in the field” 
does not mean that a thorough search regarding the validity of these frameworks is 
impossible. My initial engagement with the postcolonial urban critique derived 
from exactly such an impulse, after encountering the contradictions, messiness and 
path dependencies of neoliberal urban change in Beirut. However, while this 
critique helped me see some dynamics in Beirut I would otherwise have missed 
(related to the role of the state for example), it did not steer me away from the role 
of capital in urban change, but instead made me realize that the reification or 
essentialization of any particular city, scale or location is perhaps the biggest 
problem.  
Of course, the topics one chooses are, as I mentioned above, already indicative of 
one’s preferences, opinions and worldviews. My choice to study capital investment 
in real estate in Beirut as a master’s student and later a PhD-candidate emanated 
from a longer-standing practice of engaging with higher-class appropriation of 
space and place making as an activist and researcher involved in the squatting 
movement in Amsterdam. It is there where the value of “studying up” (Nader, 1972) 
became clear without at that point having any academic reference. Indeed, studying 
elites and their impact on city making is a crucial component of understanding how 
and why lower-income residents and uses are excluded. And that is ultimately 
whence I derive its importance and why it is impossible to state that I am neutral or 
objective, in the narrow sense of objectivity meaning not having an opinion. I have 
an opinion about what is happening to Beirut and its residents and it is driving my 
research in the sense that it dictates which processes I want to look at, without 
therefore having preconceived ideas and conclusions about how these happen. 
Committed to critical theory, I have sought to dig beyond official representations of 
what is happening to look at the actual interests behind and effects of these capital 
flows. Which conditions and agencies made these facts on the ground possible? This 
entails writing about these developments not in a matter-of-fact, but a matter-of-
concern way, ‘to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist 
and to maintain its existence’ (Latour, 2004, p. 246). 
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1.3.1  Positionality as a Western-European female 
researcher 
Besides one’s theoretical and political frameworks, one’s national identity, gender, 
color and personal capabilities constitute another way in which the research 
process is influenced by subjectivity. In terms of national identity, gender and color, 
being a white Western-European/Dutch female has probably contributed to a 
willingness to speak to me and help me out, from what I have heard from other 
researchers. Kerr (2009), although a Western-European male, relates how politicians 
were very willing to speak to foreign researchers in Lebanon. Indeed, Lebanese 
researchers (but also male white researchers) have spoken to me of the 
inaccessibility of certain institutions or persons that I did manage to get access to. 
When something was not available, for example, employees usually went to great 
lengths to try and come up with a solution, providing personal contact details or 
letting me in through the backdoor when the office was closed. That said, when a 
certain interviewee or employee had decided not to share information, it was most 
certainly not possible to obtain it, no matter my color or nationality. And in that 
case, it would sometimes have helped to be another person, as the example of a 
Lebanese researcher demonstrates, who managed to obtain a building permit, a 
document normally not shared, after the employee found out she was from the 
same village as him. Also, there is the example of a friend from a well-known and 
respected family in her community who could take pictures in an area where I was 
repeatedly stopped and questioned by representatives of political parties active 
there. She was stopped as well, but allowed to continue as soon as her identity was 
discovered. The strategy of using researchers from the same religious background 
as the people one intends to interview is reported by Abdulrahim et al. (2012) as 
being relatively successful in obtaining data. Bou Akar (2005, 2012) reports the same 
kind of difficulties: being from the “wrong” sect when attempting to interview 
residents and being obstructed from collecting information by political parties. 
Thus, the info one manages to obtain is certainly constrained or facilitated by 
nationality, last name, color, and also gender. 
Moreover, in terms of capabilities, managing a reasonable level of conversation 
in Lebanese Arabic has usually led to smiles and opened doors, and access especially 
to residents and shop tenants who did not speak English or French, something that 
a foreign researcher who does not speak any Arabic would have had more difficulty 
with. Also, being able to read French sources is a huge advantage when researching 
a country where French was for a long time the second biggest spoken language. 
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However, the advantage of my language skills should not be overstated, because due 
to the strained and complex relationship many Lebanese have with the Arabic 
language (a product that is the result of a mix of colonialism, identity and elite 
politics and other dynamics, some of which will be elaborated in Chapter  2), many 
interviewees actually preferred speaking English, even if I initially started in Arabic. 
Moreover, while I can read and write modern standard Arabic, my ability to 
understand it fluently is limited, which is problematic because I have probably 
missed out on a wealth of news and discussions in Lebanese (social) media. This was 
partly compensated for by the fact that Lebanon has several non-Arabic dailies and 
that much information on the country and discussions on social media by Lebanese 
are conducted in English and French, but the fact that a researcher such as myself 
can write a doctoral thesis on a country without being fluent in its language is 
something to be very critical about. By taking additional Arabic courses and 
painstakingly translating all official records that I obtained during my research I 
improved my vocabulary, especially regarding real estate and finance, which did 
significantly speed up my reading on and understanding of these topics. However, 
the inability of many Western researchers to speak Arabic properly is indicative of 
the problems of hegemonic power in knowledge production on the Global South 
that I have discussed in this chapter. 
Added to the discomfort of not properly understanding Arabic has been the 
experience of moving away from Beirut before starting the research. Not living 
there but returning for short periods of time (lasting from two to five weeks, see 
Appendix 1: ) in order to collect data left me feeling somewhat uneasy, seeing the 
city suddenly as a data resource instead of my home. Especially towards the end of 
my research, when I knew much better what I was looking for, I had a hard time not 
assessing everything I encountered for its potential as data. Before I started my 
research, I was simply living my life in the city with a research project (my master’s 
thesis) or a job (my work as a project officer for an urban research institution) on 
the side, to which I would dedicate a certain amount of time and then “switch off” 
for the rest of the day.16 While I certainly did not work as intensely as during my last 
field visits before completing this dissertation, I did have a chance to closely follow 
and document the transformation of the city, discuss the news with friends, 
discover new streets and generally experience to a certain extent daily life in Beirut 
                                                       
16 Then again, the inability to “switch off” is a consequence of the rite of passage that every beginning 
academic seems to go through, i.e. realizing the creeping inability to enjoy leisure time and finding a way 
of dealing with this. 
 43 
(from a very comfortable and privileged position of course, and with a group of 
people that consisted for a considerable part of other foreigners). By looking for a 
place to live (I moved six times), finding out how to pay bills, get a generator 
subscription, taking public transportation and other mundane daily activities, I 
picked up new vocabulary and felt connected to the city. Moving away from Beirut 
and returning there about twice a year with the express purpose of doing intensive 
research during a limited time frame was a new way of working that took me a 
couple of years to get the hang of. While it was difficult to track the city’s urban 
change as closely and to keep up my level of Arabic, this way of working ultimately 
presented its own advantages in that it forced me to prepare my research properly 
since I knew time would be limited (a lesson learned after two especially 
unproductive trips during my first year). Moreover, because I could not do 
fieldwork while in Ghent, I inevitably spent more time reflecting on my data and 
growing my theoretical knowledge. However, the postcolonial criticism that 
maintains that Southern cities are being mainly used to supply empirics for 
Western theories gets uncomfortably close in such a set-up.  
1 .3.2  Case studies and triangulation; a mostly qualitative 
affair 
My methodological strategy has rested on studying capital investment in real estate 
in three areas in Beirut and explaining the broader political-economic dynamics 
that facilitated and mediated this capital investment. The nature of my research, 
studying processes that are not easily captured in numbers and graphs (capital 
investment, social networks, circulating ideas, geographies of urban 
transformation), and the lack of reliable quantitative data in Lebanon meant that 
my research relied to a large extent on qualitative methods: an ethnographic 
approach with extended fieldwork that included many interviews (Brockington & 
Sullivan, 2003; Bulmer & Warwick, 1993). For the first part of this strategy I relied to 
a large extent on case studies, i.e. the three neighborhoods that are investigated in 
this dissertation, and the processes I observed there led to the questions that 
underlay the second part of the strategy. My exploration of the field and the 
processes I observed therefore guided my findings and led to new questions (i.e. I 
started to wonder about the role of the banks when I discovered their involvement 
in the real estate projects I studied via media articles, mortgages on their cadastral 
records or their name on construction site billboards). Ultimately, the case study 
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method leads to a deeper understanding of a broader phenomenon, and in my case 
led me to the underlying political-economic structure mediating capital flows into 
the built environment (the political economy of public debt, diaspora remittances 
and mortgages). Of course, no research project departs from neatly defined research 
questions that remain unchanged over time, due to the ‘generous surprises’ data 
(and the people helping us obtain them) present us with (Lund, 2014, p. 224), and 
my dissertation is no exception. Each case presented its own particularities, its own 
way in which capital could be invested, in which the area was transformed, in which 
different coalitions of actors employed ideas that allowed such capital flows to find 
friction in these areas, and in this way produced new knowledge about how these 
processes happen.  
In order to understand my observations and verify my findings, I employed 
triangulation (Lund, 2014; Rothbauer, 2008), which is a way of consolidating 
hypotheses by looking for confirmation via more than one research method and 
more than one data source. This is iterated until a certain degree of saturation is 
reached and an observation can be said to occur more generally. For example, when 
a developer told me that he consulted with the municipality about renaming an 
area, I would go and interview someone at the municipality and check with other 
developers and public officials, as well as conduct a media search online in the local 
press and discuss with befriended researchers. Only then was saturation reached. 
Besides using case studies and triangulation, I combined several other, mostly 
qualitative, research methods that served to highlight different aspects of real 
estate investment and the spatial fix in Beirut. The most important of these was 
interviews, on which I reflect below. Where possible and useful, however, I did try 
to obtain quantitative data, for example on the influx of bank deposits or the 
construction sector. The data collection process with all its frustrations (my 
experience with that starting back in 2008 even prior to this dissertation) taught me 
a large deal about how things work in Lebanon and was hence a tool for learning in 
and by itself. Below I will explain how I gathered the primary and secondary data 
that inform this thesis and what this taught me. 
1.3.2.1  Main primary sources (1):  interviews 
The first and largest sources of primary data were my interviews. I conducted a 
total of ninety-nine interviews for the duration of my dissertation (sometimes with 
more than one respondent at a time), and relied on a total number of 132 
interviews, which includes the ones conducted during my master’s thesis (see 
Appendix 1: . Interviewees were selected for their relevance per case study, as will 
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become clear throughout this work. I started by for example looking at which 
developers had real estate projects in a certain area, which banks were involved, 
which existing residents were affected, or which mechanisms I wanted to know 
more about (i.e. mortgage financing incentives made me contact the Central Bank, 
the way a certain project was marketed sent me to the developer’s advertising 
agency, exploring the role of state actors took me to several ministries and the 
municipality, and so on). Many of these interviewees were contacted directly by 
either calling them if I could find a number or passing by their offices and asking for 
an appointment. Residents and shop tenants were contacted by walking up to them 
and asking them some questions, after explaining what I was looking for and why.  
More often than not, interviewees referred me to other people I should speak to 
about the topic: developers sent me to their bankers, sales representatives to the 
engineers in charge of the project, experts to their contacts inside public 
institutions, shop tenants to residents living in buildings threatened by 
gentrification… Therefore, besides cold calling, snowballing was the other way in 
which I was brought into contact with interviewees. I hereby also benefited from 
my pre-existing network in Beirut, due to having lived there the years before and 
the work done on my master’s thesis with Prof. Mona Fawaz, who referred me to 
some experts at the time. Of course snowballing has a disadvantage, because it 
potentially leads to a confirmation bias. However, because I also cold-called a 
number of interviewees without being referred to them, this bias was hopefully 
somewhat ameliorated. While it was not always easy to get an appointment with the 
people I wanted to speak to, calling back relentlessly and showing up in person at 
the office proved to be the most successful strategy of getting the interviews I 
wanted. Interviews were conducted mostly in English, but sometimes I used Arabic 
or a bit of French when necessary. I did not record my interviews nor do I use the 
real names of people interviewed throughout this dissertation, even if they would 
agree to it (which I am fairly certain they would not; without even my suggesting it, 
many respondents told me that they did not want to be recorded nor cited with 
their real names). Not recording them but typing along as they were speaking, 
when possible, meant that I could gather almost every word literally. Guaranteeing 
anonymity and not recording led to a higher quality of information because people 
felt free to speak and, as I tend to agree with Amour (2012), this is more important 
than insisting on recordings. However, this also meant that I was not one hundred 
percent present during the interviews and could not capture every single word that 
was said. 
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1.3.2.2  Main primary sources (2):  official  and public records 
(that are not-so-official  and public)  
The second biggest sources of primary data were official records of all kinds related 
to the political economy of real estate. These included Land Registry records 
containing information on the owners of plots, mortgages, and dates of acquisition. 
Accessing these was relatively straightforward: a written request and payment of a 
stamp fee for every basic record. At some point, when the amount of records that I 
needed became financially infeasible to obtain, I put in an official request to have 
them for free on the grounds that I would use them for research purposes only. 
After meeting with the director of the information department, he kindly provided 
me with all I had asked for at no charge. Another important set of data was taken 
from company shareholder records, available at the Commercial Registry. I had to 
submit a written request with a list of companies and finally had to go and speak to 
the Minister of Justice in person in order to get permission to obtain copies of these 
records (the Commercial Registry is an institution within the Ministry of Justice). 
Later, I discovered that the Commercial Registry has an online portal where the 
same information can be requested, something no one at the actual registry seemed 
aware of or at least thought of telling me, which I have extensively used since then. 
Furthermore, obtaining official information from banks on capital flows was usually 
impossible. Banking secrecy does not allow for a thorough understanding of the 
origins of bank deposits in Lebanon (Finger & Hesse, 2009). Interviews with bankers 
and at the Central Bank helped provide me with a general idea, triangulated by 
existing research. However, the wide-ranging suspicions of shadow banking with 
drugs and war money remain just that: suspicions. Illegitimate capital flows are 
hard to track anywhere, after all.  
The records I obtained at the Land and Commercial Registries had one problem 
in common: besides often being quite limited in the amount of information listed, 
they could not be trusted to be complete and up-to-date. First, it is not obligatory to 
register one’s property or company right away. When one acquires a property, a 
buyer can opt not to register the apartment for a period of up to ten years.17 And if 
                                                       
17 A “surveyed purchase contract” is a ten-year contract between developers and buyers that allows 
people to stay in their apartments for ten years without registering it at the Land Registry. If they do not 
register after ten years, the developer can retrieve the apartment and sell it to a third party. This 
measure allows people to postpone registration, which is prohibitively expensive for many, also because 
they have to pay all municipal fees they might owe at the time of registration (Bou Akar, 2005), even 
though many investors are for example exempted (Krijnen, 2010). Moreover, many banks do not accept 
this paper for a mortgage even though legally they should. 
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an apartment or a company is not registered within this time period, fines are often 
waived on a yearly basis to encourage registration. Of course, sales and other 
contracts are always made, but these are registered at a notary public and not 
accessible to the public. In this way, not only can the registration fee be avoided, 
but also many transactions can be hidden from the public because they were never 
publicly consultable.  
 
Figure 2-Examples of records I obtained at the Land Registry: a record with information 
on the plot (left) and the first page of a sales contract (right). 
Moreover, even at institutions where records are in principle available to the 
public, not everything is readily provided. When I went to request sales contracts at 
the Land Registry for example, which are more sensitive in terms of information 
than basic records because they contain the price of sale and the names of 
representatives of the selling and buying parties, I received them for some parcels 
but not for others. No explanation was given. Also, records such as building permits 
are almost always off-limits to the public. Often, even when shown an official letter 
from university explaining the purpose of the research, many public officials were 
not willing to cooperate because they viewed these data as private. Therefore, it was 
again essential to triangulate any findings (for example: comparing a land price 
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cited by a developer to land prices in the area cited by real estate consultants to the 
price paid according to the record of sale if I was lucky enough to get access to an 
up-to-date record, to the prices cited for that area or project in real estate 
magazines, and so on). 
Another issue regarding the consultation of records in public institutions was the 
way they were kept. While real estate developers’ and architects’ offices were often 
sleek, spacious, comfortable and provided with the latest telecommunications 
equipment, public institutions in Lebanon were often housed in dilapidated 
buildings, with dimly lit rooms where one stumbled over piles of suitcases filled 
with documents. Registration was often not computerized but happened via 
handwritten ledgers. The only reason I was lucky enough to obtain a considerable 
amount of data from the Land Registry and the Commercial Registry is because 
these were digitized to a large extent through a program funded by the World Bank. 
Most ministries and municipal institutions, as far as I have seen, are paper-based, 
and reasons for this might be related to how much these institutions and the 
politicians who steer them are actually willing to share. A manager of the Lebanese 
Transparency Association (LTA) put it thus18: ‘there is a draft law about public 
access to information. This is playing with words; it’s very wide and elastic, because 
first of all in case I don’t give you the information, what happens? If I’m not 
punished, I don’t give a damn about giving you something that gives me the 
privilege to control key issues in any distribution of information. Information is the 
most important thing you can have (…). The politicians will pass it [the law], but 
applying it is the problem. (…) They’re not organized and don’t want to be.’ This 
state of “the public” compared to “the private” in Lebanon is indicative of how the 
country’s political system is set up, but I will get to that in the next chapter. 
                                                       
18 Interview December 13, 2013 
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Figure 3-The state of public offices: the first floor of the building on the left houses a 
municipal office; the office on the right is at the Directorate General of Urban 
Planning. Pictures taken December 13 and 16, 2013. 
1.3.2.3  Additional primary sources:  brochures and mapping 
Other sources of primary data I used consisted of brochures, booklets and other 
information handed out to me by real estate developers, experts and public officials 
during interviews, which besides providing information on projects, procedures or 
research projects helped me form an idea of the discursive practices developers 
employed to market their projects. Moreover, I conducted neighborhood surveys 
where I noted changes in the built environment or building uses that helped me 
track urban transformation. Being a foreign researcher walking around taking 
pictures and taking notes on a map more often than not solicited the suspicion of 
public and private security, for example when a member of State Security stopped 
me in the Corniche en-Nahr-area while I was taking photos, because an army base 
was nearby. These suspicions are probably also related to Lebanon’s history and 
continuing problem of civil conflict (Kerr, 2009): surveying areas in such a way 
speaks to the remnants of distrust that inevitably inhabit a city with a legacy of 
such severe civil strife and current political tensions can easily impede data 
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collection in certain areas (Abdulrahim et al., 2012). However, in my own case, after 
an identity check and an explanation I was usually sent on my way, although not 
always able to keep on mapping. These kinds of experiences meant that I could not 
always obtain the exact picture I wanted but generally did not hamper me greatly. 
1.3.2.4  Secondary data:  the problem of unreliable statistics 
I consulted secondary data sources such as statistics on Lebanon’s political economy 
or reports on the real estate and banking sectors. Unfortunately, there is a 
considerable lack of reliable statistical, demographic and secondary data in Lebanon 
(Abdulrahim et al., 2012; Amour, 2012; Bou Akar, 2005; Fawaz & Peillen, 2003; Finger 
& Hesse, 2009; Ross & Jamil, 2011; Verdeil, Faour, Haddad, & Velut, 2005). The 
country ranked 103rd out of 143 countries listed by the World Bank in terms of 
statistical capacity (Berthélemy, Dessus, & Nahas, 2007). The last population census 
took place in 1932.19 The Central Administration for Statistics (CAS) collects some 
data, as do NGOs and international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), but these are often lumped 
together on a citywide basis. Requests for geographic data distribution maps were 
consistently denied.20  Population registries exist, but most people register in their 
village of origin, in which they may have never lived, instead of in their 
neighborhood in Beirut. This makes these data rather useless for studying 
demographic trends in Beirut (see also Abdulrahim et al., 2012).  
Also, obtaining background data on the Lebanese diaspora, which significantly 
impacts the country’s political economy, has been quite challenging: there are no 
reliable numbers or statistics regarding the precise number of Lebanese migrants in 
countries, their activities abroad, their place of origin in Lebanon or their 
contribution to the country via developmental projects. “The Ministry of Finance 
estimated the amount of remittances at the equivalent of US$939 million in 1996, 
but this figure is quite unreliable. Errors and omissions in the Ministry of Finance 
data amounted to over US$4 billion in their reconciliation of the balance of 
payments” (Peters, Raad, & Sinkey, 2004, p. 282). Neither the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs nor the Directorate of Migrants collect data related to the Lebanese diaspora. 
These kinds of numbers are usually estimated by putting several sources together 
                                                       
19 A new census is considered too politically sensitive, because political office is divided according to sect.  
20 According to one employee of the Central Administration of Statistics, who wishes to remain 
anonymous, work on a map is currently underway but will take at least two more years to complete and 
he could not guarantee that it will be accessible to the public. 
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and conducting surveys (G. Hourani, 2007, 2009, 2010; Labaki, 2006; MPC Team, 
2013). The absence of precise numbers can be explained not just by inaccurate 
administrative practices but also by the political sensitivity of such numbers (Brand, 
2007, note 22), since power-sharing is based on a contentious confessional quota 
system. This lack of information hampered the understanding of larger trends of 
urban change within Beirut. If we were to look at socioeconomic changes in a 
neighborhood in Amsterdam, for example, we would be able to pull demographic 
data of the last ten years from the municipal website within minutes, providing us 
with indicators of socioeconomic transformation such as changes in average age, 
income, household size, and so on. In Lebanon, these kinds of data do not exist. 
Besides attempting to obtain reliable numbers on political, economic and 
demographic trends in Lebanon that could help me situate my findings, I also relied 
to a large extent on newspaper articles and of course a large amount of academic 
literature on Lebanon and Beirut. Press articles were taken from local newspapers 
and business sources such as Le Commerce du Levant, Lebanon Opportunities and The 
Executive. These data informed me about the kinds of projects real estate developers 
are trying to sell; their clients and the lifestyle that they are attracted to, and how 
this differs per neighborhood. Newspaper articles provided detailed information 
about real estate projects, government policies, protest movements, and so on. The 
academic literature helped me triangulate my findings and filled in some gaps, 
especially related to banking data. 
To conclude, my methods have remained fairly consistent throughout the years, 
relying for the most part on qualitative data gathering through interviews, surveys 
and records, but the theoretical framework informing these methods’ directionality 
has undergone some development that led to the cautious evaluation of the 
postcolonial critique and a specific approach to the urban transformation of Beirut, 
that I chose to ground solidly in a Marxist-geographical perspective. The next 
chapters will focus on explaining why capital was spatially fixed in Beirut’s built 
environment, how it was directed there and who benefited from this. Chapter 2 
provides a historical background of Lebanon’s political economy and legal and 
institutional framework, while Chapter  3 will focus on the post-2008 period, when 
the large amount of capital available led to a real estate and banking boom 
significantly transforming the city. Chapter  4 concludes Part 1 by looking at the 
networks of agents who benefited from this set-up.  
 Part 1:  Explaining the spatial  f ix 
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 2  Lebanon’s political economy 
This chapter offers a background to my case studies and sets the stage for 
understanding the post-2008 spatial fix, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
First, it provides an overview of Lebanon’s political-economic history from the late 
nineteenth century, when it was part of the Ottoman Empire, via the post-World 
War I French Mandate and Independence in 1943, to the end of the Civil War in 
1990, with a focus on the city of Beirut. It pays attention to how the state regulated 
the economy from the ideology of laissez-faire and how this led to but at the same 
time was caused by the historical primacy of Beirut and its real estate and banking 
sector. I show how during the civil war (1975-1991), diaspora migration intensified, 
especially to the Gulf but also to other high-income countries, and a large volume of 
remittances, together with the rise of Lebanese banks and large-scale government 
borrowing, set the stage for the current spatial fix. It also set the stage for the 
geographies of conflict that continue to influence the way in which the spatial fix 
materializes. The second section of this chapter discusses the postwar era, in which 
my case studies are situated. I show how the legal and institutional framework 
related to profitable investment in the built environment was changed to allow for 
a more intensive exploitation. These reforms were in line with neoliberalization 
processes elsewhere, and led to the increasing commodification and marketization 
of life. Of course, as everywhere, this process was made through particular 
constellations of actors and through the inherited traditions of governance, and did 
not just descend from “out there” to a “local” context. Specifically, diaspora 
remittances allowed for a political economy of reconstruction based on huge 
amounts of public debt, which set the stage for the spatial fix in 2008 by providing 
banks with a source of income that made investment in other sectors unprofitable.  
Together, the sections in this chapter will form a background sketch that will 
help the reader understand the agents and flows of capital in Beirut and the way in 
which these have been directed through state policies and financial intermediaries. 
The sections pay attention to the larger macro-economic dimensions needed to 
understand the reasons for the spatial fix, but also to the legal framework 
surrounding the production of space that highlights the role of the state in the 
development of Beirut. It should become clear that Lebanon never had a Fordist-
Keynesian system as described for the West, nor developmentalist strategies such as 
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import-replacement-industrialization or a command economy as described for 
many other countries of the Global South (see Brenner & Theodore, 2002b, p. 344). 
Instead, it has always assisted investors and provided a legal and institutional 
framework conducive to business interests, where real estate and finance were 
always important economic sectors. However, the role of the banks and public debt, 
together with the influence of neoliberalism, allowed for a more active channeling 
of capital into the built environment. These are necessary elements to understand 
the post-2008 spatial fix, in which banks played such an important role. Moreover, 
this chapter emphasizes the connections and multiple relationships with elsewhere 
that have shaped what constitutes the Lebanese territory today, whose local 
‘uniqueness’ is already a product in part of ‘global’ forces i.e. contacts beyond the 
place itself (Massey, 1995, p. 183). It also pays attention to how the state dealt with 
the legacies of displacement and conflict, which influenced the way in which the 
spatial fix materialized, as discussed in Part 2 of the dissertation. 
2 .1  Commercial  and colonial  connections:  
Lebanon’s political  economy from the late 
Ottoman Empire until  1990 
The area that makes up Lebanon’s territory21 today has been dominated by an 
economic elite since trading operations with European merchants increased 
significantly in the nineteenth century (Chaaban & Gebara, 2007). The earliest 
product of international trade was silk, produced mostly in Mount Lebanon22 for 
export to France. Trade and financial services related to this booming industry led 
to significant growth of Beirut, as silk was exported through its port (Gates, 1998). 
In this growing city, outward-looking economic agents, consisting of an elite of 
                                                       
21Lebanon as a country, including Beirut in the West, Tripoli in the North, Sidon and Tyre in the South 
and the Bekaa valley in the East, did not exist until 1920, when France created the State of Greater 
Lebanon during its post-World War I-mandate in the Levant.  
22 “Mount Lebanon”, the mountainous region outside Beirut (traditionally a refuge for religious 
minorities), has existed as a concept for centuries but was part of the province of Syria during the 
Ottoman Empire, as was the rest of present-day Lebanon. Its economy began to be integrated with 
Beirut’s during the silk trade. 
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merchants, financiers, lawyers, landlords and traditional clan leaders (zu‘ama), 
allied themselves with powerful foreign economic actors and gradually transformed 
Beirut into a center of international trade, finance and services (Fawaz, 1983; 
Gaspard, 2004; Gates, 1989, 1998; Hanssen, 2005a; Kassir, 2010), setting the stage for 
the continuing primacy of these sectors and the multiple translocal relations that 
shaped the city, its population movements and investment flows. The making of the 
Lebanese territory was part of the expansion of a capitalist system that intensified 
during the late nineteenth century. This section traces the rise of Beirut and the 
Lebanese territory’s political economy, from the increasing European intervention 
during the late Ottoman Empire and the establishment of powerful foreign and local 
economic elites in Beirut, to the French Mandate and Lebanon’s Independence in 
1943. 
2 .1.1   The Lebanese territory during the late Ottoman 
Empire and the rise of Beirut 
'Thus, the imperatives of expanding international 
capitalism articulated with the interests of the 
Lebanese mercantile-financial bourgeoisie produced 
an international division of labor and specialization 
in which Lebanon became a market for European 
manufactures, a producer of primary and semi-
finished products and, in the 20th century, a 
distributor of European goods and services in the 
Middle East’ (Gates, 1989, p. 8). 
The Lebanese region became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1516 after the Ottomans 
defeated the Mamluk Sultanate. International connections have been part and 
parcel of Beirut’s history as a Levantine seaport for many centuries before that. 
During the Crusades, John of Ibelin, governor of Beirut, encouraged trade with 
Venetians, Genoans, and Pisa. These merchants settled in the city during the 
seventeenth century (Fawaz, 1983). Until the nineteenth century, however, 
overland trade routes were much more important than sea routes, because of the 
immense domestic market of the Ottoman Empire. In the face of overland 
commerce, Beirut remained insignificant in comparison to Damascus or Aleppo. 
However, Mount Lebanon attracted foreign attention due to its large population of 
Christians, which were used as a political tool to install foreign economic 
domination. This began as early as 1517, when an alliance between Sultan Süleyman 
the Magnificent and François I of France against the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V 
 57 
granted commercial concessions and recognition of France’s status as protector of 
the Maronite Catholics in the Ottoman Empire (Kassir, 2010). The Ottoman 
Capitulations, of which more followed in 1740, were treaties that provided European 
states (especially France) with commercial and judicial privileges, which later 
became rights, for their trading companies (Fawaz, 1983). France benefited most 
from these treaties, as it was the first to sign the Capitulations, and it integrated 
Mount Lebanon’s silk industry into its own. Hence, the seeds of foreign (especially 
French) economic domination, based on military superiority that forced the 
Ottoman Empire to concessions, were sown during this time. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Western economic domination increased when, 
in 1838, the Ottoman Empire signed the Anglo-Ottoman Free Trade Agreement, 
followed by trade agreements with Löbeck, Bremen, Hamburg, Sardinia, Sweden, 
Norway, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Prussia, Denmark and Toscana. This coincided 
with the European Industrial Revolution. The Middle East became a provider of 
increasingly in-demand raw materials (such as cotton, silk and tobacco) and a 
market for European goods, which were accumulating as the capitalist system 
expanded. Beirut was the entry point for these goods and an export node for the 
raw materials. In this way, it was crucial to the capitalist expansion of these nations 
at the time. The main reason Beirut became successful and not its neighbors was 
that the enlargement of the port coincided with the arrival of the first steamship in 
1836 (Atakul, 2012; Fawaz, 1983; Kihtir Öztürk, 2006). Hence, foreign trade, which 
had always been part of the Empire, started to dominate its economy upon its 
integration into the world economy (Atakul, 2012); a domination that was made 
possible by Europe’s military superiority and hegemonic political position at the 
time. The Ottoman Bank, which was a state bank, was entirely owned by British and 
French capital (Kihtir Öztürk, 2006) and by 1910, two-thirds of all trade from Beirut 
was conducted with Europe, of which ninety percent with France (Kassir, 2010). The 
city’s port received steamships from Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Norway and Egypt (Kassir, 2010). A Syrian desert Bedouin 
in the mid-nineteenth century would typically wear a shirt from Lancashire and 
drink coffee from Brazil (Kassir, 2010, p. 82). Because of the unequal terms of trade, 
French silk manufacturers soon controlled silkworm cultivation, with 67 factories in 
Beirut under French control in 1867 (Fawaz, 1983). A tight network of military, 
educational and political links between mainly French government and private 
agencies and Beirut was maintained. The British in turn had most influence in 
economic affairs (Fawaz, 1983), involved in the water supply system, banking and 
import-export trade. 
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The Ottomans responded to the increasing foreign economic domination with the 
so-called Tanzimat-reforms, established to ward off foreign intervention and 
prevent the falling-apart of the Empire. These comprised three major moments of 
reform, beginning in 1839, which were heavily influenced by the Napoleonic code 
and French Law. They included the establishment of a system of private property, 
significantly influencing the way in which investment in the built environment 
could proceed, and a secular and more centralized system of government. However, 
many of these modernization reforms were undercut by Europeans, who negotiated 
the re-establishment of privileges for non-Muslims during the second round of 
reforms in 1856, because they needed local Christians as intermediaries for their 
trade (Atakul, 2012; Kassir, 2010). The Capitulations, which should have been 
abolished by the Tanzimat, were maintained at the insistence of France and Britain. 
This demonstrates the way in which the political-economic interests of Western 
powers, who acquiesced to certain forms of political emancipation back home (due 
to social struggle, leading to the beginnings of the welfare state), led them to thwart 
emancipatory reforms in the Middle East. 
All these developments were not without effect on the city itself: Beirut grew 
enormously during the nineteenth century. Its number of inhabitants increased 
from 4-6,000 people in the beginning of the century to 100,000 at the end, its size 
increased fifteen times in twenty-five years. Rich local and foreign merchants built 
their mansions on the hills surrounding the old city, and many infrastructural 
projects, hotels, banks, universities, hospitals, learned societies, newspapers and 
political parties were established (Kassir, 2010). The city attracted European 
migrants who brought Christian missions and French freemasons’ lodges with them 
(Dumont, 1989; Kassir, 2010). In this way, Beirut became the leading commercial, 
financial and communications intermediary between Europe and the Middle East. 
Its regional position and commercial links with the East diminished, while its role 
and status as trading partner of the West increased (Gates, 1989). European powers 
actively invested in its trade infrastructure: ‘European capitalism commodified 
space and ‘conquered’ distance through infrastructural investment in transport, 
communication, and ‘public services’. Of an estimated 205 million francs of major 
European investment in Syria between 1860 and 1914, over 72 million went into the 
city of Beirut’ (Hanssen, 2005a, pp. 9–10).  
An increasing number of European merchants hired local Christian 
intermediaries in exchange for consular protection. This led to the rise of a new 
class in Beirut, as non-Muslims gained very prominent positions and used their 
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advantage to expand their own businesses, gaining power at the expense of 
established notables (Atakul, 2012; Kassir, 2010; Kihtir Öztürk, 2006). By 1910, 73 
major exporters were established in Beirut, the largest among whom were local 
merchants who operated internationally as well (Kassir, 2010). The Sursock family is 
one of them and legendary in Beirut up until this day. They were involved in 
finance, trade and real estate (Fawaz, 1983). These local and international 
merchants came together in advocating railway and road construction to facilitate 
the circulation of goods and capital, and lobbied for making Beirut a provincial 
capital, which was granted by the Ottomans in 1888 (Fawaz, 1983; Gates, 1989; 
Hanssen, 2005a). Hence the development of Beirut was shaped to a large extent by 
foreign economic powers and the tactics of its leading local and foreign merchants 
(Hanssen, 2005a), who enjoyed European consular protection. 
At the same time, migration from the Lebanese territory became a regularly 
recurring trend, extending the city’s translocal connections even further (although 
the state of telecommunications at the time did not always allow for intensive 
interaction with places of origin). In the 17th century, many merchants, who were 
mostly Christian, set up trade networks in Egypt and Europe, fleeing bleak economic 
prospects and conflict (Cohen, 2008, p. 91). When Lebanon’s silk industry collapsed 
at the end of the nineteenth century because European traders bought cheaper 
Chinese goods, a large group of people left the area in search for a higher standard 
of living, most of them in the Americas and West-Africa (Senegal, Sierra Leone) 
(Ahmed, Zgheib, Kowatly, & Rhetts, 2012; Gberie, 2002, p. 10). Up until 1914, a 
quarter of the population of the Syrian province left, from all sects, mainly from the 
region that is Lebanon today (Cohen, 2008, p. 92). During World War I, migration 
continued unabated, spurred on by war and famine, and by 1914, 15-20,000 people a 
year left (Humphrey, 2004, p. 35), leading to a total number of 350,000 at the end of 
World War I (MPC Team, 2013, p. 2). Many descendants of Lebanese emigrants in the 
United States trace their roots back to this period.  
In this decade leading up to World War I, France, which, as mentioned above, 
benefited most from the trade with the Levant, made sure its political and economic 
claims on the area were consolidated and recognized internationally in the face of 
competition from other colonial powers’ aspirations, such as Britain, Germany and 
Italy (Attié, 2004). The French government consolidated its political claims through 
subsidizing missionary works and seeking political influence among disgruntled 
locals by lobbying with the Ottoman authorities for reforms and promising them 
more autonomy. Its economic claims were consolidated through large capital 
investments: France held two-thirds of Ottoman public debt and managed to wrest 
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economic concessions from the Ottomans in exchange for the loans. They held 
contracts for (rail)road and port construction and were involved in land and 
mortgage companies all over the Levant (Shorrock, 1970). Hence, the political and 
economic influence of France in the region at the eve of World War I was unrivaled.  
2 .1.2  The French Mandate 
At the end of World War I, in 1918, the Allied Powers, consisting of France and the 
United Kingdom, defeated the Ottoman Empire. The victors divided up the 
remnants of the Empire’s provinces. France was given the mandate over the former 
Ottoman province of Syria, which included present-day Lebanon and over which it 
had already consolidated its political and economic claims, as explained above. The 
League of Nations gave France the mandate provided that it lead to self-rule and 
allowed free trade access to all members of the League. Instead, however, Mandate 
authorities favored French economic interests in conjunction with a Maronite 
Christian business elite who was lobbying for the creation of their own state (Attié, 
2004). Subsidized French concessionary companies secured monopolies on many 
infrastructural projects. The mandate was given its own colonial currency tied to 
the French franc and controlled by the French treasury, and trade between the 
colony and metropolis was monopolized by French companies and their allies 
(Owen & Pamuk, 1998). France also borrowed money from their Mandates in order 
to finance their war efforts elsewhere and exercised complete control over their 
finances (Chaitani, 2007).  
France’s political and economic alliance with the Maronite business elite was 
consolidated when, after intense lobbying, it created the state of Greater Lebanon in 
1920. The idea for a Greater Lebanon can be traced back to “the Young 
Phoenicians”, a movement consisting of a Maronite elite of bankers, lawyers and 
property owners (Salibi, 1987), who argued for a shared Phoenician heritage that set 
the Lebanese apart from the Arab world and naturalized their trade- and services-
based economy as a national trait. They referred to Switzerland as their model-state 
and in 1921 founded a party (the Parti Progressiste) whose motto was “Pour le Liban 
avec la France” (Buheiry, 1987). When France created the state of Greater Lebanon 
however, the new borders included many cities that used to have closer ties to 
other places: Damascus for the Bekaa region, the cities of the Orontes basin in 
central Syria for Tripoli, Haifa for the cities in the South… (J. Nasr & Verdeil, 2008). 
Indeed, prominent figures of the Maronite elite clashed over the shape of Greater 
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Lebanon, with some arguing that it should only encompass Mount Lebanon (Attié, 
2004). France’s colonial-economic interests however dictated that isolating the 
trading port of Beirut from land routes in Syria was a necessary concession to the 
ideal of a part of the Lebanese mercantile-financial bourgeoisie. A cultural-
economic nationalist project in this way dovetailed with the French colonial 
project. At the same time, a sectarian system began to be put in place, as charity 
organizations based on religious affiliation were encouraged to provide for their 
constituencies, in line with a long tradition of sect-based welfare in the Ottoman 
Empire (Cammett & Issar, 2010).  
Beirut was the privileged site of French infrastructural investments and in 1924, 
major construction was undertaken in the center, cutting wide boulevards through 
the old city that facilitated the rapid deployment of military troops if corporate 
interests were threatened (Hibri, 2009; Kihtir Öztürk, 2006). Its population swelled 
when Armenian and Syriac refugees, fleeing massacres and deportations in what 
would become modern Turkey, established their camps near the city in the 1920s 
(Fawaz & Peillen, 2003). Outside of the city center, Beirut developed without a 
master plan, even though several were drafted (the Danger-plan in 1932, Ecochard 
in 1944). However, these remained general schemes that were never approved nor 
implemented (Khalaf, 1993; J. Tabet, 1993), contrary to similar schemes in Morocco 
for example, due to real estate speculation, the interests of private French 
corporations, the protests of Beiruti property owners and the financial weakness of 
public institutions (J. Nasr & Verdeil, 2008; Verdeil, 2002).  
Other infrastructural investments included the Beirut airport, opened in 1939 
and the expansion of the port’s capacity, after which traffic almost quadrupled 
between 1920 and 1939 (Gates, 1998). In this way, the centralization of Beirut within 
the Lebanese territory was accelerated and continued by French planning policies 
(Hibri, 2009), for whom Beirut was part of a global network of colonial trade. The 
colonial dimension of France’s economic interests in its mandate became clearly 
visible during this time. Meanwhile, industry and agriculture declined and 
emigration from Lebanon continued, with increasing numbers of people, especially 
from the newly integrated areas of Greater Lebanon who had been cut off from 
their hinterlands (Chaaban & Gebara, 2007), migrating to West-Africa (Bourgi, 2005; 
Gberie, 2002, p. 10). In 1932, the last population census in French Mandate Lebanon 
put the number of resident citizens at 793,396 and emigrants at 254,987 (Brand, 
2007, p. 7). It counted fourteen different religious groups: Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, 
Maronite, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Protestant, Armenian Orthodox, 
Armenian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Jews, Chaldean Orthodox, 
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Chaldean Catholic (Maktabi, 1999). This census, which remains the last one 
conducted, formed the basis of Lebanon’s confessional democratic power-sharing 
system and included the diaspora residents, the majority of which was Maronite 
Christian at the time (Humphrey, 1993, p. 5). This helped them gain the majority of 
parliamentary seats when Lebanon became independent in 1943.  
Lebanon’s independence became an increasingly strong demand by disgruntled 
groups such as Sunni merchants from Beirut, who resented the coalition between 
France and their mostly Maronite allies. These groups were deprived of the 
economic advantages the coalition brought (Attié, 2004). Demands for full 
independence from France became stronger and independence was finally granted 
during World War II, in 1943, with the support of the British, who saw it as a chance 
to maintain their influence in the Levant. A National Pact was made between the 
Lebanese pro- and anti-French blocs, where the first agreed to break off relations 
with France and the latter recognized the state of Greater Lebanon, which was, after 
all, a French creation. The Maronite elite wanted a stable source of public finance 
for the new republic, which was obtained via custom duties on foreign imports that 
were actively controlled by Sunni trading houses. The National Pact of 1943 aligned 
their interests (Kubursi, 1993, p. 169). President El-Khoury and Prime Minister El-
Solh formulated a pact in which a political system, based on confessional power 
sharing (i.e. power sharing between religious sects) and a minimalist state, was 
tacitly accepted as Lebanon’s default. It was verbally agreed that Lebanon’s 
President should always be a Maronite Christian, its Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, 
and its Speaker of Parliament a Shia, representing the largest religious groups. At 
this time, there were eighteen recognized sects in Lebanon: Sunni, Shi’a, Alawite, 
Ismaili, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian 
Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Copts, 
Protestants, Druze, Roman Catholics and Jews. With independence, Lebanon’s elite 
of mostly Maronite intellectuals and bankers had a chance to implement their 
vision of the state of Lebanon (Attié, 2004), with a central role for Beirut. 
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2.1.3  Post-Independence Lebanon and the political  
economy of “ laissez-faire” 
‘There is nothing magical or miraculous about the 
sources of economic growth in Lebanon. Actually, 
most of the sources and causes of this growth can be 
explained by conventional economic factors.’ 
(Kubursi, 1993, p. 168) 
Lebanon’s economic system was explicitly proclaimed as laissez-faire in the so-called 
Merchant Republic of the post-Independence 1950s. Laissez-faire is an ideology that 
proposes a political economy resting on the pillars of private property and free 
exchange, with market forces operating as freely as possible. A group of merchants, 
economists and bankers who called themselves the “New Phoenicians” promoted 
laissez-faire in Lebanon via their association SLEP (Societé libanaise déconomie politique) 
(Gates, 1998). One of their most prominent members, intellectual and successful 
banker Michel Chiha23, argued that confessional harmony would be best maintained 
in a state that limits political interference in confessional affairs, guaranteeing 
liberty and tolerance (Attié, 2004; Chaaban & Gebara, 2007; Gaspard, 2004). Chiha 
also saw laissez-faire as the economic embodiment of this philosophy, describing it 
as the essence of the country (Firro, 2003).  
The laissez-faire system allowed state actors to assume little responsibility for the 
development of industry and agriculture and focus instead on attracting private 
domestic and foreign capital. Thus, they employed economic policies that favored 
mercantile financial and banking interests and limited state intervention in the 
economy to facilitating the tourism and services industries, to the neglect of 
industrial development, healthcare, education and job creation (Attié, 2004; 
Gaspard, 2004; Gates, 1989; Shwayri, 2008; Traboulsi, 2007). As a result, in 1970, 
seventy-two percent of Lebanon’s GDP consisted of tertiary activities; its primary 
and secondary sectors24 were eclipsed (Gates, 1989). The “Switzerland of the Middle 
East” was a country relying on services, tourism and banking. In 1973, no more than 
                                                       
23 Michel Chiha (1891-1954) was a banker, politician, writer and journalist and was a secretary to the 
drafting of the Lebanese Constitution in 1943. The bank that his father founded, the Pharaon and Chiha 
Bank, founded in 1876, still operates in Lebanon today (Gebara, 2007). 
24 It should be noted that Lebanon developed a significant industrial sector during the 1930s, partly 
driven by diaspora capital, but that the post-Independence period, with the government prioritizing the 
development of the banking and services sectors, did not contribute to maintaining this sector (Gates, 
1989). 
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twenty percent of the total labor force in Beirut was working in industry; most 
worked in trade, commercial services and educational/cultural institutions (Khalaf 
& Kongstadt, 1973). Income and profit taxes remained low (Kubursi, 1993, p. 169). 
Fiscal policies were not used for economic management and development but 
aimed at creating budget surpluses, taxing broad based consumption. The state 
liberated foreign exchange regimes, the convertibility of the domestic currency, the 
repatriation and movement of (foreign) capital into and out of the country, and 
implemented a banking secrecy law. This represented a sharp contrast with the 
economic policies of the emerging welfare states and regulated economic systems 
in the industrial countries and developmentalist regimes in neighboring states, 
which aimed at redistributing wealth and regulating trade. This eventually led to 
the dissolution of the customs union with neighboring Syria (Chaitani, 2007). Table 
1 summarizes the regulatory framework in post-Independence Lebanon.   
 
Aspects of regulatory framework 
encouraging trade and services-
sectors 
Government-provided facilities to trade, 
services and tourism 
Free mobility of goods and capital Modernization of the port 
Deregulated trade and foreign exchange 
regimes 
Construction of international airport (1953) 
Banking secrecy law (adopted in 1956) Expansions of the airport (1969 and 1971) 
Low income taxes Road development 
Low customs duties Subsidizing transport costs for Arab summer 
visitors 
Guaranteeing loans to the hotel industry  
Legalizing gambling in resorts 
Table 1-Government policies in favor of the private sector (source: Krijnen, 2010, p. 48, 
based on several works cited above) 
2.1.3.1  Beirut as a regional financial  center 
Lebanon and especially Beirut, which was the privileged site of state investments in 
trade infrastructure, indeed attracted huge amounts of capital at this time. A large 
part of this was due to regional turmoil. Many businesses were fleeing socialist and 
nationalist regimes in other Arab countries, and found in Lebanon a safe haven for 
their capital. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 brought a huge influx of 
Palestinian wealth to Lebanon, while Beirut lost its main rival, the port of Haifa. The 
Suez-crisis and nationalization in Syria sent more businessmen fleeing with their 
resources to Beirut. Investors from oil states, who were accruing increasingly large 
revenues, and Arab businessmen from other countries as well as Lebanese 
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expatriates saw Lebanon, and more specifically Beirut, as a safe location for their 
capital, both as a place of deposit and of investment (Khalaf & Kongstadt, 1973). 
Moreover, in 1948, an estimated US$3 million was remitted to Lebanon annually by 
its expatriate population (Chaitani, 2007, p. 100), which was of course not only 
invested or deposited in banks but which does provide an idea of the amount of 
capital flowing into the country at this time.  
In this period, Beirut became a regional financial center, an intermediary of trade 
between the West and the Middle East, echoing its nineteenth century role. The 
liberal trade regulations, facilities to business, relatively high-skilled workforce, 
availability of other labor, already existing connections with Western businesses 
and highly developed trade infrastructure ‘bestowed on the country some real 
advantages in being able to act as the indispensable middleman in much of the 
contacts of the Gulf and other Arab countries with the west and to provide the 
conduit routes of trade between the two areas’ (Kubursi, 1993, p. 170). In 1951, for 
example, thirty percent of the world’s gold traffic passed through Beirut (Khalaf, 
1993, p. 53). Foreign companies found a platform for their regional trade operations 
and recycling of capital and established their Middle East headquarters there 
(Chaaban & Gebara, 2007 citing Nasr, 1978). All kinds of services, financial 
institutions, government agencies and other economic, political, social and cultural 
institutions clustered in Beirut, which became the financial and commercial center 
of the Middle East.  
Banking, which had been an extremely important sector of the Lebanese 
economy since the nineteenth century, boomed. While there were seven banks in 
Beirut in 1945 (Gaspard, 2004), about a hundred domestic and foreign banks 
operated in Beirut in the 1960s (Peters et al., 2004). These banks attracted enormous 
surplus capital from the Gulf in the form of petrodollars, which was typically 
exported as deposits with correspondent banks in Europe and North America 
(Gaspard, 2004). Many of these banks operated in Euromarkets, and recycled the 
funds as loans to developing countries (Hanieh, 2011) who eventually went 
bankrupt, triggering the 1980s crisis mentioned in the previous chapter.  
Capital flowing into the country was also fixed in the built environment, leading 
to an increase in land and rental prices and far-reaching changes in the city’s 
landscape as ground rent increased. In the 1950s, a true real estate boom was 
underway that more or less continued until the start of the civil war (Boudisseau, 
2001; Gaspard, 2004; Khalaf & Kongstadt, 1973). Many hotels and entertainment 
venues were constructed along the seaside and Northern coastline, often illegally. 
At the same time, rural migrants and foreign (Palestinian) refugees and workers 
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moved to the city, because it was the only place that offered employment and/or an 
education. Conditions in the neglected regions of Lebanon, already dire, were 
exacerbated when the State of Israel was created, which cut South Lebanon off from 
its hinterland and led to a period of protracted conflict in that region, and when the 
customs union with Syria was dissolved, isolating Northern Lebanon and the Bekaa 
region further (Chaaban & Gebara, 2007). The migrants from these areas 
constructed informal settlements, often close to surrounding villages, which offered 
them a foothold in the city (Fawaz & Peillen, 2003; Fawaz, 2012). The real estate 
boom and the need for shelter contributed to the expansion and densification of the 
city, whose inhabitants grew from 300,000 in 1950 to 1.2 million in 1975 (Fawaz, 
2012). It is estimated that on the eve of the civil war, forty percent of Lebanon’s 
entire rural population had moved to Beirut (Chaaban & Gebara, 2007, citing Nasr, 
1978) 
This urban expansion was left largely unregulated by the government (J. Tabet, 
1993). In 1952, the first official master plan for Beirut presented no more than a 
road network, and while building regulations carried detailed requirements on 
setbacks, ventilation, plot ratios and so on, planning legislation itself was inexistent, 
as were a comprehensive approach to urban development or a view on future 
growth (Khalaf, 1993; J. Tabet, 1993). Meanwhile, studies by French and Greek 
consultants, which recommended the relocation of slum dwellers (Fawaz & Peillen, 
2003), were not implemented, just like all other studies that were carried out after 
that date as we will see. Indeed, the government’s laissez-faire ideology was perhaps 
most saliently illustrated in the way Beirut developed unchecked, and the way the 
exorbitant living conditions of a privileged few contrasted with the struggle for a 
livelihood by the majority of its deprived residents. 
2.1.3.2  The political  economy of laissez-faire  
While the proponents of the laissez-faire ideology and the political-economic 
reforms resulting from it claimed to act out of considerations for political stability 
and protecting the sectarian plurality and “economic essence” of the country (an 
open economy focused on trade), their claims obscure the fact that these reforms 
were actually very much in their own interests and in the interests of the political 
elites that succeeded them, as with most laissez-faire ideologies (Keynes, 1926). 
Political elites consisted for a large part of capitalist businessmen (Traboulsi, 2014). 
Their market power allowed them to engage in price-fixing and manipulation 
(Gates, 1998). Their banks, companies and French business allies captured the influx 
of capital and the contracts for state-led Build-Operate-Transfer-projects (Chaitani, 
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2007). The Franco-Lebanese Monetary Accord of 1948, agreed upon in order to 
maintain a strong currency necessary for the international service economy, 
guaranteed private French concessions. As Gates (1998, p. 134) put it: ‘Building what 
came to be known as the Merchant Republic -based on an idealised version of the 
Swiss model- was a strategic objective of a small power bloc consisting of the 
mercantile-financial bourgeoisie, much of the governing elite and intellectual 
economic liberals.’ Support for the laissez-faire system from Lebanon’s political elite 
continued unabated throughout the 1950s, even when the ascent of Arab nationalist 
leader Nasser in Egypt inspired many Lebanese to revolt against the economic 
inequality in their country. The Lebanese business community, which included 
prominent politicians and businessmen that had fled the reforms in Egypt and 
Syria, had no desire to replace the laissez-faire ideology with Nasser’s state-
controlled socialism (Attié, 2004), and Lebanon chose a firmly pro-western stance by 
subscribing to the Eisenhower doctrine.25 Excluded groups meanwhile sought 
influence elsewhere, in entrepreneurial activities and/or obtaining a good 
education (Kubursi, 1993, p. 169), and added to the numbers emigrating from 
Lebanon. 
Hence, we see that the laissez-faire ideology and its resulting reforms in Lebanon 
were in the interests of the mercantile-financial bourgeoisie, whose plea for 
externally oriented capitalist development and limited state intervention did not 
extend to competitive internal production. Laissez-faire in Lebanon was not a free 
market in the sense of encouraging competition and efficiency. As Gates (1998, p. 
10) puts it: ‘Lebanon implemented ersatz laissez-faire, intended to permit the 
mobility of goods and capital, but not to create competitive internal markets.’ 
Competition and efficiency were against the interests of the major business families 
(Pharaon, Chiha, Khuri, Haddad, Freige, Kettaneh, ‘Arida, Bustrus, ‘Asayli, Doumit, 
Sehnaoui), who often enjoyed monopoly power: in 1973, the largest 13 families 
controlled forty-seven percent of total industrial capital, thirty percent of bank 
assets and twenty-four percent of total capital. Ownership of companies was 
interlocked, and at least half the markets in Lebanon had a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic structure (Gaspard, 2004; Gates, 1989; Traboulsi, 2007). These families 
were dynasties of powerful political-economic actors who intermarried and in this 
way consolidated their shared business interests (for examples, see Dib, 2006; 
                                                       
25  This refers to a speech given by then-President of the United States Dwight Eisenhower in 1957, where 
a Middle Eastern country could request military aid from the United States if it was threatened by armed 
aggression from another state. He was referring especially to the Soviet threat. 
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Fawaz, 1983; Hanssen, 2005a; Traboulsi, 2007). So any claims of a laissez-faire system 
characterizing post-Independence Lebanon are misleading, as vested economic 
interests of powerful political actors always prevented market access of outsiders. 
Besides the concerns of the mercantile-financial bourgeoisie, French stakes 
continued to play an important role in the Lebanese political economy in the form 
of French capital and political treaties, which exerted their influence on banking, 
infrastructure and public enterprises, through existing concessions to companies 
and especially via the presidency of the Lebanese-Syrian bank, which remained 
under French management until 1963 (Gates, 1998). A Monetary Agreement with 
France, signed in 1948, tied the Lebanese currency to the French franc. The 
agreement enjoyed full support from the political elite and Lebanon’s merchants, 
who argued that breaking it would lead to inflation in a country of trade and transit 
and threaten the livelihoods of Lebanese expatriates in the French colonies (as 
mentioned earlier, many Lebanese had migrated to West-Africa). It was signed 
despite protests that the agreement was a reinstatement of colonial relations with 
France and that it gave unfair advantages to French companies (Chaitani, 2007). 
Hence, the Lebanese political economy, with its privileging of banking and services 
sectors under the laissez-faire ideology, was ruled by tightly interconnected 
networks of elite agents and continued to be influenced to a large extent by an 
alliance between French and Lebanese business interests. 
2.1.3.3  The Chehabist period 
While Lebanon’s open economic model with a minimal role for the state was not 
uncontroversial, conflicts were usually dealt with in back-room deal making (Gates, 
1998). However, in 1958, many Lebanese openly protested against then-President 
Chamoun, whose six-year term was about to end and which they did not want to see 
renewed, due to his anti-Nasserist stances. These protests originated in longer 
simmering tensions and dissatisfactions due to the economic inequalities, 
government neglect of other regions, the privileging of Beirut as a site of 
investment and the unequal representation of different sects in the government 
(Salibi, 1966). The continuing protests eventually led to a civil conflict in 1958 that 
lasted for three months and saw the landing of 15,000 American troops to restore 
authority, after which reformist President Chehab (1958-1964) came to power 
(Attié, 2004). He tried to intervene in the economy to distribute its proceeds more 
evenly, geographically as well as socially, albeit without impeding the booming 
market. Tabet (1993, p. 85) termed this ‘the birth of a great illusion: the dream of 
planned development.’ This period saw large investments in infrastructure and the 
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introduction of a measure of social security as well as a public, free university 
(Gaspard, 2004; Salibi, 1966). Moreover, Chehab established a central bank in 196426 
and asked French non-government agency IRFED (l’Institut international de Recherche 
et de formation Éducation et développement) to undertake a study of the country to 
identify its needs (Gaspard, 2004). A Civil Service Council and Central Inspection 
Board were put in place to try and curb clientelism and corruption. 
The Chehabist period also saw the first attempts at creating an administrative 
structure dedicated towards urban planning. In 1963, the Directorate General of 
Urban Planning (DGUP) and the attached Higher Council of Urban Planning (HCUP) 
were founded, who in principle had far-reaching authority to expropriate and plan 
large-scale developments (Fawaz, 1993; Salaam, 1993). A new master plan was 
approved in 1964, originally designed by French consultant Ecochard, who proposed 
a modernist polycentric plan with new towns to alleviate the dominance of Beirut. 
When this plan was approved by Parliament however it had been changed in such a 
way that he publicly disassociated himself from it. The plan was only partially 
implemented, its zoning ordinance modified under pressure of landowners, while 
only part of the road network and a few administrative buildings outside the center 
were built, and public housing and new towns were never constructed (J. Nasr & 
Verdeil, 2008; J. Tabet, 1993). In the 1970s, several studies of informal settlements 
were carried out, with a view on developing new plans for Beirut’s development. 
However, none of these were followed up with actual intervention or new policies 
(Fawaz & Peillen, 2003). Planners in Beirut merely focused on opening large arteries 
and the city remained central (J. Tabet, 1993).  
Therefore, the Chehabist reforms, while not completely without success, 
especially in creating an administrative structure related to urban planning and 
social security that remains largely intact today, remained largely unimplemented. 
Even though ‘[t]he state invested in the regions, [but] capital continued to invest in 
the city’ (Sarkis, 1993, p. 113). Deeply ingrained interests, of landowners, bankers, 
French businesses and politicians (who maintained clientelist relationships) 
reduced their efficiency and credibility (Salaam, 1993; Salibi, 1966). When the 
Central Bank was founded, it met with opposition by the Association of Lebanese 
Banks (ABL), who demanded many changes to the newly established Code of Money 
and Credit (MCC). They feared control and regulation and consequently fought a 
battle with the state over banking secrecy and the financial sector’s dominance over 
                                                       
26 The Central Bank could not be established earlier because former colonial power France had reserved 
the right to be the country’s fiscal agent and issue notes until that date. 
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the Lebanese economy. In 1973, the MCC was amended with article 174, specifying 
that the Central Bank take the opinion of the ABL into account when laying down 
overall banking regulations.27 The ABL’s opposition led to legal and instrument 
independence of the Central Bank, following a mostly non-interventionist policy 
(Dibeh, 2009). It is one of the most independent central banks in the MENA region.28 
The Central Bank’s main priority became the stability of the value of the currency. 
It did not intervene much otherwise in the pre-civil war era (Dibeh, 2009). Hence, 
even if Lebanon saw a short period of developmentalist, national scale-making 
policies, it did not change its political economy in any significant way (Chaaban & 
Gebara, 2007), with (foreign) banks recycling petrodollars and the related services 
sector continuing to be dominant. Moreover, despite many attempts at creating 
master plans for Beirut and the country, not more than seven percent of the 
Lebanese built environment was ultimately the result of predetermined physical 
planning (Sarkis, 1993, p. 111). 
2.1.3.4  The civil  war 
Eventually, the severe socioeconomic polarization in Lebanon that Chehab had been 
unable to fix, combined with several other geopolitical factors and events, led to the 
outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 and a series of Israeli invasions and 
occupations. The first two years saw heavy fighting between groups allied with the 
pan-Arab, leftist ideology of Nasser’s Egypt, and right-wing nationalist groups. 
Beirut’s financial center was destroyed and moved to Bahrain, who had introduced 
regulations that allowed for offshore banking (Hanieh, 2011). A lull in fighting led to 
a short-lived attempt at Keynesian redistribution policies in order to reduce the 
inequalities that were a major cause of the war (Kubursi, 1993). Semi-public banks 
were formed to provide credit to the productive and housing sectors, the Central 
Bank, who maintained its function and status throughout the civil war (Dibeh, 
2005), curtailed speculation in real estate and foreign exchange (Corm, 1988; N. B. 
Hourani, 2010). However, the war soon flared up again and fighting continued until 
1991. Lines of confrontation shifted continuously, and militias who were allies at 
                                                       
27 From the website of the ABL, www.abl.org.lb/subPage.aspx?pageid=362. Accessed August 12, 2014. 
28 Independence in this case refers to independence from governments. The arguments in favor of 
monetary policy independence derive from a central bank's monopoly over money creation. This 
monopoly carries with it certain powers that elected governments may be tempted to misuse for short-
term benefits at the cost of rising inflation over time. Resisting such temptations requires a degree of 
commitment on the part of the central bank, and without independence, that commitment might be 
difficult to maintain. 
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one point battled each other at another. The main Lebanese groups involved were a 
collection of right-wing, nationalist oriented, mostly Christian militias including the 
Lebanese Front that included the fascism-inspired Kata’eb (Phalange) party and the 
Lebanese Forces, the South Lebanon Army that was trained by Israel to fight the 
Palestinians and later resistance groups to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon; 
and a collection of left-wing, pan-Arab oriented groups, including the Lebanese 
National Movement, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Other main groups were 
the Shiite militias Amal and Hezbollah (the latter established in response to Israel’s 
occupation of South Lebanon). The main foreign parties in the conflict were the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Syrian, Israeli and American armies 
and many other countries and states indirectly by funding and training the militia 
of their choice.  
Lebanese banks survived the war and in fact managed to grow a lot more 
powerful. They expanded to countries with significant Lebanese immigrant 
populations (Gebara, 2007) and dominated the banking sector, profiting from the 
fact that foreign banks had withdrawn from Beirut. Prior to 1977, the banking 
sector was in the hands of a few oligarchs whose control over this sector and the 
resulting socioeconomic horizontal and vertical inequalities acted as a catalyst for 
conflict, especially when they started to profit enormously from petrodollars (N. B. 
Hourani, 2010). These oligarchs were unwilling to allow for the establishment of 
new banks. With a new president in 1977, however, the Free Banking Law was 
introduced as part of the reforms enacted after the first years of fighting that 
attempted to redress the dominance of some families in the sector. It was ruled by 
decree that the establishment of any new bank required the approval of the Central 
Bank, who was to decide in the public interest. This allowed new banks to come that 
had connections to Gulf capital, such as Hariri’s Bank Med, and purchased licenses 
of Western banks, who were by then withdrawing from Lebanon (such as the French 
Mediterranean bank, whose French shares were bought by Hariri in 1980) (N. B. 
Hourani, 2010). Together with the establishment of new banks, powerful new 
constellations of actors emerged, consisting of militias who created their own 
financial networks that were connected to diaspora funds as well (Chami, 1992; N. B. 
Hourani, 2010; Peters et al., 2004). In this way, Lebanon became a militia economy 
run by networks of capitalists, companies and other institutions working within and 
alongside a variety of states in pursuit of political-economic power (N. B. Hourani, 
2010, p. 290). The warlords created their own mini-states with ports, airports, 
services, taxes and taxation systems. Some even ran their own courts and public 
sector (Traboulsi, 2007). In total, there were about twenty illegal ports in service (S. 
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Nasr, 1993, p. 71). In this way, Lebanon’s economy remained actively interconnected 
to transnational flows of capital.  
The civil war also marks the period when large-scale government borrowing 
from Lebanese banks became a normal practice. When the Israeli invasion of 1982 
led to the collapse of the economy and thus tax revenues, the government started 
to lean heavily on the commercial banks and the Central Bank for borrowing in 
order to pay public wages, maintain services and import basic goods. The banks 
more than doubled their assets and deposits in the period 1980-3 (Maasry, 1988). At 
the end of the war, the financing of the high budget deficits by the Central Bank and 
commercial banks had led to a massive increase in money supply, followed by a 
severe depreciation of the Lebanese currency (from 2.25LBP per dollar in 1975 to 
2300LBP per dollar in 1992), dollarization and high prices of imports (Bolbol, 1999; 
Kubursi, 1993). Despite the continuity of capital inflows, therefore, the war also had 
deleterious consequences for the banks, because these developments eroded their 
capital base (S. Hakim & Neaime, 2001; Kubursi, 1993; Peters et al., 2004). 
Nonetheless, as we will see in the next chapter, the arrangement of Lebanese banks 
financing the budget deficit with the help of the Central Bank remained intact. 
Naturally, the war had far-reaching consequences for the geography of Beirut. The 
civil war, Israeli invasions and Israeli, Syrian and American bombardments led to 
the large-scale destruction of infrastructure and capital, the deaths of an estimated 
120,000 people as well as the displacement of an estimated 450,000 (Ministry of 
Displacement) to 900,000 people (a report mentioned in Picard, 2005, p. 38), around 
two thirds of its population. Political parties and militias carried out their 
resettlement during the war, and many moved to Beirut where they occupied 
apartments vacated by other displaced people, sometimes on the condition of 
enrollment in the militia. Many young men of the displaced became militia 
members, which gave them a lot of power during and after the war (Bou Akar, 
2005). The massive population displacements also led to the formation of new 
informal settlements or the reshuffling of their populations (Fawaz & Peillen, 2003). 
The city became divided by one large demarcation line, in addition to many shifting 
frontlines throughout the years, and large groups of people moved across these 
lines to one area or the other, either preemptively or following destruction of their 
homes and/or deportation on the basis of their political and/or sectarian belonging. 
Capital followed suit, and speculation and soaring land prices in “safe” areas, the 
construction of residential and commercial complexes, encroaching on beaches and 
 73 
the mountains, were as much a characteristic of the war as destruction (Corm, 1988; 
J. Tabet, 1993, p. 90). The coast was disfigured by illegal construction (Fawaz, 1993). 
Moreover, massive numbers of people, of which a significant amount of young, 
high-skilled, well-educated members of the workforce (over sixty percent), left 
Lebanon (Bolbol, 1999, p. 1861; Bourgey, 1985; Kubursi, 1993, p. 171; S. Nasr, 1993, p. 
65). Kubursi (1999, p. 70), who bases himself on several studies by Lebanese 
sociologist Boutros Labaki, reckons that around 740,000 individuals (fifty percent of 
the 1970s labor force) left Lebanon between 1975 and 1988, another 240,000 in 1989 
and another one during the last vicious conflict in 1990. In total, around a million 
people left. Many went to France, initially to pursue higher education, but stayed 
there when the war started (Ahmed et al., 2012; Al Ariss & Özbilgin, 2010). A large 
part also migrated to the oil-producing countries as the oil price rose in 1973 
(Ahmed et al., 2012, pp. 305–306; G. Hourani, 2010). The diaspora kept Lebanon 
afloat during the first half of the civil war, transferring forty percent of total 
national income in remittances, often channeled via local militias (Picard, 2005), so 
national per-capita income actually increased during 1974-81 (Bolbol, 1999, p. 1861; 
Bourgey, 1985; Corm, 1988; Humphrey, 1993, p. 4; Kubursi, 1993, p. 174) until the end 
of the oil boom and inflation (explained below) put an end to this and larger 
numbers were forced to migrate, moving mainly to the Gulf, especially to the 
United Arab Emirates that needed high-skilled migrants at the time (G. Hourani, 
2010). Prominent political parties and militias such as the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (SSNP) and the Lebanese Phalange sought to strengthen ties with their 
constituencies abroad (Brand, 2007, p. 7). ‘A global geography of war mobilization 
outside Lebanon could be mapped with Amal and then Hizbollah supporters in West 
Africa, and Lebanese Forces supporters in Australia and the United States, among 
others’ (Picard, 2005, p. 44). The displaced, at home or abroad, were therefore 
connected by the ways in which political parties intervened in their resettlement. 
Plans for the reconstruction of Beirut were drawn up as soon as a lull in fighting 
seemed to signal the end of the conflict. In 1977, the French Atelier Parisien 
d'Urbanisme (APUR) was asked to design, with Lebanese urban planners, a planning 
scheme for Downtown Beirut, which became a master plan for reconstruction in 
1977. It focused on preservation and protection of heritage. In the same year, the 
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) was founded to replace the 
Ministry of Planning, concentrating powers at the expense of the existing 
administrative structure. In 1982-1983, after the Israeli invasion, President Gemayel 
proposed a plan to bulldoze informal settlements, refugee camps and much of 
Beirut Central District and develop a large-scale project with sea reclamations to 
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the North of Beirut. Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese-Saudi construction tycoon, offered to 
help and put his company Oger to work in the city center. The company razed the 
ancient Nourieh and Sursock souks, as well as the Saifi area, which had escaped 
Ottoman destruction and French Mandate layouts. Many salvageable or non-
damaged structures were destroyed. A beginning was also made with bulldozing 
houses in the informal settlements, but these were halted due to an uprising in 1984 
and resumption of the war. From 1983 to 1986, a General Master Plan for Beirut was 
drawn up, with the participation of another French agency, IAURIF (Institut 
d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région d’Île de France) and Lebanese experts, 
striving to introduce a hierarchy of centers by integrating war developments, but 
that meant also following militia borders. It recognized the permanency of informal 
settlements and argued against relocation as such (Fawaz & Peillen, 2003; J. Nasr & 
Verdeil, 2008; J. Tabet, 1993). However, the implementation of this plan was 
thwarted by yet more rounds of fighting. In 1990, however, the Ta’ef Accords, 
negotiated in Saudi Arabia, put and end to the civil war, and a newly formed 
Lebanese government eventually embarked on an extensive program of 
reconstruction and state building. 
2 .2  The postwar era 
Postwar Lebanon was characterized by the rise of Lebanese entrepreneurs who 
made their fortune in the Gulf and rich Lebanese diaspora from West-Africa (S. 
Nasr, 1993), constituting a new political elite, also referred to as the “contractor 
bourgeoisie” (Baumann, 2012). The number of politicians who had been emigrants 
at some point in their lives increased (Labaki, 2006, p. 13). In 1992 almost nine 
percent of MPs were Lebanese former migrants; in 2000, this had increased to 16.5 
percent and in 2005, 19.5 percent (G. Hourani, 2007, p. 11). Many expatriates also 
started to work at government institutions and banks (Labaki, 2006, p. 9). Political 
parties received a lot of support from Lebanese diaspora members abroad (Labaki, 
2006, pp. 14–15) and parties have been known to fly in members from the diaspora 
when voting in absentia was not yet allowed (Fielding-Smith, 2009). These new 
actors existed alongside former warlords who had gained prominent political 
positions and received amnesty for any war crimes they may have committed. They 
controlled thirty-nine cabinet posts between 1989 and 2003 (Gebara, 2007). 
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Warlords and diaspora politicians could overlap as well: Nabih Berri, Speaker of 
Parliament up until this day, leader of political party and powerful civil war-militia 
Amal, was born in Sierra Leone and maintained good ties there (Gberie, 2002, p. 12). 
In keeping with Lebanese tradition, most politicians were businessmen and had 
considerable interests in the banking and construction sectors (Dib, 2006), whether 
obtained via their successful companies started as diaspora abroad or as militia 
leaders during the civil war. Their wealth was striking: Lebanon’s Parliament in 
1996 counted thirty-five millionaires and three billionaires (Makdisi, 1997).  
Lebanon’s second postwar Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (1992-1998; 2000-2004) 
claimed that he would put Lebanon back on track as a destination of tourism, trade 
and capital investment and let the country continue from where it supposedly 
halted due to the war (even though we have seen above that the country by all 
means stayed connected to international flows of capital). While still under military 
tutelage of Syria, which was one of the conditions of the Ta’ef Accords that put an 
end to the civil war, Lebanon would reconquer its position as a center of trade, 
reliving the supposed economic success story of its laissez-faire tradition (Leenders, 
2004). The reconstruction agenda started with the Horizon 2000 program, intended 
to ‘convince investors that Lebanon re-emerged as a stable location for big finance 
and capital’ (Gebara, 2007, p. 13). Hence, Hariri’s discourse pointed towards a certain 
continuity of political-economic traditions when announcing what many observers 
considered a neoliberal agenda of reconstruction (Baumann, 2012; N. B. Hourani, 
2013; Makdisi, 1997; Roy, 2009a; Yassin, 2012).  
While the arrival of Hariri represented a dramatic intensification of the presence 
of market forces in national economic and political organization (Makdisi, 1997, p. 
695), and the international experience and reliance on Western-educated experts of 
these new actors represented a break from earlier styles of politics (El-Husseini, 
2004), many aspects of neoliberal reform were already present in Lebanon’s past, as 
we have seen above. These historically specific regulatory landscapes and political 
settlements (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a, p. 357) were introduced in a context 
where setting up infrastructural projects with the help of private companies and 
capital; facilitating tourism projects; a focus on tertiary economic activities; 
privileging the urban as a site of state investments; and delegating the provision of 
basic needs to non-state actors (Cammett & Issar, 2010; Fawaz, 2009b) did not 
constitute a radical break with the past (Traboulsi, 2014). In many ways, it seems 
that, as Gaspard (2004, p. 210) put it: ‘The laissez-faire system in Lebanon has 
suddenly become part of the actual mainstream.’ Many of the neoliberal policies in 
Lebanon fell within the earlier existing tradition of delegating social provision and 
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other tasks to non-state actors. However, the way in which the state actively 
intervened to create conditions for the profitable exploitation of land and the new 
connections and networks that had emerged during the civil war constitute an 
important difference with the prewar era. 
2 .2.1  1990-1998:  “Harirism”, Solidere and public debt 
Hariri was to play a prominent role in the Lebanon’s first postwar decade. A rich 
construction magnate who had made his fortune in Saudi Arabia (and even obtained 
Saudi citizenship), who had played a role in setting up the Ta’ef Accords and who 
had already started demolitions in the city during the war with his company Oger 
(as explained above), he was determined to reinstate the business function of the 
city center of Beirut as fast and efficiently as possible. He lobbied for the 
appointment of the former head of Oger as new head of the CDR in 1990 and for a 
legal framework where a private company would reconstruct Downtown Beirut. In 
1991, Law 117 (see Table 2) was passed to this effect. Meanwhile, the CDR had begun 
demolitions without an approved master plan and with such strong explosives that 
other undamaged buildings were ruined beyond repair. As protests mounted, 
however, Hariri worked his way into Lebanese politics and was appointed Prime 
Minister in 1992. After laying the legal basis, in 1994 private company Solidere was 
founded (an acronym for Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de 
Beyrouth), of which Hariri owned significant shares. Solidere benefited from a 
mechanism in the law that had existed since 1983, allowing a company who 
acquires a majority of shares to dissolve property, and received exceptional powers 
to expropriate all property owners in Downtown Beirut (with the exception of 
religious endowments, awqāf) and issue them shares in return. It then swiftly 
demolished large swaths of the center, destroying large amounts of invaluable, 
salvageable (archeological as well as built) heritage and turned what had once been 
a meeting place of Lebanon’s different socioeconomic and religious groups into a 
privately secured upmarket consumption zone. More buildings were destroyed 
during “reconstruction” than during the war. Only French mandate-era and 
religious buildings were spared. In exchange for providing infrastructure works, 
Solidere was allowed to sanitize and reclaim as land the garbage dump in the sea that 
had grown throughout the war years, just off Downtown, and sell part of it for 
development. In order to succeed in his ambitions, Hariri appointed several of his 
business associates to powerful positions in prominent institutions (the Central 
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Bank was governed by his banker at Merrill Lynch, the finance ministry by former 
Citibank employee Fouad Siniora who worked for Hariri’s enterprises, the 
governorship of Mount Lebanon to Suhail Yamut, who used to be the director of 
Hariri’s business interests in Brazil (Denoeux & Springborg, 1998, p. 162) and 
circumvented existing administrative structures. He has been accused of bribing 
opponents with shares in his banks. This entire process has been well-documented 
in all its details by a range of critical scholars (Becherer, 2005; Leenders, 2003, 2004; 
Makdisi, 1997; Mango, 2014; Summer, 2005). 
The privatization of Downtown Beirut was accompanied by several other large-
scale works that sought to pave the way for investors to “return” to the country and 
turn Beirut into a “Singapore of the Middle East” (Denoeux & Springborg, 1998). A 
new highway, built by the CDR, ensured a swift connection from the airport to the 
city center, bypassing the old airport road that led through an impoverished area, 
and several other infrastructural works such as tunnels and roads were constructed. 
Reconstructing other damaged parts of the city was however not a priority. Instead, 
taxes on income and corporate profit were lowered to ten percent maximum (but 
raised to twenty percent in 1998 for incomes and fifteen percent for corporations) 
and no taxes on financial transactions or interest-bearing instruments were levied. 
Massive transfers and capital inflows from abroad characterized the political 
economy of Lebanon in this period. Foreign capital inflows, transfers and 
remittances constituted on average thirty-three percent of GDP annually between 
1993 and 2005 (Berthélemy et al., 2007). Hence, while the new Downtown area did 
attract investments, most of Lebanon was left to fend for itself and still dependent 
on family remittances, as government spending did not extend to many areas 
outside Beirut Central District or to many ordinary Lebanese, for that matter. The 
Ministry of Displaced, for example, that was set up in order to return the people 
who had been displaced by the war, was soon accused of corruption and inefficiency 
(Leenders, 2012). The Minister of the Displaced was an ex-militia leader responsible 
for many of the displacements himself (Yahya, 1993, p. 150). 
2.2.1.1  Postwar reconstruction and public debt 
On the macroeconomic level, Hariri focused on stabilizing the Lebanese currency in 
order to stop inflation. As mentioned before, the Lebanese pound suffered from 
severe inflation at the end of the war. In 1992, this led to riots after the exchange 
rate jumped by around 300 percent when the Central Bank stopped intervening. 
When Hariri came to power, he introduced a stabilization program that eventually 
pegged the Lebanese pound to the dollar in 1997 (Dibeh, 2011) and relied on 
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borrowing from Lebanese banks to partly finance his reconstruction plans. Indeed, 
the banking sector grew enormously and once again became one of the country’s 
most profitable economic sectors (Peters et al., 2004). Banks’ capital increased from 
US$143 million end 1992 to US$3.3 billion end 2002. While they witnessed a large 
increase in their deposit base, the growth of their consolidated assets29 from 
US$14.5 billion in 1994 to US$52.4 billion in 2002 (Srouji, 2005, p. 34) was due largely 
to the borrowing patterns of postwar governments.  
Government financing was undertaken via writing out treasury bills, 
denominated in Lebanese pounds (LBP) and auctioned by the Central Bank. Some 
Eurobonds30 were issued as well in 1994, but most bonds at this time were in 
Lebanese pounds. The government offered high interest rates, i.e. above market 
levels, to attract buyers: around twenty-five percent for twelve-month bills in 1990, 
peaking at over thirty-six percent at one point in 1995.31 Although they were bought 
by foreign investors as well (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997), the majority of buyers 
were Lebanese commercial banks (Hardie, 2012). Their extreme profitability 
allowed these banks to transform the huge postwar growth in deposits, that was a 
result of transfers of Lebanese expatriates and Arab investors lured by high interest 
rates and good returns on real estate investment (Bolbol, 1999, p. 1870) into 
lucrative and relatively safe investments. Interest payments on bank loans to the 
government reached forty-two percent for some maturities in the early 1990s, 
twenty-eight percent in 1992. There was a twenty-five percent return rate on three-
month securities in dollars. From 1993, the yield on three-month securities 
averaged 14.6 percent, and on two-year bonds 19.29 percent and (S. R. Hakim & 
Andary, 1997; Peters et al., 2004). However this did go down somewhat: the average 
rate went from 21.4 percent in 1993 to 12.07 percent in 2000 (Peters et al., 2004). The 
banks passed these high returns partly on to their depositors via high interest rates, 
attracting even more deposits. The resulting increase in rentier income provided a 
pillar of political-economic support for the system (Dibeh, 2011).  
The Central Bank has been crucial to the setup surrounding public debt in 
Lebanon as auctioneer of the bonds. Its postwar position has been quite powerful: 
all banks and financial institutions in Lebanon fall under its jurisdiction; it controls 
                                                       
29 I.e., their assets combined. 
30 Eurobonds are bonds denominated in foreign currency listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. 
31 According to data provided by the Central Bank, see www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/table.php? 
name=t5271-3. 
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entry into the banking industry; defines the scope of banking activities and 
regulates banks’ practices. The banks also fall under the Banking Control 
Commission (BCC), which was established in 1967 to supervise banking activities 
and ensure compliance with regulations.32 The Central Bank is quite prudent when 
it comes to speculative practices and regulations around these are very strict. It 
regulates monetary policy, including exchange rate policy and interest rate ceilings 
(Saad, 2014). However, the Central Bank is at its most powerful in the role it plays in 
the Lebanon’s public debt.  
The Central Bank’s role in Lebanon’s public debt has several aspects. First, the 
Bank auctions Lebanese pound-denominated treasury bills, controlling the primary 
market. It thus has an influence on who buys these bonds. The Bank shielded the 
market from competition by foreign investors by committing to fulfill all foreign 
demand for treasury bills regardless of size or interest rate and also if this demand 
exceeded the financing needs of the government, thus preserving high interest 
rates. These foreign investors could well be dealers hired by domestic Lebanese 
banks. The Bank refused to release data about the number of market participants at 
the weekly auctions, reinforcing this suspicion (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997). 
Second, the Bank controls the interest rates and could hence protect the Lebanese 
pound exchange rate by making investments in pounds more attractive (S. R. Hakim 
& Andary, 1997), encouraging deposits in Lebanese pounds by offering a higher 
interest on these (Poddar, Goswami, Solé, & Icaza, 2006) and requiring Lebanese 
banks to invest a minimum of forty percent of their LBP-deposits in treasury bills 
from 1994 to 1997 (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997). When supply levels were low vis-à-
vis demand high interests rates were maintained, which could not be justified 
transparently. Third, there is hardly a secondary market for these bonds, but the 
Central Bank buys its obligations back at a discount (Peters et al., 2004). It also 
absorbs excess liquidity via certificates of deposit and finances the government to 
meet liquidity shortfalls (Poddar et al., 2006). In short, the Central Bank is an agent 
of the Ministry of Finance, a dealer, and the main financial regulatory body of 
Lebanon, which is asking for conflicts of interest (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997). As 
Gaspard (2004, p. 218) argued, the treasury bill-market was not regulated through 
supply and demand, but an unofficial understanding between the Central Bank and 
major commercial banks, reflecting the oligopolistic structure of the banking 
industry. The Central bank’s policy of providing high interest rates allowed banks to 
                                                       
32 This paragraph is largely based on information from the website of the Association of Banks in Lebanon 
(ABL) www.abl.org.lb/subPage.aspx?pageid=360. Accessed August 12, 2014. 
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make super profits between 1993 and 1997 by investing their deposits in the T-bills, 
and later Eurobonds. The state and the banks had reached an understanding that 
upheld these practices, avoiding a debt crisis, a state-central bank-commercial 
banks collusion (Dibeh, 2005, p. 16; Kubursi, 1999). 
The Central Bank’s actions in the 1990s have taken away capital from banks that 
could have been invested privately in the country. The authorities’ argument was 
that investors’ confidence needed to be restored first. Then, Lebanon would re-
emerge as a regional financial hub, not based on banking secrecy, but as a capital 
market channeling funds into the Middle East, Hariri’s dream of turning Beirut into 
a Singapore (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997). The Central Bank paid exorbitant 
amounts of interest on Lebanese-pound denominated T-bills while at the same time 
Eurobonds were flying over the counter. Why did the government not raise more 
debt internationally? Hakim and Andary (1997) maintain that the Lebanese-pound 
bills subsidized the operations of the domestic banks, who would otherwise not 
have not been able to survive. Its policies ensured the continued stability of the 
Lebanese banking sector, by for example never (directly) transmitting the costs of 
banks’ bankruptcies to depositors (Berthélemy et al., 2007).  
The high interest payments on bank loans to the government were partly 
financed through the broad taxation of essential goods for the Lebanese population, 
for example via import duties, hitting the poorest segments of society hardest 
(Srouji, 2005, p. 24). This is because Lebanon was dependent on imports for a large 
part of its consumption, in part because historically Lebanese governments did not 
give priority to the development of industry and agriculture but also because the 
postwar development of productive sectors was hindered by the government’s high 
interest payments to the banks, which crowded out loans to the private sector 
(Gebara, 2007). If a bank can lend to the government on conditions of such favorable 
returns, it will only lend to the private sector if they can get at least the same 
returns. The exorbitant interest rates on loans were simply unaffordable to many 
businesses. Hence, the productive sectors were starved of credit and the Lebanese 
remained dependent on imports, which are heavily taxed. Of course, taxes could 
have been collected on high incomes and corporate profit as well, but successive 
postwar governments almost always avoided taxation of the rich: in the 1990s, taxes 
on income and corporate profit were lowered to ten percent maximum (but raised 
to twenty percent in 1998 for incomes and fifteen percent for corporations) and 
there are no taxes on financial transactions or interest-bearing instruments to date.  
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However, notwithstanding this form of accumulation by dispossession of the 
Lebanese population (between 1993 and 2008, servicing the Lebanese debt cost 
US$9,500 per person, Traboulsi, 2014, p. 28), this entire setup would not have 
worked if the banks were not awash with cash remittances from the Lebanese 
diaspora. Some of these came from Lebanese nationals residing in the Gulf and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Labaki, 2006). Indeed, migration had continued in postwar Lebanon 
because of the high youth unemployment rates, around thirty percent (G. Hourani, 
2009).   
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2.2.1.2  The role of diaspora capital  
 
Figure 4-The geographical spread and numbers of the Lebanese diaspora. This fact sheet 
claims to have the most accurate numbers © Moise A. Khayrallah Center for 
Lebanese Diaspora Studies. Retrieved from lebanesestudies.ncsu.edu, accessed 
April 24, 2015. Estimates of the size of Lebanon’s current diaspora range from 
600,000 (MPC Team, 2013) to a staggering, unbelievable 20 million (see 
freakonomics.com/2013/08/29/who-are-the-most-successful-immigrants-in-
the-world). This variation results from different ways of counting who is 
Lebanese (i.e.: is it only people born in Lebanon? People who hold Lebanese 
citizenship?  Do descendants count? If so, how many generations should one 
go back? And so on). 
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Currently, the United States number anything from one to 2.5 million (descendants 
of) Lebanese immigrants (Marinova, 2010, p. 1). Australia and Latin America have a 
huge Lebanese diaspora community as well (there are an estimated seven million 
people of “Lebanese” origin in Brazil alone, Cohen, 2008, p. 95). Wealthy emigrants 
sent money back home and returned sometimes flaunting their money and 
renovating their ancestral homes, which changed the look of entire villages (Khater, 
2001). Postwar, the government saw diaspora capital more and more as a valuable 
source of investment, and actively tried to attract it. It had however never 
developed a consistent framework regarding its diaspora population (Brand, 2007; 
G. Hourani, 2007). The Lebanese state did not yet exist when the first migration 
waves started and henceforth had not been very proactive in pursuing ties, due to 
distance and because many emigrants lost their (Ottoman/Syrian) citizenship 
(Brand, 2007, p. 6). Therefore, there was never a separate Ministry for Expatriates 
and expatriates could not vote in Lebanon in order not to upset the delicate 
sectarian balance (Brand, 2007, p. 8). There were some attempts at setting up official 
institutions, such as a short-lived Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interests of 
Lebanese Abroad between 1941 and 1942, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Expatriates set up in 1945, consular missions in countries with a large Lebanese 
community, allowing for Turkish citizens of Lebanese descent to apply for 
nationality (Brand, 2007; G. Hourani, 2007; Labaki, 2006) and the Lebanese World 
(Cultural) Union that found itself paralyzed at the outbreak of the war (Brand, 2007, 
p. 8).  
Despite these mostly failed attempts to maintain official ties with the diaspora, in 
the early 1990s the belief in its power to help rebuild the country was strong among 
the government and scholars alike. The diaspora was estimated to have US$10-30 
billion in assets (Kubursi, 1993, p. 179; S. Nasr, 1993, p. 72). Many expressed hope 
that these expats would return to invest (Khalaf, 1993; Kubursi, 1993). These ‘gifted 
professionals and entrepreneurs’, symbolizing the ‘idyllic national character’, could 
play a role in rebuilding the war-torn country with their ‘cosmopolitan Levantine 
and republican spirits’, ‘native and consummate virtuosity’ (Khalaf, 1993, pp. 44–53). 
The Solidere company sold US$550 million of its US$650 million issued in shares to 
Lebanese expatriates (Mango, 2014, p. 291). The diaspora assisted in buying 
government bonds in the 1990s (around US$35 million) (G. Hourani, 2007, p. 6) and 
in June 2000, the Minister of Economy issued zero percent rate bonds where 
subscribers would receive the Migrant Medal, an initiative that was not continued. 
While the diaspora’s indirect influence on Lebanon’s political economy, via its 
remittances and contributions to the banks’ deposit boom as explained above, was 
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enormous, and the impact of powerful diaspora entrepreneurs and politicians no 
less so, any direct contribution to the country’s rebuilding via an active state policy 
of attracting their resources remained minimal. 
2.2.1.3  The return of the displaced: sectarian tension and the 
role of political  parties  
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of people remained displaced. In 1993, Lebanese 
Ministry for the Displaced and the Central Fund for the Displaced were created, two 
public agencies that were meant to facilitate the return of displaced people and 
compensate them in cash for reconstructing or repairing their houses, or for being 
displaced as squatters, a category which was added under pressure from political 
parties. In the end, the latter category was resorted to most, while the Ministry’s 
mandate to reconstruct housing was not carried out, with the exception of one 
project in the Northern city of Tripoli. The people who squatted in what would 
become Solidere’s reconstruction project were given the priority to be removed first. 
These people were able to receive compensation sums that were sometimes way 
above what was officially mandated by the Ministry of the Displaced, partly because 
the initial compensation was too law and political parties intervened on their 
behalf; partly because of using personal connections to obtain higher sums (Bou 
Akar, 2005; Leenders, 2012). Families moved to their old apartments, to informal 
settlements but also to newly developed residential complexes with flexible 
payment schemes, made possible by financial support of political parties, who had 
an interest in locating their constituencies in contentious areas i.e. areas situated 
between several sectarian-homogeneous areas. 
The role of political parties was a consequence of the state disappearing from the 
few services it was providing before the war, reinforced by the postwar Ta‘ef 
settlement. The state did not go further than handing out compensation; it did not 
develop any social housing or low-interest subsidized loan programs. Therefore, 
political parties could step in where they provided financial incentives for affiliated 
developers to build cheap housing in Beirut’s suburbs and employed social 
networks to bring people there. They also intervened in infrastructure provision, 
mediated conflicts, and provided community facilities. This led to a construction in 
the suburbs at the time. The arrival of the displaced caused considerable tension 
with the residents of a different sect in a nearby suburb (Bou Akar, 2005). In this 
way, the monetary compensation after the civil war resulted in the formation of 
geographic religious enclaves that reinforced sectarian divisions (Bou Akar, 2015). I 
 85 
will show that this dimension played an important role in the materialization of the 
spatial fix. 
2 .2.2  1998-2008:  Crises,  reforms, debt and investments 
The system of reconstruction by public debt got in trouble at the end of the 1990s. 
The dollar peg had required a cap on wages to avoid that they would spiral out of 
control due to the real exchange rate appreciation that resulted from the peg, and 
led to unprecedented suppression of labor by the Hariri government as well as a 
frozen minimum wage until 2008 (Dibeh, 2011; Makdisi, 1997). The peg also had 
negative effects on economic growth as exports became more expensive, and 
resulted in a crisis in 1998 that halted the postwar reconstruction boom temporarily 
(Dibeh, 2008). The foreign-induced economic growth that was hoped for did not 
materialize. Debt servicing swallowed a whopping ninety percent of government 
revenues in 1998 (Srouji, 2005, p. 28). Hariri left as Prime Minister and was replaced 
by Selim al-Hoss. Hoss ruled from 1998 to 2000 and attempted to reform the 
economy. However, he soon left office and Hariri came back in power again. Banks 
pressured the government to issue Eurobonds. Conveniently, this allowed them to 
adjust their accounts as they could now profitably invest their dollar deposits as 
well, although the yields on these bonds were lower than for those in Lebanese 
pounds (ten to twelve percent) (Srouji, 2005, p. 28). Foreign currency debt increased 
therefore to fifty-four percent in 2004 (Srouji, 2005). 
In addition, a donor conference in Paris in 2002 (“Paris 2”, Paris 1 having been an 
earlier meeting to prepare) provided the government with relief from debt 
servicing (with public debt at 170 percent of GDP at that time), pledging US$4.3 
billion in soft loans from France, Saudi Arabia and other states, plus US$2 billion 
from Lebanese commercial banks (Lebanon’s debt was US$36 billion at the time), in 
exchange for promises of privatization and reforms. Deposits by Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait and diaspora remittances were vital as well (Dibeh, 2011). Diaspora 
remittances made between ten to fifteen percent of GDP between 1990 and 2004 
(Labaki, 2006), Besides sending cash, the diaspora also mobilizes to fund 
development projects in their home villages and built schools, hospitals, 
infrastructure and so on (Adebayo, 2010, p. 72; G. Hourani, 2007, p. 8; Labaki, 2006, 
pp. 7–8). 
Paris 2 showed the confidence of foreign investors in Hariri and the strength of 
his network. To meet the demands of the donors, several reforms were passed to 
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facilitate foreign direct investment (FDI). The government entered into free trade 
agreements and structural adjustment packages with international bodies such as 
the EU and the World Bank. In 2000 and 2001, the government ratified an 
Association Agreement with the European Union (EU), the trade provisions of which 
entered into force in 2006,33 and introduced an open skies policy and tariff cuts. A 
€50 million structural adjustment facility was signed in the context of Lebanon 
joining the Barcelona declaration and Euro-Med Partnership in 2000, including the 
introduction of Value-Added Tax (VAT) (Euro-Med Partnership, n.d.). Lebanon also 
pledged to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), of which it is an observing 
member since 1999, and the Arab Free Trade Area. In 2004, the country signed a free 
trade agreement with four EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries.  
Interest rates on treasury bills declined significantly after Paris 2 (Srouji, 2005): 
the average rate went from 21.4 percent in 1993 to 12.07 percent in 2000 (Peters et 
al., 2004) from over fourteen percent in 2001 to eight percent in 2005. Commercial 
banks’ share in government debt financing was decreased from eighty percent and 
reached sixty to sixty-five percent in 2009 (Dibeh, 2011). Although debt declined as 
percentage of GDP, it was still at 173 to 180 percent of GDP end-2005, eighty percent 
of which was held by Lebanese banks (Berthélemy et al., 2007; Saad, 2014). Hence 
the public debt system of borrowing from domestic banks continued, when the 
banks agreed to lower interest rates. The IMF at the time stated that investor 
confidence in Lebanon ‘has become the lynchpin of a unique symbiosis between the 
public-sector and the banking-sector balance sheets and how the authorities used 
this to overcome the near roll-over crisis of 2001-2002’ (cited in Dibeh, 2011, p. 47).  
In total, in the period 1992-2004, debt servicing constituted forty percent of all 
government expenditure, making Lebanon more dependent on foreign grants and 
funding for its reconstruction (Srouji, 2005, p. 26). Interest payments took up to 
almost twelve percent of GDP yearly from 2005-2008. The banks profited from all 
this as they held most of the debt, even eighty percent of foreign currency debt in 
2004 (Srouji, 2005, p. 34). The banking sector grew into a major pillar of the postwar 
economy, with deposits up to 255 percent of GDP in 2005, the second highest ratio 
in the world after Luxembourg (Berthélemy et al., 2007) Lebanon had the largest 
banking sector relative to GDP of all MENA countries (Cobham, 2011). In this way, 
the reconstruction program of the government constituted a massive transfer of 
finance to the political elite and the banks (Gaspard, 2004). Moreover, the high 
unemployment rates, political crises and Israeli war meant that many Lebanese 
                                                       
33 See ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/Lebanon for details. 
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soon opted to leave their country once again (G. Hourani, 2009, 2010), adding to the 
availability of remittances. In total, an estimated 466,000 people left between 1992 
and 2007, of which thirty-five percent to the Gulf (G. Hourani, 2009, p. 5), adding to 
the already large Lebanese diaspora and the image of Lebanon as a bird with two 
wings, resident and expatriate (Brand, 2007, p. 7). Meanwhile, the attempts at 
decreasing debt-to-GDP ratio had largely failed, and in 2008 this ratio stood at a 
staggering 190 percent, the highest rate in the world (compared to Japan, 130 
percent and the United States, one hundred percent, see Traboulsi, 2014, p. 27). 
As we will see in the next chapter, this kind of setup has continued into the 
present day, although I will add the dimension of real estate investment to this as a 
“spatial fix” of banks’ capital surpluses. Together with the huge domestic debt in 
Lebanese pounds, where interest rates were much higher, post-war reconstruction 
in this way became a story of massive public debt where commercial bank deposits 
are key to ensuring government finance (Finger & Hesse, 2009). 
2.2.2.1  Assassination of Hariri ,  war and political  crisis 
While the consequences of the Paris donor conference were playing out, Hariri 
increasingly clashed with President Lahoud over Syria’s domination of the country. 
He resigned in 2004, but a huge bomb targeted his motorcade in February 2005, 
killing him and twenty-one others. A large part of the Lebanese population 
demanded that Syria withdraw its forces, which it subsequently did. However, 
another significant part of the population had welcomed Syria’s presence and 
demonstrated in its favor. After the “Cedar Revolution” of 2005, therefore, the two 
main political blocs in Lebanon are characterized as “anti-Syrian” and “pro-Syrian” 
(called March 14 and March 8 respectively, after the date on which they had their 
biggest demonstrations).  
Following the withdrawal of Syrian forces, a national unity government lasted 
only for a short time. In the summer of 2006, a devastating Israeli assault following a 
cross-border raid by Hezbollah left the infrastructure of the country in ruins, 
destroyed 107,000 housing units, killed 1,500 Lebanese (mostly civilians) and left 
350,000 unexploded cluster bombs in South Lebanon which disrupt agriculture and 
kill people (mainly children) to this day. The government collapsed in a standoff 
between March 14 and March 8 factions. The latter’s supporters set up camp in 
Downtown Beirut in order to protest what they considered the unfair distribution 
of power. Meanwhile, another donor conference took place in January 2007 that 
secured almost US$1 billion in pledges. The Gulf States were key instigators of this 
Paris 3-conference, as the reproduction of their economies and their geopolitical 
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ambitions had become partly tied to Lebanon, while Iran made direct contributions 
for geopolitical reasons as well (Hamieh & Mac Ginty, 2010; Hanieh, 2011). However, 
political tensions remained unresolved and the country without President after his 
term expired in 2007. In May 2008, the ongoing political crisis escalated into a “mini 
civil war”, with street battles between supporters of the two camps in Beirut 
eventually moving to the mountains and Tripoli. Eventually, Qatar offered to 
mediate between the warring factions and a new national unity government was 
formed who appointed a new President. 
The onset of temporary “peace”, coinciding with the continuing rise in oil prices 
until mid-2008 and the global financial crisis, led to a massive surge in investment 
in the country’s real estate and banking sectors. I will discuss this boom in the next 
chapter; in the remainder of this chapter I sketch the legal framework, including 
state-provided facilities to investors, that underlay this boom. 
 
 
Figure 5-The aftermath of street battles in Beirut, left, and a banner saying “Thank you 
Qatar” with a picture of newly elected President Michel Suleiman, May 2008. 
2.2.2.2  Facilitating real estate investment 
During the postwar period, several changes to the legal and institutional framework 
allowed for a more intensive exploitation of the built environment. In the period 
after the economic slowdown of 1998-2000, and partly following the demands of 
donors, several reforms were passed that aimed at easing capital investment in the 
built environment. Restrictions on (foreign) investments and foreign property 
ownership were lifted, non-Lebanese were allowed to acquire more real estate or 
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land in 200134 and persons of Lebanese descent abroad were given the option to own 
land in 2004. Investors and their companies and projects were exempted from 
certain taxes or registration fees (for an overview, see Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; 
Krijnen, 2010). The Building Law was revised in 2004 to include extra built-up area 
and increase the maximum building height, in some cases allowing for the doubling 
of the exploitation ratio (Achkar, 2011), i.e. of how many square meters an investor 
was allowed to build on the plot. The Investment Development Authority Lebanon 
(IDAL), which was set up in 1994, was provided with special powers as a legal entity 
in 2001, allowing it to provide attractive incentive packages to investors and 
supersede all public administrations, authorities, and municipalities in issuing 
required administrative permits and licenses (Law 360/2001). In theory, this entity 
was set up to achieve a more balanced development. In practice, this entity has 
often issued attractive tax exemptions to upmarket hotel projects.35 It also set up 
investment agreements with countries with a large Lebanese diaspora, offering 
favorable investment conditions (G. Hourani, 2007). However, as far as tightening 
ties with Lebanese diaspora went, this attempt stalled as before: an attempt at 
setting up a separate Ministry of Expatriates failed when it descended into a 
sectarian turf war (Brand, 2007).  
Developers quickly jumped into the opportunities provided by these reforms, 
leading to a significant real estate boom. A significant part of foreign direct 
investment into real estate came from the Gulf States. Gulf countries’ need to invest 
their surplus oil capital, especially after the surge in oil prices that began in the late 
1990s and that lasted until mid-2008, has meant that are one of the chief investors 
in Lebanon: cumulative investment between 1985 and 2009 stood at US$11.3 billion, 
the largest share of which came from Saudi Arabia, followed by the UAE and Kuwait 
(G. Hourani, 2014). In the period 2003-2008, nearly fifty percent of all foreign 
financing for projects in Lebanon came from Gulf countries, closely tying it ‘to the 
reproduction of capitalism in the Gulf’ (Hanieh, 2011, p. 159). The next chapter will 
                                                       
34 This applied only to persons who were citizens of a recognized state. This condition allowed the 
government not to extend this privilege of acquiring land to Palestinian refugees, who never acquired 
Lebanese citizenship but also did not have a home country to fulfill the condition of reciprocity. 
35 According to an interview with the director of IDAL, October 20, 2014. Statistics provided to me during 
the interview show that between 2003 until October 2014, 70.5% of all projects (completed and ongoing) 
were in the tourism sector. In terms of the regional distribution of projects, Beirut received 55.2% of total 
investment, followed by Mount Lebanon with 31.1%. Of projects active at the time of interviewing, 73.5% 
was carried out in the tourism sector, and the same percentage of active project was located in Beirut. 
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explore this dimension further. The table on the following pages provides an 
overview of legal reforms passed in the postwar era. 
The role of public authorities such as the municipality has been one of active 
facilitation of the interests of agents of capital. The municipality hands out building 
permits (which are a lucrative source of income) and engages in completing the 
road network that was outlined in Beirut’s 1960s master plan, which remains largely 
unimplemented otherwise. It does not engage in any form of overseeing the 
massive amount of real estate projects that are under construction, planning for 
infrastructure, or policies that aim to mitigate the consequences of the increasing 
unaffordability of housing for the city’s population. Another body, the Directorate 
General of Urban Planning (DGU) can develop master and zoning plans for certain 
areas.  While legally this body has the power to limit real estate construction, in 
practice they often do not, also due to the interests represented in its Higher 
Council (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). And when they do, they are subject to political-
sectarian influencing (Bou Akar, 2005). In short, therefore, local authorities do not 
display the kind of “urban entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989) seen in the West 
(Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2002; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), but the active facilities 
contained in the legal changes discussed above combined with inaction in other 
cases together resulted in  a state that actively facilitates real estate investment and 
created the conditions in which profitable investment became possible through 
exploiting resulting rent gaps. The ways in which the legal framework and changes 
to it and the (in)action of public authorities combined to lead to the specific 
materialization of the spatial fix on the ground will be explored in Part 2 of the 
dissertation. 
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 R
eform
 type 
R
egulation 
D
ate 
C
ontent 
Increasing 
building 
allow
ances 
D
ecree 2791 
O
ct. 15, 
1992 
Am
endm
ent 
to 
im
plem
entation 
decree 
of 
the 
building 
law
, 
easing 
the 
construction of high-rises. 
Law
 
646 
& 
im
plem
entation 
decree 15874 
D
ec. 
11, 
2004 & 
2005 
N
ew
 building law
, m
ost im
portant changes: 
-Increase in total exploitation area by allow
ing for m
ore areas to be deducted: 
such as staircases, elevators, technical floors, double w
alls,  m
aid’s  room
  and  
parking grounds. 
-25 percent of apartm
ent size in balconies, up from
 20 percent, can be added.  
-Increase of the factor used to calculate the building envelope (gabarit) from
 
(2*road w
idth + setback) to (2.5* road w
idth + setback) 
-Increase of sam
e factor for the back of the building from
 (4*road w
idth + 
setback) to 5*road w
idth + setback) 
Increase  the  ‘retour de gabarit’ 36 from
 24 to 30m
. 
-Increase of m
axim
um
 height for technical floors from
 1.8 to 1.9m
, w
hile not 
counting them
 tow
ards exploitation. 
-Buildings up to 50m
 can obtain their perm
it directly from
 the M
unicipality, from
 
40m
 previously. 
-An excavation perm
it can be issued for projects w
aiting for their building 
perm
it. 
Law
 402
37 
Jan. 12, 
1995 
H
otels are allow
ed to double their Total Area Exploitation (built-up area). G
iven 
by decree. 
Law
 339 
Aug. 
6, 
A five-year extension of law
 402 m
entioned above. 
                                                
36 The retour de gabarit w
orks as follow
s: w
hen a building is on a corner and thus on tw
o streets, the height allow
ed before a developer needs to recede is sm
aller 
on the narrow
er of the streets. The retour de gabarit allow
s a developer to go 30 m
eters in depth from
 the w
ider street and apply to those 30 m
eters, w
hich are on 
the narrow
er road, the factor used to calculate the building envelope as 5*road w
idth + setback,  instead of 2.5. 
37 This inform
ation is partly derived from
 an interview
 w
ith a legal expert on 16 D
ecem
ber 2009 and partly from
 data researched by research assistant A
bir 
Saksouk. 
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R
eform
 type 
R
egulation 
D
ate 
C
ontent 
2001 
Facilitating 
foreign 
investm
ents 
Law
 296 
Am
ending 
decree 
11614 
of 
1969 
M
ar. 
20, 
2001 
-Foreigners can acquire up to 3000m
2 of property w
ithout seeking perm
ission 
from
 the C
ouncil of M
inisters. A
 total of three percent of each caza and ten 
percent of B
eirut can be ow
ned by foreigners. 
-Exem
ptions can be requested from
 the C
ouncil of M
inisters
38. 
-Areas can be acquired in regions previously off-lim
its (such as the S
yrian-
Lebanese border region). 
-R
eal estate registration fees are low
ered to 5 percent for both Lebanese and 
foreigners. 
Law
 771 
Am
ending Law
 144 of 1959 
2006 
Exem
pts 
joint-stock 
com
panies 
that 
have 
a 
contract 
w
ith 
the 
Investm
ent 
D
evelopm
ent Authority Lebanon from
 the requirem
ent of having a m
ajority of 
Lebanese on their boards. 
Law
 772 
Am
ending 
D
ecree 
Law
 
45, 
1983 
N
ov. 
2006 
-Exem
pts holdings from
 the requirem
ent of having at least tw
o Lebanese 
nationals on their boards. 
-H
oldings can have their capital in foreign currency. 
-A non-resident foreign chairm
an of a holding com
pany does not need a 
w
orking perm
it. 
-If a holding has m
ore than 20 percent of the capital in a com
pany, it cannot 
provide loans, unless it is a foreign investm
ent. 
Law
 no. 19 
Am
ending 
D
ecree 
Law
 
#46  
from
 1983  
Sep. 
5, 
2008 
-R
em
oving the requirem
ents of having tw
o Lebanese nationals on the board of 
an off-shore com
pany 
-A non-resident chairm
an of an off-shore com
pany does not need a w
orking 
perm
it. 39 
                                                
38 The C
ouncil of M
inisters has been m
ore than w
illing to grant exem
ptions for foreigners acquiring property in Lebanon. From
 a report (B
I-M
E, 2005, citing 
num
bers by R
am
co real-estate consultants): ‘B
etw
een January 2001 and M
ay 2003 for exam
ple, 80 investors from
 the G
ulf acquired 1.8 m
illion square m
eters of 
land,  m
ainly  in  M
ount  L
ebanon.  (…
)  The top 23 of these investors each bought an average of 64,467 square m
eters of land (83 percent of the total), a size clearly 
indicating the intended use is com
m
ercial rather than personal.’  
39From
 
w
w
w
.m
attarlaw
.com
/offshore-com
panies-lebanon.htm
. 
A
 
full-text 
version 
of 
the 
law
 
is 
available 
at 
doum
anico.com
/file/Law
%
20N
o_19%
20 
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R
eform
 type 
R
egulation 
D
ate 
C
ontent 
IM
F-plan 
2006 
The governm
ent signed a plan w
ith the IM
F to facilitate registration procedures 
for com
panies. 
Tax breaks  
D
ecree Law
 #45 
Jun. 24, 
1983 
H
olding com
panies are exem
pt from
 paying incom
e taxes and their capital is 
regressively taxed: 6 percent for capital up to 50 m
illion Lebanese pounds 
(LBP), 4 percent for capital betw
een LBP
50 and 80 m
illion and 2 percent if their 
assets are over LBP
80m
, w
ith a m
axim
um
 of LBP
5m
. 
N
ew
 custom
s law
 
Apr. 23, 
2001 
H
otel equipm
ent is exem
pt from
 custom
 duties. 
N
ew
 custom
s law
 
Apr. 23, 
2001 
Tourist transportation buses are exem
pt from
 taxes. 
 
 
50 percent discount on incom
e tax for joint-stock and lim
ited liability com
panies 
on profits m
ade from
 residential real estate developm
ent 40. 
Private urban 
planning  
D
ecree 2786 
O
ct. 15, 
1992 
Enabling the com
pany reconstructing D
ow
ntow
n B
eirut (established in 1994 as 
Solidere) to acquire state land 
Law
 117 Am
endm
ent of 
certain provisions of Law
 
D
ecree N
o. 5 prom
ulgated on 
31st January 1977 
D
ec. 7, 
1991 
Law
 allow
ing for the creation of a private real estate com
pany in charge of 
reconstructing w
ar-dam
aged  areas.  ‘The  object  of  the  com
pany  shall  be  the  
planning  and reconstruction of one or m
ore of the areas dam
aged during the 
hostilities in Lebanon in accordance w
ith a M
aster Plan and G
uiding Layout 
duly approved and the carrying out of the w
orks necessary for the achievem
ent 
of this object. The com
pany's object shall 
include, the developm
ent and 
reconstruction of the area in accordance w
ith the approved M
aster P
lan and 
G
uiding Layout, the sale of the developed lots, the erection of buildings thereon 
and the sale or lease of such buildings. 41’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
am
endm
ent%
20offshore%
20regulation.pdf. A
ccessed February 15, 2010. 
40 From
 w
w
w
.idal.com
.lb/W
hyLebanon.aspx?ID
=66, accessed 4 N
ovem
ber 2009 and w
w
w
.professionalsaa.com
/tax/A
dditional%
20Tax%
20inform
ation%
20in%
 
20Lebanon.htm
 
41I used an English translation of the law
, available at alm
ashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/340/342/law
_no91-117.htm
l. A
ccessed D
ecem
ber 5 2009. 
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R
eform
 type 
R
egulation 
D
ate 
C
ontent 
C
reating 
institutions to 
facilitate 
investm
ents 
D
ecree 5778 
1994 
Establishm
ent of an agency charged w
ith encouraging investm
ent in Lebanon 
and m
arketing the country abroad. 
Investm
ent D
evelopm
ent Law
 
360 
Aug. 
16, 
2001 
The agency established in 1994 is given additional m
andates and pow
ers. 
Facilities and services for an Investm
ent Project in Zone A, B or C
42, including: 
-W
ork perm
its for foreigners, provided that the project em
ploys tw
o Lebanese 
for every foreigner  
-An incom
e-tax exem
ption for tw
o years for the joint-stock com
pany ow
ning or 
m
anaging the project, if its shares are listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange.  
-50 percent-100 percent reduction on incom
e taxes and taxes on project 
dividends for five-ten years. 
Facilities and services for a Package D
eal C
ontract, including: 
-D
iscount on residence and w
ork perm
its for foreigners as w
ell as on building 
perm
its, registration, annexation, subdivision and m
ortgage fees  
-Assistance in obtaining residence and w
ork perm
its for foreigners as w
ell as in 
obtaining building perm
its 
-Exem
ptions from
 incom
e tax for up to ten years 
-Provision of w
ork perm
its as long as tw
o Lebanese are em
ployed for every 
foreigner. 
 
Table 2-O
verview
 of postw
ar reform
s.  
                                                
42 Zone A
: coastal areas delim
ited by a north-south line, detailed in Law
 360 (see A
ppendix); Zone B
: areas not falling under Zone A
 &
 C
; industrial areas in the 
N
orth and South m
ohafazat: Saida, G
hazieh and Tyre in the South and R
im
al, B
addaw
i, M
ina, B
ahsas, Enfeh, C
hekka and H
iri in the N
orth. Zone C
: cazas of 
A
kkar, M
inieh-D
innieh, B
sharre, H
erm
el, B
aalbeck, M
arjeyoun, H
asbayya, Tyre, Jezzine, R
achaya, B
int Jbeil and the W
est B
ekaa; villages in the m
ountainous 
areas of the B
yblos, B
atroun cazas and villages in the region of Iklim
 el K
harroub, N
abatiyeh, Tyre, B
int Jbeil and M
arjeyoun (a detailed list can be found in the 
appendix to Law
 360). 
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2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the historical, social, political and economic background in 
which the case studies in my following chapters are situated. It has first shown the 
way in which Beirut gradually turned into a center of international trade, where the 
inroads of expanding European capitalism led to its expansion during the second half 
of the nineteenth century as a class of local intermediaries rose to prominence. Beirut 
became first an Ottoman provincial capital and then the capital of the newly created 
state of Greater Lebanon under the French Mandate. After independence in 1943, 
trade, banking and services remained privileged sectors of government investment 
and main pillars of Lebanon’s   political   economy, and Beirut became a regional 
financial center following political upheaval elsewhere and the need for increasing 
amounts of petrodollars to be recycled since the surge in oil prices during the 1970s. 
Its built environment was shaped by surplus capital from the oil-rich countries and 
fleeing capital from other, Keynesian-Fordist and developmentalist states that were 
enacting nationalizing and redistributive policies that directed capital away from these 
states into one of the few welcoming zones at the time. The urban development of 
Beirut did not follow any master plan, contrary to other cities at the time. Another 
dimension that the chapter should have made clear is the salient place of migration in 
the history of the Lebanese territory and the way in which the diaspora has impacted 
the country politically and economically. This dimension became especially important 
during the first years of the civil war, where   Lebanese   expatriates’   remittances,   a 
large part of which from the Gulf, kept the country afloat during the first years. The 
diaspora also played a role in new transnational financial networks connected to the 
several warring militias gained a foothold in  what  was   left   of  Lebanon’s   economy. 
The displacement of large parts of the population meanwhile meant that besides 
destruction, Beirut and its surroundings experienced a real estate boom as new 
residential  and  commercial  centralities  replaced  the  city’s destroyed core. It is also in 
this period, when new banks were allowed to enter the stage after the Free Banking 
Law of 1977, that the government needed to borrow extensively and started to rely on 
Lebanese commercial banks, which were awash with cash from diaspora remittances. 
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All this should make clear that the postwar political-economic settlement, including 
the reliance of the government on borrowing from Lebanese banks, the role of 
diaspora remittances, and the power of diaspora Lebanese like Hariri, had its roots 
in the civil war and did not constitute a radical break with it. Postwar Lebanon was 
characterized by the consolidation of power of actors who had entered the stage 
during the war and who were often part of the Lebanese diaspora. Hariri’s drastic 
interventions in Downtown Beirut, started during the war, and large-scale 
infrastructural projects carried out by the CDR, were combined with an increasingly 
large budget deficit, mediated through the Central Bank, that the country has been 
unable (and the political elite unwilling) to overcome despite several bailout 
conferences. Meanwhile, the reforms to facilitate capital investment that were 
passed in the early millennium following these conferences did not miss their effect 
as real estate developers benefited from several tax exemptions, a more intensive 
exploitation of the built environment than before and relaxed requirements on the 
acquisition of real estate by foreigners. 
In short, this background should help the reader situate and understand the 
broader context and historical background of the spatial fix, the role of the 
Lebanese diaspora, the legacy of Beirut as a financial services center and the 
political economy of public debt. It should also prepare the reader for Part 2 of the 
thesis by introducing the legacy of civil conflict and displacement and the role of 
the state in creating conditions of profitable investment in the built environment, 
in order to understand how the spatial fix materialized. It has shown the way in 
which Beirut has always been constituted of connections that went beyond its 
locality, the way it was shaped by the circulation of capital throughout different 
periods in time, and avoided any reification or essentialism in terms of its character, 
scale, or liability to “Northern” theory. I will now move on to the next chapter 
where I explain the conditions and reasons for the post-2008 spatial fix, picking up 
in 2008 as a real estate boom got underway after the political settlement and 
national unity government that followed the conflict in May 2008. 
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 3  The influx of deposits, the diaspora 
and the role of the banks in the urban 
transformation of Beirut 
This chapter discusses two interrelated phenomena that explain the availability of 
capital for switching into the built environment of Beirut from 2008 onwards: the 
role of the Lebanese diaspora as investors in real estate (directly) and depositors in 
the Lebanese commercial banks (indirectly) and the role of the banks (and the 
Central Bank) in directing these flows of capital towards the built environment by 
providing credit to investors and buyers alike. As I have explained, capital 
investment in the built environment requires some coordination and some facilities 
(see Chapter 1). Individual capitalists or prospective homebuyers are usually not 
able to gather enough capital to be able to invest in a circuit with such a long 
turnover time, if they do not find investors or an intermediary willing to advance 
the money ahead of actual production and consumption, i.e. to create fictitious 
capital such as construction or housing loans. Banks can be such financial 
intermediaries: they are able to create money capital out of their flow of money in 
deposits (which can also be surplus capital resulting from overaccumulation) and 
advance this as credit, subject to regulations usually laid down by a Central Bank in 
order to protect the quality of money43 (Harvey, 1982). Financial and state 
institutions that control these processes can be seen as ‘the nerve center governing 
and mediating the relations between the primary and secondary circuits of capital’ 
(Harvey, 1978, p. 107).  
In order to explore this “nerve center” for Beirut, this chapter will first discuss 
the real estate boom of 2008 and show how increased flows of capital into Beirut’s 
built environment could at first be linked to investments by the Lebanese diaspora 
(as well as capital from the Gulf). Second, I show that the banks escaped the global 
financial crisis of 2008 and consequently ran into excess liquidity when many 
members of the Lebanese diaspora transferred their capital to them. Third, I will 
                                                       
43 The Central Bank should make sure that fictitious values do not move too far out of line with real 
commodity values, in order to protect the character of money as a measure of value versus its capacity as 
medium of circulation (credit) (Harvey, 1982, p. 249;279) 
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argue that the banks and their regulatory body, the Central Bank, directed this 
excess liquidity into the built environment of Beirut in order to avoid devaluation, 
and compensate for falling sales rates as the real estate boom stagnated around 
2011. This intervention kept capital circulating via mortgage provision (cf. Aalbers 
& Christophers, 2014), preventing the collapse of the real estate market. The banks 
went along with this because the government bonds, as discussed in Chapter  2, did 
not provide such a profitable lending outlet anymore since interest rates on these 
declined due to the rolling over of state debt. I will show how several regulatory 
measures and incentives ensured a safe outlet for banks’ surpluses in financing real 
estate, resulting in a boom in credit provision to the construction sector and in 
housing loans serving a clientele that was mostly domestic Lebanese. In order to 
fully understand how this happened, it is crucial to look at the role of the powerful 
Central Bank.  This chapter will thus make clear how the banks, with the help of the 
Central Bank and diaspora remittances, helped sustain Beirut’s real estate market, 
developers’ liquidity and the high prices of housing. 
3 .1  The 2008-2011 real  estate boom and the 
diaspora 
From 2008 to 2011, Beirut underwent a real estate boom. While much of the globe 
was embroiled in a severe financial crisis, Lebanon had just resolved a longstanding 
political crisis (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2) and investors were either cashing in on 
the results of their speculative practices (Ross & Jamil, 2011) or eagerly profiting 
from the investment flows towards Lebanon, which was deemed a safe haven after 
avoiding the financial crisis (how and why it avoided this crisis is explained in the 
next section). Figure 6 and Figure 7 show cement deliveries (in tons) between 1993 
and 2013, and construction permits in million square meters between 1993 and 
2015.44 These data are not entirely suitable to gauge capital investment in the built 
environment in Beirut: cement deliveries normally happen when a project is 
                                                       
44 Ideally, I would situate the real estate boom longer-term by describing Kuznet’s cycles for Lebanon, as 
Harvey (1978) does (see Chapter 1, section 1.1.1), using data on the amount of capital invested in the built 
environment throughout the years or building activity per capita in dollars. However, due to the fact 
that during the civil war no statistics were kept on construction, we will have to do with only one cycle. 
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already under construction, i.e. after investment has been planned and partially 
carried out, and construction permits are usually delivered six months to two years 
after a project is planned (Krijnen, 2010) and moreover do not guarantee that a 
project is actually being constructed. Also, I am using nationwide data, because first 
of all the central position of Beirut ensures that most investments are directed 
towards there in any case and second, the municipal borders of Beirut do not 
coincide with its metropolitan area, so looking at data only for Beirut would distort 
the picture (since construction in the suburbs would not be taken into account). 
Both figures are able to show that capital investment in the built environment has 
followed the Lebanese economy’s rhythm of growth and crisis, outlined in Chapter  
2: the reconstruction boom of the early 1990s, with investors jumping into the 
opportunities for reinvestment given the massive devaluation of capital in 
Downtown Beirut, followed by the bust of the late 1990s, and a pickup in growth 
that starts in 2005 (after the new Building Law was passed and Gulf investors had 
significant surplus capital to invest). The 2008-boom which is the subject of this 
chapter is visible in a gradual increase of cement deliveries that accelerates in 2009 
and a much larger growth in construction permit areas as of 2008, slowing down 
somewhat in 2009 but sharply increasing in 2010. As a real estate sales 
representative explained to me: “The momentum was there, a very high energy, 
under normal circumstances it will handicap the situation, in a saturated market it 
will hold the market back, but there was a momentum, after 2008 Doha we saw 
something very strange, never seen before in Lebanon, prices escalated in a few 
months to double, and tripled from 2005. 2005-2008 established some sort of price 
increase, 2008 Doha accord made an unprecedented price escalation”45  
 
                                                       
45 Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 30, 2012. 
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Figure 6- Cement deliveries in tons. Source: Banque du Liban Statistics, downloaded 
from Infopro Databank at www.databank.com.lb/doc.asp?ID=1546, August 25, 
2015. 
 
Figure 7-Construction permits in million square meters. Source: Statistics provided by 
the Order for Engineers and Architects, downloaded at 
www.bdl.gov.lb/statistics/table.php?name=t51-11. Note that construction 
permits take from six months up to two years, and hence the projects 
themselves have already started to be planned/sold the permit is given. 
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Figure 8-The real estate boom becomes visible. Picture taken April 14, 2010. 
The real estate boom that started in 2008 was driven largely by capital from abroad. 
Indeed, as the built environment is immobile, it ‘requires interregional and 
international flows of money to facilitate its production’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 113). 
These flows are especially prone to be international in a country like Lebanon, 
where there is no local production base (as explained in Chapter  2). However, the 
distinction “international” (or global) and “local” needs some   qualification here, 
because a significant part of these flows originated with the Lebanese diaspora. In 
this way, Lebanon is well in line with other countries who have a large diaspora 
(Ghana, China) and whose international self-made entrepreneurs changed the 
urban landscape of their hometown by constructing malls, gated communities and 
housing tailored towards the demands of the diaspora, who wish to maintain the 
higher standard of living that they are used to in their host countries (Grant, 2005; 
Hobden, 2014). Housing is constructed that far exceeds the affordability of local 
residents and property becomes disconnected from the viability of the larger 
economic context in which it is situated (Simone, 2010; Wu, 2000). During the real 
estate boom that started in 2008, something similar happened in Beirut. 
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Lebanese diaspora investment in real estate is of course not a new phenomenon; 
with such a large diaspora, many emigrants regularly bought or constructed a 
house during their annual return to the motherland (Labaki, 2006). As far back as 
the nineteenth century, geographically mobile merchants built grand palaces and 
residences in Beirut that showcased influences from other places in their 
architecture (Kassir, 2010, p. 126), investing considerable amounts of capital in 
Beirut (Hanssen, 2005a). Throughout the years, part of the Lebanese diaspora always 
maintained strong social, economic and political ties with the homeland, which 
today are stronger than ever due to faster communication and travel means, 
although it must be noted that certainly not the entire amount of people considered 
of Lebanese origin maintain such ties (Mizobuchi & Takaoka, 2013). Instead, ties are 
strongest with Lebanese in West-Africa, Europe and the Middle East, where they are 
often not naturalized and are located closer to home, contrary to their counterparts 
in Latin America and the United States (Brand, 2007, p. 6; Humphrey, 1993) (recently 
immigrants to the United States have started to unite again in order to encourage 
transnational investment (Marinova, 2010). In the process, these migrant social 
networks have generated translocal ties across the globe (Adebayo, 2010, p. 73; G. 
Hourani, 2007) and brought capital to Beirut, the consequences of which this 
chapter explores with regard to real estate (in this section) and banking (in the next 
section). 
With the postwar reconstruction of Beirut and the return of powerful Lebanese 
diaspora actors, the phenomenon of diaspora investment in real estate was 
endorsed and encouraged, and the supply of high-end apartments that the real 
estate boom provided was suited not only to the large amounts of Gulf buyers that 
formed a steady part of the demand throughout the postwar period, but also to the 
growing, well-off Lebanese diaspora (and of course not in any way to the resident 
Lebanese). The diaspora got involved in the real estate boom in two ways: as 
investors and as developers. 
3 .1.1  Diaspora investors 
As explained in Chapter  2, after the war ended a number of rich diaspora investors 
returned to Lebanon. A significant amount of capital investment in real estate in 
postwar Lebanon came from diaspora investment. The late Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri was perhaps the most famous of them; a very successful construction 
magnate in Saudi Arabia who used his capital and connections to carry out his 
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projects (Becherer, 2005; Denoeux & Springborg, 1998; Leenders, 2004; Makdisi, 
1997; Summer, 2005). Hariri was part of a larger number of diaspora investors from 
the Gulf: eighty percent of contractors from the diaspora active in the 1990s came 
from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region (Labaki, 2006). Another example is Speaker of 
Parliament of the last twenty years Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal militia during 
the civil war, who has an empire of business interests (in real estate, banking, trade) 
in West Africa and the Gulf (Gberie, 2002, p. 12). At one point, he allowed a diamond 
dealer from Sierra Leone to mine sand off the beaches in the Southern city of Tyre, 
in his role as head of the government institution Council of the South (Picard, 2005, 
p. 40 note 44). Gauging the exact amounts of capital circulating here is difficult 
because there are no numbers available on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in real 
estate by Lebanese diaspora and other foreign investments.  
Apart from these examples, my own research has provided some   idea of 
diaspora developer involvement after the real estate boom in 2008. Mercury 
Development, now called Trillium Development, the developer of the Trillium 
Beirut towers in Corniche en-Nahr, is a company founded by Lebanese-British 
diaspora entrepreneur Mustapha Ahmad. Before coming to Beirut, the company 
worked in postwar reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. 46 After making a fortune 
abroad, Ahmad set his eyes on Beirut a decade ago and started buying plots, 
including the Trillium plot.47 Meanwhile, the company continues to develop 
projects abroad, currently building an entirely new, one million m2 city in Erbil, as 
well as other projects in Iraq, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Morocco. 
“Mercury began to do projects in Iraq, Djibouti, all over Africa. We had already a lot 
of capital when we started in Lebanon.”48Another diaspora developer is HAR 
Properties, the developer of UPark in Corniche en-Nahr and the AYA-project in Mar 
Mikhael. HAR consists of two partners who both used to live in Paris.49 Its CEO Fahed 
                                                       
46 The US government has since indicted Ahmad and some of his partners for defrauding them. I also 
found out that a recurring shareholder in several companies owned by Ahmad,  Mohammed Abu 
Derwish, a Lebanese businessman who opened a private security company in Iraq after the 2003-
invasion, was arrested in 2004 on suspicion of smuggling US$13 million worth of Iraqi cash into Lebanon, 
obtained from a procurement contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (the charges were dismissed). 
This same person was accused of defrauding the US Government through food and food equipment 
provisions supplied to US-installed Iraq government., see https://www.fbi.gov/albuquerque/press-
releases/2012/former-officers-of-new-mexico-based-defense-contractor-charged-in-fraud-and-money-
laundering-schemes-related-to-rebuilding-efforts-in-iraq 
47 Interview with the developer of Trillium residential high rise, December 4, 2013. 
48 Interview with sales representative of Trillium Beirut, April 24, 2012. 
49 Interview with the developer of UPark, December 12, 2013. 
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Hariri is a billionaire heir of the late Prime Minister who made his fortune in the 
Gulf. Moreover, while the Pearl Office Tower in Corniche en-Nahr is developed by 
the Lebanese subsidiary of a Kuwaiti company, its Lebanese project manager told 
me that he used to work in Nigeria, again illustrating how many former Lebanese 
diaspora currently work in real estate in their home country.50 Other developers 
have had careers abroad as well before coming to Lebanon. A partner in BEAR 
Properties, developer of Factory 4376 in Corniche en-Nahr, was born in Montpellier, 
France and moved to Beirut when the war was over.51 Hence, Lebanese expatriates 
have been actively involved in real estate as developers. 
3 .1.2  Diaspora buyers 
Apart from capital investment in real estate development, the diaspora have been 
active buyers of this real estate as well, and this was once again affirmed after the 
latest boom, which started in 2008. The Lebanese that were living abroad “started to 
put their money in real property”, seeing that the market in Beirut was stable as 
opposed to the markets of the countries where they were living.52 The Lebanese 
diaspora constitute a large part of the buyers of upper middle class to high-end 
residential real estate, whether as end users or speculators (Wehbe, 2014c). Exact 
numbers are hard to find, however: “Suppose I go and buy an apartment, the seller 
doesn’t care if I’m resident or not.”53 Therefore, a large share of buyers consists of 
expatriate Lebanese that are employed abroad in well-paying jobs abroad, which 
means that they can afford to buy these properties. Developers confirm many of 
their clients work mostly in white-collar professions abroad and are university-
educated. They buy an apartment for their return to Lebanon after retirement, as a 
summer residence or as an investment for their children. Indeed, only two out of 
ten apartments in Beirut are sold to local residents.54 In terms of financing, buyers 
                                                       
50 Interview with the developer of Pearl Office Tower, December 5, 2013. 
51According to the sales contract of the land, obtained in December 2013 from the Land Registry, 
concluded March 31, 2010. 
52 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
53 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
54 Lecture by economist Kamal Hamdan, October 24, 2014, summary available at 
www.kas.de/libanon/en/publications/39720/. 
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often deposit an initial down payment and pay the rest of the sum in subsequent 
installments, usually following different stages of completion of the building. 
However, in the past years, mortgage financing is becoming more common, as we 
will see. It is estimated that in 2010, forty to forty-five percent of demand for 
residential real estate came from Lebanese expatriates, mostly   high-end 
apartments, and real estate agents and developers actively tried to reach 
expatriates (Pearlman, 2014). These buyers relied on personal savings, mortgages, 
and assistance from family members.55 Online real estate portals have opened that 
cater to Lebanese diaspora looking for a home in Lebanon56, and there is an online 
banking portal where they can compare mortgages57 (Cauli, 2014). Byblos Bank 
receives applications for expatriate housing loans through its representative office 
in Dubai and its online portal (Bathish, 2012). Ten percent of Lebanese non-resident 
depositors in Lebanese banks stated that having real estate services in Lebanon was 
their reason for depositing (Khoury & Kanj, 2013, p. 161). An advertising agency 
stated that they do roadshows for Lebanese living in the Gulf.58 
Most developers and other experts I interviewed concede that expatriate 
Lebanese make up a large part of the demand for real estate in Beirut: “It’s the 
Lebanese working outside who want to invest in their country; the only safe option 
is property, land; that never lost value, its either stagnating or growing.”59 “Three-
quarters of buyers live abroad, stay three months a year or bought it as an 
investment, especially the smaller ones.”60 For the Trillium Beirut-project in the 
Corniche en-Nahr-area, clients consist of sixty percent expats and ten percent 
foreigners (Boudisseau, 2011). One lawyer expressed the possibility of investing in 
these apartments as a way of saving, especially considering the low interest on 
mortgages: “If I have some   money, I purchase apartments because the interest is 
very low, I’m paying $2000 a month, and once it is constructed I can sell it with a 
                                                       
55 Also, local buyers have reported being helped by wealthier relatives abroad, hence this is part of where 
remittances by the diaspora do flow into real estate (Krijnen & De Beukelaer, 2015). 
56See, for example propertyfinder.com.lb, which offers a mortgage calculator as well. 2529 properties in 
Beirut are listed for an average price of US$1.4 million (based on results of September 17, 2014). 
57 www.bnooki.com/housing-loans-lebanon. Accessed September 17, 2014. 
58 Interview with the director of an advertising agency, December 10, 2014. 
59Interview with an advertising agent working for UPark, December 10, 2013. 
60 Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 30, 2012. 
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profit of $50,000.”61 While the amount of people who buy for these purposes has not 
been established, it seems clear that a large part of buyers during the real estate 
boom consisted of diaspora Lebanese. The diaspora had an arguably even bigger 
impact in the banking boom that started in 2008. I will now turn to this story. 
3 .2  The post-2008 influx of  bank deposits   
Chapter 2 has discussed how banking has been an extremely important sector of the 
Lebanese territory’s economy since the nineteenth century when Beirut became a 
hub of trade, through the post-independence period when Beirut was a regional 
financial center recycling fleeing and Gulf capital, and the civil war when Lebanese 
banks monopolized the banking sector as foreign banks withdrew from Beirut and 
they became important for government borrowing, using the funds they attracted 
in remittances, expanding to countries with significant Lebanese expatriate 
populations. With the Free Banking Law of 1977, new banks belonging to Lebanese 
with connections to Gulf and West African capital entered the scene. Meanwhile, 
the Central Bank, founded during the Chehabist period in 1964, was required to take 
the opinion of the Association of Lebanese Banks (ABL) into account for every 
decision, showcasing the banks’ power. During the postwar era, Lebanese 
commercial banks became the main lenders to the government on very favorable 
terms (for the banks) via Treasury Bills (and to a lesser extent Eurobonds), swelling 
their capital, which was increasing also because of continuing diaspora remittances, 
which were in turn attracted by the high interest rates banks could offer (Hardie, 
2012). The debt was repeatedly rolled over in this way and increasingly through 
Eurobonds, allowing banks to adjust their accounts by investing their dollar 
deposits. As a result, the Lebanese banking sector became enormously inflated. The 
postwar role of the Central Bank has been especially crucial, as it auctioned the 
bonds, maintaining high interest rates even when it appeared unnecessary.  
Currently, Lebanon has sixty-four commercial banks (Saad, 2014). In 2003, the 
five largest banks controlled about half of total deposits volume. Most banks are 
managed by the founding families, of which twelve are dominant (Cochrane, 2010). 
The so-called alpha banks (with over US$2 billion in deposits) are owned by 
                                                       
61 Interview with a lawyer, March 18, 2015. 
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shareholders other than the founding families, mostly investors (such as the Bank 
of New York Mellon), holding companies and Gulf capital (such as that of the 
Kuwaiti, UAE and Saudi royal families). Founding families still sit on the board of 
directors but do not have many stakes. Often banks also have shares in other banks 
(Cochrane, 2010). Foreign banks are still not settling in Lebanon, because they do 
not trust the security situation but moreover because they cannot compete with the 
interest rates that Lebanese banks are able to offer: “It’s not a safe place here so 
international bankers are very shy. HSBC offers two percent on any dollar savings 
account; local banks offer three to four percent, so why should they be interested in 
Lebanon? It's a risk for them.”62 “They cannot compete in Lebanon with the banks 
with the high rates on deposits.”63 This section will explore how the Lebanese 
banking sector, already in such a strong position, ran into enormous excess 
liquidity. It will explain how and why Lebanon escaped the global financial crisis in 
2008, which coincided with the (temporary) resolution of the political crisis. These 
two factors combined led to a surge in confidence, increasing economic activity, 
huge capital inflows and a real estate boom (Sadikov, Kyobe, Nakhle, & El-Ganainy, 
2012), the consequences of I will outline in Part 2 of this dissertation. They also 
resulted in a large increase in bank deposits, especially in Lebanese pounds, and 
huge profits for the banks. Consequently, the period 2008-2012 has been referred to 
as a ‘golden period’ for Lebanon’s banks (Saad, 2014, p. 183). How did this golden 
period come about and who were the depositors who increased the banks’ deposit 
base to such a large extent? 
3.2.1  Escaping the financial  crisis  
How did Lebanese banks escape the financial crisis? In the early 2000s, Riad 
Salameh, president of the Lebanese Central Bank, issued several decrees and 
directives prohibiting commercial banks from investing in risky instruments such 
as mortgage-backed securities, engaging in subprime lending and purchasing exotic 
derivatives (see Table 3). The regulations required banks operating in Lebanon to 
obtain prior approval from committees they established themselves for any 
decisions on granting credits, investing liquid assets, real estate investments, 
shareholding and participation, and operations involving structured or derived 
                                                       
62 Interview with a project management consultant, March 10, 2015. 
63 Interview with an investment banker, October 17, 2014. 
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financial instruments. These committees had to make sure banks comply with all 
regulations set forth by the Central Bank. Moreover, the Central Bank demanded 
high reserve requirements64: twenty-five percent of their demand liabilities and 
fifteen percent of their term liabilities in Lebanese pounds (LBP), as well as other 
reserves, are to be deposited at the Central Bank. Banks also needed sufficient 
capital adequacy to cover loans. Third, the Bank made sure that Lebanese banks 
complied with the latest international finance standards. Together, these strict 
regulations prevented Lebanese banks’ exposure to the risky instruments and 
derivative products (such as securitized mortgages) that caused the downfall of so 
many banks in the United States and Europe, and led to a large degree of trust in the 
banking sector, traditionally viewed as the only safe and stable sector of the 
Lebanese economy. “All the big banks were on the verge of bankruptcy while 
Lebanese banks were standing in the middle of the crisis, this gave credibility to 
Lebanese banks.”65 The Central Bank has thus been quite conservative regarding the 
creation of fictitious capital in order to keep speculation in check. One interviewee 
contributes this to the volatile security situation in the country: “2008 they say it 
was great, not because we were smart but because we learned in our environment 
we need to stay liquid. If something happens. It’s not because my neighbor bank, 
they won’t try to come and support me but they will finish me off. We need to keep 
thirty percent in liquidity. If something happens to the region you need the 
liquidity.”66 If depositors would take their deposits for example, the banks won’t 
collapse if sufficient liquidity is maintained. 
 
Date Reform Content 
Feb. 
2001 
Basic Circular 81 on Operations 
relating to Credit, Investment, 
Shareholding and Participation 
-Art. 1.1-1.3 (amended most recently in 
September 2006): “All decisions taken by 
banks operating in Lebanon concerning credit 
granting, liquid asset investments, real estate 
investments, shareholding, participations, and 
operations performed on their own account on 
structured financial instruments or derivatives, 
must be submitted to the prior approval of one 
                                                       
64 Reserve requirements are amounts of cash from deposits or notes that banks are not allowed to lend 
out and have to store at the Central Bank. 
65 Interview with an accountancy consultant, March 10, 2015. 
66 Interview with a financial consultant, March 11, 2015. 
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Date Reform Content 
or more committees” who have to prevent 
“unbearable risk.” 
-Art. 3 (amended most recently in November 
2006): Prohibiting banks from subprime 
lending. 
May/Sep. 
2001 
Basic Circular 84/Basic Decision 
7835 (May 30, 2001); Basic 
Circular 86/Basic Decision 7926 
(September 20, 2001); Basic 
Circular 87/Basic Decision 7935 
(September 27, 2001). 
-Banks are required to maintain a compulsory 
cash reserve on client deposits in LBP. 
-This must be in the form of a non-interest 
earning deposit calculated on the basis of 25 
percent of the weekly average demand 
deposits and 15 percent of the weekly average 
term deposits. 
-Banks are also required to maintain a 
compulsory cash reserve on client deposits in 
foreign currency. 
-This must be in the form of an interest earning 
deposit calculated on the basis of the weekly 
average foreign currency deposits. 
Jul. 2002 Banking Control Commission 
Circular 237 (July 8, 2002). 
-Setting the capital adequacy ratio at a 
minimum of twelve percent, compared to 8 
percent required by the Bank of International 
Settlements. 
Jul./Sep. 
2004 
Intermediate Decision 
8786/Intermediate Circular 63 
(2004/07/14); Intermediate 
Decision 8841/Intermediate 
Circular 67, amending Basic 
Circular 66/Basic Decision 7493 
(December 24, 1999). 
-Prohibiting banks from dealing with structured 
products and instruments in Lebanon and 
abroad. 
-Exceptions: those products or instruments 
benefiting from an unconditional guarantee on 
the total capital; those whose value does not 
exceed 25 percent of the bank’s funds. 
Table 3-Central Bank regulations that contributed to Lebanon's escaping the financial 
crisis. Sources: website of the Central Bank of Lebanon: www.bdl.gov.lb/laws-
and-circulars.html; www.abl.org.lb/pdf/LegalReviewSurvey.pdf. 
Central Bank-governor Riad Salameh was widely praised in the media for his role in 
preventing the crisis (Daragahi, 2009), hailed as a visionary and proudly boasting 
that he saw the crisis coming. He was voted Central Banker of the year by the 
Banker Magazine. However, it should be remembered that at the time Lebanese 
banks did not necessarily feel the need to invest in these risky products because 
they had another steady source of interest income: the large interest payments 
from the government on the loans they provide to sustain the public debt. The role 
of the Central Bank was instrumental in sustaining this system (as explained in 
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Chapter  2). After it became clear that the Lebanese financial system was largely 
unaffected by the global financial meltdown (which was hence not entirely global, 
and probably Lebanon is not the only country whose banking sector remained 
unaffected), many people transferred their deposits there, attracted by the high 
interest rates these banks could offer compared to interest rates in most of the rest 
of the world, which plummeted dramatically. How much capital was transferred? 
Who were these people that transferred such large amounts of capital to Lebanon’s 
banks? 
3.2.2  The influx of bank deposits:  Gulf  and diaspora 
transfers and remittances 
After the 2008 financial crisis, Lebanese banks’ private sector deposits increased 
massively, growing by fifteen percent in 2008, twenty-two percent in 2009 and nine 
percent in 2011 and reaching a total of US$141.2 billion in 2013, with bank assets at 
440 percent of Lebanon’s GDP (Chaaban, 2015; Wehbe, 2014b). The value of deposits 
in LBP of the resident and non-resident private sector increased by fifty-five 
percent in 2008 and forty-three percent in 2009, while deposits in foreign 
currencies increased by four percent in 2008 and fourteen percent in 2009 
(Association of Banks in Lebanon, 2009a). The higher growth in LBP-deposits can be 
explained by the higher interest rate offered on these, a measure decreed by the 
Central Bank to de-dollarize deposits and improve balance sheets (Poddar et al., 
2006). Consequently, at the end of 2008, liquidity in Lebanese pounds increased 
while liquidity in US dollars decreased, due to the wave of exchange to benefit from 
the better interest rate on LBP. Banks’ net profits increased with twenty-six percent 
in 2008 (Bank Audi, 2014a). Meanwhile, non-resident deposits increased with over 5 
billion LBP (forty-four percent) in 2009 (Association of Banks in Lebanon, 2009a), 
and in 2013 constituted nearly twenty-three percent of all deposits, from ten 
percent in 1997 (Khoury & Kanj, 2013, p. 154). The majority of these deposits is in 
foreign currency (US dollars) (86% in 2012, see Kanj & Khoury, 2013) but an 
increasing percentage (almost eight per cent in 2013), is in Lebanese pounds (Kanj & 
Khoury, 2013). Figure 9 shows the growth in both resident and non-resident 
deposits for the period 2007-2014.  
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Figure 9-Increase of total deposits of the resident and non-resident private sector in 
Lebanese pounds. December of each year. Source: Website of the Central 
Bank: www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/table.php?name=t5231-8; 
www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/table.php?name=t5231-10.  
Where did all this money come from? The origins of bank deposits cannot be 
determined in definite terms because of banking secrecy. While Lebanese banking 
secrecy has come under fire since 9/11, when US authorities started a crackdown on 
tax evasion and alleged terrorism financing67 worldwide, the country has managed 
to stay off the blacklist while keeping most of its banking secrecy in place, only to 
be lifted in suspicious cases, as new laws passed in December 2015 confirmed. 
“Compared to Switzerland, Beirut was called Switzerland of the Middle East, 
because it was and still is a nice place, but as well I think now even we hear from our 
clients that Switzerland is not like it used to be, they made agreements to share info 
with governmental and non-governmental organizations, we didn’t reach that 
point in Beirut, we have secrecy.”68 However, the Central Bank passed strict 
regulations regarding banks’ responsibilities with regards to deposits and the 
trustworthiness of their clients, in addition to setting up a Special Investigation 
Commission (SIC) with a mandate to investigate suspected money laundering cases 
and lifting the banking secrecy if needed.69 As a result, seventy-nine out of 103 cases 
                                                       
67 American media have accused Lebanese banks of money laundering for Hezbollah, something Central 
bank Riad Salameh denies. The Lebanese Canadian Bank was formally charged with this by the United 
States, which led to its takeover by the Central Bank and eventual acquisition by the Lebanese unit of 
French Société Générale (Derhally, 2012). 
68 Interview with a lawyer, October 9, 2014. 
69 See Basic Circular 83, May 18, 2001, amended several times over the years, especially in 2011, which can 
be downloaded from www.bdl.gov.lb/laws-and-circulars.html. Banks must ascertain that foreign 
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saw banking secrecy lifted in 2001 (Aoun, 2012). More laws allowing for the lifting of 
banking secrecy were passed in November 2015. However, unless a case is brought 
before the SIC, accounts are still protected by banking secrecy. 
Notwithstanding the continuing existence of banking secrecy, there are 
indications as to the origins of bank deposits. First, there is the Lebanese diaspora. 
Traditionally, this is a loyal bank client with a high degree of trust in their banking 
sector, who either deposit their own savings in Lebanese banks or use the accounts 
for remittances to their families (Finger & Hesse, 2009; Hardie, 2012; Labaki, 2006).70 
Many Lebanese families rely on remittances for survival. They form an important 
social safety net for families afflicted by illness, war, unemployment, the high cost 
of education and so on (G. Hourani, 2010, p. 11). They also constitute the top source 
of foreign exchange earnings (Tabar, 2010). The diaspora therefore has a “home 
bias” (Berthélemy et al., 2007). Most of the diaspora deposits are transferred from 
the Gulf States (fifty-eight percent in 2009), where the UAE is followed by Saudi 
Arabia, and West Africa (Awdeh, 2013, p. 9; Brand, 2007, p. 6; G. Hourani, 2010, p. 11), 
then Europe, North America and Africa (Khoury & Kanj, 2013, p. 160). Formal 
remittances of Lebanese living in the Gulf to Lebanon constituted US$1.7 billion in 
2005 (of a total of US$4.9 billion) and US$4.75 billion in 2011, fifty-seven percent of 
the total US$8.2 billion in remittances that year (G. Hourani, 2009, 2014). Indeed, 
there is a direct correlation between the increase in diaspora remittances and the 
increase in GCC-countries’ GDP (Finger & Hesse, 2009; Poddar et al., 2006).  
During the financial crisis, remittances were only briefly affected and recovered 
afterwards, making Lebanon the only country in the MENA-region where 
remittances increased as percentage of GDP (Ghobril, 2012). Many Lebanese 
expatriates transferred their capital to Lebanese banks, seeing that these were 
unaffected by the crisis and could offer a higher interest rate than banks in their 
countries of residence, in addition to banking secrecy and a tax exemption on non-
                                                                                                                                                                     
correspondent banks are not shell banks, ensure customers’ identities, source of funds, reasons for 
opening the account, and notify the Special Investigation Commission in the case of suspicion of money 
laundering or terrorism financing. They must have specialized committees and officers for this. 
70 There are many suspicions of money laundering and the depositing of money from criminal activities 
in Lebanese banks. It goes beyond the scope of this dissertation to research these accusations. However, 
it is certainly plausible that for example quite some money originates from the fact that the diamond 
industry in Sierra Leone is dominated by the Lebanese expatriate community there (see Gberie, 2002, p. 7 
who states “Because they have external contacts and access to greater resources than indigenous Sierra 
Leoneans, the Lebanese dominate the diamond industry at all levels.”). Traboulsi (2014, p. 94) discusses a 
case of a bank money laundering for the Russian mafia, Saudi Arabian Islamist groups and Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, mostly through real estate. 
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resident deposits (G. Hourani, 2009; Khoury & Kanj, 2013). “The Lebanese diaspora 
in countries from the financial crisis, with losses in the banking sector and the crisis 
in property markets, they realized that Lebanon was a safer environment for their 
money, so the money came in.”71 “Most of the sources of money are foreign private 
deposits, non-resident, they can be Lebanese. Most are.”72 Moreover, remittances 
were not affected by exchange rate effects that other countries experienced during 
the financial crisis (for example when then Russian ruble depreciated), since the 
LBP was pegged to the dollar and the main source countries of remittances had the 
same peg or did not face exchange rate effects (Ghobril, 2012, pp. 372–373). Fears 
that Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf would lose their jobs and be forced to return 
to Lebanon en masse have proven unfounded, although many did lower their 
expenses somewhat and some moved to other countries to pursue opportunities 
there (G. Hourani, 2009). Remittances were only temporarily affected, however as 
the Gulf States managed to contain the impact of the crisis somewhat and the 
white-collar Lebanese found it relatively easy to transfer sectors or cities and were 
well aware of the lack of opportunities in Lebanon (Ghobril, 2012). Remittances 
therefore stood at US$7 billion in 2009, and have been confirmed to have come from 
Lebanese expatriates who wanted to move away from risks faced in foreign banks 
(G. Hourani, 2009, p. 22). An anecdote told by the Central Bank’s governor himself in 
an interview in 2009 relates how a super-rich Lebanese investor living overseas 
called him after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US: “He was always 
skeptical about the stability here. But he told me, ‘I sent all my money to Beirut now 
to the banks. You were right.’” (Daragahi, 2009). Lebanese banks have actively tried 
to attract these non-resident deposits via their websites, by sending officers abroad 
or via their offices in countries with large expatriate Lebanese populations 
(Pearlman, 2014). 
Second, there are indications that a large part of the deposits is coming from Gulf 
residents as well. When in 2008 the financial crisis did not spare their region, many 
transferred their resources to Lebanese banks, whose interest rates remained high 
(Kanj & Khoury, 2013). The price of oil continued to rise until 2008, and the 
revenues were transferred to Lebanon’s banks, where interest rates were higher 
(Saad, 2014). “All the businessmen from the other countries, comes and puts the 
money here, and if they have a lot of money they take a share of this bank.”73 
                                                       
71 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
72 Interview with professor of economy, American University of Beirut, October 20, 2014. 
73 Interview with a finance journalist, October 15, 2014. 
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Because of banking secrecy, precise numbers are hard to get by, however, and it is 
impossible to gauge the amount of illicit wealth that is stored in Lebanese bank 
accounts. “I suspect the big accounts are affiliated with money laundering, illicit 
activities and Gulf money, petrodollars.”74 
 
Figure 10-Personal remittances in US$ billion. Source: World Bank, World Databank, 
World Development Indicators (found at  
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=LBN&series=
&period=# accessed October 19, 2015; ESCWA-report on remittances found at 
www.escwa.un.org/sites/SCUWRD/L1-1.pdf, accessed October 19, 2015; 
While the exact numbers remain unknown, therefore, it is still safe to assume that 
remittances from the Lebanese diaspora are responsible for a large part of the 
increase in resident private sector deposits, and the Lebanese diaspora together 
with Gulf residents are the main contributors to the increase in non-resident 
deposits (NRD).75 The large amount of excess liquidity that resulted from this 
increase had to be profitably reinvested somewhere. From this moment on, the 
                                                       
74 Interview with a professor of economy, American University of Beirut, March 11, 2015. This suspicion 
was confirmed by a finance consultant, interviewed March 11, 2015. 
75 The Code on Money and Credit defines non-resident deposits as all deposits by foreigners and Lebanese 
residing outside Lebanon. Interestingly, a law creating a banking free zone was passed in 1975 (Decree 
9976/1975 and 29/1977), exempting non-resident deposits and banking commitments in foreign 
currency from non-residents from the deposit guarantee tax, reserve requirements and income tax on 
deposits interests. The latter exemption was canceled in 2003 by article 51 of Law 497/2003. So we can 
see that non-resident capital has been important to Lebanese banks for a long time. 
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Central Bank started to encourage banks to invest their surpluses in consumer 
credit, including mortgages and construction loans. The resulting boom in private 
credit was primarily supply-driven (Sadikov et al., 2012). The next section will show 
how this was happened, and once again how important the role of the Central Bank 
was in this regard, as an institution controlling the production of money and 
governing the relations between the different circuits of capital, including the 
switching of capital into the built environment (Harvey, 1978). 
3 .3  Post-2008 mortgage incentives 
Traditionally, credit has played a very minor role as a means of obtaining housing 
or land in Lebanon: buyers have paid in installments (Bou Akar, 2012; Fawaz, 2009a) 
or relied on personal funds, developers have made deals with landowners who are 
given some apartments in exchange for letting the developers construct on their 
land. The Central Bank, during its establishment in 1964, stimulated the provision of 
credit to the real estate sector (Dibeh, 2009 footnote 12), but this apparently had 
little effect. One interviewee said that “in the past there was a naïve thinking that 
the deposits term should match the credit term, but this is nonsense in banking, 
banks are made for lending.”76 In 1996, Law 543 exempted banks from some taxes 
regarding housing loans.77 In the same year, the Public Corporation for Housing was 
founded by Law 539 to provide mortgages to lower income households. Although 
banks started to provide more loans in the 1990s after these regulations, these did 
not constitute more than thirty-five percent of assets because of strict measures for 
risk management and control imposed by the Central Bank (S. Hakim & Neaime, 
2001) and lucrative other investment opportunities that were considered safer, such 
as government bonds. The residential mortgage market was therefore small (Peters 
et al., 2004). When many vacant apartments remained unsold in the 1990s, for 
example, owners sat and waited it out, since they did not have any financial 
obligation to pay off a mortgage. In this sense, there was no housing bubble in 
Lebanon (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997).  
                                                       
76 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
77 From the website of the ADL, www.abl.org.lb/subPage.aspx?pageid=362. Accessed August 12, 2014. 
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After the large inflow of deposits following the global financial meltdown and the 
(temporary) resolution of Lebanon’s political crisis, the real estate boom had driven 
up land and apartment prices. Also, the banks’ continuing financing of the budget 
deficit and the stabilization of the Lebanese pound inevitably necessitated a rolling-
over of the debt, where banks would refinance the government at increasingly 
lower interest rates, to prevent a government default. The Central Bank allowed 
swapping of bonds to allow lower cost and longer maturity (Sadikov et al., 2012). 
But some outlet needed to be found to prevent collapse: “It’s all dependent on itself, 
the system, the inflow from Lebanese expats is steady, and is large. And that goes to 
a banking sector that invests almost completely in government, and the 
government has a need for that. If one of the links breaks there is an economic 
collapse.”78Therefore, banks needed an additional outlet for their excess liquidity. It 
is not legal for banks to be involved directly in real estate development; they cannot 
own real estate property unless it is for their own business (for example, the new 
Crédit Libanais headquarters currently under construction in the Corniche en-Nahr 
area). Banks cannot participate in real estate brokerage, finance real estate 
speculation or buy real estate for resale.79 The Central Bank however stepped in to 
provide incentives that encouraged the banks’ indirect involvement in real estate, 
by stimulating loans to the private sector, including the housing and construction 
sectors. “The Central Bank wanted to encourage this type of loans because they 
thought there is a real demand and you can help the economy in general and 
individually by providing such loans. And this would help banks to extend more 
credit and remove extra liquidity in the system; it’s one way to channel this 
liquidity and to use for investment.”80 In this way, mortgages became an 
increasingly interesting investment option for banks and they began to play a 
larger role in the gentrification of Beirut, as providers of loans to real estate 
developers and homebuyers alike. How exactly did this happen? 
In June 2009, the Central Bank reduced its reserve requirements at the 
proposition of the Association of Lebanese Banks (Association des Banques Libanaises, 
ABL) (Association of Banks in Lebanon, 2009b) . The reserve requirement 
exemptions allowed banks to deduct sixty to one hundred percent of a qualifying 
loan in LBP (depending on the type of loan) from required reserves on customer 
                                                       
78 Interview with a World Bank official, October 16, 2014. 
79Article 2bis h, from Circular 77 of the Central Bank, added 21 July 2008. 
80 Interview with director of economic research at the Association of Banks in Lebanon, October 10, 2014. 
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deposits, up to a ceiling of seventy-five percent of the reserve requirement for all 
qualifying loans, including mortgages (Sakr, 2013). This also meant that banks could 
reduce the interest rate for debtors down to near five percent (Bank Audi, 2010). 
Also, banks made it easier for buyers to borrow in order to buy apartments still 
under construction by providing subsidized loans. This was intended to speed up 
the sale of unfinished apartments in order to improve the economy.81 Banks have 
lists of pre-approved developers that they trust to finish their projects, as 
confirmed in interviews with several property developers in the Corniche en-Nahr 
area. The under-construction loans were especially targeted towards the diaspora, 
whose members can usually wait a few years before moving in (Bathish, 2012). 
Lending to non-residents therefore increased rapidly (Sadikov et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the ceiling to apply for a public housing loan through the Public 
Corporation for Housing was raised and loans for this institute were allowed to be 
taken out for up to eighty percent of the price of the house instead of sixty percent. 
“The home should be under 200 square meters and under US$350000. And the one 
who should take this loan between him and his wife, the maximum salary should be 
US$4,500. There are these three conditions.”82 
3 .3.1  Stagnation and additional incentives 
The post-2008 mortgage incentives provided an initial outlet for the banks’ excess 
liquidity, and increased developers’ potential clients for their (under construction) 
apartments, since the mortgage incentives meant that banks were more willing to 
provide credit to people who otherwise could not have afforded to buy at these high 
prices. The measures therefore also helped maintain the high property prices in 
Beirut. In 2011 however, the real estate market started showing signs of stagnation, 
when sales transactions slowed by eleven percent. The following year, this trend 
continued, with sales declining 9.9 percent in 2012, and sales to foreigners 
decreasing by 8.9 percent in the same year (Sakr, 2013). Some real estate projects 
were put on hold, including the gated community Bella Casa that was planned by 
MENA Capital in the Corniche en-Nahr area. Foreign and diaspora demand slowed 
down as well (Bank Audi, 2014b; G. Hourani, 2009; Nash, 2014). The slowdown in the 
market was a consequence of oversupply as much as political instability, with 
                                                       
81 Interview with the developer of the Urban Dreams-project in Corniche en-Nahr, December 4, 2013. 
82 Interview with the director of the Public Corporation for Housing, October 29, 2014. 
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severe political crises, the fall of the Lebanese government in 2011, and the larger 
political and security fallout (including several bomb attacks) related to the Syrian 
uprising taking its toll on investors’ confidence. The role of Hezbollah who was 
fighting in Syria on the side of Assad, violating the disassociation policy Lebanese 
political leaders had agreed upon earlier in 2012, and several other incidents83, led 
to deteriorating relations with the Gulf States (G. Hourani, 2014, pp. 644–645). As a 
consequence, also of declining oil prices since 2008, capital transfers and 
investment from the Gulf and Saudi states in real estate receded. While in 2011, the 
Gulf still accounted for fifty-six percent of real estate investments in Lebanon; in 
2014, this share dropped to thirty-four percent (Abou-Mosleh, 2015). Even though 
every developer I interviewed was quick to emphasize that prices have stagnated, 
but will not decrease and have not ever decreased as a consequence of political 
crises, and even though in 2013, investments in the construction sector still 
accounted for twenty-one percent of Lebanon’s GDP84 (compared to for example five 
percent in the United States and eleven percent worldwide), the stagnation of the 
market meant that there over 200,000 apartments were standing empty in Lebanon 
as of June 2014 (Wehbe, 2014c).  
Meanwhile, Lebanese expatriates continued to work in the Gulf States, albeit 
under a threat of deportation for some of them (see footnote 83), and diaspora bank 
deposits kept flowing in, regardless of the state of the Lebanese economy, and 
indeed have not been much influenced by the dire political situation (Khoury & 
Kanj, 2013). Moreover, Gulf agents still had stakes in Lebanese banks: “It’s not like 
suddenly Gulf capital left Lebanon. They’re still the same shareholders in the 
banks.”85 Lebanese debt was still popular with the banks: they invested US$37.66 
billion in Treasury Bonds in 2013, a twenty percent growth from 2012 (Wehbe, 
2014b), but the continuing rolling over of the debt had lowered interest rates on 
government bonds to a little over five percent for twelve-month treasury bills in 
201386 (and lowered the debt-to-GDP ratio to 125% in 2012, Saad, 2014, p. 174) so the 
                                                       
83 Such as the accusation of Lebanese Shiites living in the UAE of sympathizing with Hezbollah, 
supporting Shia demonstrators in Manama, Bahrain, and consequent (threats of) deportations of 
Lebanese citizens from the UAE and/or GCC-countries; the issuing of negative travel advice following 
perceived threats in Lebanon to GCC-nationals, and others. For details, see Hourani (2014, pp. 645–649). 
84 According to IFPInfo: www.ifpinfo.com/Top-MiddleEast-NewsArticle-4685. Accessed August 19, 2014. 
85 Interview with a finance journalist, October 15, 2014. 
86 According to data provided by the Central Bank, see www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/ 
table.php?name=t5271-3. 
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banks were interested in other outlets. They were provided with these as the 
Central Bank rolled out yet another incentives package, geared towards subsidizing 
mortgage interest rates for resident Lebanese given stagnated diaspora demand and 
towards ensuring continuing liquidity for developers. In January 2011, banks were 
allowed to use up to ninety percent of their reserve requirements for housing loans 
(Sadikov et al., 2012). When banks had used the maximum allowed percentage of 
their reserve requirements, the Central Bank stepped in once again. In April 2013, it 
provided the commercial banks with one percent interest loans at a total value of 
US$1.46 billion in order to stimulate credit provision to the housing sector (Sakr, 
2013). These loans were aimed at apartments in the lower middle segment. The 
banks welcomed this intervention with great enthusiasm; some of them offered the 
first loans within two days (Schellen, 2013).  
Moreover, the Public Corporation for Housing (PCH) received funds to start to 
offer more loans in conjunction with the commercial banks. The institution now 
offers subsidized interest rates so lenders do not pay over three percent. Currently, 
it receives 6,500 applications a year, constituting fifty percent of total real estate 
loans in Lebanon (in numbers, not in value) (Habib, 2014; Schellen, 2013). In this 
way, the banks started to invest in other things than government bonds and 
continued the trend of increased provision of credit to the private sector (Wehbe, 
2014b). In 2014, the Lebanese commercial banks held just over fifty percent of 
public debt (Saad, 2014). The table on the next pages summarizes the different 
regulations and incentives issued by the Central Bank since 2009.
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C
ontent 
Apr. 2012 
Interm
ediate 
D
ecision 
10986/Interm
ediate 
C
ircular 
298, adding Art. 1.4c in B
asic C
ircular 81 (February 
21, 2001). 
-Art. 1.4c (added in A
pril 2012): B
anks are also prohibited from
 granting 
facilities to their custom
ers against a guarantee consisting of m
ore than 5 
percent of their shares unless approval is given by the C
entral B
ank. 
Jul. 
21, 
2008 
Interm
ediate 
D
ecision 
9958/ 
Interm
ediate 
C
ircular 
177, adding Art. 3.1-g to B
asic C
ircular 81 (February 
21, 2001). 
-Banks cannot provide real estate loans that exceed 60 percent of the value 
of the property. 
-Exceptions: housing loans for first purchase; loans granted by the H
ousing 
Bank; loans granted to the H
ousing Authority; loans granted to the M
ilitary 
Volunteers H
ousing S
ystem
; housing loans stipulated in Basic D
ecision N
o. 
6180 (M
ay 31, 1996). 
Jan. 
14, 
2013 
Interm
ediate 
D
ecision 
11329/Interm
ediate 
C
ircular 
313, adding Art. 9-bis to B
asic D
ecision 6116 (M
arch 
7, 1996). 
-Providing com
m
ercial banks w
ith 2.2 trillion LBP (U
S
$1.46 billion) credit at 
1 percent interest rate until D
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ber 31, 2013. 
-50 percent of this is to be used for housing loans 
-C
eiling on loan is LBP800 m
illion (U
S$530,300) 
-M
axim
um
 interest rate is 5.44 percent based on one-year Treasury B
ills 
-D
ow
n paym
ent is obligatory 
-Loan cannot be com
bined w
ith other bank loans. 
-The H
ousing Bank m
ay benefit from
 80 billion Lebanese pounds in credit at 
a 1 percent interest provided interests and com
m
issions on loans granted to 
custom
ers do not exceed 3 
percent. 
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Aug./N
ov. 
2014 
Interm
ediate 
D
ecision 
9958/ 
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C
ircular 
369; 
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ediate 
D
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11891/ 
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e Savings Plan in Basic D
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 reserve requirem
ents on certain loans including 
m
ost housing loans. 
-Zero interest rate. 
-Valid for loans granted from
 January 1, 2009 until June 30, 2011. 
-These loans are m
eant to finance new
 projects or extend existing projects 
or for the purchasing of a new
 m
ain residence, and should not be for 
consum
ptive, real estate developm
ent and operational capital purposes. 
Jan. 2010 
Interm
ediary C
ircular 213 
-Banks 
can 
use 
up 
to 
90 
percent 
of 
reserve 
requirem
ents 
for 
the 
exem
ptions passed in 2009. 
-Loans granted through the agreem
ent w
ith the P
ublic C
orporation for 
H
ousing can be deducted for up to 80 percent, not 60 percent. 
Table 4-Central Bank m
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ased on Schellen (2013), Sakr (2013), and several circulars dow
nloaded 
from
 the w
ebsite of the Central Bank of Lebanon (w
w
w
.bdl.gov.lb/law
s-and-circulars.htm
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ber 2013 and O
ctober 2014. 
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Hence, we have seen in this section that the Central Bank stepped in during two 
moments in time since 2008 to stimulate the provision of credit to the real estate 
market. The first moment was in 2009, responding mostly to banks’ enormous 
excess liquidity due to the inflow of deposits, and the second moment started in 
2011 and has continued on a yearly basis since then, responding to the stagnation of 
the real estate market. The difference between the 2009 and 2011-2013 packages is 
that the first fueled demand during the real estate boom while the second was 
meant to stimulate the real estate sector and served the interests of developers and 
other people dependent on this sector (Schellen, 2013). The next section will show 
that these incentives have led to an unprecedented mortgage boom in Lebanon, the 
consequences of which will be felt in the decades to come as an entire generation is 
put into mortgage debt for the first time in the country’s history. 
3 .4  The mortgage boom 
The incentives issued by the Central Bank combined with several circumstances 
outlined above (such as the lower interest rate on government bonds) contributed 
to the willingness of banks to lend to the private sector. From 2008 to 2010 private 
credit grew at twenty percent per year, compared to on average six percent during 
2005-2007, with credit in LBP expanding about twice as rapidly as foreign currency 
credit (loans in LBP were encouraged in order to stimulate dedollarization). New 
loans extended from 2008-2010 consisted of twenty-four percent household loans 
(consumption, education, cars, and mortgages) and sixteen percent construction 
loans. Consequently, the number and amount of mortgages has increased (Sadikov 
et al., 2012). Loans benefiting from the 2009 exemptions grew fast, and housing 
loans even faster. Construction loans increased by twelve percent in 2009 and thirty 
percent in 2010; housing loans increased by thirty-four percent in 2008, fifty-nine 
percent in 2009 and even sixty-one percent (!) in 2010 (Bank Audi, 2010). The 
amount of outstanding housing loans increased from US$1.1 billion in 2006 to 
US$5.9bln in 2011. According to a board member of real estate developers 
association REDAL, about half of clients finance their purchase with a mortgage.87 
                                                       
87 Interview with board member of REDAL (Real Estate Developers Association Lebanon), December 12, 
2013. 
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Another interviewee expressed his surprise at how fast banks’ willingness to lend 
changed: “How the mood has changed: when I wanted to buy my apartment I had to 
bring in the deed and go to the bank to mortgage it, when the Waterfront came in [a 
new large-scale real estate development situated to the North of Beirut], they 
created a new product called, they said don’t bring the deed in but give us the sales 
agreement, we finance it, when you have the apartment we mortgage it for you. 
Without any mortgage they offer to finance the project.”88 
 
Figure 11-Total loans to the resident private sector in Lebanese pounds and foreign 
currency, in billion Lebanese pounds, in December of each year. Source: 
website of the Central Bank: www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/table.php? 
name=t5231-2a; www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/table.php?name=t5231-
2b.  
 
                                                       
88 Interview with a project management consultant, March 10, 2015. 
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Figure 12-Housing and construction loans to the resident private sector, from 2007 to 
2009, in billion Lebanese pounds. Source: ABL reports, real estate reports 
banks. 
Hence, basically the Central bank has provided cheap funding for mortgages 
(Wehbe, 2013). The banks have fared well since 2008. Almost every real estate 
developer now allows their clients to take out mortgages, something that a few 
years ago they were less than happy about when asked in interviews, preferring 
payment by installments. Nowadays, with the Central Bank incentives, risks are low. 
Mortgages have consequently been on the rise, especially in more affordable areas 
outside Beirut, according to Central Bank statistics. The average loan is US$80,000 
with a limit of US$500,000, way too little for an apartment in Metropolitan Beirut 
and in the upper end of the market. “Few people take mortgages for Beirut [by 
which municipal Beirut is meant]. You cannot offer to have US$500,000 or US$1 
million for an employee. On average it’s like 120,000 dollars, this does not even get 
you a one-bedroom in Hamra [a central area] and it needs renovation.”89 Most in 
demand are US$200,000 to 300,000 loans, outside Beirut, for resident Lebanese.90 
Banks partner up with developers to offer lucrative financing terms for buyers in 
their projects. Sometimes banks agree to finance up to eighty percent of the 
apartment and use the developer as a guarantee. For example, the bank pays the 
developer according to a payment schedule with the completion of each phase, and 
the buyer only pays interest on the amount paid to the developer, not the whole 
                                                       
89 Interview with an official at the Ministry of Finance, October 15, 2014. 
90 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
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loan amount.91 In interviews, developers made clear that they prefer to work with 
particular banks and sometimes refer their clients to them, although the clients are 
free to go to any bank. “We have a good reputation and banks know us, it’s easy, we 
provide the client with the documents he needs. The rest depends on the client’s 
income.”92  
Besides mortgages taken out by the middle class, many real estate developers 
have taken out a construction loan as well to finance their projects, according to the 
Cadastral records I obtained. A number of developers in the Corniche en-Nahr area, 
which I study in Chapter  6 (including Al Mawarid Real Estate, MENA Capital, LOFT 
Investments and BEAR Property Consultants) financed (part of) their land purchase 
with a mortgage. They happily use the banks’ willingness to lend: “The project 
development is about equity, so if you finance the entire project from your pocket, 
your rate of return is very low, so you should use the money of the customer and 
the money of the bank. It’s not conceivable today to do a project without a bank, but 
the bank is not a partner, it lends you money and then you have to send it back.”93 
In 2011, Al Mawarid Bank arranged a US$28 million real estate funding deal with 
four other banks, to ‘benefit the whole economic cycle in Lebanon’ by boosting the 
real estate market (Al-Mawarid Bank, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
91 Interview with the developer of Factory 4376, December 4, 2013. 
92 Interview with developer of Les Étages office building in Corniche en-Nahr, December 4, 2013. 
93 Interview with BEAR Properties, December 4, 2013. 
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Project Developer Loan Bank 
Bella Casa Adlieh Development Company 
(subsidiary of MENA Capital) 
US$16.5 million Bank Audi 
Achrafieh 4748 Achrafieh 4748 company 
(subsidiary of Al Mawarid Real 
Estate) 
US$13.2 million Bank Al Mawarid 
Factory 4376 Factory 4376 company (subsidiary 
of BEAR Properties) 
US$5.76 million Lebanese 
Commercial Bank 
Warehouse and loft Warehouse and loft (subsidiary of 
LOFT investments) 
US$2.82 million Bank Byblos 
AYA Mar Mikhael-Rmeil company 
(subsidiary of HAR Properties) 
US$4 million Banque Libano-
Française 
Table 5-Mortgages taken out by real estate developers in Beirut (source: Cadastral 
records obtained in December 2011 and 2013 at the Lebanese Land Registry in 
Beirut). 
Banks also have mortgage packages specifically tailored towards Lebanese 
expatriates (Bathish, 2012; Cauli, 2014), something observed in other countries with 
large diasporas as well (Grant, 2005). While diaspora demand slowed, loans to non-
residents still represented 13.1 percent of the total of loans granted to the private 
sector at the end of the years 2010 and 2011 (Association of Banks in Lebanon, 2011). 
The Bank of Beirut offers an Expat Housing Loan of up to US$1 million94, as do all 
the other major Lebanese banks. According to my interviews though, the majority 
of non-resident Lebanese prefers to pay in cash for their purchase, especially on the 
high-end side of real estate.95 “Those rich Lebanese that work in the Gulf or in Africa 
and bring a lot of money, they don’t take loans.”96 
Still, even the subsidized loans provided through the Public Corporation for 
Housing remain unaffordable for lower incomes in Lebanon (UN-Habitat & UNHCR, 
2014). A down payment of ten percent is still required, something which not 
everyone can afford (Schellen, 2013). Since October 1, 2014, for a first home, the 
down payment for a subsidized mortgage is twenty-five percent, and a maximum of 
                                                       
94 See www.bankofbeirut.com/Corporate/en/Housing-Loan-for-Lebanese-Expatriates. Accessed 
September 11, 2014. 
95 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
96 Interview with the head of a department in the Central Bank, December 10, 2013. 
 127 
seventy-five percent may be financed. Cumulative monthly payments for a housing 
loan must not exceed thirty-five percent of the household’s income, making such 
loans impossible for many Lebanese (BDL Intermediate Circular 369). An 
interviewee at the Central Bank conceded that this rule made it difficult for new 
buyers to qualify for a loan: “It’s very difficult, people who want to marry, they 
were going to the bank and financing themselves, now they have to ensure they 
have twenty-five percent. A young guy cannot. But for us it’s important in order to 
prevent the volatility of the price in the future, (…) We want to protect the banks. If 
their clients are massively not able to reimburse regularly their loan the impact will 
go on the banks.”97 This shows that many people in Lebanon, in the absence of any 
other affordable housing policy, cannot access housing. It also shows to what extent 
the Central Bank is conservative in terms of lending. Banks are not allowed to lend 
more than sixty percent of the housing value (except for public housing loans 
where it is eighty percent) and forty percent of the construction cost (except for 
first houses or loans granted by the Housing Bank and several occupational 
organizations such as the Military that have a deal with the Central bank)98. . The 
prudent regulation by the Central Bank means that subprime lending is unlikely.  
It seems that mortgage loans will continue to be an important outlet for banks’ 
excess liquidity. The Lebanese financial market is limited in terms of market 
capitalization, trading volumes, liquidity and the number of listed companies (with 
only eleven listed companies on the Beirut Stock Exchange end 2011, currently 15). 
Some banks are listed on this exchange, but, as one interviewee put it: “It’s private 
deals, it’s not about market stocks, the volume of trading is ridiculous.”99 Laws have 
been passed to encourage banks to transform illiquid assets into liquid ones by 
converting them into securities, and investing in financial instruments to attract 
capital and savings (Laws 705 and 706, 2005). However, trading on financial markets 
was heavily regulated and monitored subsequently. A Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA) has been set up, whose President is Riad Salameh, governor of the Central 
Bank. During an interview, a high-ranking official at the CMA explained that “there 
was some resistance [to the CMA’s establishment as regulatory body] and at the 
level of business we weren’t seen in a good light. Having the chairman as the 
                                                       
97 Interview with the head of a department at the Central Bank, December 10, 2013. 
98Articles 2bis g from Circular 77 of the Central Bank, added 21 July 2008, also modifying Basic Circular 81 
of February 21, 2001 by adding Art. 3.1-h. 
99 Interview with an economist, March 18, 2015. 
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governor helped a lot. At first it was like, thought to be not a very good thing to 
have this chairman shared, but actually one person heading the two institutions 
was helpful, the transition went smoother.” The CMA will therefore perhaps issue 
regulations regarding capital markets, but will not deviate much from Central Bank 
policies given that they share the same governor.  
Hence financial markets play a moderate role compared to the banking sector 
(Awdeh, 2012; Hardie, 2012). “Banks are the main financial intermediaries in the 
country, they dominate the financial interrelation in the country, we don’t have a 
mature capital market, we don’t have mature non-bank financial institutions, or uh, 
not as competitive as banks.”100 “Since in Lebanon capital markets are not 
developed, not a developed stock market, no direct financing to companies from 
investors, the banking channel, financial intermediation gained a lot of importance. 
No corporate bonds and other instruments. No securitization of mortgages, no 
complex products.”101 Some LBP-denominated treasury bills were securitized in the 
1990s, but this is not standard (S. R. Hakim & Andary, 1997). Government bonds are 
rarely traded on secondary markets and most are held by the banks (Cobham, 2011) 
“The Treasury Bills, I don’t think they sell them. Because it’s more profitable to the 
banks to keep them here.”102  All this means that while the increase in mortgages 
signifies a major shift in financing housing and construction in Lebanon, a 
financialization of the economy is so far unlikely. However, more banks are 
currently on the stock exchange and diversifying and moving outside Lebanon 
(though mostly following Lebanese clients, according to interviewees), so in the 
future more complex, transnational financial products might find their way onto 
the Lebanese market. As a professor of economy said about the banks: “These 
companies were granted a lot of space to experiment through their monopoly 
position in Lebanon, they get a lot of money and then move out very quickly.”103 
The consequences of this move remain to be seen. 
The years since 2008 have seen a true mortgage boom, where lending to housing 
and construction exploded and a large amount of people resorted to credit in order 
to be able to buy their first house. “People thought it’s going to be saturated, no way 
                                                       
100 Interview with director of economic research at the Association of Banks in Lebanon, October 10, 2014. 
101 Interview with an investment banker, October 17, 2014. 
102 Interview with a finance journalist, October 15, 2014. 
103 Interview with a professor of economy, American University of Beirut, March 11, 2015. 
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it’s gonna be more, something new happened in the world: Lehman brothers fell, 
economy crippled in the US, rippled effects in Europe, banks here and there, 
everybody was very scared, to make things worse this rippling effect came to Dubai, 
and the Arab world, the only safe haven for anyone was Lebanon, so they 
reinvested. So it was still not saturated, banks were full of money, they wanted to 
provide loans, this created another awakening, to sustain the momentum. People 
forget how the timeline of events happened, but I remember very well why we are 
here.”104 The mortgage boom provided a spatial fix for the overaccumulated capital 
in the banks and was connected to the real estate boom in Beirut, even though 
many loans were granted in the city’s suburbs. Overlapping interests between 
bankers and real estate developers explain this connection, which I will get to in the 
next chapter. 
3 .5  Conclusion 
Lebanon’s banks escaped the financial crisis in 2008, which led to a huge influx of 
capital. The mortgage incentives passed by the Central Bank were meant to keep 
the system of public debt, real estate and remittances afloat and keep capital 
circulating to avoid crisis. It was a spatial fix meant to alleviate overaccumulation in 
the banks. The role of the diaspora and the Central Bank proved to be crucial. The 
specific circumstances of a political economy of public debt led to a conservative 
banking sector that had hitherto not invested much in private loans. As from 2008, 
this changed, a change necessitated by the decreasing returns from government 
bonds and the large amounts of excess liquidity that had to be directed somewhere, 
as well as the stagnation of the real estate market. The next chapter will zoom in on 
the reasons for this spatial fix, not just as a temporary capital switch to alleviate 
overaccumulation, but also as a lucrative deal for several networks between 
powerful agents active in the banking, government and real estate sectors. 
  
                                                       
104 Interview with sales consultant of the Achrafieh 4748-project, April 30, 2012. 
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 4  Networks of accumulation105 
The official narrative that emerges from media reports and interviews alike is that 
bankers and the Central Bank are the guardians of the country, heroes who keep 
Lebanon running and save it from its incompetent government. Chaaban (2015) 
points to the narrative of the banks themselves, who eagerly join this discourse and 
insist that the government is inefficient, corrupt and spending its budget on wages 
and the electricity company, necessitating the banks’ help to sustain Lebanon’s 
economy. “The banking system, the banks are very well managed by competent 
people.”106 “Over the past twenty-five years the Central Bank has built trust. They 
are managing it properly.”107 “Once again, the banking sector is assuming tasks 
beyond its responsibilities to compensate for the lack of economic planning and 
policies by the government,” the Head of Economic Research at Byblos Bank is 
quoted as saying in Sakr (2013). A high-ranked individual at the Central Bank 
participated in this discourse: “The government is corrupt, but the private sector is 
active and banks are part of the private sector, so we also have to act like a private 
sector. That’s why here you can find people after two pm in their offices [public 
offices close at two pm in Lebanon]. We are not the government. If politicians were 
involved in the banks we would have a big disaster in the banking sector, haha!”108 
Moreover, banks are portrayed as important contributors to the treasury: “The 
banking sector pays more than thirty-six percent of the total income tax. Why, 
because it’s transparent so it pays everything, not like other sectors where there’s a 
lot of tax evasion.”109  
This narrative obscures the fact that this set-up is a very lucrative deal for the 
banks, financed to a large extent by public resources. Banks have been stepping into 
mortgage provision because they get a huge payoff from housing loans, since they 
                                                       
105 I would like to thank Koen Bogaert for this term. 
106 Interview with an information consultant, March 12, 2015. 
107 Interview with a financial consultant, March 13, 2015. 
108 Interview with the head of a department at the Central Bank, December 10, 2013. 
109 Interview with an investment banker, October 17, 2014. In reality, banks are not transparent regarding 
their finances and name their own auditors (Cochrane, 2010). 
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can free themselves from part of the compulsory reserve by reinvesting in 
certificates of deposit or T-bills, make borrowers pay a commission of one percent 
of the loan amount, force them to take two insurance policies, often sold inside the 
bank and to deposit their salaries there as well. “All clients of the bank are imposed 
this insurance company which is owned by the bank. For the record this is not 
allowed by BDL. But they do it. They can do everything they want to do. The big 
cartel.”110 Meanwhile the state, the Central Bank and the treasury bear the cost of 
subsidizing the interest rate (Wehbe, 2014d). As a result, total assets of banks in 
Lebanon have exceeded US$182 billion in August 2015111 (Bank Audi, 2014a). Thus, 
the mortgage incentives have proven to be very a lucrative deal for the banks. The 
fact that banks could profit so much from this system can be explained by looking 
at the larger “networks of accumulation” that are active in Lebanon. Networks and 
overlaps between bankers, politicians and property owners are not new in Lebanon, 
as Chapter 2 has shown. The laissez-faire system did not actually include a free 
market in the sense of encouraging competition and efficiency but instead a system 
used by the elite to capture capital flows. The monopoly power and control that 
characterized this set-up has continued to this day, but is now intricately tied to 
other networks, some of which will be discussed in this chapter. 
The networks I discuss here form part of the system discussed in the previous 
chapters, in which excess liquidity, generated by debt payment interests by the 
government and diaspora transfers, is circulated and spatially fixed in the built 
environment by banks and real estate developers alike, through the mediation of 
the Central Bank, who is an agent of the Ministry of Finance, a dealer, and the main 
financial regulatory body of Lebanon, pointing to conflicts of interest as explained 
in Chapter 2. The Central Bank maintained high interest rates in order to allow the 
commercial banks to make super profits. Indeed, it consults Lebanese banks closely 
on policy-matters, follows up on some of their suggestions, and even sends them 
drafts of circulars it plans to issue.112 The state and the banks in this way have 
reached an understanding that allowed for this to happen, a state-Central Bank-
commercial banks collusion where there is a ‘congruence of interests between the 
state and commercial banks’ (Dibeh, 2011, p. 38).  
                                                       
110 Interview with a finance journalist, October 15, 2014. 
111 According to Central Bank statistics, found on www.bdl.gov.lb/webroot/statistics/ 
table.php?name=tsid4a. 
112 See, for example, this report by the ABL about its activities: www.abl.org.lb/Library/Files/Files/ 
part%202%20E%202009.pdf. 
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The high interest rates crowded out loans to productive sectors such as 
agriculture and industry and led to the further deprivation of the majority of its 
long-suffering people, directly via taxation and indirectly via the rising cost of 
living and housing. In order to find a place to live, these people are increasingly 
forced to resort to mortgage loans. Without a steady and loyal diaspora investor 
base, regarding banking and real estate alike, this system would be hard to 
maintain, if only because the social reproduction of the Lebanese population would 
be in jeopardy. “What keeps Beirut alive is the private economy of the inhabitants 
of Beirut who are going to the Gulf, to Europe, to US, fishing for money, keeping for 
now their roots in this country. They put the money in their banks, keeping them 
and insurance companies alive. This keeps things together.”113 However, this system 
of “keeping things together” is characterized by glaring inequality. A few 
individuals control large portions of wealth. Forty-eight percent of personal wealth 
in Lebanon belongs to just 0.3 percent of the adult population, with just two 
families, Hariri and Miqati, owning fifteen percent of it. Two percent of the 
Lebanese population owns sixty percent of bank deposits.114 In measures of 
inequality such as the Gini coefficient, Lebanon is fourth in the world in terms of 
unequal wealth distribution, after Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The top fifty 
richest lawmakers of the United States had a combined wealth of US$1.4 billion 
(with a Lebanese-American in the top three), as much as Saad Hariri and less than 
Miqati (Traboulsi, 2014).  
While the set-up indeed keeps the economy together for now, the question as to 
why this set-up continues points to the interests involved in the networks that I 
discuss in this chapter. 
 
                                                       
113 Interview with a lawyer, March 12, 2015. 
114According to research done by former Minister and economist Charbel Nahas, as reported on 
www.beirutreport.com/2014/03/how-lebanon-blew-its-marshall-plan-and.html. Accessed March 13, 
2014. 
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4 .1  Networks and the capitalist  system 
I do not want to explain the Lebanese networks of accumulation away by pointing 
to a specifically corrupt tradition of government or crony capitalism in Lebanon, 
the result of the amount to which public institutions diverge from some Weberian 
ideal-type of bureaucratic organization that allows individuals to abuse these for 
their private gain: ‘the inadequacies of each of these institutions when measured 
against the criteria of bureaucratic organization’ (Leenders, 2012, p. 101), and that 
can be solved by implementing strong state institutions. I refrain from categorizing 
these public-private overlaps and the examples of using public office for private 
gain as corruption, emanating from the improper setup of these institutions that is 
an outcome of the political decision-making process in Lebanon, its ‘allotment state’ 
(Leenders, 2012). Of course corruption is rife, and the way in which the political 
system in Lebanon works is an essential part of this, but I maintain that explaining 
it in this way does not really answer how and why this system came into being, 
would unjustly essentialize or reify the Lebanese situation and come dangerously 
close to the “Arabs are essentially corrupt”-discourse, however well its intentions 
are. Moreover, Leenders (2012) hails the Central Bank as an exception in Lebanon, 
an example of the ideal-type of a Weberian bureaucratic model that managed to 
protect itself from corrupt influences (notwithstanding conflicts of interest in its 
senior management that he points out), because its independence and reputation of 
integrity was needed in the treasury bills-market that served the elite’s own 
interests. I would argue that this set-up points to exactly the opposite of integrity, 
and opt for seeing the role of the Central Bank and the overlap between agents as a 
rational outcome of a more universal logic: that of capitalism, that does not 
distinguish between a political or an economic sphere. Leenders’ (2012, p. 235) 
statement, ‘I believe that corruption is rooted in the ways in which politics, not 
economics, is conducted’, does not make sense in the analytical framework I 
employ. The solution then lies not in redesigning Lebanon’s political institutions, 
but in a much more fundamental overhaul of the system that requires looking 
beyond Lebanon to capitalism itself. 
I argue that the networks of overlapping interests that I discuss in this chapter 
are a logical outcome of the social relations of the capitalist system itself. As 
explained in Chapter 1, each capitalist is driven by the laws of competition. The 
behavior of each capitalist to extract ever higher surplus value goes against the 
interests of the capitalist class as a whole, because more is produced than can be 
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profitably absorbed (overaccumulation) (Harvey, 1978) and the rate of profit falls as 
more capital is used for production relative to labor power. Concentrating and 
centralizing capital can temporarily counteract the falling rate of profit, but not 
overaccumulation. However, the logic of competition explains why capitalists have 
a tendency towards monopolization. If we look at the capitalist economy today, 
corporations have indeed tended to get larger and more powerful, but the tendency 
for larger capital to swallow smaller ones was already noted by Marx in in the 
nineteenth century. Moreover, he pointed to the instrumental role of the credit 
system herein, something that we find in the importance of Lebanon’s banks in this 
set-up. This set-up inevitably leaves its imprint on the built environment. As Zukin 
(1982, p. 17) has argued: ‘Real estate development at the local level is connected to 
needs of national and international capitalists and politicians via their capital 
sources, responsibility to state agencies, shifting rates of profit. This network 
determines what gets built, when and how and where.’ What the examples from my 
case studies will also show, is that in this network, it is not useful to speak of ‘local’ 
versus ‘global agents’, because these agents are both at the same time, always in 
relationships to other places via their diasporic connections and their conjuring of 
landscapes that employ ideas about urban living from elsewhere.  
Who are these state agents and agents of capital that connect the interests of 
banks, real estate developers, the diaspora and politicians in order to create a 
system that thrives on the accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005) of the 
Lebanese people and obscuring these conditions of production? How are they 
interconnected in tight elite networks with overlapping interests that allow for the 
political facilitation of this system and the monopolization of interests in these 
sectors? I will not attempt to provide a full picture of the entire network, as this is 
impossible due to its size and the lack of comprehensive data. Instead, I focus on a 
few examples of networks within this system connected to some case studies that 
have been discussed in this dissertation in order to show how they are composed. 
First, I will discuss more general evidence for the existence of these networks and 
their monopolistic practices, drawn from the literature as well as my interviews, 
before moving on to some examples. 
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4 .2  Politicians,  developers and banks 
Several scholars have pointed towards the existence of networks and overlaps 
between different powerful actors. Kamal Hamdan has discussed how in business 
ventures the political divide between March 8 and March 14 is easily overcome. 115 
Achkar (2011) and my own master’s thesis work (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; Krijnen, 
2010) show how real estate developers have personally helped draft the 2004 
Building Law that increased exploitation ratios. I discuss how a minister passed a 
temporary decree allowing the building of his project in the mountains near Beirut, 
and canceled it after the building permit was passed, one of many examples of 
politicians bending the laws in their favor. Achkar (2011) discusses the project of a 
major developer (MENA Capital) who destroyed an old garden for a high rise, and 
employed an architect who sits in the Higher Council for Urban Planning, hence on 
the committee deciding on approving the project.116 Makdisi (1997, pp. 694–695) 
pointed out that members of parliament are largely businessmen who ‘take 
advantage of the very same market liberalizations that they mandate.’  
In the banking sector, the overlap with politicians has been studied as well. 
Maasry (1988) and Traboulsi (2014) have pointed to countless examples of the 
connections between banks, diaspora businessmen and Lebanon’s presidents 
throughout history, and how Lebanese diaspora-owned banks provided a 
mechanism of obtaining political power and social standing during and after the 
civil war. Traboulsi also pointed out that ‘one quarter of the names on any list of 
political families or MPs are connected with the banking sector’ (Traboulsi, 2014, p. 
35). Politicians, bankers and merchants all hailed from the same powerful families 
and mobilized capital via the colonial state, the state apparatus, partnerships with 
European countries and finance capital (N. B. Hourani, 2010; Traboulsi, 2007). Srouji 
(2005) pointed towards the interests of state actors in the banks as well. Chaaban 
(2015) started mapping the control of politicians over the banking sector, showing 
how the ultimate shareholders of the banks can be traced to a number of ruling 
political families. Individuals closely linked to Lebanon’s political elites control 
forty-three percent of assets in Lebanon’s commercial banking sector. The Hariri-
                                                       
115 At a conference on October 24, 2014, audio available at yourlisten.com/ifi.aub/housing-policies-rent-
control-property-taxation-session-2. 
116 This person is also the head of the Urban Planning Department at ALBA University, training a new 
generation of city builders, and coincidentally my former boss. 
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family tops the list, controlling US$2.5 billion in equity. Moreover, many 
shareholders and board members have direct or indirect links with these elites. The 
banks that Chaaban investigated have profited substantially from public debt 
servicing and therefore have an interest in keeping the interest rates high.  
Interviewees have confirmed the existence of these networks, pointing to the 
different ways in which the overlapping interests between banks, the Central Bank, 
real estate developers and politicians sustain the existing system. “The BDL [Central 
Bank] comes in, instead of an independent central bank, it manages public debt and 
the interest rate. It sits down with the banks, asks them what they want (…) The 
government is always putting high rates, they could also give low rates, but the 
government won’t do it. They have links with the banks.”117 An official at the 
Ministry of Finance confirmed this: “The BDL and Ministry cooperate in the 
treasury, treasury bills, the BDL has a good and excellent network with the other 
commercial banks.”118 A financial consultant admitted that the Central Bank is 
perhaps not as independent as it should be: “It’s doing a great job, a lot goes on 
under the table, I’m not comfortable with that thought, but as it appears the Central 
Bank has learned the game and is playing the reality game. They have to do it; they 
can't be in a pool and say I don’t want to get wet.”119 An economist designated the 
Central Bank as the political core of the system: “It has a very wide autonomy, 
because it is the core of the whole system, of the whole political economy. At no 
moment did anybody hear any hesitation concerning the BDL or renewing the 
mandate of governors and commissions. All this is smothered. Nobody wants to 
touch that sacrosanct, the safe haven, this is what keeps the whole system afloat 
from the political side. From the banks’ side, one could consider that we have one 
bank in Lebanon. All the other banks are marketing branches.”120 “If you have an 
independent government or central bank you’d offer the banks, saying we lower the 
rates, you buy new debt at lower rates, you keep on decreasing them for a soft 
landing. But marketed is: look at the new turmoil, we need to increase the interest 
rate.”121 In this way, the volatile security situation in Lebanon is used to obscure the 
                                                       
117 Interview with a professor of economy, American University of Beirut, March 11, 2015. 
118 Interview with an official at the public debt directorate, October 15, 2014. 
119 Interview with a financial consultant, March 11, 2015. 
120 Interview with an economist, March 18, 2015. 
121 Interview with a professor of economy, American University of Beirut,  October 20, 2014. 
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interests behind the system. “There is an interaction between certain special 
interests, policy makers, bank owners, there is a certain interaction between 
owners of capital and policymakers”, a World Bank official told me.122 Moreover, 
interviewees have expressed their suspicions regarding the involvement of banks in 
real estate: “They can’t buy real estate directly but they can finance companies that 
themselves would buy real estate, holding companies, and this is a black box. 
They’re not exposed to real estate risk directly but through the company they lend 
to.”123 As we will see in my examples, this is precisely what is happening. 
The existence of these networks also means that they exclude other agents of 
capital. Indeed, entry into Lebanon as a new bank is difficult (Cobham, 2011), as it is 
in most countries, and half of Lebanon's domestic markets are considered to be 
oligopolistic to monopolistic (Gaspard, 2004, p. 218). This means that new actors 
have difficulty entering the market (Berthélemy et al., 2007). Several real estate 
developers, investors and architects have confirmed in interviews that an outsider, 
i.e., a real estate developer with no existing social network, will not be able to 
purchase land or get a building permit. Developers rely on social networks in order 
to find investors and buyers, to gain a foothold in the market and complete the 
necessary formalities. “It’s based on people knowing each other from school, 
universities, they talk to each other, and maybe one of the guys knows other people 
who already met with this people, it’s kind of friendship/relationship more than... 
it’s not really professional. It’s small circles. Usually they go to people they know. 
No one comes without knowing someone.”124 
Hence, we see that tight networks between real estate developers, banks and 
politicians control Lebanon’s economy. While there has been scholarly attention for 
the overlaps between real estate developers and politicians on the one hand, and 
bankers and politicians on the other, I argue that we should also pay attention to 
connections between bankers and real estate developers and moreover connect all 
these overlaps in order to provide a more complete picture of the networks of 
accumulation that operate in Beirut (but are connected to many places beyond the 
city, especially via the role of the Lebanese diaspora). Below, I discuss three 
examples of networks where politicians, real estate developers and bankers have 
come together and often overlap in the same persons. It is difficult to fully 
                                                       
122 Interview with a World Bank official, October 16, 2014. 
123 Interview with a professor of economy, American University of Beirut, October 20, 2014. 
124 Interview with investor in one of the loft projects in Corniche en-Nahr, April 27, 2012. 
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understand the ownership of these companies, because first of all not all of them 
are registered in the Commercial Registry and second, a politician might hide 
behind a range of companies: “So these politicians use many henchmen to hide 
themselves, they hide themselves behind many companies. Sometimes they use the 
American way to hide behind twenty, thirty, forty layers of companies, it can drive 
you nuts to get to number ten!”125 The data below are therefore not complete, but 
should give the reader an idea of the kinds of networks that I am talking about. 
4 .2.1  Al-Mawarid Bank, Al-Mawarid Real Estate and the 
Kheireddine family 
This network is an example of a bank established during the civil war and run by a 
former diaspora Lebanese businessman. Al-Mawarid Bank, established in 1980, is 
owned by the Kheireddine family. Its chairman, Marwan Kheireddine, worked in 
Qatar, London and the United States before taking over his father’s bank in 1989. 
When the real estate boom took off in 2005, he created a company called Al-
Mawarid Real Estate, which is developing, among others, the Achrafieh 4748 project 
in Corniche en-Nahr and the Skyline-project in Mar Mikhael. General director of Al-
Mawarid Real Estate Rania Akhras said that the investors in the project are high-
end depositors in the bank, pointing towards the importance of bank deposits in the 
real estate boom.126 Even though legally the bank and the company are not 
connected to each other (it is illegal for banks to be involved in real estate 
development), when we look at their shareholders, we can see that they are headed 
by members of the same family (see Table 6). Moreover the bank is financing the 
project via a construction loan of US$13.2 million and is facilitating the payment 
schemes for buyers.127 
As the head of the banking department of the Central bank explained to me: 
Mawarid by law is not allowed, he’s doing something heike [like that], he 
thinks he’s smart but he’s not allowed. He shouldn’t do this. By law he is not 
connected, you cannot find any relation with the banks, its all hidden because 
                                                       
125 Interview with the director of the Lebanese Transparency Association, December 13, 2013. 
126Interview with general director of Al-Mawarid Real Estate, December 11, 2013. 
127 Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 30, 2012; property record of Achrafieh 
4748, obtained from the Land Registry on May 2, 2012. 
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by law its not allowed. It’s a company that is financed by Al-Mawarid to do 
this project. He can finance them, but he cannot own it, someone else has to 
own it. They usually bring someone, put a company on his name but he signs 
a paper of debt to the bank for the value of this company. This is not 
common, the real bankers don’t do it[.] Marwan likes to play smart, his father 
made lot of profit in London real estate, so he likes real estate. 128 
The connections between politics, real estate and banking are myriad in this 
network. Marwan Kheireddine was Minister of State from 2011 to 2014, appointed 
by his brother-in-law Talal Arslan, a powerful Druze leader (Traboulsi, 2014). 
Another former minister, Ibrahim Daher, has a stake in Mawarid Bank as well. The 
chairman of Al-Mawarid Real Estate is Wassim Kheireddine, a family member of 
Marwan Kheireddine. Wassim Kheireddine is also a shareholder in the bank. 
Marwan’s father Salim Kheireddine, one of the founders of the bank and its biggest 
shareholder, owns 500 shares in the real estate company. Hence, three board 
members of the bank own all the shares of Al-Mawarid Real Estate company. All 
three are also the biggest shareholders in Al-Mawarid Bank.129 Chaaban (2015) has 
established that Al-Mawarid Bank is controlled for over ninety percent by 
politically affiliated shareholders. 
 
Person/legal 
entity 
Politics Banking/holdings Real estate 
Marwan 
Kheireddine 
 
Minister of State (2011-2014), 
brother-in-law of Druze leader 
and politician Talal Arslan 
Al Mawarid Bank: CEO, 
400,000 shares 
 
Al Mawarid Real 
Estate: 500 
shares 
Wassim 
Kheireddine 
Related to Marwan 
Kheireddine 
Al Mawarid Bank: board 
member, 400,000 shares 
Al Mawarid Real 
Estate: CEO, 
500 shares 
Salim 
Kheireddine 
Father of Marwan Kheireddine Al Mawarid Bank: board 
member, 2 million shares 
Al Mawarid Real 
Estate: 1,000 
shares 
                                                       
128 Interview with the head of a department of the Central Bank, December 10, 2013. 
129According to company records retrieved from the Commercial Registry in Lebanon, December 11, 2013. 
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Person/legal 
entity 
Politics Banking/holdings Real estate 
Ibrahim al 
Daher 
Former minister (2004-2005) Al Mawarid Bank: board 
member, 2,000 shares 
- 
Majid Jumblat Former vice-governor of the 
Central Bank 
Al Mawarid Bank: board 
member, 2,000 shares 
- 
Table 6-The Al Mawarid network 
4.2.2  Bank Audi,  Audi Saradar Group. 
Lebanon’s largest bank, Bank Audi-Audi Saradar Group, is involved in real estate 
company CGI (Conseil et Gestion Immobilière), which was originally established in 
the 1990s by the Saradar Bank (a family bank founded in 1948) and is developing the 
large-scale Gemmayzeh Village project and the Urban Dreams-project in Corniche 
en-Nahr, among others. CGI became affiliated to Bank Audi when it merged with the 
Saradar Bank in 2004. Today, CGI is owned largely by Marius Saradar Holding who 
acquired eighty-one percent of it in 2011 while the Audi Saradar Private Bank kept 
nineteen percent (Speetjens, 2013). CGI explained their relationship to the bank as 
follows:  
It’s the Audi Saradar group, mainly were a Saradar-owned group. We are with 
the bank, the bank is with us, but the land is not owned by the bank. There is 
a company that owns the land, banks don’t have the right to own land and 
develop projects. That’s why we don’t own the land, the Urban Dreams 
company is the company that owns the land. The company is financed by 
shareholders; the bank has no stake in the company.130 
However, the connections between the real estate company and the bank are clear, 
looking at who owns CGI. Moreover, Bank Audi has been collecting investors for the 
project, contacting one of my interviewees.131 Bank Audi also has shareholders in 
the form of companies that are related to former Prime Minister Najib Miqati 
                                                       
130 Interview with general manager of CGI, December 4, 2013. 
131 Interview with the Vice President of an economic think tank, December 10, 2013. 
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(Achkar, 2011), who has a net worth of US$2.4 billion according to Forbes.132 
Moreover, Audi’s chairman Raymond Audi was Minister of the Displaced in 2008. 
Unfortunately, I could not access the shareholders of CGI at the Commercial 
Registry, and the amounts of shares for Bank Audi were not named. Once again 
however, it is clear that there are myriad connections between real estate, politics 
and banking in this network. 
 
 
 
Person/legal 
entity 
Politics Banking/holdings Real 
estate 
Raymond Audi -Minister of 
Displaced (2008-
2009) 
Bank Audi-Audi Saradar Group: CEO 
(shares unknown) 
 
CGI (19 
percent) 
Mario Saradar  -Marius Saradar Holding (CEO) 
-Joe Saradar Holding 
-Mario Saradar Holding 
-Bank Audi-Audi Saradar Group: board 
member (shares unknown, sold in 2015) 
CGI (81 
percent) 
Najib Miqati -Minister (1998 & 
2004) 
-Prime Minister 
(2005 & (2011-
2013) 
-M1-group (owner and shareholder) 
 
 
M1 Group Partially owned by 
Miqati 
-Bank Audi-Audi Saradar-group (shares 
unknown) 
M1 Real 
Estate 
Table 7-The Audi-Saradar network 
4.2.3  BankMed and the Hariri  dynasty 
Perhaps the most famous example of the overlap between interests is the late Rafiq 
al-Hariri, banker, real estate developer, former Prime Minister and billionaire. 
Hariri’s Bank Med is owned largely by Group Med Holding, which is currently 
chaired by Hariri’s cousin Mohammed al-Hariri, while his widow Nazek Hariri sits 
on the board too. His son Saad al-Hariri, former Prime Minister as well, owns 
twenty-four percent of Bank Med (Cochrane, 2010). Group Med is owned mostly by 
                                                       
132 www.forbes.com/profile/najib-mikati/, accessed December 9, 2015. 
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Saad and Ayman al-Hariri while other shareholders include Mohammed al-Hariri 
and Hariri’s widow Nazek. Another company, Medinvestment Bank, is owned 
mostly by BankMed, while Group Med Holding is a board member and shareholder,  
as well as Mohammed al-Hariri and two other Hariri family members. Rayya Haffar, 
former finance minister, has a stake in BankMed too (Traboulsi, 2014). 
The Hariri family is not only involved in banks, but in real estate as well. Besides 
the activities of Hariri’s Oger company during the civil war and reconstruction (the 
demolition of the souks in 1983, the Solidere-project after the war) discussed in 
Chapter  2, other real estate companies of the Hariri-family have become involved 
in controversial real estate projects on Beirut’s coast (Dictaphone Group, 2013) and 
in Mar Mikhael (AYA) and Corniche en-Nahr (UPark) with HAR Properties, which is 
a company owned by Rafiq Hariri’s son Fahed. HAR Properties created the company 
Achrafieh 1289 to develop UPark (named after the lot number), in 2010. Of 3,000 
shares, Fahd owns 1,500. Other shareholders include Ahmad al-Hariri, secretary-
general of political party Future and Saad’s cousin; Ayman al-Hariri, son of Rafiq 
Hariri, Deputy CEO of Saudi OGER and number 258 on Forbes list of billionaires133 
with a net worth of US$1.3 billion134, and former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri 
himself (150 shares each), CEO of Saudi OGER and leader of the Future political party 
in Parliament. Rafiq Hariri’s widow Nazek owns 600 shares and is a member of the 
board of directors.135 
The AYA-project was developed by the company Mar Mikhael-Rmeil, of which 
Fahed al-Hariri owns 1940 shares, Hind al-Hariri and Philippe Tabet 30, and a 
company named IRAD Real Estate Development 1,000. When looking up IRAD, it 
turns out that Bahaa al-Hariri, Rafiq al-Hariri’s oldest son, is a significant 
shareholder as well. Hence we see that Bahaa al-Hariri is involved in the real estate 
business of his brother but only via a company that does not have his name in it. 
HAR Properties itself was founded in 2009, has 15,000 shares, of which 14,100 are 
owned by Fahed al-Hariri, 150 by his sister Hind and 750 by his business partner 
Philippe Tabet.136 It was founded by another company (Company 5 Real Estate), 
which has since been dissolved and could not be found in the commercial registry. 
                                                       
133 The Forbes entry can be found here: www.forbes.com/lists/2006/10/0GFW.html. Accessed August 15, 
2014. 
134According to Forbes, www.forbes.com/profile/ayman-hariri/#. Accessed August 15, 2014. 
135According to company records retrieved from the Commercial Registry in Lebanon, December 11, 2013. 
136According to company records retrieved from the Commercial Registry in Lebanon, December 11, 2013. 
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Another real estate company, Horizon Development, is owned by Rafiq Hariri’s 
eldest son Bahaa Hariri, who has a net worth of US$3 billion. He sold his stake in 
Saudi OGER to his younger brother Saad in 2008. Horizon Development has several 
large-scale real estate projects under construction and is a major shareholder in the 
Abdali project that is currently under construction in Downtown Amman.137 
In terms of political connections, besides the fact that Rafiq and Saad Hariri have 
both been Prime Ministers, Rafiq Hariri was also closely connected to the governor 
of Lebanon’s Central Bank, Riad Salameh, who was in charge of his personal 
portfolio at Merril Lynch before returning to Beirut. Incidentally, Merril Lynch is 
one of the main managers of the Eurobond issues that arrange Lebanon’s public 
debt in foreign currency. 
 
The connections outlined above are summarized in the table below. 
 
Person/legal 
entity 
Politics Banking/holdings Real estate 
Saad al-Hariri Former Prime 
Minister, leader of 
Future Movement 
-Group Med Holding: 22 
million shares 
-Saudi OGER: CEO 
-Achrafieh 1289: 150 
shares 
-Solidere 
Ayman al-Hariri Rafiq Hariri’s 
nephew 
-Group Med Holding: 22 
million shares 
-Saudi OGER: deputy 
CEO 
-Achrafieh 1289: 150 
shares 
Mohammed al-
Hariri 
Rafiq Hariri’s older 
brother 
-BankMed: chairman, 5 
shares 
-Group Med Holding: 
chairman, 10 shares 
-Medinvestment Bank: 10 
shares 
-IRAD Investment Holding 
 
Fouad Siniora Minister of Finance 
(1992-1998) (2000-
2004) 
Prime Minister 
(2005-2009) 
-GroupMed 
-BankMed 
-Saudi Lebanese bank 
(CEO) 
-Bahr Real Estate 
Nazek Audi Widow of former 
Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri 
-BankMed: 5 shares 
-Group Med Holding: 8 
million shares 
-Achrafieh 1289: 600 
shares 
                                                       
137According to Forbes, www.forbes.com/lists/2010/10/billionaires-2010_Bahaa-Hariri_7625.html. 
Accessed August 15, 2014. 
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Person/legal 
entity 
Politics Banking/holdings Real estate 
Group Med 
Holding 
 -Bank Med (62 million 
shares) 
-Medinvestment Bank 
(board member, 13 
shares) 
 
Bank Med  -Medinvestment Bank (8 
million shares) 
-Mediterranean 
Property Management 
Fahed al-Hariri Rafiq Hariri’s son  -Achrafieh 1289: 1,500 
of 3,000 shares 
-Mar Mikhael-Rmeil 
company: 1940 shares 
-HAR Properties: 
14,100 shares 
Ahmad al-Hariri Secretary-general of 
Future Movement 
 -Achrafieh 1289: 150 
shares 
Bahaa al-Hariri Rafiq Hariri’s son  -IRAD Real Estate 
Development: 12,490 
shares 
Hind al-Hariri Rafiq Hariri’s 
daughter 
 -Mar Mikhael-Rmeil 
company: 30 shares 
-HAR Properties: 150 
shares 
IRAD Real Estate 
Development 
  -Mar Mikhael-Rmeil 
company: 1,000 
shares 
Table 8-The Hariri-network 
The three examples of networks discussed above tell us about how banks 
increasingly moved into real estate by setting up several companies in the early 
2000s, fueled by excess liquidity in their accounts. They also show how a high-
ranking political position was often preceded by successful business career. This 
business career was often made abroad during the civil war, and when the 
businessman returned to Lebanon with a vast amount of wealth, he would set up a 
bank. When government bonds became a less lucrative option and the real estate 
boom intensified after 2008, capital investment in real estate was stepped up. The 
fact that a limited amount of persons commanded a vast amount of wealth, as a 
result of the monopolistic tendencies already discussed, and was able to regulate 
themselves to a considerable extent via high political positions, made the switching 
of capital into real estate easy by just founding another company. 
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4 .3  Conclusion 
The examples discussed above have outlined the networks of real estate developers, 
politicians and bankers that profoundly impact Lebanon’s political economy. These 
networks show that many agents have the power to shape the regulatory 
framework in which they do business. Political and economic spheres are 
completely indistinguishable. Banks and real estate developers can draw up their 
own regulations, because the actual people representing the government, banks 
and real estate developers are often the same persons, and banks control most of 
the country’s debt. During the past years, the banks have become increasingly 
active in real estate development through their real estate development arms, and 
this is something that, together with their political power and the increasing 
creditization of society, will shape Lebanon’s built environment for the years to 
come. Instead of looking at these findings as evidence of corruption in Lebanon, I 
argue that they are a logical consequence of the need to invest surplus capital and 
the social relations that constitute capitalism, where the formation of monopolistic 
or oligopolistic tendencies is an answer to pressures of competition. The existence 
of a diaspora investor base together with public debt financing keeps this system 
afloat, contributing to the accumulation by dispossession of the Lebanese people, 
because the high prices of apartments are a result of the boom, which is a result of 
excess liquidity being switched into the built environment, part of a longer trend of 
banks making large profits on the public debt and now also on mortgages, paid for 
by their taxes. “We are financing these capital remunerations with debt that is 
being paid from public money in the future.”138 The official narrative is that in a 
volatile country like Lebanon, high interest rates are necessary. This chapter has 
shown that the reasons behind the high interest rates are somewhat different. 
I will now move on to the second part of this dissertation, where I discuss how the 
spatial fix actually materialized in the built environment of Beirut. 
 
                                                       
138 Interview with a professor of economy, American University of Beirut, March 11, 2015. 
 Part 2:  The materialization of the spatial  
f ix
 147 
 5  Gentrification and the rent gap: the 
cases of Mar Mikhael and Zokak el-Blat139 
This chapter presents the first two case studies of this thesis. It describes how and 
why two neighborhoods in Beirut, Mar Mikhael and Zokak el-Blat, underwent 
significant gentrification as capital flowed towards them following the resolution of 
the political crisis in 2008. These areas were susceptible to gentrification because 
their ground rent was depressed to such an extent as to make reinvestment 
profitable, i.e.: their rent gap was large enough, due to the fact that building 
allowances had increased substantially since these areas were first constructed and 
the buildings had suffered from disinvestment for a long time, partly due to the 
legacy of conflict (Ross & Jamil, 2011). The reforms to the legal and institutional 
framework that were passed in postwar Lebanon in the early millennium (see 
Chapter  2) allowed for a more intensive exploitation of the built environment, in 
itself contributing to a higher potential ground rent for any plot of land in the 
country. In this chapter, I focus specifically on how, at the level of individual 
buildings and plots, two existing legal frameworks, namely heritage protection and 
rent controls, enlarged this rent gap. Several Lebanese state actors have attempted 
to reform the legal framework pertaining to these issues but have been unable to 
find enough support or overcome the interests of landowners, who historically have 
always had the power to thwart attempts at more regulated urban development 
processes, as was the case during the Chehabist period (see Chapter  2, section 
2.1.3.3), even more so because many politicians have interests in construction.  
The subsequent gentrification of these areas happened in complex and diverse 
ways, and this chapter will shed some light on how and why this process occurred 
at that time in these areas. First however, I will discuss the gentrification concept in 
                                                       
139 This chapter is partially based on the following book chapter I co-authored with Christiaan De 
Beukelaer: Krijnen, M., & De Beukelaer, C. (2015). Capital, state and conflict: the various drivers of diverse 
gentrification processes in Beirut, Lebanon. In L. Lees, H. B. Shin, & E. Lopez (Eds.), Global Gentrifications: 
Uneven Development and Displacement (pp. 285–309). Bristol and Chicago: Policy Press. It also uses data 
collected during a workshop in Beirut that I was partly in charge of, titled Creative Economy, Social Justice 
and Urban Strategies: The Case of Mar Mikhael, organized by the Issam Fares Institute and the Department of 
Architecture and Design at the American University of Beirut in cooperation with GAIA Heritage. The 
research was carried out in the context of the American University of Beirut’s Finding Justice in the City 
program, housed at the IFI, and coordinated by Prof. Mona Fawaz. 
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more depth. We should recall that spatially fixing capital in the built environment, 
either as an aide to the production and consumption process of capitalism itself or 
as a spatial fix for overaccumulation due to competition, freezes its productive 
capacity, which means that the exchange value tied up in the building devalues as 
new and more productive fixed capital comes into being. Eventually, the remaining 
surplus value will be destroyed in order to open up room for fresh accumulation, be 
it by altering the use value of the building or cashing in on the exchange value of 
the land (ground rent). In this way, capital performs a ‘locational see-saw’ (Smith, 
1982) around cities, following a logic of investment and disinvestment that is –
crucially- a question of human agency in response to the depreciation and 
devaluation of capital140 in different areas. To understand the point at which 
investment becomes profitable, Smith (1979, 1984) has come up with the concept of 
the rent gap, as discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.1.2, to explain why redevelopment 
becomes profitable in some neighborhoods (for developers and consumers alike): 
‘At some point, the devaluation of capital depresses the ground rent level 
sufficiently that the ‘rent gap’ between actual capitalized ground rent and the 
potential ground rent (given a ‘higher’ use) becomes sufficiently large that 
redevelopment and gentrification become possible’ (Smith, 1984, p. 150).  
Gentrification is the term with which the socioeconomic and cultural results of 
renewed capital investment in the built environment have most often been 
described. Ruth Glass’s (1964) classical definition of gentrification describes an 
influx of middle class residents into working-class neighborhoods. The new 
inhabitants renovate low-income and downgraded properties into expensive 
residences, displacing the original residents and changing the entire social 
character of the district. This definition has been expanded in recent decades to 
include, among others, new-build developments (Davidson & Lees, 2005, 2010), 
gated communities (Atkinson & Blandy, 2006), super-gentrification (Lees, 2003), and 
commercial and rural gentrification (Lees et al., 2008). However, Lees et al. (2008) 
argue that these different types of gentrification have in common that they all 
cause socioeconomic and cultural transformations, due to middle-class colonization 
or recolonization of working-class spaces: people with less power and means are 
displaced involuntarily from their homes by people with more power and means 
(see also Davidson & Lees, 2005, 2010; T. Slater, 2006, 2011). With this in mind, and 
                                                       
140 ‘Depreciation refers strictly to changes in price whereas devalorization is a deeper economic process 
implying the loss or negation of value as a necessary part of the valorization process’ (Smith, 1982, p. 147 
footnote 3). 
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following Lees et al. (2008, p. xv), I define gentrification as the transformation of a 
working-class or vacant area of the city into an area for middle-class residential 
and/or commercial use. Whether this happens through new construction or 
renovation, and whether or not this process is state-led is related to the geography 
of gentrification (Lees, 2000), that is, the way in which similar processes play out 
differently in different geographic contexts. 
Following observations that gentrification has “gone global” (Smith, 2002), the 
initial scholarly focus on gentrification of cities in the United States and the United 
Kingdom has been expanded (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Badyina & Golubchikov, 
2005; Kotze & Merwe, 2000) and, more recently, following the postcolonial critique 
in which the Eurocentrism of this theory has been called into question, more 
explicitly directed towards the Global South (Choi, 2016; Harris, 2008; Lees et al., 
2015; López-Morales, 2015). This chapter fits into this trend as it looks at 
gentrification processes in Beirut. Inevitably, the real estate booms of the past two 
decades, the most recent of which started in 2008 and lasted until 2011, have led to 
the rapid transformation of many sectors of the city and subsequent population 
displacement. Neighborhoods that were once characterized by Ottoman mansions 
and their lush gardens, French Mandate-era villas and low-rise 1950s apartment 
buildings with shops on the ground floors are now dominated by glitzy high rises 
that remain uninhabited during most of the year. In Lebanon, land and housing 
markets have always been allowed to operate relatively freely and often informally 
(Fawaz, 2009a) and private property rights have historically been strongly 
guaranteed. In this way, it seems that gentrification was ‘an expected product’ 
(Smith, 1979, p. 538), given that the state did not strongly intervene to protect 
residents from the logic of capital in the housing market.  
However, areas with a large rent gap do not automatically gentrify. Subsequent 
gentrification has to be explained by more than the rent gap alone. These 
explanations are embedded in the larger political economy of real estate 
development in Beirut that is discussed in this dissertation, and that explains the 
availability of large amounts of surplus capital to invest in real estate as of 2008  3). 
At the level of my case studies that are both neighborhoods with a rent gap, 
however, specific factors influenced their eligibility for reinvestment. In Mar 
Mikhael, creative entrepreneurs and the area’s perceived authenticity and village-
like image have had a large impact on its desirability as an investment destination. 
Many buildings were renovated into upscale commercial spaces, which, together 
with the area’s reputation as a diverse, non-sectarian space was used as a selling 
point by real estate developers keen to sell upper middle class newly constructed 
 150 
apartments. In Zokak el-Blat, the area was considered attractive by investors 
because of its location next to Downtown Beirut and large traffic arteries. Its 
architectural heritage and legacy as home of the nineteenth-century Arab 
Renaissance were not named as motives to invest. Therefore, the transformation 
remained limited to residential and new-build real estate. The case studies in this 
chapter show just how much gentrification processes can diverge within a single 
city and between two areas with similar rent gaps. The existence of a rent gap and 
disinvestment in these areas is therefore in and of itself not enough to explain how 
and why they subsequently gentrified, which is not claimed by the theory .  
In what follows, I hope to contribute to a growing body of scholarship that is 
documenting this process of gentrification in Beirut (Achkar, 2011; Khechen, 2014; 
Marot, 2014; Ross & Jamil, 2011). The remainder of the chapter will be organized as 
follows: the next section zooms in on the Mar Mikhael neighborhood and first 
explains what caused the disinvestment in the area, paying special attention to rent 
controls, and then look at how the area gentrified. The third section of this chapter 
discusses Zokak el-Blat, paying attention again to how and why disinvestment 
occurred in this area, this time looking at the framework regarding the protection 
of architectural heritage and the role of conflict, and then shows how this area 
gentrified.  
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5 .1  Mar Mikhael 
Mar Mikhael is a mixed residential-commercial neighborhood141 where many villas 
from the 1930s survive, alongside more recent structures. It was originally a port 
district that started developing from 1840, when Beirut became a quarantine center 
and coal supply station and the bourgeoisie started moving out of the original city 
walls. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Mar Mikhael train station was 
built, serving the nearby port and passengers of the now-defunct Beirut-Damascus 
railroad. The quarter was thus mostly a transit for port goods and the railway. In 
the 1920s, the French colonial administration named it ‘Mar Mikhael’ (Saint 
Michael), and installed two military bases there.  
After the Armenian genocide in 1915, many Armenian refugees and survivors 
settled in the district, just as they settled on the eastern shores of the Beirut River, 
in an area that would come to be known as Bourj Hammoud. The largest camp was 
set up in 1922, while later camps were transformed into permanent settlements. 
The character of the area remains distinctly Armenian today (Ashkarian, 2012; 
Zouain, Liatard, & Fournier, 2011). It also possesses a historical, social, economic, 
architectural and urban tissue that has mostly been destroyed elsewhere in Beirut: 
neighbors sit outside on stairs, under trees, on dead-end streets. Some places have a 
village-like feel, with small, car free streets connecting old low-rise houses with 
porches overhung with vines.  
                                                       
141 Note that the quarter does not have official borders but comprises parts of the Rmeil and Medawar 
Cadastral sectors. The borders of the area shown in the map are based on the mental map of the 
inhabitants, as explained in Ashkarian (2012). 
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Figure 13-Mar Mikhael-Pictures taken between April 2010 and March 2015. 
Generally described as a sleepy quarter142 that never fully recovered from the 
closure of the railroad in 1976 and the Civil War, from 2008 onwards the 
neighborhood started transforming (Lee, 2009). Restaurants, pubs, boutiques, art 
                                                       
142 See, for example, Garine Tcholakian’s portrayal of the neighborhood in the Daily Star from January 19, 
2004: ‘Shop after shop, the small unlit spaces display more than merchandise: a man sits at his desk 
facing the door, leaning his plump cheek against his even plumper hand. In the next one, three men sit 
around a table at the window quietly eating their sandwiches. In the next, a balding white-haired barber 
squinting through his thick-lensed glasses, looks at a magazine while sitting in one of the large green 
vinyl barber chairs of his empty shop. A man emerges onto the sidewalk. He yawns slowly. The look on 
his face reveals at once tiredness, boredom and dread. See also the New York Times travel special about 
the quarter at www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2010/09/05/travel/20100912-SURFACING.html, where the 
Mar Mikhael  of 2010 is described as ‘dusty’ and ‘dowdy.’  
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galleries and small bookstores opened one after another, increasing from a dozen in 
2009 to several dozens in 2013 (“Mar Mikhaël: La nuit s’en empare,” 2013). Property 
investors and developers followed, selling the area as the next place-to-be on their 
projects’ websites and in brochures. Mar Mikhael became, as one local newspaper 
put it, a ‘magical quarter.’143 While this coincided with a project to rehabilitate Mar 
Mikhael’s façades, undertaken by the Lebanese NGO Help Lebanon from 2006 to 2009 
(see Figure 15), it is more probable that the new investors and renters were 
attracted by the lower prices of land and low rents. Property and rental prices have 
risen since these renewed investments, tripling in some cases (Ashkarian, 2012; 
Chardon, 2011; Lee, 2009; Zouain et al., 2011). While it is impossible to obtain 
reliable land value data over time on a neighborhood level, similar to those by Hoyt 
that Smith (1979) uses for example, I have combined several sources (surveys, 
property magazines and my own interviews and records) that provide an indication 
of the changes in real estate prices (see Figure 16). Unfortunately, I could not gather 
enough reliable data on land prices over a long period, but the few numbers I did 
obtain from the records and interviews show an increase in land prices from around 
US$1,200/m2 in 2006 to US$8,000/m2 in 2011. In 2014 and 2015, millions of dollars 
were being paid for buildings, pointing towards prices of US$5000 to US$13,500/m2 
for the land. For real estate prices, see Figure 16. Before moving on to the details of 
this renewed investment in Mar Mikhael, however, I will first look in more depth at 
how the initial disinvestment in the area can be explained. 
                                                       
143 L’Orient Le Jour, December 23, 2009, quoted in Achkarian, 2012, p. 16). 
 155 
 
Figure 14-Mar Mikhael’s eastern section. Picture taken December 25, 2011. 
 
Figure 15-The rehabilitation of façades in Mar Mikhael by the NGO Help Lebanon, in 
partnership with the Banque Libano-Française. Source: Help Lebanon, s.a. 
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Figure 16-Real estate prices in Mar Mikhael. Sources: Ashkarian (2012, 2013); Lebanon 
Opportunities (1999-2011)144; Boudisseau (2012b); Zouain et al. (2011); Salem 
(2010); my interviews and records. 
5 .1.1  Rent controls and the rent gap in Mar Mikhael  
In Mar Mikhael, many buildings house tenants whose contracts are subject to 
stringent rent controls. Surveys suggest that anything from fifty to eighty percent 
of residents in Mar Mikhael are renters, and eighty percent of these have rent-
controlled contracts, the majority paying less than US$1,000 a year (Ashkarian, 
2013; GAIA Heritage, 2015)145. Tenants with these contracts, signed before July 1992, 
pay rents based on pre-war rates and benefit from extensive tenant rights. The 
large number of rent-controlled contracts has contributed to the disinvestment in 
the area. As Smith (1979, pp. 543–545) explained for the case of inner-city 
disinvestment in the United States, after a first or second cycle of use by owner-
                                                       
144 I have reviewed all issues of the Lebanon Opportunities magazine from 1998 until 2011 and noted 
down prices from land and real estate price tables. The tables for Mar Mikhael have not been published 
every year. When published, they have listed prices for several streets in the quarter. I have taken the 
average of these prices, so when reading this one should note that on Armenia Street, for example, and 
other bigger roads, prices are a little higher. On a side note, in 2006, Lebanon Opportunities, a local 
business magazine, described Mar Mikhael as a ‘long-term investment’ area, where newly available 
apartments went for US$250-300 per month. 
145 Note that the survey carried out by GAIA Heritage in 2014 surveyed an area that is much larger than 
the map of Mar Mikhael that I am using in this dissertation. However, the areas that are included in this 
survey are very similar to Mar Mikhael in terms of residents, so I decided to use their numbers after all. 
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occupants (in Mar Mikhael, many bigger villas were built as housing for the richer 
classes moving out of the old walled city), properties were rented out as (the 
children of) homeowners sought newer homes where their investments were safer. 
The subsequent maintenance of these rented out properties, often requiring major 
repairs as the only way to prevent devalorization, required renewed capital 
investment that was often not an option for small landlords or owner-occupiers 
(Smith, 1982), especially given that rent-controlled contracts yielded so little. In 
Mar Mikhael, disinvestment was even more severe because of the rampant inflation 
of the Lebanese pound in the early 1990s (see section 2.2.1.1), which meant rents 
yielded sometimes as little as US$120 a year (Cochrane, 2012; Fisk, 2012), a very low 
actual ground rent.  
While it has been shown that rent controls can limit processes of gentrification 
in case of a rent gap (Ley & Dobson, 2008), this is not necessarily the case in Beirut. 
On the one hand, in a context of escalating real estate and rental prices throughout 
the city, it is true that rent control is one of the few reasons low-and middle-income 
dwellers have managed to retain their homes in central city locations. All in all, an 
estimated 40,000 families in Beirut alone are benefiting from so-called “old rent 
contracts”146, but census data on who and where they are are lacking (Bekdache, 
2015 forthcoming; Cochrane, 2012). On the other hand, the very low yield of 
buildings with old rent tenants meant that an increasingly large rent gap started to 
form in the area. During the real estate boom, at a time when in real market value, 
the rent of a building could rise above US$100,000 annually, or the plot with the 
building on it could be sold for millions of dollars, this very high potential 
capitalized ground rent provided landlords with a huge incentive to first, lobby for 
a new rental law to replace the temporary law introduced for pre-July 1992 rental 
contracts, to be able to capture market rate rents, and on the other hand, sell their 
buildings, including tenants, to real estate developers who were willing to pay large 
sums for the land and compensation above court-rate for the tenants to leave 
(Bekdache, 2015 forthcoming; Salem, 2010). These developers know they can 
construct a high rise on the land, i.e. benefit from the much larger potential 
capitalized ground rent, and are therefore willing to pay considerable sums. Hence, 
on the one hand, the old rent law allows people to stay in the city, while at the same 
time the rent gap it created contributed to landlords’ unwillingness to invest in 
                                                       
146 In all of Lebanon, the number of old rental contracts is 153,361 officially, but probably even higher 
because of unregistered contracts, i.e. around 180,000. Assuming that the average household in Lebanon 
numbers four persons (a low estimate), this means that around 600- to 800,000 people might be displaced 
if the rent law is reformed (Baradeai, 2014). 
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maintenance and willingness to sell their properties instead, after which tenants 
were evicted, thus speeding up gentrification. Under-maintenance of properties in 
this case did not yield (temporary) surplus capital for the landlords as discussed by 
Smith (1979, p. 544) because the rental yields were simply too low due to their 
unadjusted rates after the inflation of the early 1990s. 
The lobbying of the landlords to replace the old rent law and be allowed to ask 
market rate rents was not wholly unsuccessful. Several laws were drafted that 
sought to replace the old rent law, the latest involving a gradual transition to 
higher rent, compensation and eviction to state-provided housing with a rent-to-
own scheme (Cochrane, 2012; Marot, 2014). This law was passed by Parliament but 
sent back for modification by the Constitutional Council. The new rent law does not 
bode well for Beirut’s tenants on old rental contracts, who can usually not afford to 
pay higher rents. While in the 1970s, leftist parties protected the interests of the 
tenants, today these parties are a lot smaller and suppressed by the neoliberal 
consensus that was formed under Hariri (Makdisi, 1997). A committee to protect 
tenant rights exists, but has yet to succeed in preventing evictions or securing 
alternative housing. On the other hand, one can wonder if a new rent law is going to 
make a difference at all, since property developers are buying up entire buildings 
with tenants included and pay more than the landlord would make if the building 
were rented out at market rates. However, as I will show in the next section, the 
way in which gentrification is happening in Mar Mikhael shows that charging high 
rents can (temporarily) stave off the sale of entire buildings. I will now take a closer 
look at how and why gentrification occurred in Mar Mikhael. 
5 .1.2  Gentrification in Mar Mikhael  
The transformation of Mar Mikhael became first visible when older shops that had 
existed in the area for decades, including car mechanics, light industry and small 
supermarkets, started being replaced by bars, art galleries and restaurants. Having 
lived uphill from the area for two years (in Rmeil), I witnessed the stunning 
transformation first-hand. According to surveys by Ashkarian (2012, 2013), one 
third of all commercial spaces in the areas was new, replacing many older shops, 
and by now this share is certainly even higher. Therefore, gentrification in Mar 
Mikhael became first visible as a commercial transformation, from inexpensive 
shops serving local and Beiruti dwellers to upper middle class and high-end 
boutiques and restaurants targeting young middle class customers and mostly 
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Western foreigners. This does not mean that at the same time no residential 
gentrification was taking place, but I will address this below. The commercial 
gentrification of Mar Mikhael meant that many buildings saw their ground floors 
transformed and renovated but their upper floors remained occupied by the same 
tenants. It could thus be argued that landlords were benefiting from increased 
capitalized ground rent, and the smaller rent gap allowed for the tenants upstairs to 
stay put (for now), albeit often with dire consequences for their quality of life as we 
will see below. The commercial gentrification of Mar Mikhael happened in two 
ways: a “creative” and a nightlife variety. Both types of renewed capital investment 
happened in Mar Mikhael for their own reasons: affordable work space in an 
“authentic”, the presence of service providers for creative activities, the quiet 
setting, the proximity to another nightlife area with unaffordable rents… I will 
explain how and why these forms of commercial gentrification happened in the 
next two sections.  
 
5 .1.2.1  “Creative” gentrification 
The commercial transformation of Mar Mikhael was partly carried out through the 
settlement of young creative entrepreneurs in the neighborhood, which started as 
early as 2005 and peaked in 2010 (GAIA Heritage, 2015). Surveys of these companies 
(GAIA Heritage, 2015; Zouain et al., 2011)147 show that they moved to the 
neighborhood in two waves, the first attracted by the area’s low prices and village-
like characteristics around 2008; and the second attracted by the developing 
cultural and creative industries themselves around 2010-2011. The new boutiques 
replaced many former mechanics and other shops that gave Mar Mikhael its village-
like feel. They paid higher rents than local shops, albeit lower than the bars and 
restaurants (Krijnen, 2015). The settlement of the first creative entrepreneurs 
coincided with the publication of Richard Florida’s (2005) highly influential work on 
the creative class, which was translated into policy kits that would supposedly spur 
economic development in the Global South (see De Beukelaer, 2014). Indeed, in 
Lebanon, institutions such as The British Council and the European Commission 
have taken it upon themselves to promote the “creative economy” as a 
                                                       
147 For the survey in 2011, 35 creative entrepreneurs in Mar Mikhael were identified, of which 26 
completed a questionnaire. Of these, 22 were actual creators, while (some overlapping) four were 
exhibitors of creative work and six provided services to the creators and exhibitors, including 
restaurants. For the second survey in 2014, 71 ACDs were identified, of which 40 completed the survey. 
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development tool. These organizations believe that stimulating the development of 
creative industries in Lebanon would facilitate a transition to, or at least a more 
significant role for, what they term the “knowledge economy”, and transfer 
resources and investments from real estate development and financial services to 
this sector. In this way, young, highly educated people that are currently leaving 
the country in droves would be inclined to stay or tempted to return. A British 
Council-sponsored report stated: ‘The importance of creativity and content in any 
present-day economy presents to Lebanon unique opportunities for growth, 
development and stability. Grasping these opportunities can transform all our 
futures’ (Hill, 2008, p. 15). The Lebanese consultancy company GAIA Heritage, which 
has been the most active in voicing support to and providing research on Mar 
Mikhael’s emerging creative industries, has recently joined an EU-funded project 
that aims at ‘improving the economic and social returns of the Arts, Crafts and 
Design (ACDs)’148 industries (GAIA Heritage, 2015, p. I). ACDs include designers (the 
majority), architects, IT, publicity, communication, agents, specialized bookshops 
and accompanying services such as artisan furniture and “conceptual restaurants”, 
thus going beyond a focus on creative industries to provide support to other types 
of companies as well. For sure, what “creative industries” are and which alleged 
positive effects they actually have remains a topic of dispute (Peck, 2005), but the 
trend had some real effects on the ground and provided legitimacy to creative 
entrepreneurs seeking to start their own businesses.
                                                       
148 The European Union funded project “Mediterranean Cultural Network to Promote Creativity in the 
Arts, Crafts and Design for Communities Regeneration in Historical Cities – MEDNETA” is part of the 
multilateral cross-border cooperation "Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme" of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and of its financing instrument (ENPI). 
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While these creative entrepreneurs were probably were interested in preserving 
the social diversity of the area (Lees et al., 2008), they contributed to creating Mar 
Mikhael’s “hip” image, which helped attract nightlife and provided residential real 
estate developers with an excellent marketing tool (see below). The effect has been 
that the very diversity that made Mar Mikhael attractive to creative entrepreneurs 
is threatened by gentrification (Evans & Shaw, 2004; Peck, 2005). As described in the 
literature (Ley, 2003), they valorized the area before the ‘big fish’ moved in and they 
are now being displaced themselves. The self-proclaimed non-profit Karaj-media 
lab, for example (founded by two expatriate Lebanese designers/artists in 2010), 
stated that it takes a pro-active stance in support of architectural and cultural 
preservation, but has since been forced to relocate due to rent increases (personal 
correspondence, June 24, 2013). Indeed, more than a few venues have indicated that 
they are seeking to relocate their premises because they are being priced out (GAIA 
Heritage, 2015; Rahhal, 2015). However, a few shops on one particular street 
(Pharaon) have also indicated that their landlords collectively decided against 
renting to pubs (Krijnen, 2015; Rahhal, 2015) in order to preserve the character of 
the area. Notwithstanding this, I noticed a newly opened pub on that street during a 
site visit in March 2015. 
The establishment of creative entrepreneurs in Mar Mikhael has therefore led to 
far-reaching changes for its residents, most of which are not positive. They replaced 
shops that served the local population and contributed to rising property values, 
which in turn led to the forced displacement of many residents, as explained below. 
They do not serve local residents as their clients hail mainly from outside Mar 
Mikhael; when asked, Mar Mikhael’s residents rarely stated that they bought things 
from these boutiques; moreover forty-one percent of shops export their products 
abroad, mostly to the Gulf and Europe (GAIA Heritage, 2015). While GAIA seeks to 
promote the preservation of cultural heritage and the arts while activating their 
economic potential (Zouain et al., 2011) and find a balance between residents’ and 
ACDs’ interests (GAIA Heritage, 2015), it seems that shop tenants’ and residents’ 
displacement is inevitable when pursuing this strategy in Mar Mikhael. After all, 
apart from a few spaces that were empty when taken over by these industries, ACDs 
had to settle somewhere and existing tenants thus had to go elsewhere. The 
increase in property prices inevitably impacted prospective residents (exclusionary 
displacement, see Marcuse, 1985), while residents and tenants who were not 
protected by rent controls faced rent increases (Lee, 2009). 
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5.1.2.2  Nightlife gentrification 
Subsequent to the settlement of creative entrepreneurs, the establishment of 
countless bars and restaurants all around the neighborhood arguably had a much 
larger impact on the area. They were attracted by its trendy image following the 
establishment of creative entrepreneurs but also by the lower rental prices that 
were unavailable in the neighboring saturated Gemmayzeh-area and the 
“authentic” charm of old buildings that by that time were being sold and/or 
demolished in high tempo in other areas of Beirut popular with investors (Rahhal, 
2014a). The area’s trendy image, the competitive prices for drinks the bars could 
offer due to low rental prices and the wide two-way road that provided a relief from 
traffic-choked one-way Gemmayzeh quickly attracted many investors who could 
count on a large clientele (GAIA Heritage, 2015). The lack of enforcement by 
municipal authorities allowed bars to encroach on public sidewalks with seating 
areas, enlarging their revenues. Moreover, reportedly many of them operated 
without the proper licenses, bribing officials or working under a restaurant permit, 
because the municipality refused to provide permits to pubs in residential areas 
(Lee, 2009).149  
These bars once again replaced many older shops, whose tenants were forced to 
relocate when landlords increased the rent or gave them a month’s notice to leave 
(Rahhal, 2015). While one mukhtar stated that ‘with all this increased activity, there 
is more employment’ (quoted in Salem, 2010), and being able to rent their place out 
to a bar is a financial windfall for some shop owners (one says he was trying to get 
US$150,000 in rent yearly for his shop, another one rented out two of his garages to 
restaurants150), interviews have made clear that shop tenants hardly benefit from 
the opening of these establishments; often the opposite is the case as they are 
threatened by rent increases, loss of clientele and eviction with insufficient 
compensation in the case of old rents, and consequently lose their livelihood. Rents 
paid by these older shops vary greatly: tenants have named US$4,000 a year151 to 
US$4,000 a month, even on rent-controlled contracts (Krijnen, 2015). One tenant 
said he would receive US$99,000, which does not buy him a new shop and does not 
last long with the high rents in place. Another one stated that he would need US$1 
                                                       
149 Confirmed by interviews with residents, October 15, 2014. 
150 Interview with garage owner, October 15, 2014, see also Rahhal (2015) 
151 Interviews with shop tenants, October 15, 2014. 
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million to be able to find a new place and cannot afford anything on the same street. 
One mini market pays US$1,200 a month on a new rental contract and faces a rent 
increase of thirty percent every three years. Currently, the tenant is able to pay the 
rent because he stays open late at night in order to serve pub dwellers (which have 
flooded the area, as I will explain below). He was not sure about being able to meet 
his obligations at the time of the next rent increase. A hair dresser claimed that he 
had lost 700-900 clients in the past decade (all examples from Krijnen, 2015).  
Meanwhile, the increase in pubs and restaurants has been enormous, considering 
the area is not that large. In 2011, fifty new businesses opened, in 2013, twenty-six 
(GAIA Heritage, 2015). Apart from the rent increases and displacement these new 
places engender, their activities have not missed their effect on the inhabitants of 
the area. People complain that noisy bar dwellers occupy the sidewalks until the 
early morning, keeping residents awake; restaurants take over their backyards, 
destroying old gardens;152 parking spaces and sidewalks are appropriated; shops 
that they used to frequent are closing and continuously replaced with new venues. 
Their doorways are littered with garbage and vomit in the morning and bins are 
constantly overflowing, attracting stray dogs and cats (complaints are recorded in 
interviews with residents as well as in Ashkarian, 2012, 2013; GAIA Heritage, 2015).  
The pubs pay very high rents: fees were around US$200 per square meter in 2011, 
tripling to US$600-700 in 2014 on the main street and surpassing this in 2015 (“Et si 
Mar Mikhaël passait de mode!?,” 2015; Rahhal, 2014a). This means monthly rent for 
bars is at least around US$5-6,000, as residents confirmed.153 While a terrible 
nuisance for residents, bars, like ACDs, might have contributed to slowing 
residential gentrification processes in Mar Mikhael because many of them occupy 
the ground floors of rent-controlled buildings, making a landlord less pressured to 
sell to a developer. Considering the size of the rent gap and the temporary 
character of nightlife trends in Beirut more generally, however, it is unlikely that 
this “fix” will last forever (Rahhal, 2015). Indeed, due to the finicky nature of 
nightlife trends in Beirut more generally and the escalating rental prices in Mar 
Mikhael specifically, a new area in Beirut is being targeted for nightlife. Badaro, to 
the Southeast, has seen a flurry of pubs opening in 2014 and 2015 to the dismay of 
residents (Rahhal, 2014b).154 This means that the nightlife scene in Mar Mikhael 
                                                       
152 The 3inab restaurant cut down a 100-year old avocado tree, according to one of my interviewees, June 
24, 2013, although avocado trees are not known to live this long. 
153 Interviews with residents of Mar Mikhael, October 15, 2014. 
154 One disgruntled resident complained on Facebook: “So it's not enough we have to tolerate drunkards 
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might slow down soon and the consequences for its residents, after their landlords 
lose this lucrative rental business, are potentially dire. While they would enjoy a 
restored night’s rest, real estate developers are on the lookout to cash in on the 
(newly opened) rent gap. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
all night, puke on our doorsteps in the morning, parking valets and the impossibility of parking in our 
own street, the Badaro Merchant association apparently has just decreed a car free Sunday so that they 
bring in as much noise and annoyance because FUCK the residents as long as they can hype the street 
and make more money on stupid shop rents...” Later he commented: “I can sleep through shelling, 
bombs and firework...it's the drunken Haaaappyyy biiirthday tooo yooouuuuu that get to me.” His friend 
commented: “God be with you, everyone I know is also complaining.” (posted May 27, 2015. I chose to not 
name this resident). 
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Figure 17-New venues in Mar Mikhael (creative industries and nightlife). All photos 
taken between 2010 and 2015. 
The influx of creative entrepreneurs, bars and restaurants has been visualized in 
the map below (Map 5), which compares two surveys that I conducted in 2011 and 
2013. It also shows new real estate projects that are being executed in the area, to 
which I will turn below. Below this map, a graphic by business magazine Executive 
shows the bars and restaurants in 2014 shows the large number of these kinds of 
businesses operating in Mar Mikhael. 
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Map 6-Cafes and restaurants in Mar Mikhael, March 27, 2014. © Executive, 
www.executive-magazine.com/buzz/mar-mikhael-map. 
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5.1.2.3  Residential  gentrification 
The renting out of buildings’ ground floors to pubs or ACDs has possibly protected 
some of them from being sold to real estate developers when the area initially 
became popular with investors. Selling buildings with tenants included is a popular 
practice in areas experiencing reinvestment. Sometimes, owners initiate the 
eviction of tenants through winkling practices (bribery and harassment practices to 
evict tenants, see Lees et al., 2008, p. 14), such as the tagging of buildings, warning 
of their possible collapse and obtaining a notice from the municipality for eviction 
and cutting off services (Bekdache, 2015 forthcoming). Once a building is sold and 
the tenants have been evicted, it is usually demolished. The existing high 
exploitation ratios via zoning and building laws coupled with sufficient demand 
from the Lebanese diaspora means that enormous profits can be made by 
demolishing older, three-to-six-floor buildings and replacing them with twenty- to 
forty-story high rises. This is even more so given the relatively low costs of 
construction and the abundance of cheap labor power provided by Syrian migrant 
workers, which has become even cheaper due to the massive influx of Syrian 
refugees during the past four years. 
 
Figure 18-The Skyline tower, a project by Al Mawarid Real Estate, a twenty-four-floor 
residential tower designed by Bernard Khoury, completed in July 2014. 
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As field findings indicate, this is happening increasingly often in Mar Mikhael as 
well. Allegedly, real estate developers followed in the footsteps of the creative 
entrepreneurs (Zouain et al., 2011), but in fact many developers bought their plots 
at the same time as creative entrepreneurs were moving in. Developers certainly 
were attracted by the relatively low prices of land in Mar Mikhael compared to the 
rest of the city, but also knew that they could cash in on the area’s trendy image, as 
I will show below with some examples of projects below. Generally, developers 
bought several lots, merged them, evicted existing tenants (residential and 
commercial) and demolished the old structures, in order to be able to build a 
residential high rise.155 Several tenants reported that their buildings had been sold 
and compensation was being negotiated. For example, one older lady told me that 
she needs to leave the apartment she and her husband share on the fourth floor of 
an old building, because it has been sold to a developer.156 The building has been 
emptied of other tenants and is in very bad shape: leaking ceilings, peeling paint... 
She said she would need US$2-400,000 in order to find a new apartment, even 
outside Beirut. Her husband has temporary work and they will never meet the 
minimum income requirement needed for a subsidized mortgage (see Chapter  3). 
Therefore, they will probably move to their mountain house. Their entire social 
network and access to services as well as employment will be cut off.157 Indeed, 
residential displacement means that the thirty-nine percent of inhabitants who 
work in the area (GAIA Heritage, 2015) will have to start commuting to work from 
the Northern suburbs where they usually relocate158, a difficult task as car 
ownership is low and daily traffic jams on the roads leading to Beirut are severe. 
One older lady was startled one day as a developer “accidentally” knocked a hole in 
her bedroom wall while demolishing the building next door. She had made an 
agreement to move out but had not in fact moved out yet. The developer maintains 
that he did not intend to damage her house. Moreover, those tenants in Mar 
                                                       
155 In the Lebanese building law, a high rise requires a setback because of the building envelope-rule. 
Moreover, if a plot area is at least 4,000m2, Article 16 of the building law allows a developer to circumvent 
the maximum height of 50 meters. Through merging lots, a procedure called ‘damm w farz’, a developer 
can obtain the needed lot size. 
156 One shop owner told me the building was sold to the same developer that is doing the AYA-tower, 
discussed below, but I have not been able to verify this as other people contradicted this. 
157 Interview with a resident on a rent-controlled contract, October 15, 2014. 
158 Interviews with residents, October 15, 2014. 
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Mikhael who are not protected by rent controls have faced direct displacement 
through enormous rent increases (Lee, 2009).159 
 
Figure 19-Left: a building sold for US$12 million; top right: the building whose left wall 
was knocked out; other pictures: a well-maintained owner-occupied 
apartment in an old building.  
When evicted, displacees usually have no other choice than to move to the 
periphery of the city, into politically segregated neighborhoods that first emerged 
during the mass displacement of the civil war (see Chapter  2, section 2.1.3.4). These 
areas are characterized by sectarian homogeneity and sometimes under the control 
                                                       
159 Confirmed by interviews with residents, October 15, 2014. 
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of political parties (Bou Akar, 2005). Most rent-controlled clusters from which 
people are being evicted were among some of the last remaining diverse sections in 
the city (Bekdache, 2015 forthcoming)160 and in this way gentrification in Beirut 
contributes to sectarian segregation as well. As residents are being directly 
displaced, the remaining inhabitants experience increasing displacement pressure 
(Marcuse, 1985) and sociocultural displacement (Davidson & Lees, 2005): the area 
changes beyond recognition, shops close and social networks fall apart. Half of the 
residents have been living in the area for over thirty years, forty percent was born 
there and the majority spends all their free time in the area. This deep rootedness, 
together with high rates of unemployment and old age, makes these residents 
especially vulnerable to changes (GAIA Heritage, 2015). One lady told me that her 
neighbors “almost died having to leave their house that they had been living in for 
generations.”161 A repair shop owner told me that his client decided to have a coffee 
next-door in a new bar while waiting for his repairs, and returned in shock: “What 
is this? I pay you twenty dollars, and I just paid them twenty dollars too!”162 The 
distinctly Armenian character of the area is under threat as well. A Lebanese-
Armenian friend wrote: “How do we know that gentrification is “destroying” Mar 
Mikhael? Well, today when our march for the 98th commemoration of the 
Armenian genocide passed through Mar Mikhael, shops owned by Lebanese-
Armenians were closed, shops that have been owned by Lebanese who have been 
living with the Lebanese-Armenians for a long time in Mar Mikhael were also 
closed. However, many of the new trendy places do not seem to care: Chez Sophie 
and 3enab for example: shame on you!” (Kevork Baboyan on Facebook, 24 April 
2013). Of course, the fact that large numbers of residents’ children have emigrated 
abroad for work has always meant that a certain social rupture was going to take 
place in the area, now that over a third of residents are between fifty-five and 
seventy years old (GAIA Heritage, 2015). But even if their children would want to, 
they usually cannot afford to return as prices are too high (Davidson & Lees, 2010; 
Marcuse, 1985). 
                                                       
160 Public Works Studio, a research and design studio run by Nadine Bekdache and Abir Saksouk, has been 
running a project called “Narrating Beirut through its Tenants’ Stories”, where people’s experiences with 
gentrification and displacement are heard during several events focusing on different neighborhoods. 
For more information, see publicworksstudio.com. 
161 Interview with a resident in a renovated owner-occupied apartment, October 17. 2014. 
162 Interview with a shop tenant, October 15, 2014. 
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The (threat of) displacement has thus far not engaged Mar Mikhael’s neighborhood 
representatives to come to residents’ defense to preserve the character of the area. 
In fact, a mukhtar is quoted as welcoming the transformation of the neighborhood: 
‘You have owners who are getting the opportunity of a lifetime when developers 
come pay them big money to buy their land to build a tower’ (Salem, 2010). 
Moreover, there is no overlapping structure in which Mar Mikhael’s 20,000 
residents come together on a neighborhood level (Ashkarian, 2012). While there are 
two main political parties in the neighborhood (the Armenian majority is generally 
aligned with the Tachnag party; the Maronite minority generally identifies itself 
with the Phalange) and the Mar Mikhael church parish brings together a large group 
of people, no larger representative organizations or committees exist. There are 
twelve neighborhood political leaders, the mukhatir (singular: mukhtar) but they 
often work alone, although they have good connections with members of the 
municipality.  
It should be noted that, on top of the pressures of real estate development and 
commercial activity, the neighborhood’s morphology and residents are also 
threatened by a projected highway. This highway was planned in the 1960s and 
threatens fifty-eight heritage buildings, of which a substantial part has already been 
expropriated, and 8,000 m2 of gardens (Atallah, 2014). Together with other 
organizations, SBH is fighting these plans in a civil society coalition that has so far 
managed to halt construction, but has not obtained any guarantees that its 
alternative plan will be accepted. The municipality and the CDR want to carry out 
the works as planned, and prices around the projected highway trajectory have 
already risen sharply. In fact, developers bought some properties speculating on the 
increased values. More research is needed to understand how exactly this affected 
gentrification in the area.  
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Figure 20-The impact of the Fouad Boutros highway. © Antoine Atallah, Robert Saliba, 
Alex Nicolas, Save Beirut Heritage (Atallah,  2014) . Picture of sign 
announcing the highway taken by author, March 2015. 
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Figure 21-The garden and houses of the Tobagi family threatened by the planned new 
highway. Picture taken April 7, 2011 
5.1.2.3.1 AYA 
To illustrate how process of residential gentrification in Mar Mikhael actually took 
place, I will discuss the first large-scale real estate project in the area, namely the 
AYA-tower. I elaborate on the way in which the developer marketed the 
neighborhood to prospective buyers and how space was cleared for the project. The 
AYA-tower is developed by HAR Properties (est. 2009), one of whose founders and 
major shareholders is the son of former Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri, Fahed el-
Hariri. Forbes estimated his inherited fortune at US$1.4 billion in 2010.163 He heads 
Oger Dubai, established in 2005, an offshoot of his late father’s construction 
company Saudi Oger, established in 1978, and is head of the latter’s property 
portfolio and a major shareholder.164 He studied architecture in Paris and has the 
ambition to be an “aware developer” who adds “a theatrical dimension to the public 
spaces” he seeks to create. He hopes to “participate in the definition of modernity” 
                                                       
163 www.forbes.com/lists/2010/10/billionaires-2010_Fahd-Hariri_F5B7.html, accessed January 2, 2013. 
164 According to the Zawya database record on the company, retrieved December 23, 2011 from 
www.zawya.com, and Ashby, 2009. 
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(quoted in Ashby, 2009) and the AYA-tower is one of the projects that contribute to 
this objective:  it has an open area that supposedly creates a public space (see Figure 
22). HAR Properties sought to “create a thin tall building that cannot be seen from 
anywhere, it’s where the street turns, so you won’t see it. (…) The idea was to not 
have a big impact’ and ‘not [to be] intrusive”165 (“City Sculptor,” 2014). Of course, 
the intention of not being intrusive is almost comically unbelievable when one sees 
a twenty-floor, US$30 million (Salem, 2010; Zawya database166), upper-end high rise 
being constructed in a low-rise lower middle class area, with apartment prices from 
US$3,000 to US$4,200/m2167 and facilities like a gym and a swimming pool. This 
rhetoric of low impact is however part of HAR’s marketing ploy, where the building 
had to be marketed as a special design in a unique area in order to attract buyers. 
The project was launched at Beirut Art Center in 2010 and is marketed on HAR 
Properties’ website168 as “low-cost” housing in a once-forgotten neighborhood full 
of architectural charm and potential (see also an interview in Ekaruna, 2010). The 
developer represents workers and residents of Mar Mikhael as elements of 
authenticity that can be interacted with in order to experience the “real” Beirut, 
the built environment ‘a place where arched doorways, romantic stairways and 
sepia shutters recall the true essence of Beirut’ (developer, quoted in Salem, 2010).  
At the same time he provides the comforting knowledge that the area is full of 
trendy bars: 
‘Suddenly, you became the next door grocer’s best confident. He’s telling you 
everything about his sciatica, or about the last twists and plots in his son’s 
life, and your new friend won’t forget to show you the pictures of his two 
other kids, that he’s so proud of. Then, you stop by the hairdresser, where 
you play tawlat zahr (backgammon) with his friends. In the meantime you 
start to love Turkish coffe [sic] and narguile, and you also understand basics 
[sic] of Armenian language. At the bend in the path you stop by the EM Chill 
to have a drink and watch the boiling underground arts scene which is 
leaving Gemmayze and Monnot for Bourj Hammoud and Gouraud.’ ‘Let’s try 
                                                       
165 Interview with one of the partners in HAR Properties, December 13, 2011. 
166 www.zawya.com 
167 Interview with one of the partners in HAR Properties, December 13, 2012. 
168 www.har-properties.com 
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this life surroundings full of surprises and oddness’ (from HAR Properties 
website169).  
 
Figure 22-AYA © HAR Properties. 
Hence, the developer is trying to attract a certain class of buyers that is interested 
in experiencing “authentic” elements of Lebanese life or at least live in areas where 
these elements, supposedly lost elsewhere in Beirut, can still be found, and who is 
looking for an unusual design in a trendy place: “All our clients are aware of 
architecture, they like nice things, they’re not people who can buy in any classic 
building.”170 The advertising agency for HAR Properties told me that they have lists 
                                                       
169 har-properties.com/en/our_latest_news/Experiencing_Mar_Mikhaël. Accessed December 30, 2012. 
170 Interview with one of the partners of HAR Properties, December 13, 2012. 
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of people that they buy from a company, who obtains these lists from an unknown 
location: “So I say I want A-class people, architects, engineers that earn in this and 
that area, 3000 dollars and above.” These people are invited to the launch of the 
project. “Were not interested in someone who makes 1000 dollars month.”171 The 
developer is adamant that he does not sell to speculators (Salem, 2010; P. Tabet, 
2010): clients are “one hundred percent Lebanese, but about half of them are living 
abroad, in Europe, Dubai, Qatar…” When looking at sales numbers (HAR has sold 
about seventy percent of planned apartments at the time of writing172) the 
developer certainly succeeded in attracting buyers.  
The way in which the project was marketed masked its true impact on the area, 
which was significant in several ways. First, it replaced existing shops and 
residences, displacing the tenants. The lots on which the project is being 
constructed173 contained before their eviction174 eight shops, a bakery, two mini-
markets and fourteen one-bedroom apartments. Salem (2010) reports that eight 
(mostly commercial) tenants on rent-controlled contracts remained175 and were 
paid a total of US$900,000 to leave. Second, it destroyed a significant amount of 
architectural heritage, including an old modernist cinema, drawing protests from 
local heritage preservation groups (Sikimic, 2010). The developer claims to be 
interested in heritage preservation176 and that he wanted to preserve the existing 
structures (Ashby, 2009) but that it was not financially feasible and that the 
architectural value of the cinema was not that great.177 However, after the Minister 
                                                       
171 Interview with director of ad agency, December 10, 2013. 
172 According to the developer’s website: www.har-
properties.com/en/desc_projects/Aya_Beirut_Mar_Mikhael/plans 
173As evidenced by a Cadastral record requested on December 15, 2011, HAR Properties bought lots 633, 
containing three buildings, and 1159, containing the cinema, on September 8, 2009 and merged them. 
174 No exact date is given at the description on the record, however the entry is made between two events 
recorded in 2008 and 2009. 
175  Confirmed in an interview, December 13, 2012. 
176har-properties.com/en/our_latest_news/solution%20preserve%20Beiruts%20architectural%20 
heritage. Accessed December 12, 2011. The solution entails the designation of a high-rise area by the 
Lebanese authorities, to where exploitation rights from low-rise areas can be transported (this is also 
referred to as ‘air rights’). In order to be attractive to developers, the prices per built-up square meter in 
the area should be higher than elsewhere.  
177 Interview with one of the partners of HAR Properties, December 13, 2012. 
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of Culture intervened, the developer was ordered to preserve the façade of one of 
the old buildings.178 
 
Figure 23-Protest March organized by citizens' group Save Beirut Heritage, September 
2011. 
 
Figure 24-An old and new render clearly show that the developer did not intend to 
preserve the façade of the old building © HAR Properties. 
                                                       
178 According to an interview with one of the partners of HAR Properties, the developer of AYA, by MK on 
December 13, 2011. In the original renders of the project, no such preservation can be seen. 
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Figure 25-Demolitions on the AYA-site (pictures taken in April 2010 and April 2011). 
5.1.2.3.2 BoBo 
Another project currently under development in Mar Mikhael is “BoBo”. BoBo is 
being developed by the Zardman-company, and consists of an eleven-floor 
residential-commercial building with luxury apartments starting at US$3,300 per 
square meter, ranging from 200 to 350 m2 with a 425m2 penthouse and 108m2 roof 
garden. Even more clearly than in the case of AYA, the project aims to sell its 
apartments using an unconventional design and Mar Mikhael’s trendy image. 
“BoBo” stands for bohemian-bourgeois, the Francophone equivalent of “hipster”. 
‘BoBo project is the new luxurious, residential estate; located in the new hotspot of 
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Beirut, Mar Mikhael, combining a luxurious lifestyle with a non-stop lifestyle.’179 
And this strategy was extremely successful: the project, designed by SOMA 
Architects, a New York-based firm that was founded by Lebanese-born Michel 
Abboud, was sold out in half an hour during its launch in February 2011.  
 
 
Figure 26-BoBo © Zardman. 
Once again, the project impacted the area in several ways. Its original design did not 
include the old building, because its preservation did not make sense in a 
framework where the rent gap was so large. Activists lobbied and managed to get an 
order from then-Minister of Culture Warde that forced the developer to preserve 
the façade.180 However, the large number of floors added will naturally have an 
impact on the area. Moreover, graffiti has appeared on the site that protests the 
class nature of the transformation and accuses the government of being complicit 
in the destruction of Beirut’s urban and social fabric. 
                                                       
179 From Zardmans Facebook-page: www.facebook.com/zardman/?fref=ts. 
180 See the debate on the Skyscrapercity Forum, www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread 
.php?t=653138&page=3. 
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Figure 27- The site of BoBo: to the left the building before it was demolished; to the right 
the preservation of façade is visible, with graffiti protesting the development 
(including “country of thieves”). Pictures taken in December 2011 and March 
2015. 
Besides the hip and trendy character of the area, developers have noted in 
interviews that some clients prefer Mar Mikhael because of its allegedly non-
sectarian character. Political flagging is mostly absent, except for Armenian 
banners calling for the recognition of the genocide by Turkey. Of course, since the 
majority of residents is Christian, the area is in reality far from non-sectarian. 
However, the impression of a non-sectarian area can be explained by the large 
amount of Armenian inhabitants, a group that stuck together during the civil war 
and did not get involved much. 
This section of the chapter has shown how the area of Mar Mikhael has significantly 
transformed in recent years. One of the main conditions for this transformation was 
the rent gap, which became quite large following the disinvestment in the area due 
to old rental contracts and high potential built-up area that was allowed by 
Lebanese law. The subsequent gentrification of this area started when a group of 
creative entrepreneurs, followed by bars and restaurants, moved in because of 
lower prices and other attractive conditions. At the same time, some developers 
decided to invest in the area and use its increasingly trendy yet authentic and 
moreover sectarian neutral image to successfully sell their projects. These 
gentrification processes led to far-reaching transformations in the area and various 
forms of displacement for its residents. While the high rents charged by landlords 
might have temporarily staved off the sale of some buildings to developers, the slow 
saturation of the bar scene means that more landlords will be tempted to sell their 
buildings and cash in on the high potential capitalized ground rent that developers 
are willing to pay for. I will now move on to discuss the area of Zokak el-Blat and 
point to the way in which the heritage protection framework has contributed to the 
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rent gap, as well as how the area’s transformation was made possible due to its 
location near Downtown Beirut and influenced by the legacy of conflict. The case of 
Zokak el-Blat will help the reader understand just how differently gentrification 
processes can play out across Beirut.  
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5 .2  Zokak el-Blat 
 
Map 7-Zokak el-Blat. By MAJAL © 
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In contrast to Mar Mikhael, the case of Zokak el-Blat illustrates processes of new-
build residential gentrification that are, thus far, unaccompanied by commercial 
changes. Located southwest of Downtown Beirut, Zokak el-Blat was one of the first 
areas to develop outside Beirut’s city walls, urbanized by a merchant elite that 
owned businesses in the city center and built their residences there (Mollenhauer, 
2005). When Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt occupied the region (1831-1840), he paved the 
street leading from Downtown towards the Southeastern hill, giving Zokak el-Blat 
(‘the paved alley’) its name. Powerful local and foreign families such as the 
Pharaons, Dassoums, Farjallahs, Soussas, Yamouts and Mezhers resided there, and 
writers, diplomats, professors and presidents alike have called the area home. Zokak 
el-Blat was a central locus of the so-called Arab Renaissance (an-Nahda), famous for 
its cultural and sectarian diversity and vivacity (Mollenhauer, 2005). 
During the 1920s, port workers, mostly migrants from rural areas in the south 
that were newly integrated into the state of Greater Lebanon and Kurds fleeing 
prosecution in Anatolia, took up residence in the area, leading to densification. 
Subsequent new building laws led to the demolition of many old Ottoman palaces 
and villas, to be replaced with apartment buildings up to eight stories with shops on 
the ground floor. Middle class families relocated to quieter suburbs. By 1945, forty-
five percent of existing buildings had been demolished. Additionally, infrastructural 
projects during the 1960s cut main highways through Zokak el-Blat (Fouad Chehab 
and the airport road), involving the demolition of more than fifty houses 
(Bodenstein, 2005). Here we see that, to a far greater extent than in Mar Mikhael, 
far-reaching urban transformation had already impacted the area during the 
French Mandate and post-Independence period, with an outflow of the middle 
classes towards the suburbs and a poorer segment of the population moving in. The 
presence of a poorer population and main arteries cutting through the area would 
have consequences for how it gentrified, as we will see. 
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Figure 28-Zokak el-Blat. Pictures taken between 2010 and 2013, bottom row pictures © 
Sietske Gadema 2010 (sietske-in-beiroet.blogspot.be/2009/10/friendly-
neighborhood-walk-zokak-el.html). 
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Figure 29-Destruction of the urban fabric in Zokak el-Blat during the 1960s, to make way 
for the Fouad Chehab highway. 
Before 1960, most inhabitants worked in trade and services in the city center and in 
the port. In 1958, the escalating conflict between Arab nationalists and Lebanese 
conservatives led to the first civil war and resulting migration wave from the area 
(Hanssen, 2005b). Afterwards, work opportunities in Beirut attracted an increasing 
number of migrants, mostly Shiites from rural areas who had been displaced by 
Israeli invasions and the debilitating poverty of the neglected Lebanese regions. 
From 1975, the Civil War and the consequent division of Beirut into a mainly 
Muslim and mainly Christian half led to the relocation of most Christian and Sunni 
elite families to other areas of Beirut or Lebanon. It is estimated that around 50,000 
Christians left the area after 1984. The Armenian inhabitants of Zokak el-Blat 
attempted to remain neutral during the war and have hence succeeded in 
preserving most of their institutions. A large, mainly Shiite, refugee population 
from the South moved in, often squatting in the abandoned mansions (for example: 
the Ziadeh palace was squatted by twenty-one families from the Beit Lif village in 
the south) or renting apartments in newly built ten-to-twelve-story buildings. With 
them came militias that ensured their protection and provided social services 
(Hanssen, 2005b; MAJAL, 2012). Many of these squatters were displaced from the 
Eastern suburbs or the South of Lebanon, and were housed there by militias who 
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opened the abandoned apartments. Here we see that the abandonment of property 
happens somewhat differently from what is discussed by Smith (1979) for the 
United States: in his explanation, which he cautioned was not universal, 
abandonment occurs when disinvestment is complete, after the landlord is unable 
to any longer use the building profitably. In a context like Beirut however, it would 
do well to remember that many buildings were abandoned forcibly because of civil 
conflict and war, long before their property value had a chance to decline or their 
owners had a chance to undermaintain it, and consequently occupied by refugees 
with their own forms of protection. As we will see, this has definitely influenced 
gentrification processes in Zokak el-Blat. 
Post-civil war reconstruction activities extended the existing highways and 
destroyed many buildings in the area’s northern segment, which became part of 
Solidere’s “reconstruction” of Downtown Beirut (see Map 7). What remains of the 
original area is inhabited by poorer people, including some refugee squatters that 
remain to this day. Also, there are pockets of informal housing (Gebhardt, Sack, & 
Bodenstein, 2005) and a high number of schools and other educational institutions 
(MAJAL, 2012), mosques and churches. Two political actors prevail in the area: (1) 
Hezbollah, a major party in Parliament, with a primarily Shiite constituency and 
famous for leading the resistance against the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon 
(1978-2000) and (2) Haraket Amal, a predominantly Shiite party sprung from Imam 
Moussa Sadr’s Movement of the dispossessed in the 1970s. In some areas of Zokak 
el-Blat, flags and banners of either party are visible. Once again, this influenced the 
way gentrification processes ultimately took place in the area. A sufficiently large 
rent gap, due to the many squatted or abandoned buildings and the high potential 
ground rent landowners could profit from by selling their buildings to developers, 
made profitable reinvestment possible. The way in which this reinvestment 
occurred, however, was influenced by how Lebanese state agents attempted to 
change the legal framework pertaining to the protection of heritage. This had an 
impact on the rent gap and subsequent gentrification in Zokak el-Blat because the 
area houses a large number of heritage buildings. 
5 .2.1  Non-protection of architectural heritage and the 
rent gap 
State attempts at safeguarding architectural heritage have in fact sped up the 
transformation of Zokak el-Blat and Beirut. During the 1990s, when Lebanese state 
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institutions ordered several studies on heritage buildings in the pericentral areas of 
Beirut, many owners demolished their properties in order to prevent their 
classification, afraid that once they were listed they would not be able to capture 
the full capitalized ground rent they saw other owners –who sold their properties to 
developers- reap. Heritage protection plans always failed to devise incentives or 
subsidies that would convince owners to invest in their monumental properties, 
instead of illegally demolish or neglect them. Once lists with classified protected 
properties were established therefore, landlords lobbied to get their buildings 
declassified, stating in one letter: ‘we also ask you to preserve the wealth of a large 
portion of the middle class by releasing all the buildings on the list’ (Bekdache, 2015 
forthcoming). The way in which stone represents trapped wealth and becomes an 
obstacle to further accumulation became very clear in this formulation. Landlords 
successfully lobbied to remove about three-quarters of properties from the list 
(Bekdache, 2015 forthcoming; MAJAL, 2012), and more were declassified 
subsequently. While in an exceptional move, the municipality of Beirut acquired the 
childhood home of Lebanese singer Fayrouz and the mansion of Bechara el-Khoury, 
both located in Zokak el-Blat in 2008, so far no renovation project has attempted to 
save the crumbling mansions. More recently, a law was drafted to better protect 
buildings. It allows owners to sell their land development rights in exchange for 
preserving the property. This law has been sitting in parliament since 2007 and has 
not been voted on because of political conflict (Byrns, 2011; MAJAL, 2012) and other 
interests. Meanwhile, Minister of Culture Warde (2009-2011) temporarily froze all 
demolition permits, resulting in the preservation of some façades (as discussed 
above for Mar Mikhael), but his successor has since revoked this measure.  
The few buildings that remain under official protection today (many of which are 
located in Zokak el-Blat) are often subject to illegal demolitions by landlords and 
developers alike.181 The Heneine mansion, a magnificent palace that was placed on 
the World Monument Watchlist for 2016182, recently received a large gaping hole in 
                                                       
181 A case in point is a listed villa in the Gemmayzeh-neighborhood that was protected on paper. Once it 
was emptied of its tenants, developer Zardman committed illegal demolitions in order to prevent a 
forced preservation of the façade. An activist from the Save Beirut Heritage-group (SBH) reports: ‘They 
began demolishing the traditional elements only: indoor and outdoor arcades, they ripped out the 
gorgeous tiles, broke the berkeh [fountain] and opened sewage onto the foundations. We closed the 
sewage pipes ourselves. One of our members actually bribed the illegal demolition workers to stop 
working to buy us time to notify the ministry.’ While the demolition was halted under then-Minister 
Warde, the new Minister gave permission to go ahead. As related by Save Beirut Heritage on the 
Skyscraper City Forum Lebanon on September 15, 2011, see 
www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=653138&page=3. 
182 See blogbaladi.com/the-iconic-heneine-palace-in-beirut-placed-on-the-2016-world-monuments-fund-
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its façade, which the owner claims was accidental but activists suspect was 
intentional.183 The neighboring Akar-palace was largely demolished overnight in 
2011.184 This operation was completely illegal but so far no one has been punished 
for it. Hence, any attempts at preserving what remains of the city’s architectural 
heritage were met with successful lobby efforts by the landlords and developers 
(Fielding-Smith, 2010). 
Therefore, while in certain contexts, classifying buildings officially as 
monuments and protecting them from devalorization can present an incentive to 
gentrification if owners are provided with subsidies or tax breaks for renovation 
(see for example Lees et al., 2008; Lees, 2003), in Beirut, assigning landmark status to 
buildings speeds up their destruction and in that way paves the way for subsequent 
gentrification. However, when developers became interested in investing in the 
area, profiting form the rent gap, not all heritage buildings in Zokak el-Blat were 
sold and demolished. Besides complicated property inheritance patterns, where 
several heirs need to be tracked down that are usually scattered all over the world 
given Lebanese emigration patterns, the fact that many monumental buildings are 
still occupied by refugees who enjoy a certain form of political protection plays a 
role in preserving these buildings as well. The legacy of civil conflict in shaping 
gentrification processes hereby comes to the fore. In the next section, I will zoom in 
on this dimension, while explaining how and why gentrification reached the area 
after the rent gap became sufficiently large. 
5 .2.2  Residential  gentrification and political  parties in 
Zokak el-Blat 
Zokak el-Blat is facing intensive capital investment in its built environment, as 
evidenced by an increase in sales transactions and construction permits, the 
disappearance of empty lots and older buildings (MAJAL, 2012). As elsewhere, a 
developer usually acquires several lots,185 merges them, demolishes existing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
watch-list/ 
183 See www.happyplanetlebanon.com/newsdetails.aspx?Id=608&CatType=1 
184 See savebeirutheritage.org/akar-palace and www.happyplanetlebanon.com/newsdetails.as 
px?Id=608&CatType=1 
185 This is especially so in Zokak el-Blat, where many lots are not large enough to meet the minimum lot 
size for construction: 125 lots in the Patriarchate area (twenty-three percent) do not exceed 100 m2, often 
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structures and constructs a high rise. One such large-scale real estate development 
in Zokak el-Blat is the Jamil Agha/Binadar-project, consisting of three fourteen-
floor towers. According to a Binadar-representative, the 210-250 m2 apartments sell 
for an average of $3,200/m2 and target middle-class buyers, eighty percent 
foreigners or Lebanese expatriates, mostly well-off families living and working in 
Qatar or Dubai. Most apartments sold rapidly, attesting to high demand, while some 
were retained to make a higher profit later. Initially, one tower was planned, but 
due to high demand, three were built.186 
 
Figure 30-Binadar Highland, La Citadelle and Solitaire-towers (picture taken Fall 2010). 
In this way, between 1991 and 2003, buildings up to twelve stories appeared at a rate 
of more than five per year in Zokak el-Blat. Construction peaked between 2006 and 
2008, while a slowdown in 2009 and 2010 can be explained by the temporary 
measure of the Minister of Culture to review all demolition permits since Zokak el-
Blat has so many historic properties. Since then, development has continued apace, 
with the newest projects rising far above twelve floors (see Map 8). Investors 
                                                                                                                                                                     
a consequence of the addition of roads without a comprehensive plan, see MAJAL (2012).  
186Interview with Binadar representative, conducted by MK for MAJAL, September 28, 2010. 
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profited from the area’s proximity to Downtown Beirut, moreover a low-rise part of 
Downtown. They were well aware that buyers would be interested in an apartment 
overlooking the business district and the sea. “It is as if they built it for us to look 
at”, one developer stated.187 Another one said that the price of land can “triple when 
the property overlooks Solidere.”188 Most upper middle class and high-end projects 
there cluster on the edge of Zokak el-Blat, especially bordering the Fouad Chehab 
and airport roads. Currently, 32- and 44-floor towers are under construction on the 
Fouad Chehab highway, walling the neighborhood in. Consequently, prices in the 
area have risen sharply (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 31-Building under construction at the edge of the area on the highway. Picture 
taken December 11, 2013. Since this picture was taken, a 42-floor tower is 
under construction next to this building. 
                                                       
187 Interview conducted for MAJAL, September 30, 2010. 
188 Interview with developer, conducted for MAJAL, September 30, 2010. 
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Map 8-Real estate development and corresponding increase in floor heights in Zokak el-
Blat until 2011 © MAJAL 
 
Figure 32-Real estate prices in Zokak el-Blat. Sources: local broker and developers 
interviews; Lebanon Opportunities (1999-2011)189 
                                                       
189 I have reviewed all issues of the Lebanon Opportunities magazine from 1998 until 2011 and noted land 
and real estate price tables. The tables for Zokak el-Blat were only published for the year 2000. They 
listed prices for several streets in the quarter. I have taken the average of these prices, so when reading 
this one should note that on the bigger roads, prices are much higher. 
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In addition to selling the view of the sea and Downtown, developers have 
successfully managed to attract buyers by pointing towards the area’s proximity to 
major thoroughfares, Downtown, and the entertainment and shopping 
neighborhoods of Hamra and Achrafieh. They knew the area itself did not have a 
very good reputation because of the squatters and lower-income population, so 
building on the edges and emphasizing the proximity of other, more attractive 
areas for upper class residents was a must. One developer summarized it as such: 
“The location of our project is interesting because it is located near Downtown and 
the tunnel to the airport. The surroundings and the people are still poor though.” 190 
Another developer claims that his clients were looking for a high standard of living, 
regardless of the sectarian identity of the area: “They try to break away from 
sectarian boundaries.”191 Developers in Zokak el-Blat have stated that most demand 
comes from Lebanese expatriates, while hardly any developer claims to have sold to 
foreigners. They claim their clients work in white-collar professions and are 
university-educated (MAJAL, 2012). 
However, there are indicators that the presence of Hezbollah and Amal might 
influence locational choices of investors; indeed, interviewees have told me that 
especially in the inner areas, where some smaller-scale real estate projects were 
constructed, developers and most owners were mostly local Shiites who would 
supposedly support these parties.192 Moreover, developers can choose not to acquire 
land in an area with a heavy political presence because the parties might protect 
poor inhabitants or refugee squatters living in heritage buildings from eviction. 
Therefore, some of the most remarkable palaces and mansions in the area that are 
in fact protected on paper remain squatted and supposedly safe from demolition.  
The high prices of land in Zokak el-Blat have pushed up prices for existing 
residents. According to one café owner, local people cannot afford to live in Zokak 
el-Blat anymore and are forced out to the Southern suburbs, whence they face a 
long commute to work.193 An Egyptian worker told me his rent went up from US$300 
                                                       
190 Interview with developer, conducted for MAJAL, September 24, 2010. 
191 Interview with developer, conducted for MAJAL, September 30, 2010. 
192 This is confirmed by the Sheikh of the local Husseiniyeh (a place where Shiites gather for several 
(religious) community activities), in an interview conducted by Hala Moussawi and Jean-Marc Adjizian 
for MAJAL, August 20, 2010. Let it be noted, just to  be clear, that not everyone who is a Shiite necessarily 
supports these parties, nor vice versa. 
193 Interview, October 13, 2014. 
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to US$500 a month and that he was already forced to move once. He said that 
people generally receive US$5,000 as compensation for being displaced.194 It should 
be noted that normally only Lebanese households receive compensation when 
displaced. A representative of Zokak el-Blat’s mukhtar said that people are taking 
two, three jobs in order to afford the rent, and that those who are not on rent-
controlled contracts are forced to move out.195 As woman who owns a hair salon 
said: “I pay US$1,300 a month. We are slowly dying here trying to pay the rent.”196 
Hence, residents are certainly noticing the increase in prices and their displacement 
to sectarian homogeneous areas reinforces the sectarian segregation of the country, 
as in Mar Mikhael (and as observed by Bou Akar, 2005). 
Gentrification in Zokak el-Blat was therefore influenced by the possibilities and 
constraints of reinvestment specific to the area, which were in turn determined by 
its legacies of displacement and civil conflict: investors opted for large projects at 
the edges, but did not invest in nightlife or creative industries because of the area’s 
reputation and presence of powerful political parties, together with the lack of 
available properties that would attract clients and tenants since many old mansions 
were either demolished or squatted. Nightlife was moreover not an option because 
of the dominance of a conservative attitude towards alcohol in the area, an 
orientation that is sustained by the political parties. Moreover, the fact that the vast 
majority of new residents do not actually live in Lebanon for most of the year means 
that they do not have the same influence on changing landscapes of consumption as 
elsewhere (see T. Slater, 2011) and if they do reside in Zokak el-Blat, they probably 
go elsewhere as developers made the accessibility of entertainment areas a selling 
point. A survey carried out by MAJAL (2012) that included all 527 shops in the area, 
found that most were serving local residents and had been around for a long time; 
functions had not changed during the past decade. Contrary to Mar Mikhael, 
therefore, residential gentrification in Zokak el-Blat has not been accompanied by 
commercial changes.  
                                                       
194 Interview, October 13, 2014. This Egyptian worker also noted that the presence of Syrian refugees who 
are desperate for work is forcing him to work for LL5,000 (barely US$4). 
195 Interview, October 13, 2014. 
196 Interview, October 13, 2014. 
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5 .3  Conclusion 
Both case studies of gentrification processes follow the same logic as gentrification 
processes elsewhere: a sufficient rent gap creates the first, necessary condition for 
reinvestment. In both areas, there was a considerable rent gap because of the 
substantial increase in building allowances since these areas were developed and 
because the buildings had suffered from disinvestment for a long time. This rent 
gap became larger due to rent controls, the way in which a legal framework related 
to heritage failed to protect buildings, and the legacies of conflict and displacement 
that shaped the possibilities for reinvestment to occur. The role of the state in 
creating the rent gap and in allowing its exploitation becomes clear here. 
Reinvestment in both areas occurred as a result of different decisions, 
circumstances and ideas: lower prices of land, perceived authenticity, trendiness, a 
convenient location with a view, the presence of political parties and squatters, 
diaspora demand, gentrifiers’ (non-)sectarian preferences… While these dimensions 
do not figure prominently in the literature on gentrification, they need to be 
understood properly in order to provide a more comprehensive explanatory 
framework for gentrification in Beirut. I will return to this in my conclusion, where 
I claim the contributions my findings have made to the study of gentrification and 
the rent gap more generally. 
While this chapter has remained fairly “local”, as it sought to clarify some factors 
that influence the rent gap at the level of individual buildings in Beirut, the 
different ways in which processes of gentrification in Beirut unfold, and how they 
are influenced by context-specific factors, the next chapter will “zoom out” and 
look at how the urban transformation of Beirut creates places out of multiple 
relations and circulating ideas. 
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 6  Creating Soho in Beirut: circulating 
capital and ideas in Corniche en-Nahr 
In Chapter  1, I pointed towards the open sense of space that is needed in order to 
understand a place in its full complexity. Places are always constituted of multiple 
relations that reach beyond their locality (Massey, 2005). As the history of Beirut 
has shown, the city has always been shaped by connections that went beyond its 
immediate boundaries. After the previous chapter discussed the disinvestment and 
subsequent reinvestment of Mar Mikhael and Zokak el-Blat, paying special 
attention to locally specific forces, this chapter will use the case study of Corniche 
en-Nahr, an area at the Eastern edge of the city located just within Beirut’s 
municipal borders, to zoom in on some translocal dimensions that played a role in 
its ongoing transformation into an upper middle class residential enclave. I will 
focus on the ways in which the making of this area constituted a coming together of 
several actors, ideas and capital that reached beyond the immediate boundaries of 
the city but found “friction” there (Tsing, 2005). In order to flesh out these different 
dimensions, I discuss the “Soho Beirut”-development, a cluster of projects whose 
developers not only succeeded in directing capital flows towards their real estate 
projects, but also adopted ideas and referents borrowed from other national and 
regional contexts in order to shape the particular projects they built and the way 
they marketed them. The idea of loft living is sublimely incorporated into their 
narrative. In this way, they treat the area like a tabula rasa without its own history, 
which, as we will see, has a dark side related to the civil war. 
The way in which the Soho-model is referenced is reminiscent of how some cities 
are shaped and reshaped by citing, alluding to or aspiring to other cities as models, 
either as a form of urban makeover or by disciplining urban residents into a new 
way of life. Of course, the making of such new places requires that space for 
redevelopment is available in the first place. The developers chose Corniche en-
Nahr because of its rent gap, and used its industrial character together with the 
increasing presence of art-related spaces to engage in the fantastic construction of 
an imagined future bohemian chic quarter. I will show that the creativity at work in 
designing this area is at the end in the service of a sound capital investment by the 
real estate developers. Even as these developers display real enthusiasm about 
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creating a trendy, lively enclave, in practice the area will closely resemble a gated 
community with conventional upper middle class to high-end apartments (and in 
this way resembles what the original Soho-quarter in New York quickly became 
after real estate developers cashed in on its artistic valuation). Imagining Soho 
helped the developers create a unique and successful product, allowing them to set 
themselves apart from other investors in Corniche en-Nahr who exploited its rent 
gap by constructing conventional high rises instead of quasi industrial loft 
buildings. The extent to which these lofts are “authentic” is of little importance in 
this construction. 
In order to tell this story, I will first introduce the area of Corniche en-Nahr and 
show how and why it developed a considerable rent gap, the first necessary 
condition for capital reinvestment. I also discuss the conditions that led to 
developers’ willingness to consider investing in the area. I then consider the Soho-
case specifically, showing how developers engaged in the construction of a new 
favorable image for the area while glossing over its dark past. Most of these 
developers and their architects drew on ideas they picked up while living abroad in 
order to shape the new space they imagined. In this way, they used the area’s 
industrial character and emerging image as an art hub to connect it to the 
redevelopment of brownfields in the United States and Western Europe and Soho 
Beirut became part of an imagined urban world of loft living. In the process, many 
existing tenants, including the art spaces that helped developers sell their product, 
were displaced or threatened by rent increases. The way in which Corniche en-Nahr 
has transformed points towards the ways in which capital can grip onto circulating 
ideas about urban living, and the large amount of urban inter-referencing that 
these actors employ is part of how Beirut, like most places, is being shaped by ideas, 
actors and capital from elsewhere.  It also points to the role of the municipality in 
allowing for the transformation of this space. 
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 Figure 33-A satellite image of Corniche en-Nahr in 2012. Edited by myself and Dalila 
Ghodbane, Arnaud Thomas © 
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6 .1  Corniche en-Nahr:  a  disinvested space 
Corniche en-Nahr, i.e. the river cornice, lies at the Eastern edge of Beirut’s 
municipal area, next to the densely populated, mostly low-income Bourj Hammoud 
and Naba‘a quarters on the other side of the river. During Lebanon’s short-lived 
industrial boom of the 1940s, many industries settled in the area, feeding off the 
cheap labor that was available in the form of rural migrants living in the informal 
settlements nearby (Fawaz & Peillen, 2003; Frem, 2009; Joreige, 2015). Next to its 
large, overgrown railway yard, with its stacked tracks and abandoned train wagons, 
frantic construction activity is taking place. Towards the south, fields with plastic 
greenhouses growing tomatoes, strawberries and other crops mark the limit of this 
activity, as long as their owners have not sold their land to developers. Real estate 
development in the area has resulted in its transformation from a largely 
industrial/agricultural zone with many empty, privately owned plots into what 
some developers believe will be Soho Beirut197, while others see it merely as a 
natural extension of the built-up area of the city, with residential and commercial 
buildings that resemble those closer to the center. What made the rent gap in 
Corniche en-Nahr large enough in order for developers to consider reinvestment? 
Which conditions contributed to their decision to invest there? 
                                                       
197 Note that Mar Mikhael has been named the “new Soho” of Beirut as well, for example in Salem (2010). 
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Figure 34-Corniche en-Nahr. Pictures taken between April 2010 and December 2013. 
Some pictures © Dalila Ghodbane and Arnaud Thomas, February 2012. 
Corniche en-Nahr was in many ways the logical next place for capital to touch down 
in Beirut. During the French mandate, large amounts of capital were invested in 
infrastructure (the railway station) and industry in the area. These kinds of 
investments in the built environment have a long turnover time (Smith, 1979) but 
were not maintained for various reasons: the post-Independence Lebanese political 
economy disinvested in industry before it became fashionable and the civil war put 
an end to the operation of the railways, which were in decline in any case due to the 
rise of private cars. During the war, the area was abandoned, its few residents 
chased out and used by militias as an execution ground. Postwar, some factories 
resumed business, but the railways were never reinstated and many warehouses 
remained abandoned. What was left was an area with many empty plots, abandoned 
warehouses and a cluster of activities, mostly industrial wholesale (steel, wood, 
concrete, air conditioning installations), car sales (Impex garage) and some offices, 
and, further southwards, an agricultural zone. Investors did not consider it as a site 
of investment; the area was effectively “off the map” for real estate brokers: 
“Before, on this plateau, land was not available, any broker said there is no land.”198 
                                                       
198 Interview with sales agent of the Achrafieh 4748-project, April 30, 2012. 
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For the kinds of upper-middle class to high-end real estate investments that are the 
subject of my investigation, developers were still investing in areas closer to the 
center of Beirut. 
However, around 2008, when a lot of capital became available that was looking 
for spaces to invest in (see Chapter 3) and prices were going up really fast in other 
areas of Beirut where high-end investors had purchased large amounts of plots, 
Corniche en-Nahr became interesting for some developers. In other parts of the 
city, prices had risen to such an extent that construction had become too expensive 
because cheaper apartments would still be available, as one developer explained, 
who was offered a piece of land in high-end Achrafieh for US$3,700,000, which 
would cost him US$3,200/m2 to construct so he would have to sell for US$4,000/m2. 
This was not feasible for him since similar apartments can still be found below that 
price.199 It had become “uneconomic to develop” in some areas, according to the 
CEO of large-scale developer MENA Capital (“Moving times,” 2013). Ground rent had 
increased following the see-sawing movement of capital to these places until it was 
not profitable to develop anymore.  
This is why some developers started looking around for areas with lower prices 
of land. In 2008, a few “pioneers”200 bought the first plots in Corniche en-Nahr, 
profiting from and reinforcing the hype around the area as an up-and-coming arts 
hub and fixing its unfavorable image. They moreover knew that there was an 
oversupply of high-end luxury apartments elsewhere which ensured a growing 
demand for the smaller, more affordable units they were planning to build (Abu-
Nasr, 2013; Bank Audi, 2014b). In just two years’ time, Corniche en-Nahr became a 
wanted place for capital investment. Below, I will trace how exactly this happened 
using the case study of Soho Beirut. 
                                                       
199 Project manager of Achrafieh 4748 project, April 30, 2012. Note that the more built-up area is allowed, 
the more potential development becomes profitable. In order to build high, however, a large plot is 
needed, usually made up of several plots combined. These have become harder to find in more central 
locations. 
200 I am aware of the derogatory meaning of the word pioneer, because it suggests that these places were 
not previously socially inhabited (Smith, 1996, p. xvi) and this is why I use it with quotation marks.  
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6 .2  The making of  Soho Beirut 
Corniche en-Nahr was an area I would occasionally cross to get to Beirut’s weekend 
flea market, Souk al-Ahad. I would take a minibus to what is known locally as the Fiat 
bridge, get off on the highway just before the bridge and walk across the abandoned 
rail yard which I entered through a hole in the fence, all the while hoping that the 
pack of stray dogs that was living in the abandoned train wagons would be in a 
friendly mood. I would pass the industrial area on my right, where the bustling 
activity of the businesses still in operation sharply contrasted with the empty 
warehouses in its midst. In January 2009, the area became a destination for an 
audience that until then did not set foot there, when Beirut Art Center (BAC), a 
privately run art gallery, opened to the public after renovating a former furniture 
factory in the area that they had been eyeing since 2004 and finally managed to 
obtain after tracking down twelve heirs around the world (Joreige, 2015; Khouri, 
2009). I often combined visits to the gallery with a visit to the market. If there was 
an opening in the art center at night, I would make sure to get a ride back with 
someone rather than walking back to the highway to catch a cab, because the area 
was considered unsafe for a woman alone at night (I have occasionally been 
followed by harassers in the area, but the biggest nuisance was private cars trying 
to pick me up on the highway).  
A few months later, I was very surprised to find that one of the plots close to 
Beirut Art Center was being prepared for construction. This was the Artist Lofts 
project, a circular building of eight floors organized around a central core that 
houses a freight elevator, so residents can in principle bring a car up to their 
apartments. “We wanted to make the people dream, but we have also provided 
parking spaces downstairs”, Mark Doumet, one of the developers, said in an 
interview (Boudisseau, 2015). His company LOFT Investments bought the plot for 
US$2,200/m2 (this is compared to around US$10-20,000/m2 in more central areas) 
from a French-Lebanese family in February 2008.201 It was empty and had been out 
of use for over twenty years. The developer wanted to provide a daring project in a 
location that was thus far off limits (hence its slogan “Why join the navy when you 
can be a pirate?”): “I had to go to Corniche en-Nahr. Why? I wanted a virgin place, 
no man’s land, it was kind of a challenge.”202 He chartered famous Lebanese 
                                                       
201 Interview with the developer of Artist and Factory Lofts, April 27, 2012. 
202 Interview with developer of Artist and Factory Lofts, April 27, 2012. 
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architect Bernard Khoury –a Harvard graduate- for the building’s design. 
Reportedly, Khoury told the developer: “I am crazy, but you are crazier.”203 By 
branding and designing the building as “artistic lofts”, the developer cleverly 
played on the area’s image as an emerging creative hub. As Khoury told me: “For 
the developer it was a purely financial move, it was still very affordable and I think 
his project was to have a low incidence on the cost of land, so he was ahead of 
others, so you need a convincing product.”204 This convincing product was the loft-
concept, as the developer sold ninety percent of his 29 units in the building for 
around US$4,000/m2 (compared to US$6,000/m2 in Downtown Beirut in the second 
quarter of 2009, up from US$1,200/m2 in 2004)205, providing a handsome profit since 
he bought the land for almost half of that price. LOFT Investments also acquired a 
warehouse in the same area in 2010 for US$2300/m2 206, and created a trendy venue 
there called Warehouse and Loft. This warehouse is slated for demolition and will be 
replaced with newly built lofts that are to be incorporated into the Soho-project.207 
                                                       
203 Interview with partner of LOFT Investments, April 27, 2012. 
204 Interview with Bernard Khoury, January 21, 2014. 
205 According to the Global Property Guide, found at https://encrypted.google.com/search 
?q=lebanon+land+prices&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&hl= 
en&lr=all, accessed April 1, 2011. 
206 According to the sales contract, obtained December 12, 2013. 
207 Interview with Beirut Art Center director, December 11, 2013; website loftinvestments.com.  Accessed 
June 4, 2014. Initially, another building, designed by Bernard Khoury, was to be constructed there, but 
this was canceled in 2011 (interview Bernard Khoury, January 21, 2014; developer at LOFT Investments, 
April 27, 2012). Another architect has now designed a new building. 
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Figure 35-Artist Lofts. Pictures taken between April 2012 and October 2014. Renders © 
Bernard Khoury. 
For a while, Artist Lofts remained the only project under construction in the 
warehouse-area, until April 2010, when BEAR Property Consultants acquired plot 
4376, next to the Artist Lofts plot. This coincided with the opening of yet another 
modern arts association, Ashkal Alwan, which moved into a warehouse next to Beirut 
Art Center. BEAR planned to construct a project called Factory 4376, a low-rise 
building inspired by New York’s lofts, “a modern interpretation of the industrial loft 
building”, according to the project’s brochure. The land cost US$2,900/m2 and 
belonged to a family formerly active in the steel retail business (that also owned the 
Warehouse and Lofts plot and the plots for the Urban Dreams project, mentioned 
below). They came to the broker themselves because the land and warehouse on it 
was unused and they wanted to sell.208 The developer was interested in buying: “It's 
overcrowded in Achrafieh, they’re fighting for the lands, it's easier to find a land 
here and build it. Prices are lower.”209  
Soon after the land for the Factory 4376-project was bought, another developer, 
HAR Properties (which, to remind the reader, is also building the AYA-tower in Mar 
Mikhael) acquired the neighboring plot. It was already under option with the 
                                                       
208 Interview with the developer of Factory 4376, April 24, 2012. 
209 Interview with sales representative of Factory 4376, April 30, 2012. 
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developers of Factory 4376, who approached HAR.210 HAR’s project, called UPark, 
has a similar design and shares a garden with the adjacent Factory 4376-project. 
They bought the land in August 2010 for an unknown price.211 Across from the 
Factory 4376 and UPark projects, CGI Saradar is building the Urban Dreams project, 
another low-rise residential building built on land bought for US$3,700/m2 in 
October 2010 from a member of the same Fayyad family.212 CGI’s CEO told me that he 
remembered he knew the owner when they planned the project.213 In 2012, they 
merged two lots that they acquired in 2010.214 Hence, within a relatively short time 
period, a cluster of projects with similar designs and densities was under 
construction. 
                                                       
210 Interview with the developer of UPark, December 12, 2013. 
211 Property record of plot 1289, obtained December 9, 2013. I did not get the price from the developer 
and could not obtain the sales contract, nor was there a mortgage on the plot that could help me 
estimate the price. 
212 Property record of plot Achrafieh 4368, obtained December 9, 2013. 
213 Interview with the developer of Urban Dreams, December 4, 2013. 
214 Property record of plot Achrafieh 4368, obtained December 9, 2013. 
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Figure 36-Left: the Urban Dreams and Artist Lofts project. Right: the UPark project and 
interiors of UPark. © Charles Hadife, BEAR Property Consultants. 
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Map 9-The current cluster of Soho-projects. Urban Dreams in red, Artist Lofts in green, 
Factory 4376 in yellow, UPark in blue and Warehouse and Lofts in pink. 
The developers of this cluster of projects teamed up to create a distinctive area 
within the Corniche en-Nahr neighborhood that they decided to call “Soho 
Beirut”215. This would eventually encompass about ten projects, to be completed in 
three phases by the end of 2015 (Boudisseau, 2012a; Sahli, 2013) (this date will not 
                                                       
215 It is impossible to establish which developer came up with the idea first because during interviews, 
different developers claim to have coined the concept; it is hence impossible to establish who came up 
with it first. 
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be made). The Soho-name refers to “South of Houston”, the quarter in New York 
where artists, looking for affordable studio space, moved into disinvested 
warehouses in the formerly industrial area, ‘residentially virgin territory’ (Zukin, 
1982, p. 17), during the 1960s. This fit into a wider “loft-living” trend around New 
York City, where countless warehouse floors were converted into artist lofts. Soon, 
this living concept started to circulate, spreading throughout deindustrialized areas 
of the United States and Western Europe, with Paris for example advertising ‘les 
lofts’ in 1980 (Zukin, 1982). The idea started to have a certain “circulatory capacity” 
(Roy, 2011a). 
The loft-living idea has now found “friction” (Tsing, 2005) in Beirut via its 
Lebanese developer-team (including the architects). One of the few former 
industrial areas in the city, Corniche en-Nahr reminded them of what they had seen 
elsewhere, as dual citizens, expatriates, students or visitors. They cited places in 
Europe and the United States, including of course New York’s SoHo (Dalal, 2013; 
Sahli, 2013), but also formerly industrial areas in London and Paris, as sources of 
inspiration.216 “Beirut Art Center looks like any place in Detroit or LA so let’s take 
those elements that people are used to seeing in the movies. So it was my idea to 
bring those industrial look buildings after spending a few months in New York in 
1993.” 217 “I went to pay a visit to my uncle who lives in Washington DC and I went to 
Baltimore, you know, I spent two days walking in the old port and saw the old 
buildings, and when I came back to Lebanon it was an idea.”218 The brochure of LOFT 
Investments compares its projects to the Meatpacking District of Manhattan. 
Indeed, references about “the good city” ‘circulate not only through the state-
formulated plans but also through the urban aspirations of middle-class 
associations and elite NGOs all seeking to create the good city’ (Roy, 2011c, p. 10).  In 
this case, a couple of developers well connected to trends of urban living elsewhere 
decided to come together and work on the creation of what has to become Soho 
Beirut. I will now zoom in on the details of this project, answering the following 
questions: How exactly did the developers and architects use the loft-living idea in 
their projects? How is the development of Soho Beirut intertwined with the image 
of the area as an emerging art hub? And who is actually buying into these projects? 
                                                       
216 Interview with developer of UPark, December 12, 2013; interview with developer of Urban Dreams, 
December 4, 2013. 
217Interview with the architect of Factory 4376 and UPark, December 9, 2013.  
218 Interview with the developer of Factory 4376, December 4, 2013. Again, it is a bit difficult to establish 
who came up first with the idea of bringing loft-living to Beirut, because most developers and architects 
claim it was them. 
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6.2.1  Architecture and the loft-living concept 
The architectural style of all Soho-projects has been conceptualized with the 
industrial loft living-concept in mind, in the earlier projects stronger than in the 
later ones. LOFT Investments “aims at providing non-typical working/ living lofts 
for the emerging creative scene in Beirut, similar to the artists studios as they were 
known in SOHO in the 1970s”.219 Other developers told me that they tried to give 
their projects the look of former factories:220 “I said I will go to invent a story saying 
that my grandfather used to own a factory here and my father and uncles went to 
university in the US, and they came back and asked the grandfather if they could 
live in it. So the grandfather said OK, and if you look at the picture of the building, 
the first floors are bricks so it’s like the old factory. Then the second generation is a 
more nineties design: it replaces brick by steel and keeps the openings, and then 
transparent houses, the third generation.”221 
                                                       
219 From Loft Investments’ website, see www.loftinvestments.com. 
220 Two of them in fact fought over who had the right to use the term “factory” (interview with developer 
who wishes to stay anonymous, April 2012). 
221 Interview with developer of Factory 4376, April 24, 2012. 
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Figure 37-Factory 4376. © BEAR Property Consultants. 
As is probably clear by now, none of the Soho-projects consists of converting an 
actual warehouse into residential lofts. Instead, all projects are new-build and any 
existing warehouses on the plots (the majority of plots was actually empty) were 
slated for demolition. This was the case for the Factory 4376-project and will be for 
the Warehouse and Lofts-project by LOFT Investments (to be incorporated into 
Soho at a later stage). One of the developers justified this choice as follows: “The 
existing warehouse was not a nice warehouse, no bricks, just concrete.”222 In other 
words, it did not resemble the nineteenth-century industrial brick warehouses that 
were originally the target of loft conversions. Instead, this particular industrial look 
and feel had to be created from scratch, and, as we have seen was incorporated to 
varying degrees. 
                                                       
222 Interview with developer of Factory 4376, April 24, 2012. 
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Besides the new-build character of the loft-buildings, the majority of apartments 
that are constructed do not resemble what is usually considered a loft. The 
“original” lofts that Zukin (1982) describes were characterized by large amounts of 
open space, huge windows, exposed brick walls, wooden floors and cast-iron façades 
(Zukin, 1982, p. 2). Only the Artist Lofts-project, designed by Bernard Khoury, 
retains some of these characteristics, while other developers have applied these 
concepts sparsely: “We have some lofts in the building but it’s not a full loft as done 
by Bernard [Khoury] or other developers. We have two floors with a high ceiling, 
but it’s not the whole project.”223 Others had to listen to their clients: “We put a lot 
of money not to have any concrete pillars inside so you can have a big space. But 
mostly all of our customers kept the three bedrooms. (…) There is only two out of 
thirty that really made it into a real loft. A lot of people don’t want the bricks inside. 
They don’t want a concrete ceiling and they cover it. So in fact it’s… I love old cars 
but I would buy a new one that looks like an old one. It’s logical, if the apartment 
starts at US$700,000 and finishes at US$1 million, if I have kids I have to create a 
livable space for my family. If I was living alone I would have taken another 
apartment. The people that have the purchasing power are well established; they 
need a different type of space. But they accept a lot, they accept that you don’t have 
marble, that the common areas are very rough, purely industrial, the floor is beton, 
everything is beton.”224 Even the architect of the only project that has somewhat 
“lofty” apartments, Artist Lofts, has this to say: “I don’t call them lofts on my 
website, this is a very basic commercial terminology that my client is using. It is 
simplistic marketing terms that I don’t necessarily agree with. These are not lofts, 
they have nothing to do with lofts.” He concedes that they are not conventional 
apartments either, though: the freight elevator is meant so “that you can bring any 
sort of loft-scale object into your apartment” and have “another flair, another field 
into the apartments.” 225 Hence, the loft-elements of the Soho-projects are more of a 
marketing ploy than real architectural features. Instead, the apartments have been 
adapted to the needs of well-off buyers who are perhaps interested in a project that 
looks different, but not in an apartment that feels like a loft. 
                                                       
223 Interview with developer of Urban Dreams, December 4, 2013. 
224 Interview with developer, December 4, 2013. 
225 Interview with the architect, January 21, 2014. I had permission to quote him. 
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6.2.2  Art and Soho Beirut 
All developers have appealed to the area’s image of an emerging art hub, citing the 
opening of art-related institutions as inspiration. “First Beirut Art Center opened 
there. This is how the idea of Soho came, because it was industrial (…), little by little 
it was mixed between an artistic area and an industrial area, this is why the idea 
came.”226 Indeed, as more galleries opened, the media picked up on it and started 
referring to the area as “the post-industrial Jisr El Wati227 creative hub” (R. 
Thornton, 2013) or “SoAd”, signifying the nearby Adlieh roundabout after which 
the neighborhood is named as well (Dalal, 2013) (although in fact it should be called 
“NoAd” since it is located North of Adlieh). Some developers actively tried to 
connect their projects to the artists that supposedly frequent the area: “We will do 
graffiti in the common area of the project. On the site, I left white spaces and ask 
people to come and tag on it.”  
 
Figure 38-The “tagging” spaces left on the boards fencing off the Factory 4376-plot 
(picture taken April 28, 2012). 
                                                       
226 Interview with developer of UPark, October 21, 2014. 
227 Jisr El Wati is another name for the area of Corniche en-Nahr. 
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Other developers conceded that perhaps their projected lofts were not so much 
meant for artists, but that they would support the settlement of creative industries 
in the area: “We would like to put shops there, but not any shops, but galleries, 
restaurants, pubs… And offices, but I mean architects, designers… not artists, 
because you have to have some money for this, but still creative professions.”228 In 
this way, the hip, trendy character of the area, eagerly perpetuated by the media 
(Sahli, 2013), is gratefully latched onto by the developers, who emphasize that 
anyone who wants to be on top of things trendy should invest in an apartment. A 
representative of the developers stated: “it's cool to be among the first owners of 
what will surely become the next SoHo of Beirut” (Dalal, 2013).  
This kind of utilization of an area’s trendy image has been seen in the Mar 
Mikhael-area as well, but in Corniche en-Nahr it is arguably even stronger. Such a 
strategy closely resonates with the literature on the relationship between art and 
gentrification. The cultural capital that artists bring with them when they move 
into a quarter is converted into economic capital by real estate developers (Ley, 
2003, drawing on Bourdieu). In New York’s Soho, developers quickly bought the 
remaining lofts and started renovating them and selling them to wealthy buyers, in 
the process displacing the artists that valorized the area in the first place (Ley, 2003; 
Zukin, 1982). As we have seen, in Soho Beirut the entire process of artists moving 
into abandoned warehouses and subsequent loft conversion has been absent, but 
the establishment of several art centers has definitely brought some cultural capital 
along that was eagerly transformed into economic capital by the developers. The 
institutions that brought this cultural capital are in some cases already threatened 
with eviction. Institutes such as Beirut Art Center and Ashkal Alwan do not own their 
spaces; Ashkal Alwan acquired the use of a factory floor for five years in 2011, a 
donation from the Philippe Jabre Association, whose founder specializes in 
speculative share trading and runs a Geneva-based hedge fund.229 BAC is on a rental 
contract and is aided by the same association as well. The future of these kinds of 
contemporary not-for-profit art spaces is far from certain. At one space I was told, 
on condition of anonymity, that their owner had realized the profitable potential of 
the area and might sell. At the same time, new entertainment venues have opened, 
including the short-lived Solea V club (closed due to high rents in April 2013) and 
Station Beirut, a gallery and club launched in September 2013 by Lebanese-Swiss 
                                                       
228 Interviews with developer of Factory 4376, April 24, 2012 and April 25, 2013. 
229 https://www.dailystar.com.lb/GetArticleBody.aspx?id=305935&fromgoogle=1 
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entrepreneur Nabil Canaan, housed in a former wood factory. Together with the 
real estate activity, which hinders the existing spaces already230, these new spaces 
arguably drive up rental prices more and indirectly threaten the pioneer art spaces. 
Eventually, the continuing development of the area into an expensive residential 
quarter will probably push them out for good.  
 
Figure 39-The Warehouse and Loft-building that will be demolished; in the 
background Station Beirut, opened in 2013. Picture taken in October 2014. 
 
6 .2.3  Selling Soho 
Once the Soho-idea was born, developers actively marketed their product as such, 
as we have seen above. How did they attract buyers and which market segment did 
these belong to? In New York’s SoHo, buying an apartment in these developments 
became a middle class expression of lifestyle, an aesthetic choice. The Lebanese 
developers readily concede that the pricing of their apartments attracts a similar, 
upper-middle class clientele: “The location of this project has been chosen with the 
idea in mind to target and attract open-minded and young urban professionals and 
                                                       
230 Opposite BAC, the aforementioned Warehouse and Lofts-project is going to be under construction 
soon, something that prompted the director of BAC to say she might have to change her opening hours 
because the center would be practically unreachable. Interview with the owner of Beirut Art Center, 
December 11, 2012. 
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artists who wish to have an original living quarter which fits their well-off status, 
while having more freedom and advantages than other common bourgeois areas in 
town” (Dalal, 2013). “A real loft like in New York or something, the people who are 
willing to live in it are artists, and they can’t afford to live in it. It’s the same in the 
whole world.”231 “The description ‘emerging creative scene’ is not very true because 
the emerging creative scene would not afford this kind of property, this was not 
said in a very serious tone. It is either single non-married people, or people with 
one foot abroad, or people without kids. Professionals or business people. There is 
some creatives, but these are quite established in order to afford that.”232 Hence, the 
apartments are aimed at the same kind of public that developers try to attract in 
Mar Mikhael: highly educated professionals who appreciate somewhat of an 
unconventional design. However, in practice, there are indications that quite a 
number of buyers are families (such as the fact that people refuse to leave out 
internal walls in order to have three bedrooms). 
Another indication that perhaps the projects are attracting more “conventional” 
buyers materialized from interviews: Soho Beirut, once the plan has been carried to 
completion, will more closely resemble a gated community than a hip quarter. 
Streets will be closed off and private guards will keep watch: “Actually we would 
like to put security on the entrances to the neighborhoods, on all four streets. It’s 
not the Pentagon, but we have 2,500m2 of gardens, if my daughters are playing, I 
don’t want just anyone to be able to come there.”233 The developers claim that they 
got municipal permission to do this. As soon as the Soho-idea was born, they 
wanted to register the name at the municipality of Beirut and be allowed to 
officially name the area “Soho Beirut”. In exchange for permission to use this name, 
they would carry out all the public and infrastructural works in the area: “The 
Mohafez [governor] of Beirut gave us the authorization to name it Soho Beirut. He 
allows us to create the road, the pavement, lamps, so we create a small 
neighborhood that is unique, in harmony, we got his authorization to make the 
neighborhood as we want.”234 When asked, the engineer in charge of Corniche en-
                                                       
231 Interview with developer of Factory 4376, December 4, 2013. 
232 Interview with the architect of Artist Lofts, January 21, 2014. 
233 Interview with developer, April 2013. 
234 Several interviews have been held with the Soho-developers, as well as email exchanges and phone 
calls requesting updates on the project. At the time of writing (Fall 2015), nothing official has been 
guaranteed and a brochure that was supposed to present all the projects together as Soho Beirut has still 
not been produced. The developers of the four projects accused the others of not being fast enough and 
sometimes even asked me to convey a message to the others. 
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Nahr at the municipality of Beirut was unaware of the plans, and said that the city 
council should decide on naming matters, not the Mohafez.235 This points to a long-
existing institutional problem in Beirut: the (appointed) governor has executive, 
powers and the mayor and (elected) city council take decisions that the governor 
has executive power to implement.236 The law is not very clear on the exact 
jurisdictions of each authority, leading to conflicts on a regular basis237, even more 
so because they often belong to different political blocks in Lebanon  (March 8 and 
March 14). Despite persistent attempts, I have not been able to speak to the Mohafez 
himself about this matter (it should be noted that a new Mohafez has been appointed 
since May 2014), so I will assume that the plan to landscape the streets, provide 
infrastructure and lighting, and close them off with private security guards at the 
entrances is real. It has been confirmed by three developers, an architect, an article 
(Sahli, 2013) and an ad agency working for HAR Properties. The privatization of 
public space by private parties fits into a longer tradition in Beirut, such as working 
on the public domain in exchange for a building permit or privatizing public spaces 
with security measures (Fawaz, Harb, & Gharbieh, 2012; Ghodbane, 2012). In this 
way, the developers’ role in infrastructure provision and landscaping mirrors that 
of political parties in low-income formal and informal settlements, who also step in 
to provide these services where municipal authorities do not (Bou Akar, 2005; 
Fawaz, 2004). 
The concern to close oneself off from the outside also goes back to the civil war, 
when residents would close off their streets at night to prevent militiamen from 
entering (Sarkis, 1993, p. 120). It perhaps betrays a sense of unsafety that goes back 
to the lingering legacy of the area as a no-go zone during the war, its postwar shady 
reputation238 together with the bad reputation of the flea market nearby (for more 
on that market, see Krijnen & Pelgrim, 2014). Besides emphasizing its unique 
qualities as an art hub therefore, developers “normalize” the area by highlighting 
that it is located within the municipal boundaries of Beirut, in the Cadastral area of 
                                                       
235 Engineer at municipality, December 10, 2013. This was confirmed by an architect at the main 
municipal building in Downtown Beirut, December 13, 2013. 
236 This dual structure exists because the borders of the city of Beirut are the same as the borders of the 
governorate Beirut.  
237 Interview with vice-president of the municipal council, October 14, 2014. 
238 Interview with the director of Beirut Art Center, December 11, 2013. 
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Achrafieh, a name that is usually associated with the upmarket neighborhood on 
Beirut’s eastern hill: “This is still part of Achrafieh; this is what makes it a plus.”239 
Finally, the developers all share a concern for making sure that their projects are 
“green”: they participate in the Jouzour Lubnan-program, where for every square 
meter sold a tree is planted somewhere in Lebanon; they have planned some 
gardens as part of their projects; and once more they plan to work on the public 
domain, this time the abandoned railyard, lobbying with the Ministry who owns the 
lot for the right to plant trees there: “The railyard is public land but it is closed. We 
thought: let’s do something, we can manage to plant twenty to thirty meters deep, 
even if we don’t have access to it after, at least we can see it.” This sensitivity for 
greenery did not come out of thin air, but fits in nicely with a “green building 
trend” in Lebanon and existing plans for the area, where NGOs as well as private 
consultants advising the municipality have drawn up extensive plans to “green” the 
Corniche en-Nahr area, including the idea to cover the river in greenery and 
convert the railway yard into a public park.240 Developers are well aware of these 
plans and refer to them when they promote their projects, even though they 
themselves are often skeptical about the probability of their implementation.241 
When asked, the director of one of the agencies who is planning a green project 
emphasized repeatedly that it was in the planning stage, not any project stage.242 A 
consultant who worked on these plans struck a rather pessimistic note as well, 
lamenting the lack of cooperation from public bodies.243 Nevertheless, selling one’s 
project as “green” contributes to positioning it in a worldwide trend of “green” 
urban living and environmental consciousness, which is in and of itself not a bad 
thing, and in the context of Beirut public authorities cannot be counted on to take 
responsibility for this. 
To conclude this section, we have seen that Soho Beirut incorporates some loft-
living elements, but will at the end be a secured, upper middle class gated 
community, with apartments not much different from other projects under 
                                                       
239 Interview with sales representative of Factory 4376, April 30, 2012. 
240 For more information on the Green River Project, see… and the park plan, see …  
241 Interview with developer of Urban Dreams, December 4, 2013; interview with developer of Artist Lofts, 
April 27, 2012. 
242 Interview with director of IAURIF, December 9, 2013. 
243 Interview with a consultant, October 10, 2014. 
 219 
construction in Corniche en-Nahr. The main reason that the Soho-buildings are 
being built is that a sufficient rent gap in the area coincided with a large amount of 
surplus capital looking for spaces with a rent gap to invest in, and developers 
managed to create a convincing product using the area’s industrial and trendy 
image. In this way, it actually resembles the original SoHo closer than one would 
expect: ‘Far from being either an indigenous or a spontaneous artists’ community, 
SoHo was really a creation of the investment climate’ (Zukin, 1982, p. 16). One 
developer readily conceded this: “In fact if you wanna see the pure marketing of it, 
it was that we had a large client who wanted to buy a large apartment that was not 
available in Achrafieh [for that price]”244 By erasing the actual built environment 
and inventing an alternative narrative, the loft developers have managed to create 
a niche in Beirut’s real estate market that has arguably successfully reflected on 
their sales percentages. Regardless of actual Soho emerging, the idea itself of the 
area being a “Soho of Beirut” has gained traction, in the press as well as among 
developers who are not included in the Soho project: “This is the new Soho they 
say”, another developer’s sales representative told me.245 We see here how the 
developers invite potential buyers to see a world that does not (yet) exist: they 
conjure a landscape that allows them to make a profit (Tsing, 2005), given that most 
developers finance construction by selling apartments off-plan, and contrast it with 
competing investment areas: 
“Mar Mikhael is our main competitor. People buying there are the same as in 
our project. I have had to develop a counterargument: Mar Mikhael existed 
already; it has charm, a spirit. We have to create a spirit. It will happen 
anyway because of the type of projects we built. So it depends: if you want 
authenticity, or you want comfort. With us, there is no sound, no traffic, 
there are gardens, the buildings are all new, there is new infrastructure, and 
it is not like the building next to you will be demolished suddenly and there 
will be a tower built next to you, taking the view. Our area, once it is finished, 
will be finished, it won’t change. Mar Mikhael is disorganized urbanism, there 
is a small shop here, a large plot there, a tower, an old building…”246 
                                                       
244 Interview with a developer, December 2013. 
245 Interview with MENA Capital’s sales representative, December 5, 2013. 
246 Interview with developer of Factory 4376, April 25, 2013. 
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I will now zoom out to look at how the Soho-area is situated in larger development 
in the area and how other developers have created different products, investment 
in which is justified using other reasons than the Soho-developers. 
6 .3  Urban change in Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate development in Corniche en-Nahr is not limited to the Soho-area alone. 
When the first developers moved in around 2008, others noted that the area had 
become a profitable investment opportunity. Hence, more of them swiftly followed, 
which drove up land prices. From US$2,000-3,500 in 2008, prices in 2011 had gone 
up to on average US$5,500/m2, and in 2013 to around US$8,000/m2.247 Indeed, it 
seems that in 2010, somewhat of a scramble for land took place among developers, 
something that would have made landowners realize they could increase their 
prices. A developer told me he rushed to buy after “we felt like we were losing the 
land.”248  
Other developers than the Soho-related team had moved into the area as well. 
The first actually bought their land at the same time as the Artist Lofts-plot. Al 
Mawarid Real Estate, the real estate investment company founded by Al Mawarid 
Bank, acquired a large plot to the South of Beirut Art Center, away from the Soho-
cluster, where they planned three high rises called the “Achrafieh 4748”-project 
(named after the plot number). The project consists of three large residential 
towers that are constructed on a plot of around 13,000m2, with 10,000m2 of 
landscaped areas. The land was bought in 2008 for US$1,160/m2 from the Beton 
Company, who moved their industry out of Beirut after a general assembly of 
shareholders decided to sell the land.249 One of the loft developers said he tipped off 
                                                       
247 These numbers are based on several interviews and were cross-checked with the mortgages 
mentioned on property records or sales prices mentioned in sales contracts. Persons interviewed 
include: developer of Factory 4376, April 24, 2012; sales consultant Trillium Tower, April 24, 2012; 
developer Artist Lofts/Factory Lofts, April 27, 2012; sales consultant at the Achrafieh 4748 project, April 
30, 2012; developer Trillium Tower, December 4, 2013; developer Pearl Office Tower, December 5, 2013. 
248 Interview with developer, April 27, 2012. 
249 According to sales contract obtained December 12, 2013, size obtained from property record of 
Achrafieh 4748, obtained December 12, 2013. Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 
30, 2012.  
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Marwan Kheireddine, head of the Al Mawarid Bank, because they are friends (this 
claim remains unverified; all I got out of the developer was that indeed someone 
told them about the land).250 Apartments sell for US$2,200 to US$3,700/m2 251, 
making it one of the more affordable developments in the area (although by all 
means out of reach for ordinary Lebanese: while the project’s ads claim that “the 
good life starts with a downpayment of US$25,000”, meant to show how little 
money that is, this sum is unaffordable for the majority of Beirut’s population, in a 
country where the minimum wage is US$450 a month). With 270 apartments and a 
total built-up area of 105,000 m2, the company managed to make a handsome profit 
considering the low price they paid for the land. They market their project in its 
brochure as “a self-sufficient neighborhood”, where “the chaos of the city is 
immediately forgotten.” In this way they refer to the agricultural setting and island-
like feel of the area, the project being located on the highway and river, cut off from 
the poor neighborhoods on the other side. 
 
On the other side of Corniche en-Nahr, the National Holding Group (a subsidiary of 
Kuwait’s National Real Estate Company) bought the land for their project “The Pearl 
                                                       
250 Interview, April 2012; interview with developer of Achrafieh 4748, December 11, 2013. 
251 Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 30, 2012. 
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Office Tower” in 2008. The developer bought it from a family facing financial 
difficulties and put it on the market for an attractive price.252 Indeed, two records 
for nearby plots, owned by the same family, have several notices of confiscation for 
unpaid debts on them.253 Together with Achrafieh 4748 and Artist Lofts, these were 
the first developers in the area. After this initial phase of land acquisition by 
connection or personal preference or memory of developers, professional real 
estate brokers started knocking on doors of existing businesses, inquiring about 
landowners and their willingness to sell.254 They then tipped off developers, and 
more projects were announced subsequently. 
Besides the “pioneer” large-scale residential high rise project Achrafieh 4748, 
two other large-scale residential tower-projects have been planned. First, the 
Trillium towers, consisting of two twenty-five-floor residential high rises and a 
separate six-floor commercial block, the land of which was purchased via a 
neighbor of the developer in his village of origin (indeed, not via a broker) and cost 
US$7,000/m2.255 Apartments were priced at US$3,500-4,000/m2 and sold out 
completely. Second, the Bella Casa gated community project is an investment by 
large-scale developer MENA Capital, consisting of three towers. MENA bought the 
plots in July 2011 for US$3,500/m2 and merged them in order to be able to increase 
the height of their buildings.256 Since March 2014, the project has been suspended 
because of low sales (fifteen percent in two years), blamed on the dire political and 
economic situation (Makar, 2014): the project was considered too big for such a 
risky time and some investors already got their money back.257 One of the loft 
developers said that in fact, the Bella Casa project did not fit into the area 
architecturally and that is why they did not sell,258 but my explanation is that 
developers overshot their chances, as land prices had become too high to profitably 
                                                       
252 Interview with the developer of Pearl Office Tower, December 5, 2013. 
253Property records of plot Achrafieh 997, obtained May 2, 2012, and Achrafieh 4928, obtained December 
9, 2013. 
254 Interview with factory owner, October 18, 2014. 
255 Interview with Trillium sales representative, April 24, 2012. 
256Property record of lot 998, Bella Casa: merged lot numbers 5439, 5440 and 5441 into this one 
257 Interview with marketing manager of Bella Casa developer, December 5, 2013; interview with 
developer Bella Casa, October 14, 2014. 
258Interview with developer, October 21, 2014. 
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invest. Achrafieh 4748 and Trillium, both with similar amenities, are just around the 
corner and are much cheaper because of their prices per square meter or because 
they offer smaller apartments between 100 and 200m2 (compared to over 200m2 for 
most apartments in that price range in the city). 
Finally, the second wave of development in Corniche en-Nahr saw some high-rise 
office buildings being constructed. The twenty-storey Les Etages office building, by 
Development H (former A&H), is built on a plot that is owned by the Mizher-family. 
The developer did not buy the land but gave the family a share in the building, a 
deal struck in 2010.259 The bank Crédit Libanais has built its 33-floor headquarters on 
land that was owned by an individual who sold it because they wanted an 
investment. He was approached by the bank itself and got US$3,000/m2.260 This is 
the same landowner as the neighboring Trillium plot. Hence, between 2010 and 
2013, Corniche en-Nahr was well on the way to being transformed from a once 
agricultural-industrial area to an upper middle class to high-end residential and 
commercial enclave. 
The table on the next page summarizes the information about real estate projects in 
Corniche en-Nahr, including the Soho-area. Details provided are based on 
interviews, property records, sales contracts261 and property ads.
                                                       
259 Interview with sales representative of Les Etages, December 4, 2013. 
260 Interview with a representative of Crédit Libanais, December 16, 2013. 
261 Property records are publicly accessible and can be obtained for a fee at the Land Registry. For details 
about selling prices, pending cases or blocks on plots, one has to forward a request to another 
department. In this case, I managed to get some of the official records and contracts I requested, but I did 
not manage to get all of them because very often, property transactions and contracts are not registered 
at the Land Registry for purposes of tax evasion. I have thus been unable to establish details for every 
single real estate project under construction in the area, but obtained them for six out of thirteen 
projects. 
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The developers who are not part of the Soho-project did not use the area’s 
increasingly trendy image as an art hub, but they did employ other selling 
strategies which I will discuss in this section and which were often employed by the 
Soho-developers as well. First, they emphasized that the area was still located 
within the city’s municipal boundaries: “You are in Achrafieh, on the papers. These 
are the last Achrafieh lands.”262 The brochure of the Trillium-project sells its 
apartments with a series of half-truths or blatant fabrications using the Achrafieh-
card, naming the highway next to Corniche en-Nahr (the Pierre Gemayel boulevard) 
as “the most active part of the centre of Beirut, after Downtown” (it really is not), 
presenting the area as full of heritage buildings (which it is not), and “hundreds of 
them are listed by the Directorate of Archeology as buildings of historic 
architecture, thus preserving them for posterity.” If the previous chapter has made 
anything clear, it is that listed buildings are not protected in any significant way, 
and in any case there are very few and definitely not “hundreds” in Achrafieh. 
 
Figure 40-The Trillium-project as advertised and under construction in its advertised 
“idyllic, light surroundings of spacious landscaped greenery.” © Trillium 
Development and Kristelle Maya. 
Second, these developers endlessly emphasize the area’s supposed accessibility by 
car, because of the many large traffic arteries that surround it: “It’s close to 
everything, if you want to go to the mountains, the highway takes you to Baabda, to 
Jounieh, to Habtoor, Downtown is like five minutes, the sea, Achrafieh... If you want 
                                                       
262 Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 30, 2012. 
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to go to Hamra or Verdun…”263 Notwithstanding the fact that traffic gridlock usually 
ensures that Downtown Beirut takes at least thirty minutes to reach by car, the 
proximity of highways is an often-used sales tool that we have also seen for Zokak 
el-Blat, and that makes sense in a city where private cars are usually seen as the 
only viable means of transportation for the middle and upper classes.  
So far, these marketing tricks are not too different from those employed 
elsewhere in Beirut. However, what is unique about the Corniche en-Nahr area is a 
third selling point that developers cite again and again: the area’s supposed 
“virginity”. So, on the one hand, the fact that the area is still part of Beirut and that 
the city is easily reachable is considered an advantage, but on the other hand, the 
area’s unique, uninhabited character is used as an advantage as well. The area’s 
perceived “virginity” provides developers with a supposed tabula rasa to experiment 
and allows them to market their projects as existing in an empty, new area where 
possibilities are endless, unlike in old Beirut, and conveniently gloss over its bad 
reputation. Using the blank slate in this way has been observed in Dubai as well, 
where it de-politicized the practice and participated in constructing an image of the 
urban that evades political and social responsibility (Kanna, 2012). “It was a virgin 
area.”264 “Because the area is new, it’s not like Beirut, this project started two years 
ago, the area was a virgin area.”265 “You don’t have someone in front of you blocking 
your view, there’s a lot of greenery, it’s a virgin area.”266 Related to this latter aspect 
is the supposed sectarian neutrality of the area, a trait that was named as favorable 
for Mar Mikhael as well. “It’s a mixed area, all kind of religions, it helps when 
something bad happens. It’s not Christian, it’s not Muslim.”267 “The location it’s a 
mixed area, from all the religions, it’s not unique, any person can buy.”268  
These claims obscure certain facts that prove that Corniche en-Nahr is in fact by 
no means a “virgin area” or a tabula rasa. First, as I have already mentioned in 
passing, it has a dark past. During the civil war, the area was under control of the 
Lebanese Forces-faction, who used it as an execution ground. The (Muslim) 
                                                       
263 Interview with sales representative of Achrafieh 4748, April 30, 2012.  
264 Interview with sales representative of Trillium, April 24, 2012. 
265Interview with sales representative of Les Etages office tower, December 4, 2013. 
266Interview with developer of Bella Casa gated community (on hold), December 5, 2013. 
267Interview with sales representative of Les Etages office tower, December 4, 2013. 
268Interview with developer of Bella Casa gated community (on hold), December 5, 2013. 
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residents of one of the few houses in the area explained how during the war, the 
(Christian) Lebanese Forces militia burnt their house down and killed their 
neighbor and his two children. They fled and lived in the Corniche Mazra’a area in 
Beirut until they returned in 1991 to rebuild their house using compensation 
acquired through the Ministry of the Displaced. They said that mass graves are 
probably still to be found in Corniche en-Nahr, if developers have not quietly dug 
them up already. They even pointed towards a hill where bodies would still be 
buried.269 Once again, these people are threatened with displacement. They fear that 
once the projects are finished, a road that has been planned for a long time and that 
runs right through their plot will be opened to facilitate circulation. 
Yet, this reputation and history did not prevent capital investment. It has been 
observed that stigma can prevent investment in the most severely disinvested areas 
with the largest rent gap (T. Slater, 2015). While a negative perception of a 
neighborhood can lead to targeting them for reinvestment to be “fixed”, a too 
negative perception can act as a symbolic barrier or diversion of circulation of 
capital. In Beirut, we see that many poor areas are not gentrified. However, in the 
case of Corniche en-Nahr, its dark past was not a barrier to the circulation of 
capital. I can only speculate as to the reason for this because I did explore this 
sufficiently.  I think it has to do with the general amnesia surrounding the civil war, 
the fact that 17,000 people remain missing, the amnesty for the warlords who are 
still active in politics.  
The tabula rasa selling point also obscures the fact that Corniche en-Nahr still has 
quite some active industrial activity, which has been impacted by the developments 
in different ways. These include the United Industrial Corporation (UIC) is a large 
company established in 1967 and specialized in manufacturing air-conditioning 
equipment. Karam Bois is a wood seller that has been there for forty years.270 The 
Impex Garage, selling luxury cars, has been located in the area since 1973.271 Besides 
expressing their worries about a large increase of traffic in the area and insufficient 
parking spaces, one of these companies has fought in court with the developer of 
the Achrafieh 4748-project about its appropriation of space. UIC is located above the 
                                                       
269 Interview with residents, December 7, 2013. 
270 Karam Bois is a wood supplier owned by the Karam family. Four children own the plot (since 1981 
according to the property record).  
271 These data were obtained by interviewing employees and owners of these companies, October 18, 
2014. Behind the large Achrafieh 4748 project, the heir of Karagoula family owns plots 4747 and 5041 to 
5046 (according to sales contract between father and son, obtained December 12, 2013). 
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Achrafieh 4748-plot. When the developer started excavation works, UIC sued them 
for supposedly drilling under their land, cutting trees and removing the road that 
separates plots 4383, 4365 and 4366 from 4748. UIC’s president told me that he needs 
this road, because the other road they use is not public and always crowded, 
something the developer vehemently denies.272 
 
Figure 41-The situation: Plot 4383 is the building of the United Industrial Corporation. 
The empty 4748-plot is where Al Mawarid is currently developing its three 
towers. The red line is the disputed road. 
According to the subpoena that I obtained, the road provided “passage between a 
number of properties in the middle of a crowded area that contains a large number 
of factories and companies273.” The developer told me that this road was a leftover 
plot, a so-called fadle, and that they were forced to buy it when they obtained their 
construction permit in order to compensate for building so high, something that is 
confirmed by the building permit that I obtained.274 The role of the municipality is 
                                                       
272 Interview with developer of Achrafieh 4748, January 30, 2014; interview with industry owner, October 
18, 2014. 
273 According to a subpoena obtained December 12, 2013. 
274 Interview with developer January 30, 2014; DGU-permit for Achrafieh 4748, obtained from 
achrafieh4748.com/progress.aspx. The developer opted to construct high rises, occupying just thirty 
percent of the lot, even though they were allowed to occupy seventy percent since the plot is situated in 
Zone 7. In fact, it turns out that the road should be reopened because it is a necessary road for the 
adjacent school, the developer told me, something that the government did not foresee. The developer 
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important here, because they are selling leftover spaces that were committed for 
green spaces through the Plan Vert that they signed in partnership with French 
agency IAURIF. Instead, it allows developers to build more and higher by buying 
these leftovers. According to the developer, UIC’s accusations are baseless and 
motivated by the desire to get rich quick (they demanded US$100,000 compensation 
according to the subpoena record). UIC’s president meanwhile lamented the fact 
that the state would sell leftover plots to real estate developers instead of turning 
them into public spaces, and said that there is no more room for industry in Beirut. 
The only reason he managed to stay, he said, is because he owns his plot and has no 
desire to sell it to the brokers that regularly knock on his door, to his own surprise: 
“No one thought this would be a residential area one day.”275 At the end, UIC lost the 
court case. Other industries have either sold their land, or, if they were renting, 
were replaced by the new renters related to the art industry or paid by the 
developer to leave.276 In this way, gentrification in Corniche en-Nahr resembles the 
transformation of New York’s Soho-area as described by Zukin (1982, p. 5), where 
most of the victims of gentrification are existing businesses, not residents. With 
loft-living, the industrial look is valued, but actual industry is not. Manufacturers 
and their workers are deprived the space they need to work (Zukin, 1982).  
What this story should make clear is that the tabula rasa narrative as employed by 
the developers is somewhat baseless, as the area has a history and developers have 
been forced to interact with its users. Nevertheless, developers have managed to 
shape the site according to their wishes and were free to conjure up a new story for 
the area. Buyers are either unaware of or not deterred by any facts contradicting 
developers’ claims. Instead, the developers have told them a story that justifies 
their buying in the area (even if they might be aware of its history) and covered up 
the conditions of the production of this conjured new landscape (Tsing, 2005). This 
was possible because the kinds of activities that Corniche en-Nahr harbors, industry 
and agriculture, became undesirable in the context of the expanding city. While 
IDAL has packages stimulating the development of industry and agriculture in 
Lebanon’s regions, the majority of projects granted tax exemptions are actually in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
still profits from garage space under the road, however. 
275 Interview with the president of United Industrial Corporation, October 18, 2014. 
276 According to one industry owner, for example, there was a carpenter in a building that is currently 
empty. The owner sold the land, the carpenter was paid to leave by a real estate developer and the 
building will be demolished (interview, October 18, 2014). 
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the tourism industry.277 When the war ended, there were high hopes for industrial 
growth and Lebanese industrialists started looking for cheap land to expand, but 
were thwarted in part because of the boom in the suburbs that followed the 
compensation and resettlement of displaced people, accompanied in one case by a 
successful (re)zoning of the areas as residential (Bou Akar, 2005). Historically, 
Lebanese governments have seldom given priority to the development of industry 
and agriculture, as explained in Chapter  2, but the postwar development of 
productive sectors was also hindered by the government’s high interest payments 
to the banks, which crowded out loans to the private sector (Gebara, 2007). Indeed, 
the government’s policy of neglecting industry and agriculture was deliberate, just 
as the displacement and takeover of manufacturing space in New York in the 1970s 
by real estate developers keen to sell lofts was encouraged by the city’s 
administration (Zukin, 1982), part of a neoliberal agenda in which the interests of 
real estate developers (well represented in the city council) and other tertiary 
sectors took precedence. 
                                                       
277 Based on statistics received during an interview at IDAL, October 20, 2014, see also section 2.2.2.2 in 
Chapter 2. 
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Figure 42-The Achrafieh 4748 project rising over the former industrial area. The pink 
building in the left hand corner houses the Ashkal Alwan Arts Association. 
6 .4  Conclusion 
In Corniche en-Nahr, buildings based on the model of loft living in former industrial 
warehouses were created from scratch and sold using the area’s industrial character 
and trendy image as an emerging art hub, connecting these buildings to trends of 
urban living that circulate around the globe and that are desirable to a certain 
clientele. Other developers sold their projects citing the area’s location within 
Visual'impact'of'Achraﬁeh'4748'
February'2012'
'December'2013'
October'2014'
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Beirut’s municipal limits, proximity to highways and supposedly “virginal” 
character in order to conjure up an acceptable story, a desirable landscape, and 
cover up the conditions of its production as well as the darker sides of its history. 
While the urban transformation in Corniche en-Nahr could not have happened 
without the existing rent gap and available capital for reinvestment therefore, 
reinvestment only occurred when a combination of events, ideas and actors came 
together at the right time and the right place.  
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 7  Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to answer two main research questions: first, why did 
circulating capital become fixed in Beirut’s built environment, answered in Part 1, 
and second, how did this happen, answered in Part 2. A third question, namely: 
what were the effects of this spatial fix on Beirut’s urban landscape and its 
residents, has been answered throughout the chapters in this thesis and will also 
become clear from the summary of findings and contributions in this conclusion. In 
Part 1, I showed that a large amount of surplus capital flowed to Lebanon via its 
diaspora and the Gulf States, when its banking sector escaped the global financial 
crisis due to conservative banking practices mandated by the Central Bank, made 
possible through the opportunities for profit that lending to the government 
entailed. Not only did a large amount of capital become available for investment, 
but investors also found a legal framework in place that created profitable 
investment opportunities in real estate and loans to the housing and construction 
sector. The latter were stimulated via several regulations passed by the Central 
Bank, entailing subsidized interest rates and other incentives, encouraging capital 
switching into the built environment. A spatial fix was thus achieved that was very 
lucrative for banks and real estate developers alike. The “networks of 
accumulation”, formed by powerful agents with overlapping interests in the 
banking, political and real estate sectors, explain why this spatial fix was allowed to 
occur in this way. It is this elite that profits from the massive returns of the banks 
and the increasing indebtedness of the Lebanese population. These networks are 
neither a corrupt exception, nor a manifestation of crony capitalism, but instead 
they are a logical outcome of the social relations of capitalism, especially the laws of 
competition, which encourage the concentration and centralization of capital and 
hence monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies. It shows that political and 
economic spheres are completely indistinguishable and indeed do not exist as 
separate spheres as such. 
In Part 2, I moved on to show how the spatial fix materialized in Beirut, by 
looking at three different areas in the city that had each received considerable 
capital investment in their built environment since 2008. In all three areas, there 
was a considerable rent gap, due to rent controls that lowered the actual ground 
rent, a dysfunctional heritage preservation framework that prevented the 
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valorization of older buildings, and a legal framework that allowed for an 
exploitation factor that exceeded the current exploitation of the land many times. 
The ways in which all three areas subsequently gentrified varied greatly, influenced 
by legacies of displacement and conflict, the presence of art-related institutions, 
creative industries or political parties, the previous uses of the land or buildings, 
the extent to which buildings were allowed to be demolished without prosecution, 
and the reputation of the area. In each case, developers emphasized different selling 
points and, in the case of Soho Beirut, conjured entire future landscapes based on 
circulating ideas of urban living. The previous connections of developers, which 
allowed them to buy the land, get their building permits and mobilize capital, were 
important as well. 
This conclusion will bring my findings together and claim their theoretical 
contribution, which are relevant to scholars interested in the rent gap theory, the 
circulation of capital in urban land markets, urban political economy, the 
production of networks of accumulation, the structure, function and influence of 
diasporas, the historical development of secondary circuits of accumulation and 
neoliberalism, postcolonial/Marxist debates, the geographies of the financial crisis 
and the financialization of housing and land. I will revisit the debate between 
Marxist-geographical and postcolonial urban scholarship by pointing towards 
dimensions that my work brought in as a case from the “South”, which might open 
up relevant questions for cities everywhere. In this way, I take seriously the 
experiences of Beirut as a city occupying the same historical time as Western cities 
(Massey, 2005; Robinson, 2006) and as a place full of potential for theory making, 
beyond a place that is exceptional, lagging behind and in need of a developmental 
fix. The remainder of the conclusion is divided into three parts: the first two parts 
outline the findings and theoretical contributions related to Part 1 and Part 2 of the 
thesis. The third section outlines more general contributions the thesis made to 
theories on the social relations of capitalism and the debate between postcolonial 
scholars and Marxists. 
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7 .1  Explaining the spatial  f ix 
7.1.1  The financial  crisis  creates a boom: the position of 
Lebanese banks and the role of public debt 
The first important finding relates to the role of the Lebanese banking sector and 
the political economy of public debt in avoiding the consequences of the global 
financial crisis and indeed profiting from it. Lebanese banks moved into a powerful 
position during the civil war, when foreign banks retreated from what used to be 
the financial center of the Middle East. As the war progressed, the government 
increasingly resorted to borrowing from these banks as its revenues dried up. These 
banks were awash with cash due to remittances from Lebanon’s diaspora (whose 
role is discussed in the next entry). This set-up, which I term “the political economy 
of public debt”, continued during the postwar period. The high interest rates paid 
by the government, maintained by the Central Bank, crowded out loans to the 
productive sector, including industry and agriculture, but also to the housing and 
construction sectors, and provided a steady source of income for the banks, who did 
not have to resort to risky financial instruments and products in search of a good 
profit. The Central Bank, who consults Lebanese banks closely on policy-matters, 
moreover regulated lending conservatively. This meant that the banks were not 
affected by the financial crisis and could in fact offer attractive interest rates on 
deposits, which led to a large influx of funds transferred from countries struck by 
the crisis, mostly by Lebanese expatriates but also Gulf investors.  
The subsequent mortgage boom is then a direct consequence of the financial 
crisis, as the transfer of funds to Lebanon’s banks created a large glut of money that 
had to be profitably reinvested somewhere, and could not be invested to the same 
extent in government bonds as before, because the rolling over of the public debt 
resulted in lower interest rates. The Central Bank-provided incentives ensured a 
profitable reinvestment of these funds as well as the maintenance of high housing 
prices. This points to the importance of understanding the consequences and 
geographies of the financial crisis beyond Europe en North America, and thereby 
gauging the extent to which this crisis can actually be termed “global”. Indeed, as 
the Lebanese case has demonstrated, one country’s crisis can be another country’s 
boom. These findings can be relevant to understanding how and why other contexts 
as diverse as India, Canada, Nigeria and Moldova escaped the financial crisis and 
perhaps subsequently experienced a boom: do they have a history of domestic 
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banks lending to the government? Do they have a large expatriate population 
sending remittances back home? How did their Central Bank regulate lending to the 
private sector and which role did it play in maintaining interest rates on 
government bonds? What was its relationship to domestic banks? The spatial fix is a 
temporary displacement of overaccumulated capital, but as the Lebanese case has 
made clear, this displacement only serves to exacerbate the contradictions of 
capitalism. The propping up of the real estate sector and its function as a valve to 
relieve overaccumulation will only be temporary and ultimately, the resulting crisis 
will be even more severe, as has become clear from the 2008 credit crunch in the 
West (Gotham, 2009). 
 
7 .1.2  The role of the diaspora in the banking and real  
estate sectors:  remittances,  investments,  
intermediation 
Lebanon’s diaspora played a crucial role in the spatial fix. When Beirut’s financial 
center functions moved to the Gulf during the civil war, and these economies 
experienced large growth because of the surge in oil prices, Lebanon’s highly 
educated, prone-to-migrate workforce profited from their country’s history and 
reputation as trade intermediary between West and East by being hired as service 
providers there (but also in many other high-income countries in Europe and North 
America). Their remittances contributed to the rise of Lebanon’s domestic banks 
and the latter’s ability to lend to the government. More directly, several Lebanese 
who had made a fortune in the Gulf and West Africa founded new banks and 
companies towards the end of the war, which grew into powerful postwar 
conglomerates spread over several countries. As postwar reconstruction failed to 
deliver on its promises, emigration of Lebanon’s high-skilled workforce proceeded 
unabated, over half of which to Gulf countries. The postwar settlement therefore 
continued to hinge on remittances and domestic lending to the state. Besides 
propping up the banking sector, the diaspora fulfills an important function in 
supporting the real estate sector as well, either as investors in and buyers of real 
estate, as we have seen. Moreover, they support this sector indirectly by helping 
resident family members access housing. 
The role of the diaspora in making a spatial fix possible is a major contribution to 
the theory, and one that hints at the kind of contribution a Southern view can 
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bring. Many countries in the Global South have a sizeable expatriate population; the 
ways in which these influence their political economies, by maintaining 
consumption levels of resident family members, by purchasing real estate, by 
transferring money to their banking sectors, are important factors that should be 
taken into account when studying the kinds of processes that I researched in this 
dissertation. The impact of diasporas on their host cities has been researched quite 
extensively, but we also need to look at how migrants shape their home cities. How 
are the places whence these transnational elites come shaped by them, the cities 
and countries that are left behind yet visited, that do not attract financial center 
activities yet are overbanked, that do not produce but live from remittances and 
grants? This goes beyond the literature on urban neoliberalism where the story is 
often one of a city attracting international investors and tourists. The Lebanese case 
shows us another type of investor and tourist, an international national, an agent 
that should be taken into account perhaps not only in cities of the South but also in 
other places with a sizeable part of their population residing overseas. 
7 .1.3  Gulf capital  and the making of political  economy 
My findings emphasize the importance of looking at the role of Gulf capital, not 
only in shaping the built environment of the Middle East and beyond (Barthel, 2010; 
Bogaert, 2011b; Daher, 2008; Musa, 2013; Simpson, 2013) but also in shaping other 
countries’ banking sectors (Hanieh, 2011, p. 157 looked at this to some extent). In 
Lebanon, the amount of Gulf capital that flowed towards its real estate and banking 
sectors, beginning in the early 2000s but reaching an absolute peak in 2008, 
together with the peak of oil prices and the onset of the financial crisis, has had a 
profound impact not only on the built environment of Beirut and probably other 
cities as well, but also on its political economy, as the banks ran into considerable 
excess liquidity that they could put to profitable use by lending to the government 
and, later, homebuyers and real estate developers. In this way, the economies of the 
Gulf were partially reproduced through Lebanon (Hanieh, 2011), as their large 
amounts of deposits but also ownership shares in Lebanon’s main banks ensured 
good returns, and vice-versa, as they helped bail out Lebanon’s economy during 
public debt and other crises via several Paris-conferences. Here, it became clear that 
Gulf economies’ investments in Lebanon made the country “too important to fail.”  
The dimensions of Gulf and diaspora capital are intimately connected and even 
co-constitutive. Lebanese expatriates contributed to the rise of Gulf economies as 
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service providers, building on their longstanding reputation as successful 
intermediaries between west and east and their high education to become 
indispensable elements of their growth, taking their salaries to invest in banking 
and real estate at home (G. Hourani, 2014; Krijnen, Bassens, & van Meeteren, 2016). I 
focused here on links with the Gulf, but there are other networks between Lebanon 
and West Africa, Lebanon and France, Lebanon and the United States… all these 
could provide interesting insights into how they shape Beirut and Lebanon’s 
political economy and vice versa. 
Once again, we bring a kind of “Southern” perspective into the research on 
spatial fixes and the movements of capital into banking and real estate. Whereas 
Gulf capital or as it is commonly known, petrodollars, was tied to “the West” much 
more strongly in the past when it was recycled to Euro-American banks via Beirut 
and later Bahrain, the attacks on New York City of September 11 restricted the flow 
of these dollars to the West as oil prices rose. My research points towards a massive 
“wall of money” originating in the Gulf after the surge in oil prices (from 1999 to 
2008), which became entangled in Lebanon’s political economy and beyond as it 
moved around looking for profitable investment opportunities. 
 
7 .1.4  A neoliberal  f ix in a different context 
The way in which the state stepped in to facilitate investment in the built 
environment, and “rolled out” a legal and institutional infrastructure that 
generated conditions for its profitable exploitation by private investors (such as the 
changes in the early 2000s), fits in very well with what has been described in the 
literature on neoliberalism. However, when this literature speaks of a “roll-back” of 
the state in terms of its welfare, developmentalist or redistributive functions, it 
becomes less applicable. Beirut’s history as a trade intermediary and provider of 
financial services, the making of its primacy by the French colonial regime when it 
created the state of Greater Lebanon, and the ways in which its political economy 
was proclaimed and regulated as “laissez-faire” since Independence, resulted in a 
country where Keynesian or developmentalist policies never gained a strong 
footing. The provision of social services was already delegated to private actors 
(political parties), industry and agriculture were not subsidized or encouraged to 
the same extent as in most other Arab countries, where developmentalist policies 
were in place, and the government never took responsibility for large-scale public 
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housing, even though some attempts were made, notably during the Chehabist 
period. 
A neoliberal policy agenda found fertile ground in this context, where the 
secondary circuit of accumulation was to a large extent the only circuit, industries’ 
interests were historically weak and those of tertiary sectors such as banking and 
real estate strong. In such a context, the consequences of social and economic 
inequality, an inevitable byproduct of capitalist development, were never 
buttressed by a welfare or developmentalist state. This set-up also dovetailed quite 
well with traveling neoliberal policy prescriptions that encouraged investment in 
finance and real estate. The neoliberal agenda moreover allowed for the small 
amount of social policies that did exist, such as rent control, to be reversed during 
the 1990s. The introduction of policies such as rent liberalization and housing 
access through mortgage loans make housing even more unaffordable in Lebanon 
than they do in the West, because the social minimum is much lower as a result of 
the lack of welfare policies. 
Another way in which neoliberalism in Lebanon is different is in the way it was 
introduced, not enforced as part of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
following a debt crisis by institutions such as the IMF or WB, but traveling with rich 
returning diaspora Lebanese. Indeed, the collusion between domestic banks, the 
Central Bank and the state allowed Lebanon to maintain its high debt-to-GDP ratio 
without having to answer to international finance discipline. Notwithstanding this, 
some form of structural adjustment was imposed after the Paris 2-conference in 
2002, where debt relief was pledged in exchange for promises of privatization and 
reforms encouraging foreign direct investment, and several free trade agreements 
were signed. However, the role of domestic banks remained crucial in government 
financing.  
The Lebanese case demonstrates that neoliberal reform cannot be generalized 
across contexts in the North as well as the South. Especially in terms of theorizing 
the path dependencies and specificities of the latter, beyond SAPs and the 
dismantling of developmentalist regimes, the Lebanese case provides an example 
where the tradition of government was already well in line with a neoliberal policy 
agenda; one where the transition to neoliberalism constituted more of a continuity, 
instead of a rupture, with previous policies.  
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7.1.5  Mortgages and the financialization of housing 
The increasing resort to credit by homebuyers and developers alike is a new 
phenomenon in Lebanon and part of a wider trend where the “wall of money” (i.e., 
surplus capital) that led to the financialization of housing in the Global North is 
making its way to the Global South, increasingly so after the 2008 crisis (Fernandez 
& Aalbers, 2016; Gruffydd Jones, 2012). Strategies to provide affordable housing 
have been progressively underpinned by finance-based models, from residential 
mortgage-backed securities in Mexico implemented in coordination with Western 
donors and financial institutions as a development strategy (Soederberg, 2015), to 
slum upgrading programs premised on attracting private capital from commercial 
banks and capital markets that is repaid by indebting slum dwellers, making slums 
“bankable” (Gruffydd Jones, 2012, see also Bogaert, 2011), to the way in which 
affordable housing policies in Morocco are increasingly used to promote Tangier’s 
property market as a destination for foreign investment, creating new submarkets 
in a country with an underdeveloped financial system (Kutz & Lenhardt, 2016). The 
belief that market-based housing finance, and not the right to housing, should 
organize the provision of shelter across the globe (Rolnik, 2013) is becoming 
widespread, reflected in the policy-oriented literature on housing in the global 
South that can be found in World Bank and UN-Habitat reports and journals. Both 
political economy and policy-oriented research have mostly focused on the 
financialization of home as a tool of development, part of the “poverty industry” 
extracting value from low-income individuals and linking their housing rights to 
global financial flows (Soederberg, 2015). In all cases, these programs have largely 
failed to provide adequate housing to lower-income groups, but have been 
profitable for the financial and construction interests involved. 
The Lebanese case then can be situated in this trend, although mortgages are not 
so much aimed at slum upgrading but are directed towards the middle-income 
bracket. The poorest residents of Beirut still resort to other means to access 
housing: informal settlements, housing provided by developers connected to 
political parties, or help from family members abroad. 
The “wall of money” that moved from the Global North but also the 
intensification of capital flows from the Gulf after the crisis indicate that the 
mortgage boom and the inflation of housing prices in Lebanon are in a way the 
result, and not the trigger of the financial crisis, which once again points to the 
different consequences of the crisis in the South. A glut of money in the South is 
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now reproducing the same problematic conjuncture of capital switching into the 
built environment to temporarily relieve crises of overaccumulation. 
7 .2  The materialization of  the spatial  f ix 
7.2.1  The rent gap in Beirut:  a  legal framework 
facilitating gentrification 
The rent gap in the three areas that I studied in Beirut, explaining why some areas 
became susceptible to investment and disinvestment, but not if and how they 
subsequently gentrified, was influenced by rent controls, a high potential ground 
rent due to the building law and future highway plans, and ineffective heritage 
preservation measures. Rent controls lowered the actual ground rent to such an 
extent that landlords discontinued building maintenance, leading to a deterioration 
of the building stock and a strong motivation to sell. Rent controls allow 40,000 
families to live in Beirut, and in this way limit processes of gentrification (Ley & 
Dobson, 2008), but their tenancy is not secure as increasing numbers are evicted 
when buildings are sold to developers. The building law ensured that a plot with an 
older building on it had a much higher potential ground rent because of the high 
exploitation factor. The priority given to highway construction raised the potential 
ground rent of plots located along a planned trajectory, as car accessibility is 
important in a context with no efficient public transportation. The ineffective 
heritage protection framework, with no budget for repairing listed buildings, no 
possibility to transfer development rights and no repercussions when illegal 
demolitions occurred, did not encourage the preservation of old buildings and 
allowed for the full exploitation of the plot they were located on. Many owners in 
fact demolished their properties in order to prevent their classification and reap the 
full ground rent by selling to a developer. The classification of buildings then did 
not present an incentive to gentrification by way of refurbishing them and selling 
them to higher-income buyers, as discussed for the United States, for example (Lees 
et al., 2008; Lees, 2003), but it did encourage gentrification in the sense that owners 
demolished their properties preemptively or were not prosecuted for doing so once 
a building had been listed, because the framework did not provide for funds with 
which owners could refurbish or sell development rights. 
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The role of the state in creating the rent gap becomes clear here. What we can 
learn from the Lebanese case is the importance of national laws for influencing the 
rent gap at a very local level. In the context of Beirut, where no local master plan 
exists, the national legal framework decides the exploitation factor of a plot. The 
changes in the framework in the first half of the 2000s set the stage for a more 
intensive exploitation of land. The national level also decides on the regulations 
related to old rent or the law on heritage protection. The role of local authorities is 
then not one of proactively designating zones for redevelopment, engaging in 
public-private partnerships with developers or place-marketing as described for 
cases in Europe and North-America (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a).  Instead, the 
municipality facilitates the exploitation of potential ground rent by handing out 
building permits, selling leftover spaces to developers, letting developers privatize 
an area in exchange for the latter’s work on infrastructure, in short: being moved 
by developers to suit their projects. Local authorities are not entirely stripped of 
prerogatives, though. The municipality could improve public transportation (which 
arguably does not lower potential ground rent because then its value becomes 
related to being located near a public transport hub) and the availability of public 
spaces, but it prioritizes the construction of highways and parking spaces, raising 
the potential ground rent of properties located close to these and close to shopping 
districts and entertainment districts, which explains why Zokak el-Blat gentrified. 
In this way, pedestrianizing streets, encouraging the use of bicycles or public 
transportation, interventions that improve the quality of life for residents but that 
arguably facilitate gentrification in many Western cities as well, are not strategies 
Beirut municipality engages in, making high-income dwellers prioritize access to 
thoroughfares (also because they allow people bypass certain stigmatized areas, but 
I will get to that below).  
In short, the rent gap is to a large extent created by the legal framework in place, 
mostly decided on a national level. It is not done through large sweeping gestures 
such as the authoritarian redevelopment of entire slum areas in the Global South 
(Smith, 2002) or the creation of zones of exception, where an authoritarian state 
suspends laws and creates exceptional incentives for investors (Ong, 2006). Instead, 
it is through the existing framework, embedded in a tradition of facilitating 
investors, that the rent gap has been allowed to grow so large. 
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7.2.2  Pathways of gentrification 
A rent gap alone is not enough to explain which areas gentrify and which do not, 
and the timing of this process. My research has uncovered certain dimensions that 
influence processes of gentrification in Beirut, some of which are not discussed in 
the literature. A first dimension relates to the role of territorial stigma and legacies 
of conflict and displacement, which influenced the abandonment and reoccupation 
patterns of buildings (hence also the rent gap) and subsequent processes of 
gentrification. In Zokak el-Blat, the presence of people displaced during the war, 
protected by former militias turned political parties, prevented the full exploitation 
of the rent gap, limiting development to its edges near highways. This has 
prevented gentrification and also possibly protected some monumental buildings 
from demolition because they were occupied by refugees who enjoyed certain 
forms of protection. It is interesting to note that Zokak el-Blat’s neighboring area, 
the equally stigmatized district of Bachoura, is currently being transformed into 
“Beirut Digital District” with a large capital injection, public support and an 
extensive campaign that framed the transformation as saving the neighborhood 
from poverty (Whiting, 2012). Here we see that with powerful means, pooling 
capital and coordinating a large campaign, the stigma is forcibly overcome. In 
Corniche en-Nahr however, where there were for the most part no actual people 
involved, the area’s stigma, that consisted in part of stories of massacres that took 
place there during the civil war and the probable presence of mass graves, was 
easier to gloss over, corresponding to the general amnesia surrounding the conflict 
that was necessitated by the need to move on (a capability that contributes to 
Beirut’s reputation as a place that “won’t die”). This allowed developers to 
construct a new identity for the area, a tabula rasa onto which they had a freedom to 
inscribe their projects not found elsewhere in densely built-up Beirut, using its 
reputation as an emerging art hub, selling new forms of urban living based on 
examples from deindustrializing Western cities. In the process, the area was 
moreover presented as a sectarian neutral space, something that emerged from the 
Mar Mikhael-findings as well. Justified or not, the fact that these areas were 
perceived as such, and that this was a positive selling point (“in case something 
happens”), points to the role of past and also future anticipated conflicts (Bou Akar, 
2012) in explaining processes of gentrification. Besides the rent gap then, an area’s 
stigma, which is not only related to poverty but also to legacies of conflict and 
displacement, and the ease or difficulty of overcoming this stigma, helps explain 
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why gentrification does or does not occur in severely disinvested areas and why 
some central Beiruti working class neighborhoods have not yet gentrified. 
A second contribution relates to the diversity of gentrification processes taking 
place in one and the same city. In the case of Mar Mikhael, the perceived 
authenticity of the area, in part related to its old buildings, was used as a selling 
point by developers (who however did not find it economically feasible to preserve 
more than a façade); catering to an increasing desire for “authenticity” in a city 
rapidly losing its built heritage. Moreover, the area’s reputation as a creative and 
nightlife hub allowed for the profitable transformation of commercial ground-floor 
spaces into bars, galleries and restaurants, partially and temporarily closing the 
rent gap. These and other factors that I discuss in this conclusion explain why 
gentrification in Mar Mikhael is so notably different from what we have seen in 
Zokak el-Blat, an area with a similar rent gap and a more impressive architectural 
heritage. My case studies therefore demonstrate how gentrification processes in 
one and the same city, taking place simultaneously, can have vastly different 
dynamics and outcomes. 
A third dimension to take into account are the complicated property patterns 
that exist in Beirut’s old areas, due to the law related to inheritance which results in 
so many heirs that on the one hand property transfers are facilitated but on the 
other hand sometimes costly, and avoided. Transfers are facilitated because 
developers can buy a certain amount of shares and then force the remaining heirs 
to sell (a process that I did not explore in detail this thesis but am currently 
exploring in a co-authored paper), or they are hindered because tracking down 
multiple heirs is tedious and costly. Legacies of displacement and conflict play a role 
here as well, because many properties were abandoned during the war, not 
reoccupied by their original owners who fled, passed away and left heirs scattered 
all over Lebanon and even the world. 
My findings have, fourthly, drawn attention to how the geographies of 
displacement by gentrification reinforce sectarianism. Many lower-income tenants 
and working class households have been displaced to confessionally homogeneous 
areas outside Beirut, which has enhanced their susceptibility to the sectarian 
appropriation of their political consciousness. Sectarian appropriation and 
depoliticization are widespread, and it should be remembered that sectarian 
organizations and later political parties, which are unfortunately often tied to one 
particular sect (although sects are divided between parties as well), have played an 
important role in providing services and employment to their constituencies who 
moved to Beirut in search of a better life or who were displaced; services that the 
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state did not provide (Bou Akar, 2005; Cammett & Issar, 2010; Fawaz, 2009a). Of 
course they could only play this role because the state did not provide any services 
or construct affordable housing.  
Finally, the role of the Lebanese diaspora, not only in channeling capital towards 
Beirut’s banking and real estate sectors as discussed above, but also in shaping 
gentrification processes, is another important dimension. The fact that many 
developers had lived abroad allowed them to pick up ideas that influenced the way 
in which they conceived of and marketed their projects. They appealed to the tastes 
of their buyers, under which there were many expatriates. In this way, ideas that 
were developed in the context of deindustrializing cities in the West gained traction 
in Corniche en-Nahr. 
7 .3  The urban transformation of Beirut and the 
social  relations of  capitalism 
In this dissertation, I have connected concrete developments on the ground to 
broader questions about capitalism, the role of the state, networks of accumulation 
and the exploitation of land. The idea that the urban process reflects and 
constitutes the relations and contradictions of the capitalist system was explored by 
first looking at how these relations and contradictions direct capital towards the 
built environment, and then by looking at how these impact the built environment 
itself. The two parts of the thesis reflect elements that are co-constitutive; previous 
investments in the built environment determine future ones. Capital renders space 
in its own image, raising barriers to further expansion and profitable investment, 
which are only removed when the rent gap becomes large enough to consider 
reinvestment. I paid close attention to specific factors that influenced how the rent 
gap and gentrification occurred in Beirut and that were not always discussed in the 
literature, contributing to theory formation by looking at ‘[t]he shared capitalist 
structures of gentrification vis-à-vis the sociological, cultural and institutional 
contextual particularities [that] the phenomenon acquires in each place’ (López-
Morales, 2015, p. 566). Taking seriously the experiences of Southern cities as places 
occupying the same historical time as Western cities (Massey, 2005; Robinson, 2006) 
and as places full of potential for theory making takes urban theory beyond treating 
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these cities as places that lag behind, in need of developmental fixes. As I have 
shown in the introduction, Beirut is too often described in just such terms, as 
lagging behind, full of problems and abnormalities, and not as a place that could 
inform urban theory or produce more general knowledge about how cities work. As 
we have seen however, processes of gentrification and urban transformation, 
triggered by the flow and fixation of capital in the built environment, are actually 
similar to processes documented elsewhere, with some specific dimensions. 
This is however not just a story about Beirut. It is also about the social relations 
of capitalism in general and their relationship with the built environment in 
particular. At its core, gentrification is about class struggle. Not a class struggle 
between yuppies and existing tenants, but one that is situated in the realm of the 
circulation of capital, between people living in precarity and the “agents of capital” 
that produce and exploit rent gaps (T. Slater, 2015). Their actions are shaped by the 
laws of capitalism but also highly contingent connections that are based on many 
different factors, including (colonial) nation-state making, cultural preferences and 
histories of war and conflict. These connections generate friction that allow capital 
to touch down in different places. The agents of capital are organized in powerful 
networks of accumulation. I argued that these networks are not indicative of a 
particular culture of corruption but are part of the social relations of capitalism 
itself. Of course the network-formation, monopoly-encouraging tendencies of 
capitalism did find an especially fertile ground in Lebanon, where even before the 
country came into existence there was a tradition of clientelism and the state itself 
was premised on a tertiary economy, with its politicians coming from powerful 
business families. However, these alliances and networks were established during 
the rise of capitalism in the Levant itself. It is not as if capitalism descended onto a 
clientelist sectarian structure; in fact as Chapter 2 has shown, the ways in which 
European powers actively utilized alliances with Christians and lobbied with 
political institutions for economic goals, shows that this structure was made 
together with, perhaps co-constitutive of, and not in opposition to, capitalism. Of 
course, the fact that a limited amount of persons commanded a vast amount of 
wealth, as a result of the ways in which capitalism played out in Lebanon, made the 
switching of capital into real estate easier, because this elite could just found 
another company and channel capital there. But this set-up is a result of the 
relations of capitalism itself. 
Therefore it is imperative to take the study of the Middle East away from a focus 
on corruption and authoritarianism, because this conceals more than it clarifies. 
Looking at how the networks of accumulation are situated in and can be explained 
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by the social relations of capitalism breaks down the barriers between North and 
South and points towards the urgency of understanding the class struggle 
underlying the capitalist transformation of urban space. The endless complexity of 
a case such as Lebanon shows that viewing urban transformation in this way is not a 
reductionist or dull exercise, does not preclude complexity or necessarily overlooks 
certain dimensions because I am using a theory that originated in the West. To the 
contrary, using this framework allowed me to ask the right questions, the search for 
answers to which allowed me endless freedom to think deeply about what shapes 
Beirut today.  
What we learn from Beirut is the importance of looking beyond North America 
and Western Europe when trying to understand the consequences of the financial 
crisis and the functioning of the capitalist economy as a whole. It teaches us to look 
at the impact a large, highly educated diaspora can have on a country’s banking and 
real estate sectors, the role that Gulf capital plays in shaping the built environment 
of cities, and how a differing political-economic context, with no history of a 
welfare or developmentalist state model, has fared in an increasingly neoliberal 
context. It also teaches us about the many specific dimensions that come into play 
when areas are gentrifying as a result of renewed capital investment, such as the 
role of conflict, a rent control and heritage protection framework in limbo, and a 
state and legal framework that allow almost unlimited exploitation. 
Notwithstanding these specificities, it is pointless to reify differences between 
Northern and Southern cities because the circulation of capital is a universal 
process. This process takes place in endlessly intricate, varied and complex ways 
that open up many fascinating research questions for cities all around the globe, 
that can help us understand the connections between the context of changing 
global financial and economic dynamics, between burgeoning cities and networks of 
profit and ultimately, and this is why this research is important, between these 
dynamics and the increasingly glaring socioeconomic inequality. 
This dissertation has shown that, far from being an exceptional place, Beirut is 
shaped by the same dynamics of capital investment that wreak their havoc 
elsewhere. In all three areas whose gentrification I examined, consequences for 
existing residents and commercial tenants were dismal, because they faced rampant 
displacement (pressure) and unaffordable rents. As elsewhere, the “good city”, the 
good life that the real estate developments promise, is not meant for poor or even 
middle income people. No matter if it is the state or other actors displacing them, 
no matter if the references used are New York or Shanghai (Roy, 2011c), there is no 
place for the poor in gentrifying areas. Fifty percent of households in Lebanon live 
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on less than US$6,500 a year and the income of Lebanon’s middle classes averages 
US$24,000 a year (Traboulsi, 2014). It is very difficult to obtain an apartment that 
costs half a million dollars on such a salary. Mortgage lending has meant that 
housing prices are not going to decline anytime soon in Beirut and that they are 
maintained in its suburbs as well. Ironically, the subsidized mortgages that many 
Lebanese are forced to resort to have been financed to a large extent by their own 
taxation. In this way, they are exploited in the interests of the agents of capital that 
are driving the urban transformation of Beirut, and that will continue to do so as 
long as the capitalist system is in place.  
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Appendix 1: Fieldwork trips and interviews 
Besides being resident in Beirut from September 2007 until September 2011, I 
undertook fieldwork trips in November and December 2011, March and April 2012, 
April 2013 and December 2013, October 2014 and March 2015. In addition to my own 
interviews, listed in the table below, I benefited from interviews conducted by Abir 
Saksouk-Sasso (three), Mona Fawaz (one) and those conducted by AUB and Sciences 
Po students in the context of a workshop on gentrification in Mar Mikhael that took 
place in March 2015 (twenty-nine), which I led. 
This table includes interviews conducted for my master’s thesis research, because I 
relied on these as well. All interviews took place in Beirut, mostly in English, but 
French and Arabic were also used. 
Date Interviewee, affiliation Main topic 
May 15, 
2009 
Economist, independent Networks of accumulation 
Jun. 25, 
2009 
Magazine editor, per email Status of real estate projects 
Oct. 19, 
2009 
Architect, DGU Building Law 
Oct. 27, 
2009 
Architect, private practice Building Law 
Oct. 31, 
2009 
Architect, DGU Building Law 
Dec. 2, 
2009 
Real estate agent Building Law, real estate market 
Dec. 9, 
2009 
Banker/consultant IDAL 
Dec. 11, 
2009 
Political scientist Solidere 
Dec. 15, 
2009 
Real estate agent Status of real estate projects 
Real estate developer Process of obtaining a building 
permit 
Architect, DGU Process of obtaining a building 
permit 
Dec. 16, 
2009 
Director of One-Stop-Shop, IDAL IDAL 
Dec. 17, 
2009 
Real estate developer Process of obtaining a building 
permit 
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Date Interviewee, affiliation Main topic 
Dec. 22, 
2009 
Real estate developer Process of obtaining a building 
permit 
Dec. 23, 
2009 
Real estate developer Process of obtaining a building 
permit 
Dec. 28, 
2009 
Lawyer Building Law, IDAL 
Jan. 4, 
2010 
Lawyer, per email Building Law 
Real estate developer Building Law, real estate market 
Jan. 6, 
2010 
Architects, private practice Building Law 
Jan. 8, 
2010 
Engineer, real estate developer Building Law, building permits 
Jan. 12, 
2010 
Engineer, real estate developer Building Law 
Jan. 15, 
2010 
Architects, private practice Building Law 
Jan. 19, 
2010 
Architect, DGU Process of obtaining a building 
permit 
Jan. 20, 
2010 
Real estate developer Building Law, building permits 
Jan. 21, 
2010 
Real estate consultant Building Law 
Jan. 27, 
2010 
Real estate developer Building Law, building permits 
Apr. 24, 
2012 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Apr. 27, 
2012 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Apr. 30, 
2012 
Real estate agents Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developers Corniche en-Nahr 
Apr. 25, 
2013 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Dec. 4, 
2013 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Dec. 5, 
2013 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Dec. 6, 
2013 
Land Registry Information on plot records 
Dec. 7, 
2013 
Army base in Corniche en-Nahr Changes in the area 
Residents, Corniche en-Nahr Changes in the area 
School, Corniche en-Nahr Changes in the area 
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Date Interviewee, affiliation Main topic 
Vendors, Souk al-Ahad Changes in the area 
Dec. 9, 
2013 
Architect, private practice Corniche en-Nahr 
Director, French urban planning agency Projects in Beirut 
Dec. 10, 
2013 
Architect, Beirut municipality Corniche en-Nahr 
Head of Banking Department, Central Bank of 
Lebanon 
Mortgage incentives 
Vice-President, Lebanese economic research 
NGO 
Banks and real estate 
Director, advertising agency Marketing of real estate projects 
Dec. 11, 
2013 
Director, art institution, Corniche en-Nahr Changes in the area 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr 
Dec. 12, 
2013 
Real estate developer Corniche en-Nahr, Mar Mikhael 
Dec. 13, 
2013 
Engineer, Beirut municipality Corniche en-Nahr 
Farmers Corniche en-Nahr Changes in the area 
Lebanese anti-corruption NGO Networks of accumulation 
Dec. 16, 
2013 
Lebanese domestic bank Corniche en-Nahr 
Architect and engineer, DGU Corniche en-Nahr 
Jan. 21, 
2014 
Architect, private practice (by phone) Corniche en-Nahr 
Oct. 9, 
2014 
Lawyer Lebanese political economy 
Oct. 10, 
2014 
Researchers, Association of Banks in Lebanon Lebanese political economy 
Real estate developer Beirut Digital District 
Oct. 13, 
2014 
Five persons at the Central Bank of Lebanon Mortgage incentives, public debt 
President of security, municipality of Sin el Fil Souk al Ahad, Corniche en-Nahr 
Residents and shop owners, Zokak el-Blat Changes in the area 
Neighborhood leader, Zokak el-Blat Changes in the area 
Oct. 14, 
2013 
Urban planner, private practice Role of the state 
Private consultant Creative industries in Mar 
Mikhael 
Lawyer Lebanese political economy 
Real estate developer Real estate market, finance 
Municipality of Beirut Role of the state 
Oct. 15, 
2014 
Residents and shop tenants, Mar Mikhael Changes in the area 
Head of Public Debt Directorate, Ministry of 
Finance 
Public debt 
Journalist, finance and real estate Banks and real estate 
Oct. 16, 
2014 
Information consultant Lebanese political economy 
Two economists, World Bank Lebanese political economy 
Oct. 17, 
2014 
Head of Research, domestic investment bank Banking sector 
Residents and shop tenants, Mar Mikhael Changes in the area 
Oct. 18, 
2014 
Industrial tenants, Corniche en-Nahr Changes in the area 
Vendors, Souk al-Ahad Changes in the area 
 271 
Date Interviewee, affiliation Main topic 
Oct. 20, 
2014 
Professor of economy, American University of 
Beirut 
Lebanese political economy 
Partner in charge, one of the Big Four 
international professional services firms 
Lebanese political economy 
Economist, World Bank Lebanese political economy 
Vice President, IDAL IDAL 
Oct. 21, 
2014 
Engineer, Council for Development and 
Reconstruction 
Role of the state, Mar Mikhael 
Board member, Real Estate Developers 
Association 
Political economy of real estate 
development 
Two lawyers Beirut Digital District, Lebanese 
political economy 
Vice-President, Lebanese Economic Research 
NGO 
Lebanese political economy 
Oct. 29, 
2014 
Director, Public Corporation for Housing (by 
phone) 
Mortgages 
Mar. 9, 
2015 
Vice-President, Lebanese Economic Research 
NGO 
Lebanese political economy 
Lawyer Lebanese political economy 
Mar. 10, 
2015 
Chairman, International construction consultancy 
company 
Lebanese political economy 
Partner in charge, one of the “Big Four” Lebanese political economy 
Mar. 11, 
2015 
Head of Business Development, international real 
estate consultancy 
Real estate market 
Professor of economy, American University of 
Beirut 
Lebanese political economy 
Managing partner, international financial 
consulting firm 
Lebanese political economy 
Mar. 12, 
2015 
Lawyer Lebanese political economy 
Chairman, information consultancy Lebanese political economy 
Mar. 13, 
2015 
Chairman, international financial consultancy Lebanese political economy 
Mar. 17, 
2015 
Senior legal counsel and Head of Legal 
Department, Capital Markets Authority 
Lebanese political economy 
Mar. 18, 
2015 
Economist, independent Lebanese political economy 
Lawyer and accountant Lebanese political economy 
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Appendix 2: Company shareholders 
Al  Mawarid network 
Company Share 
capital 
CEO Shareholders 
Achrafieh 4748 SAL 
(est. 2008/08/27) 
LL30mln, 
200 shares 
Rania Rayadh 
Sarieddine 
-Basam Abdalrizaq al-Qisi (Leb.), shareholder (4 shares: 
2009/05/22). 
-Daria Rashid Sharmand (Leb.), shareholder (13 shares: 
2009/05/22). 
-Rania Rayadh Sarieddine [Akhras] (Leb.), responsible for 
signing (2009/05/22), chairwoman (2009/05/22), founder 
(2008/08/28), shareholder (86 shares: 2009/05/22).] 
-Raja Ali al-Shriti (Leb.), shareholder (20 shares: 
2009/05/22). 
-Gabriel Toufiq Malouli (Leb.), lawyer (2008/08/28). 
-Faysal Salim al-Halabi (Leb.), shareholder (6 shares: 
2009/05/22). 
-Mohammed Arkan al-Siblani (Leb.), shareholder (13 
shares: 2009/05/22). 
-Marwan Shkib Daw (Leb.), shareholder (37 shares: 
2009/05/22), board member (2009/05/22), founder 
(2008/08/28). 
-Maan Shkib Daw (Leb.), founder (2008/08/28), 
shareholder (8 shares, 2009/05/22). 
-Local legal entity: Company 4791 Real Estate SAL  (Leb.), 
shareholder (13 shares: 2009/05/22), board member. 
-Foreign legal entity: Huruth Abu Shakra and Associates, 
responsible for audit (2008/08/28). 
Company 4791 Real 
Estate SAL (reg. 
2005/15/07) 
LL30 mln Rania Rayadh 
Sarieddine 
-Crowheart Professional Auditors (Leb.), responsible for 
audit. 
-Rania Rayadh Sarieddine (Leb.), chairwomen, 
shareholder (980 shares), founder, responsible for signing. 
-Mazen Wassim Tajeddine (Leb.), shareholder (10 shares), 
founder, board member, lawyer. 
-Ibrahim Samir Azar (Leb.), shareholder (10 shares), 
founder, board member. 
Al Mawarid Real 
Estate Company (reg. 
2002/27/04) 
LL2 bln Wassim Salim 
Kheireddine 
-Wassim Salim Kheireddine (Leb.), chairman, shareholder 
(500 shares), founder, responsible for signing. 
-Hikmat Ismail Nawfal (Leb.), responsible for audit. 
-Salim Ismail Kheireddine (Leb.), shareholder (1000 
shares), founder, board member. 
-Marwan Salim Kheireddine (Leb.), shareholder (500 
shares), founder, board member. 
-Nadim Najib Mukhaibar (Leb.), lawyer. 
-Rania Sarieddine Akhras (nationality unknown [?]), 
general director, responsible for signing. 
Al Mawarid Bank (reg. 
2008/08/21) 
LL36 bln Marwan Salim 
Kheireddine 
-Marketing and construction company (Leb.), shareholder 
(7500 shares). 
-Grand Thornton (Leb.), responsible for audit. 
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-Price Waterhouse Coopers (Leb.), responsible for audit. 
-Marwan Salim Kheireddine (Leb.), chairman, shareholder 
(400,000 shares), responsible for signing. 
-Edmond Amin Jreisati (Leb.), shareholder (3600 shares), 
board member. 
-Tamim Mahmoud Zidane (Leb.), shareholder (3250 
shares). 
-Rami Manam Nasreddine (Leb.), shareholder (3250 
shares). 
-Rada Atif Saad (Leb.), shareholder (2500 shares). 
-Rakan Manam Nasreddine (Leb.), shareholder (3250 
shares). 
-Salim Ismail Kheireddine (Leb.), shareholder (2,072,000 
shares), founder. 
-Samir Abdallah Najad (Leb.), shareholder (17,000 
shares). 
-Abdelrahman Ben Abdelaziz (Leb.), shareholder (30,000 
shares). 
-Nizar Mahmoud Zidane (Leb.), shareholder (3250 shares). 
-Wassim Rashid al-Rasamny (Leb.), shareholder (1250 
shares). 
-Wassim Salim Kheireddine (Leb.), shareholder (400,000 
shares), board member. 
-Wajdi Rashid al-Rasamny (Leb.), shareholder (1250 
shares). 
-Walid Rashid al-Rasamny (Leb.), shareholder (1250 
shares). 
-Mona Rashid al-Rasamny (Leb.), shareholder (625 
shares). 
-Ibrahim Emile Hanna al-Daher (Leb.), shareholder (2000 
shares), board member. 
-Majid Aref Junblat (Leb.), shareholder (2000 shares), 
board member. 
-Marwan Yousef Kisrwani, (Leb.), founder. 
-Mona Amr Jandi Daw (Leb.), shareholder (12400 shares). 
-Amr Mahieddine Jandi (Leb.), board member, founder, 
shareholder (3000 shares). 
-Mahmoud Hamdane Zidane (Leb.), board member, 
shareholder (2500 shares). 
-Ghassan Ismail Kheireddine (Leb.), shareholder (21,100 
shares). 
-Nada Rashid al-Rasamny Rizk (Leb.), shareholder (625 
shares). 
-Ibrahim Wafiq al-Hasamy (Leb.), board member. 
-Mustafa Mohammed Sahtoot, (Leb.), shareholder (6250 
shares). 
- Nadim Najib Mukhaibar (Leb.), shareholder (150 shares). 
-Abir Ghaleb Ramadan (Leb.), lawyer. 
-Note: request for a sign of concession franchise… [?], 
number 466/s. 
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Urban Dreams Trust 
Holding SAL (est. 
2010/08/11) 
US$20,000, 
amount of shares 
1,000 
Martine Isabel 
Akoub 
Joubourian 
-Emile Pascal al-Bina (Leb.), shareholder (120 
shares, 2010/08/12). 
-Toufiq Rabih Awad (Leb.), founder (2010/08/12), 
shareholder (160 shares, 2010/08/12). 
-Joseph Ibrahim al-Kisrwani (Leb.), shareholder 
(120 shares, 2010/08/12). 
-Joseph Michel Halit (Leb.), board member, 
shareholder (120 shares, 2010/08/12). 
-Salim Badri al-Maoushi (Leb.), lawyer 
(2010/08/12). 
-Ali Azmi Mohammed Aziz (Leb.), shareholder (120 
shares, 2010/08/12). 
-Leila Sami Alamuddine (Leb.), shareholder (120 
shares, 2010/08/12). 
-Martine Isabel Akoub Joubourian (Leb.), 
chairwoman, shareholder (120 shares, 
2010/08/12), responsible for signing, founder 
(2010/08/12). 
-Nada Joseph Jlailati (Leb.), board member, 
shareholder (120 shares, 2010/08/12), founder. 
-Foreign legal entity: Ernst and Young Co., 
responsible for audit. 
Bank Audi SAL (est. 
1962/02/06) 
LL460 bln 
(roughly), amount 
of shares around 
352 mln. 
Raymond Wadih 
Audi 
-Ahmad al-Hamidh (nationality unknown), founder 
(1962/02/06). 
-Elie Samir Samaha (Leb.), general director 
(1962/02/06). 
-Jean Wadih Audi (Leb.), founder (1962/02/06). 
-George Wadih Audi (Leb.), founder (1962/02/06). 
-Hamid al-Saleh al-Hamidh (nationality unknown), 
founder (1962/02/06). 
-Khalil Michel Bitar (Leb.), board member 
(2013/04/08). 
-Raymond Wadih Audi (Leb.), chairman 
(1998/03/19), responsible for signing, founder 
(1962/02/06). 
-Souad Hamad al-Hamidh (nationality unknown), 
board member (2013/04/08). 
-Samir Naqoula Hanna (Leb.), general director 
(1998/03/19), responsible for signing in union [?], 
board member (2013/04/08). 
-Sana Hamad al-Hamidh (nationality unknown), 
founder (1962/02/06). 
-Shahdaan Elias al-Jbeily (nationality unknown), 
general director (1962/02/06). 
-Sheikha[?] Mohammed Isdiradi (nationality 
unknown), founder (1962/02/06). 
-Adel Naqoula Batal (nationality unknown), general 
director (1962/02/06). 
-Abdallah al-Habib (nationality unknown), board 
member (2013/04/08). 
-Imad Ibrahim Itani (Leb.), board member 
(2013/04/08), general director (2013/04/08). 
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-Gaby George Qassis (nationality unknown), 
responsible for signing in union [?] (2013/04/08), 
general director (2013/04/08). 
-Freddy Charles Baz (Leb.), board member 
(2013/04/08), general director (2013/04/08). 
-Mark Jean Audi (Leb.), general director 
(2013/04/08), responsible for signing in union [?] 
(2013/04/08), board member (2013/04/08). 
-Mario Joseph Saradar (Leb.), board member 
(2013/04/08). 
-Marwan Mukhtar Ghandour (Leb.), (Leb.), board 
member (2013/04/08). 
-Mariam Nasr al-Sabah (nationality unknown), 
board member (2013/04/08). 
-Yousef Asad Nasr (Leb.), board member 
(2013/04/08). 
Bank Audi Saradar for 
Private Services SAL 
(est. 1999/05/19) 
LL40 bln, amount 
of shares 40mln 
Fadi George 
Amaturi 
-Toufiq Rabih Awad (Leb.), shareholder (5 shares, 
2013/03/21), board member (2012/05/16). 
-Jad Nassib Chedid (Leb.), founder (1999/05/19). 
-Joe Marios Saradar (Leb.), founder (1999/05/19). 
-George Said al-Khoury Yusef Doumit (Leb.), 
shareholder (5 shares: 2013/03/21), board member 
(2012/05/16). 
-Joumana Raymond Hashem (Leb.), lawyer 
(2012/01/11). 
-Khalil Michel Bitar (Leb.), shareholder (5 shares: 
2012/03/21), board member (2012/05/16). 
-Stefan Istefan Naji (Leb.), board member 
(2012/05/16), shareholder (5 shares: 2012/03/21). 
-Salam George Nadh (Leb.), shareholder (5 
shares: 2013/03/21), board member (2012/05/16). 
-Fadi George Amaturi (Leb.), shareholder (5 
shares: 2013/03/21), responsible for signing 
(2012/06/11), chairman (2012/05/16). 
-Marios Joseph Saradar (Leb.), founder 
(1999/05/19). 
-Henriette Saradar (Leb.), founder (1999/05/19). 
-Wafa Suleiman Younes al-Dawuq (Leb.), 
shareholder (5 shares: 2013/03/21), board member 
(2012/05/16). 
-Yousef Antoun (Leb.), board member 
(2012/05/16), shareholder (5 shares: 2012/03/21). 
-Local legal entity: Bank Audi SAL “Group Audi-
Saradar” (Leb.), shareholder (39,999,960 shares: 
2012/03/21), board member (2012/05/16). 
-Foreign legal entity: Saman Ghalam and 
Associates (Leb.), responsible for audit 
(2010/07/28). 
-Foreign legal entity: Company Ernst and Young 
(Leb.), responsible for audit (2010/07/28). 
-Note: On 2003/08/12 noted report number 487 
submitted by lawyer Charbel Khairallah: Bank 
Saradar SAL represented by its chairman Marios 
Saradar issued by the Court of Appeal of Beirut. 
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Achrafieh 1289 SAL (est. 
2010/06/16) 
LL30mln 
(US$20,000), 
amount of shares 
3,000 
Fahed Rafiq Al-
Hariri 
-Ahmad Mukhtar Mohammed Al-Hariri 
(Leb.), shareholder (150 shares: 
2011/02/11). 
-Ayman Rafiq Al-Hariri (Leb.), shareholder 
(150 shares: 2011/02/11). 
-Joumana Musa Ismail Al-Sheikh (Leb.), 
shareholder (150 shares: 2011/02/11). 
-Rola Nazar Al-Tabash (Leb.), founder (0 
shares: 2010/06/16). 
-Rita Yousef Al-Jamil (Leb.), shareholder 
(150 shares: 2011/02/11). 
-Saadeddine Rafiq Al-Hariri (Leb.), 
shareholder (150 shares: 2011/02/11). 
-Fahed Rafiq Al-Hariri (Leb.), shareholder 
(1500 shares: 2011/02/11), founder 
(2010/06/16), chairman (2010/06/16), 
responsible for signing (2010/06/28). 
-Philippe Afif Shaiban Tabet (Leb.), board 
member (2010/06/16), founder 
(2010/06/16), shareholder (150 shares: 
2010/06/28). 
-Mohammed Yousef Alam (Leb.), lawyer (0 
shares: 2010/06/16). 
-Nazek Asad Al-Rizaq Audi (Leb.), [widow 
of Rafiq Hariri, director at BankMed] board 
member (2011/02/11), shareholder (600 
shares: 2011/02/11). 
-Foreign legal entity: Saidani and 
Associates for Accounting, responsible for 
audit (2010/02/12). 
Mar Mikhael-Rmeil Company 
(reg. 2009/21/02) 
LL30mln Fahed Rafiq al-
Hariri 
-IRAD Real Estate Development Company 
SAL-IRIADAT HOLDING (Leb.), 
shareholder (1,000 shares). 
-Saidani and Associates for Accounting, 
responsible for audit. 
-Fahed Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), chairman, 
shareholder (1940 shares), founder, 
responsible for signing. 
-Hind Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), shareholder (30 
shares), founder, board member. 
-Philippe Afif Shaiban Tabet (Leb.), 
shareholder (30 shares), founder, 
responsible for signing, board member. 
-Mohammed Yousef Alam (Leb.), lawyer. 
IRAD Real Estate 
Development Company SAL-
IRIADAT HOLDING (est. 
2003/18/11) 
LL1,885bln  -Ernst and Young (Leb.), responsible for 
audit. 
-Baha’eddine Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), 
chairman, shareholder (12,490 shares), 
responsible for signing. 
-Safi Olivier Nazih Kalo (Leb.), shareholder 
(5 shares), board member. 
-Jamil Jamil Biram (Leb.), shareholder (5 
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shares), responsible for signing, board 
member. 
-Abdelhafiz Mustafa Mansour (Leb.), 
founder. 
-Mohammed Walid Mohammed Atif al-
Taqib (Leb.), founder. 
-Hoda Sami Kriakus Saad (Leb.), founder, 
lawyer. 
-Joseph Mousa al-Helo (Leb.), responsible 
for signing. 
HAR Properties SAL (est. 
2009/03/12) 
LL150mln, amount 
of shares 15,000 
Fahed Rafiq al-
Hariri 
-Fahed Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), responsible 
for signing (2009/03/13), founder, 
shareholder (14100 shares, 2009/03/13), 
chairman. 
-Philippe Afif Shaiban Tabet (Leb.), 
responsible for signing (2009/03/13), board 
member (2011/06/08), shareholder (750 
shares: 2010/11/29). 
-Mohammed Yousef Alam (Leb.), lawyer. 
-Hind Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), shareholder 
(150 shares, 2009/03/13), founder, board 
member. 
-Local legal entity: Company 5 Real Estate 
[cannot find it anywhere!], Leb., founder 
(2009/03/13). 
-Foreign legal entity: Saidani and 
Associates for Accounting, responsible for 
audit (2010/08/12). 
Bank Med (reg. 1955/13/08) LL652bln Mohammed 
Ahmad Mukhtar 
al-Hariri 
-Group Med Holding (Leb.). shareholder 
(61,999,667 shares), board member. 
-Mohammed Ahmad Mukhtar al-Hariri 
(Leb.), chairman, shareholder (5 shares), 
responsible for signing 
-Maroun Michel al-Asmar (Leb.), 
shareholder (5 shares), board member. 
-Bassil Elias Yared (Leb.), shareholder 
(293 shares), founder, board member. 
-Nazek Asad Abdelraziq Audi (Leb.), 
shareholder (5 shares), board member. 
-Naameh Elias Sabbagh (Leb.), 
shareholder (5 shares). 
-Ghazi Ali Youssef (Leb.), shareholder (5 
shares), board member. 
-Rayya Mohammed Ali Hafar al-Hosn 
(Leb.), shareholder (5 shares), board 
member. 
-Rafiq Baha’eddine al-Hariri (Leb.), 
founder. 
-Raja Salim Saab (founder). 
-Arif Mohammed Mneimeh (Leb.), lawyer. 
-Mohammed Ali Mohammed  Asem 
Beyhum (Leb.), executive director. 
-Stanislas Jean Marie - De Hauss Boncza 
(nationality unknown), shareholder (5 
shares), board member. 
-Hani Ibrahim Suleiman Fedayel 
(nationality unknown), shareholder (5 
 278 
Company Share capital CEO Shareholders 
shares), board member. 
-Note: report issued against defendant. 
Group Med (reg. 1994/26/11) LL530bln Mohammed 
Ahmad Mukhtar 
al-Hariri 
-Deloitte and Touche (Leb.), responsible 
for audit. 
-Mohammed Ahmad Mukhtar al-Hariri 
(Leb.), chairman, shareholder (10 shares), 
responsible for signing 
-Bassil Elias Yared (Leb.), shareholder (16 
shares), founder, board member. 
-Saadeddine Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), 
shareholder (22,387,908 shares). 
-Ayman Rafiq al-Hariri (Leb.), shareholder 
(22,387,907 shares). 
-Nazek Asad Abdelraziq Audi (Leb.), 
shareholder (8,224,139 shares), board 
member. 
-Mohammed Ali Mohammed  Asem 
Beyhum (Leb.), shareholder (10 shares), 
board member. 
-Mustafa Hassan Razziane (Leb.), founder. 
-Yousef Salim Bek Taqla (Leb.), founder. 
-Arif Mohammed Mneimeh (Leb.), lawyer. 
Medinvestment Bank SAL 
(reg. 1996/15/01) 
LL85bln Mohammed 
Ahmad Mukhtar 
al-Hariri 
-Bank Med (Leb.), shareholder (8,499,924 
shares), board member. 
-Group Med Holding (Leb.), shareholder 
(13 shares), board member. 
-Ernst and Young (Leb.), responsible for 
audit. 
-Mohammed Ahmad Mukhtar al-Hariri 
(Leb.), chairman, shareholder (10 shares), 
responsible for signing 
-Bassil Elias Yared (Leb.), shareholder (13 
shares), founder, board member. 
-Maroun Michel al-Asmar (Leb.), 
shareholder (10 shares), board member. 
-Ghazi Ali Youssef (Leb.), shareholder (10 
shares), board member. 
-Rayya Mohammed Ali Hafar al-Hosn 
(Leb.), shareholder (10 shares), board 
member. 
-Mustafa Hassan Razziane (Leb.), founder. 
-Hani Othman al-Dna (Leb.), founder [a 
note for him on BankMed’s record]. 
-Fouad Abdel Basit al-Siniora (Leb.), 
responsible for signing). 
-Mohammed Ali Mohammed  Asem 
Beyhum (Leb.), responsible for signing, 
executive director. 
-Ricardos Hanna Rahme (Leb.), board 
member. 
-Arif Mohammed Mneimeh (Leb.), lawyer. 
-Hani Ibrahim Suleiman Fedayel 
(nationality unknown), shareholder (10 
shares), board member. 
 
